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DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DEMONSTRATED THAT THE STORM IN PROGRESS DOCTRINE APPLIED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (A PROPERTY OWNER WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR A SNOW AND ICE CONDITION UNTIL A REASONABLE TIME AFTER THE PRECIPITATION HAS STOPPED); THE BURDEN THEN SHIFTED TO PLAINTIFF TO SHOW DEFENDANT’S EFFORT TO REMOVE SNOW HOURS BEFORE THE FALL CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION; TO MEET THAT BURDEN AN EXPERT AFFIDAVIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN, BUT WAS NOT, SUBMITTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the property owner’s (Site A’s) motion for summary judgment in this ice and snow slip and fall case should have been granted. The evidence demonstrated it was still snowing at the time of plaintiff’s fall and plaintiff did not submit an expert affidavit demonstrating how defendant’s snow removal efforts exacerbated the condition:

Site A made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment based on the storm-in-progress doctrine, because the meteorological data, its expert meteorological affidavit, and plaintiff’s deposition testimony annexed to its moving papers establish that there was a storm in progress when the accident occurred … . …

Although the burden shifted to plaintiff to establish that Site A created the alleged condition or made it more hazardous by attempting to remove the precipitation from the driveway about five hours before he fell, plaintiff failed to meet that burden as he submitted no expert affidavit explaining how Site A, by not salting or sanding the area before the accident, could have created or exacerbated the naturally occurring ice condition … . Colon v Site A – Wash. Hgts., 2022 NY Slip Op 03173, First Dept 5-12-22

Practice Point: Here in this ice and snow slip and fall case, the defendant property owner presented prima facie proof that the storm-in-progress doctrine applied because it was snowing hours before plaintiff fell and was still snowing when plaintiff fell. The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to show that defendant’s snow removal efforts undertaken hours before the fall exacerbated the dangerous condition. Because plaintiff did not submit an expert affidavit on that issue, plaintiff’s burden of proof was not met.

 

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THE “ABANDONMENT” EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT; MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TERMINATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the petitioner did not prove mother had abandoned her children. Mother’s parental rights should not have been terminated:

… [T]he petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the mother evinced an intent to forego her parental rights. The record demonstrates that, during the six-month abandonment period, the mother visited with the children on two occasions, saw the children on at least one additional occasion at a family gathering, purchased clothing for the children, spoke with the case worker on the phone multiple times, and objected to the goal for the children’s placement changing to a kinship adoption rather than returning the children to the mother. Under these circumstances, the Family Court should have denied the petitions on the merits, insofar as asserted against the mother … . We further note that the record contains testimony from a case worker that, during family visits subsequent to the filing of the petitions, the mother’s interactions with the children were “very positive.” “While a parent’s conduct outside the abandonment period is not determinative in an abandonment proceeding, it may be relevant to assessing parental intent” … .  Matter of Grace E. W.-F. (Zanovia W.), 2022 NY Slip Op 03119, Second Dept 5-11-22

Practice Point: The petitioner did not present clear and convincing evidence that mother abandoned her children. The termination of parental rights petition should not have have been granted. Mother had visited the children, seen the children at a family gathering, purchased clothing for the children and frequently talked to the case worker.

 

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DEFENDANTS PRESENTED NO PROOF OF WHEN THE AREA OF THE SLIP AND FALL WAS LAST INSPECTED; THERFORE DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. The defendants did not submit proof of when the area was last inspected and therefore did not demonstrate they lacked constructive notice of the condition:

A defendant has constructive notice of a hazardous condition on property when the condition is visible and apparent, and has existed for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to discover and remedy it … . To meet its burden on the issue of constructive notice, a defendant is required to offer evidence as to when the accident site was last inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell … . Here, the defendants failed to demonstrate when they last inspected the walkway prior to the incident and they failed to establish, prima facie, that they did not have constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition … . The defendants also failed to establish, prima facie, that the cinder block was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous … . Ferrer v 120 Union Ave., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 03096, Second Dept 5-11-22

Practice Point: For years hundreds of cases were reversed because there was no evidence of when the area of a slip and fall was last inspected by a defendant and therefore defendant did not demonstrate a lack of constructive notice and was not entitled to summary judgment. Now there are just a few cases reversed for this reason in a given year. The bar has learned this lesson.

 

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DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE STAIRS ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL BECAUSE THEY OFFERED NO PROOF OF WHEN THE STAIRS WERE LAST INSPECTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this stairway slip and fall case should not have been granted. To warrant summary judgment on the issue of constructive notice, defendants must show when the stairway was last inspected, which they failed to do:

The defendants … failed to show … that they did not have constructive notice of the condition that the plaintiff alleged caused her to fall. “A defendant has constructive notice of a hazardous condition on property when the condition is visible and apparent, and has existed for a sufficient length of time to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to discover and remedy it” … . “To meet its initial burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice, the defendant must offer some evidence as to when the area in question was last . . . inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell” … . Here, the evidence submitted on the defendants’ motion failed to demonstrate when the subject staircase was last inspected relative to the plaintiff’s accident … . Weiss v Bay Club, 2022 NY Slip Op 03026, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: In a slip and fall case, to warrant summary judgment the defendant must show it did not have constructive notice of the dangerous condition by demonstrating that the area of the fall was inspected close in time to the incident.

 

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THE BANK’S AFFIDAVIT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT LAY A SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF BUSINESS RECORDS, INCLUDING PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the bank’s proof of compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304 was deficient because the foundation for the admission of business records was not laid:

… [T]he plaintiff submitted … an affidavit of an employee of its current mortgage loan servicer, along with copies of the 90-day notice, which was generated by the plaintiff’s prior loan servicer, along with alleged proof of mailing, which was also generated by the prior loan servicer. The affiant averred … that the current mortgage loan servicer is responsible for maintaining the books and records pertaining to the subject mortgage, “including, but not limited to, the account ledgers, and prior servicer’s records.” However, the affiant did not aver to her familiarity with the prior loan servicer’s business practices and procedures, or that the prior loan servicer’s records were incorporated into the current loan servicer’s records. Thus, the plaintiff’s moving affidavit failed to satisfy the admissibility requirements of CPLR 4518(a) … , and the prior loan servicer’s records, including the 90-day notice, were not admissible … . “Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that it complied with the notice provision of RPAPL 1304” … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Basta, 2022 NY Slip Op 02971, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: In a foreclosure action, at the summary judgment stage, even if business records demonstrating the bank’s compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304 are submitted, they are not admissible unless a proper foundation (CPLR 4518(a)) is laid in the accompanying affidavit.

 

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A PROSECUTION WITNESS’S WRITTEN STATEMENT DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR PAST RECOLLECTION RECORDED AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED; THE JUDGE’S USE OF THE PHRASE “POTENTIALLY AIDS” INSTEAD OF “INTENTIONALLY AIDS” IN THE ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY JURY INSTRUCTION PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT; ALTHOUGH THE JURY INSTRUCTION ERROR WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE ISSUE WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined: (1) a written statement by a prosecution witness should not have been admitted as “past recollection recorded;” and (2) the jury instruction on accomplice liability prejudiced defendant. The jury-instruction error was not preserved but was considered in the interest of justice:

“The foundational requirements for the admissibility of a past recollection recorded are: (1) the witness must have observed the matter recorded; (2) the recollection must have been fairly fresh at the time when it was recorded; (3) the witness must currently be able to testify that the record is a correct representation of his or her knowledge and recollection at the time it was made; and (4) the witness must lack sufficient present recollection of the information recorded”  … . ,,,

… [T]he prosecution witness in question did not testify that his written statement accurately represented his knowledge and recollection when made. To the contrary, the witness testified that the statement was not accurate when given because he was under the influence of narcotics at that time … . Moreover, because the statement was made more than six months after the alleged events recorded therein, the recollection was not “fairly fresh” when recorded … . …

Penal Law § 20.00 provides that a “person is criminally liable for [the conduct of another] when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct” ,,, . … [W]e conclude that the court’s use of the phrase “potentially aids” rather than “intentionally aids” significantly prejudiced defendant, who was alleged to have aided and abetted the principal by driving him to and from the crime scene…. . People v Gardner, 2022 NY Slip Op 02911, Fourth Dept 4-29-22

Practice Point: Here the written statement did not meet the criteria for admissibility as past recollection recorded. The witness testified the statement was not accurate when given because he was high and the statement was not “fresh” because it was made six months after the events described in it.

 

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DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF ASSAULT THIRD BASED UPON HIS LOSING CONTROL OF THE CAR AND CRASHING, INJURING A PASSENGER; THE “CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE” ELEMENT OF ASSAULT THIRD WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE; CONVICTION REVERSED UNDER A “WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE” ANALYSIS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and dismissing the indictment, determined the criminal-negligence element of assault third was not proven. Defendant was driving with a passenger when he crossed into the oncoming lane, pulled back into his lane, lost control and crashed, injuring the passenger:

In cases involving criminal negligence arising out of automobile accidents involving excess rates of speed, such as here, “it takes some additional affirmative act by the defendant to transform ‘speeding’ into ‘dangerous speeding’ ” … . With respect to the issue of defendant’s rate of speed, the trial testimony from the prosecution’s expert witness that defendant was driving at the excessive speed of approximately 92 miles per hour at the time of the incident was speculative … . The expert’s calculation of the vehicle’s speed was based on the assumption of “100 percent braking,” but there was no evidence that defendant braked at all before his vehicle collided with the mailbox, tree and utility pole and came to a stop. Moreover, the People’s version of the events, that defendant deliberately attempted to “flatten out the curve” by crossing the double line of the curve, does not rise to the level of moral blameworthiness to constitute criminal negligence … . People v Palombi, 2022 NY Slip Op 02896, Fourth Dept 4-29-22

Practice Point: In the context of an assault third charge alleging a car accident was the result of defendant’s “criminal negligence,” proof of speeding, as opposed to proof of “dangerous speeding,” will not support a conviction. This case is a good example of “legally sufficient evidence” resulting in a conviction which is determined on appeal to be “against the weight of the evidence.” The expert evidence presented to show the speed at which defendant was driving was speculative and based upon an unproved assumption. That evidence was deemed too weak to support a conviction, thereby rendering the conviction “against the weight of the evidence.”

 

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THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THAT, IF IT WAS ERROR TO ADMIT TESTIMONY THAT THE RAPE VICTIM WAS AWARE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN INCARCERATED, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE EVIDENCE HAD NO PROBATIVE VALUE BECAUSE THE VICTIM’S STATE OF MIND WAS NOT IN ISSUE AND ITS INTRODUCTION WAS THERFORE HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined that, if it was error to admit testimony that the rape victim was aware defendant had been incarcerated, the error was harmless. The dissenters argued that the victim’s state of mind, i.e., awareness of defendant’s prior incarceration, was irrelevant because the victim was immediately overpowered and pushed to the floor upon opening the door for the defendant:

From the dissent:

The evidence … had no probative value under the circumstances of this case and should have been excluded as prejudicial … . People v Hartsfield, 2022 NY Slip Op 02908, Fourth Dept 4-29-22

Practice Point: The two dissenters argued that evidence the rape victim was aware defendant had been incarcerated should not have been admitted because it was  irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The evidence was irrelevant because the victim’s state of mind was not in issue.

 

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THE MAJORITY HELD THE DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS INSIDE THE STOPPED VEHICLE RAISED A REASONABLE SUSPICION DEFENDANT WAS ARMED, JUSTIFYING A PAT DOWN SEARCH; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE EQUIVOCAL AND INNOCUOUS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined the police officer’s observations of defendant inside the stopped vehicle were sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion the defendant was armed, which justified the pat down search. The dissent argued that the proof presented at the suppression hearing did not meet the “reasonable suspicion” standard.

Although the dissent suggests otherwise, the fact that the officer’s view of defendant was obscured to some extent when defendant was partially concealed inside the vehicle and was observed surreptitiously reaching toward his waistband constitutes a “circumstance that supports a reasonable suspicion that [defendant was] armed or pose[d] a threat to [officer] safety” … .

From the dissent:

“Reasonable suspicion ‘may not rest on equivocal or “innocuous behavior” that is susceptible of an innocent as well as a culpable interpretation’ ” … . Inasmuch as defendant’s nervousness and movements were susceptible of an innocent interpretation, particularly in light of his status as the vehicle’s only black occupant, and inasmuch as defendant was, according to the officer’s testimony, “fully compliant” with the officers’ instruction to exit the vehicle, I agree with defendant that his conduct while in the vehicle was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion necessary for law enforcement to conduct a pat frisk of his person … . People v Ginty, 2022 NY Slip Op 02899, Fourth Dept 4-29-22

Practice Point: Although only the dissent felt this analysis applied here, a person’s “equivocal” or “innocuous” behavior, like nervousness or shaking, does not support a “reasonable suspicion” that a person is armed.

 

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THE PETITIONER SEEKING TO MODIFY A CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT MUST MAKE A THRESHOLD SHOWING THAT THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE LAST CUSTODY ORDER WAS ISSUED; HERE, FATHER’S WANTING MORE PARENTING TIME TO DEVELOP A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WAS NOT A CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined father did not meet his burden of showing changed circumstances warranting an increase in parenting time. Father’s simply wanting more parenting time is not a changed circumstance:

Family Court found that a change in circumstances existed — namely, that the father wanted to have a closer relationship with the child and the amount of parenting time provided in the January 2019 order was insufficient to develop that relationship. Even crediting the father’s testimony, the father’s mere dissatisfaction with the amount of parenting time provided in the January 2019 order and the desire for more time do not constitute a change in circumstances … .. Furthermore, the record fails to show any “new developments or changes that have occurred since the [January 2019] order was entered” … . Accordingly, because the father did not satisfy his threshold burden of establishing a change in circumstances, the modification petition should have been dismissed … . Matter of Joshua KK. v Jaime LL., 2022 NY Slip Op 02847, Third Dept 4-28-22

Practice Point: A party seeking a modification of a custody order must make a threshold showing of changed circumstances. Here father’s wanting more parenting time to develop a closer relationship was not a changed circumstance. Therefore father’s petition should have been dismissed.

 

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