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THE BANK’S PROOF OF DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT, MAILING OF THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT, AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MORTGAGE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank’s proof of defendant’s default and mailing of the notice of default was insufficient in this foreclosure action:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, as it failed to submit evidence demonstrating the defendant’s default and that it complied with the notice of default provisions in the mortgage. In support of its motion, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit of Sonja Manderville, who averred that, in her position as a contract management coordinator of … the plaintiff’s loan servicer, she has access to and is familiar with the business records related to the mortgage loan at issue. She averred that the records “were made at or near the time of the Transactions documented thereby by a person with knowledge of the Transactions . . . and are maintained in the regular and usual course of business.” However, Manderville failed to aver to familiarity with the record-keeping practices and procedures of the entity that generated the records or establish that the records provided by the maker were incorporated into the recipient’s own records and routinely relied upon by the recipient in its own business … .

… Manderville failed to identify the records upon which she relied, and the plaintiff failed to submit copies of the records themselves. …

… Manderville’s assertions regarding the purported mailing of the notice of default were insufficient to establish a mailing … .Manderville failed to allege familiarity with the mailing practices and procedures of the third party that allegedly sent the notice of default in 2009 … . Since the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of the actual mailing, or “proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed, sworn to by someone with personal knowledge of the procedure,” the plaintiff failed to establish that the notice of default was sent in accordance with the terms of the mortgage … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. Ams. v Banu, 2022 NY Slip Op 03231, Second Dept 5-18-22

Practice Point: In this foreclosure action, the affidavit submitted by the bank to demonstrate defendant’s default and the mailing of the notice of default was deficient and the relevant business records were not submitted. These “foundational-affidavit” problems and the failure to submit the records referenced in the foundational affidavit have required reversal on appeal in literally hundreds cases over the last five or more years.

 

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THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE “SEPARATE ENVELOPE” RULE AND THEREFORE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304; THE BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank in this foreclosure action failed to demonstrate the 90-day notice required by RPAPL 1304 was sent to the defendant in a separate envelope:

RPAPL 1304(2) also provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he notices required by this section shall be sent by the lender, assignee or mortgage loan servicer in a separate envelope from any other mailing or notice.”

The plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it sent 90-day notices to the defendant “in a separate envelope from any other mailing or notice” … . Since the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant and dismissing his answer with affirmative defenses and for an order of reference, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Bonal, 2022 NY Slip Op 03230, Second Dept 5-18-22

Practice Point: To warrant summary judgment in a foreclosure action, the bank must demonstrate that the RPAPL 1304 notice was sent to each borrower in a separate envelope which includes no other materials.

 

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THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE INTEREST CALCULATION WAS DONE USING THE METHOD REQUIRED BY THE NOTE AND THE RELEVANT BUSINESS RECORDS WERE NOT SUBMITTED; THE REFEREE’S REPORT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the referee’s report in this foreclosure action should not have been confirmed. There was no evidence the interest calculation was done in the manner required by the note and the relevant business records were not submitted:

… Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff’s motion to confirm the referee’s report and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the interest on the loan was calculated using the method set forth in the note, and the referee’s computations, including the amount due and owing and payments for taxes, insurance, and other advances, were premised upon unproduced business records … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Singh, 2022 NY Slip Op 03221, Second Dept 5-18-22

Practice Point: In a foreclosure action, the interest must be calculated using the method required by the note, and any relevant business records must be produced in order to warrant confirmation of the referee’s report.

 

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DESPITE THE APPARENT FAILURE TO PRESERVE A VIDEO OF A MEETING DURING WHICH PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY PLANNED A DEMONSTRATION AT THE PRISON, THE DETERMINATION FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF PLANNING THE DEMONSTRATION WAS CONFIRMED; THE DISSENT ARGUED PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS BY THE FAILURE TO TURN OVER THE VIDEO, WHICH HAD BEEN REVIEWED BY THE OFFICER WHO PREPARED THE MISBEHAVIOR REPORT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department confirmed the determination finding petitioner-inmate guilty of urging others to participate in a demonstration at the prison. There was a video of the meeting where the demonstration was allegedly planned. An officer who witnessed the meeting and testified about it apparently viewed the video. Petitioner made timely requests for the video, but it was never provided. The dissent argued the failure to retain and provide the video of the alleged meeting required that the determination be annulled:

From the dissent:

The sergeant and the correction officer have described two distinctly different meetings, one involving 12 people, the other 30 to 40 … . This discrepancy heightens the relevance of the … video, as does the fact that the sergeant viewed the video and the Hearing Officer was uncertain whether that viewing occurred before or after the undefined retention period expired. Complicating matters, the Hearing Officer noted the three-week delay between the … meeting and issuance and service of the misbehavior report on petitioner.

… In a situation such as this, where there is an extended delay in issuing a misbehavior report and the author of that report has in fact reviewed a video, it is incumbent upon the correctional facility to preserve that evidence … . The failure to do so here compromised petitioner’s due process right to a fair evidentiary hearing … . That is particularly so in view of the sergeant’s affirmative testimony as to what ostensibly happened in the E-yard on May 29, 2020. It is further evident that the Hearing Officer should have, but failed to, inquire further as to the existence of the video or the circumstances of its deletion … Matter of Headley v Annucci, 2022 NY Slip Op 03166, Third Dept 5-12-22

Practice Point: Inmates subjected to disciplinary actions by prison authorities have due process rights. Here the dissent argued that the failure to preserve and provide a video of the meeting at which petitioner-inmate allegedly planned a prison demonstration deprived him of his due process rights. The dissenter would have annulled the determination on that ground.

 

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DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DEMONSTRATED THAT THE STORM IN PROGRESS DOCTRINE APPLIED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (A PROPERTY OWNER WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR A SNOW AND ICE CONDITION UNTIL A REASONABLE TIME AFTER THE PRECIPITATION HAS STOPPED); THE BURDEN THEN SHIFTED TO PLAINTIFF TO SHOW DEFENDANT’S EFFORT TO REMOVE SNOW HOURS BEFORE THE FALL CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION; TO MEET THAT BURDEN AN EXPERT AFFIDAVIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN, BUT WAS NOT, SUBMITTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the property owner’s (Site A’s) motion for summary judgment in this ice and snow slip and fall case should have been granted. The evidence demonstrated it was still snowing at the time of plaintiff’s fall and plaintiff did not submit an expert affidavit demonstrating how defendant’s snow removal efforts exacerbated the condition:

Site A made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment based on the storm-in-progress doctrine, because the meteorological data, its expert meteorological affidavit, and plaintiff’s deposition testimony annexed to its moving papers establish that there was a storm in progress when the accident occurred … . …

Although the burden shifted to plaintiff to establish that Site A created the alleged condition or made it more hazardous by attempting to remove the precipitation from the driveway about five hours before he fell, plaintiff failed to meet that burden as he submitted no expert affidavit explaining how Site A, by not salting or sanding the area before the accident, could have created or exacerbated the naturally occurring ice condition … . Colon v Site A – Wash. Hgts., 2022 NY Slip Op 03173, First Dept 5-12-22

Practice Point: Here in this ice and snow slip and fall case, the defendant property owner presented prima facie proof that the storm-in-progress doctrine applied because it was snowing hours before plaintiff fell and was still snowing when plaintiff fell. The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to show that defendant’s snow removal efforts undertaken hours before the fall exacerbated the dangerous condition. Because plaintiff did not submit an expert affidavit on that issue, plaintiff’s burden of proof was not met.

 

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THE “ABANDONMENT” EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT; MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TERMINATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the petitioner did not prove mother had abandoned her children. Mother’s parental rights should not have been terminated:

… [T]he petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the mother evinced an intent to forego her parental rights. The record demonstrates that, during the six-month abandonment period, the mother visited with the children on two occasions, saw the children on at least one additional occasion at a family gathering, purchased clothing for the children, spoke with the case worker on the phone multiple times, and objected to the goal for the children’s placement changing to a kinship adoption rather than returning the children to the mother. Under these circumstances, the Family Court should have denied the petitions on the merits, insofar as asserted against the mother … . We further note that the record contains testimony from a case worker that, during family visits subsequent to the filing of the petitions, the mother’s interactions with the children were “very positive.” “While a parent’s conduct outside the abandonment period is not determinative in an abandonment proceeding, it may be relevant to assessing parental intent” … .  Matter of Grace E. W.-F. (Zanovia W.), 2022 NY Slip Op 03119, Second Dept 5-11-22

Practice Point: The petitioner did not present clear and convincing evidence that mother abandoned her children. The termination of parental rights petition should not have have been granted. Mother had visited the children, seen the children at a family gathering, purchased clothing for the children and frequently talked to the case worker.

 

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DEFENDANTS PRESENTED NO PROOF OF WHEN THE AREA OF THE SLIP AND FALL WAS LAST INSPECTED; THERFORE DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. The defendants did not submit proof of when the area was last inspected and therefore did not demonstrate they lacked constructive notice of the condition:

A defendant has constructive notice of a hazardous condition on property when the condition is visible and apparent, and has existed for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to discover and remedy it … . To meet its burden on the issue of constructive notice, a defendant is required to offer evidence as to when the accident site was last inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell … . Here, the defendants failed to demonstrate when they last inspected the walkway prior to the incident and they failed to establish, prima facie, that they did not have constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition … . The defendants also failed to establish, prima facie, that the cinder block was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous … . Ferrer v 120 Union Ave., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 03096, Second Dept 5-11-22

Practice Point: For years hundreds of cases were reversed because there was no evidence of when the area of a slip and fall was last inspected by a defendant and therefore defendant did not demonstrate a lack of constructive notice and was not entitled to summary judgment. Now there are just a few cases reversed for this reason in a given year. The bar has learned this lesson.

 

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DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE STAIRS ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL BECAUSE THEY OFFERED NO PROOF OF WHEN THE STAIRS WERE LAST INSPECTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this stairway slip and fall case should not have been granted. To warrant summary judgment on the issue of constructive notice, defendants must show when the stairway was last inspected, which they failed to do:

The defendants … failed to show … that they did not have constructive notice of the condition that the plaintiff alleged caused her to fall. “A defendant has constructive notice of a hazardous condition on property when the condition is visible and apparent, and has existed for a sufficient length of time to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to discover and remedy it” … . “To meet its initial burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice, the defendant must offer some evidence as to when the area in question was last . . . inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell” … . Here, the evidence submitted on the defendants’ motion failed to demonstrate when the subject staircase was last inspected relative to the plaintiff’s accident … . Weiss v Bay Club, 2022 NY Slip Op 03026, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: In a slip and fall case, to warrant summary judgment the defendant must show it did not have constructive notice of the dangerous condition by demonstrating that the area of the fall was inspected close in time to the incident.

 

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THE BANK’S AFFIDAVIT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT LAY A SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF BUSINESS RECORDS, INCLUDING PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the bank’s proof of compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304 was deficient because the foundation for the admission of business records was not laid:

… [T]he plaintiff submitted … an affidavit of an employee of its current mortgage loan servicer, along with copies of the 90-day notice, which was generated by the plaintiff’s prior loan servicer, along with alleged proof of mailing, which was also generated by the prior loan servicer. The affiant averred … that the current mortgage loan servicer is responsible for maintaining the books and records pertaining to the subject mortgage, “including, but not limited to, the account ledgers, and prior servicer’s records.” However, the affiant did not aver to her familiarity with the prior loan servicer’s business practices and procedures, or that the prior loan servicer’s records were incorporated into the current loan servicer’s records. Thus, the plaintiff’s moving affidavit failed to satisfy the admissibility requirements of CPLR 4518(a) … , and the prior loan servicer’s records, including the 90-day notice, were not admissible … . “Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that it complied with the notice provision of RPAPL 1304” … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Basta, 2022 NY Slip Op 02971, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: In a foreclosure action, at the summary judgment stage, even if business records demonstrating the bank’s compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304 are submitted, they are not admissible unless a proper foundation (CPLR 4518(a)) is laid in the accompanying affidavit.

 

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A PROSECUTION WITNESS’S WRITTEN STATEMENT DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR PAST RECOLLECTION RECORDED AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED; THE JUDGE’S USE OF THE PHRASE “POTENTIALLY AIDS” INSTEAD OF “INTENTIONALLY AIDS” IN THE ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY JURY INSTRUCTION PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT; ALTHOUGH THE JURY INSTRUCTION ERROR WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE ISSUE WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined: (1) a written statement by a prosecution witness should not have been admitted as “past recollection recorded;” and (2) the jury instruction on accomplice liability prejudiced defendant. The jury-instruction error was not preserved but was considered in the interest of justice:

“The foundational requirements for the admissibility of a past recollection recorded are: (1) the witness must have observed the matter recorded; (2) the recollection must have been fairly fresh at the time when it was recorded; (3) the witness must currently be able to testify that the record is a correct representation of his or her knowledge and recollection at the time it was made; and (4) the witness must lack sufficient present recollection of the information recorded”  … . ,,,

… [T]he prosecution witness in question did not testify that his written statement accurately represented his knowledge and recollection when made. To the contrary, the witness testified that the statement was not accurate when given because he was under the influence of narcotics at that time … . Moreover, because the statement was made more than six months after the alleged events recorded therein, the recollection was not “fairly fresh” when recorded … . …

Penal Law § 20.00 provides that a “person is criminally liable for [the conduct of another] when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct” ,,, . … [W]e conclude that the court’s use of the phrase “potentially aids” rather than “intentionally aids” significantly prejudiced defendant, who was alleged to have aided and abetted the principal by driving him to and from the crime scene…. . People v Gardner, 2022 NY Slip Op 02911, Fourth Dept 4-29-22

Practice Point: Here the written statement did not meet the criteria for admissibility as past recollection recorded. The witness testified the statement was not accurate when given because he was high and the statement was not “fresh” because it was made six months after the events described in it.

 

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