You are here: / Employment Law
,

Supreme Court’s Denial of Application for Stationary Engineer License Based on Applicant’s Criminal Record Reversed

The First Department, in this and several other similar rulings, reversed Supreme Court’s denial of petitioner’s application for a stationary engineer license determining that petitioner’s criminal record bore no relationship to the duties of a stationary engineer:

The determination to deny petitioner’s renewal application for a stationary engineer license was in violation of lawful procedure and lacked a rational basis. Respondents arbitrarily concluded that petitioner’s prior federal conviction for conspiracy bore a direct relationship to the duties and responsibilities attendant to a stationary engineer, the license for which he sought renewal after having his license renewed several times (see Correction Law § 750[3]; 752[2];…. Petitioner’s prior conviction resulted from the misuse of his administrative powers in his former position, which granted him control over hiring, payroll, and selection of vendors. Such actions bear no direct relationship to the equipment maintenance duties and responsibilities inherent in the stationary engineer license, and thus do not satisfy the first exception to the general prohibition of discrimination against persons previously convicted of criminal offenses (see Correction Law § 752[1]).  Matter of Donovan v LiMandri, 2013 NY Slip Op 04737, 1st Dept 6-25-13

 

, ,

Teacher Wrongly Denied Hearing Allowed by Education Law

The Fourth Department annulled a determination which suspended a tenured teacher for 30 days without pay finding she was wrongly denied a hearing:

[Under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA)] petitioner was entitled to choose whether to be disciplined under the procedures set forth in the CBA or those set forth in section [Education Law] 3020-a, which allowed petitioner to elect a hearing (see § 3020-a [c]). Respondents, however, incorrectly denied petitioner’s written request for a section 3020-a hearing. We therefore reverse the judgment, grant the petition, annul the determination, and we direct respondents to reinstate petitioner with back pay and benefits retroactive to the date of her suspension, and to remove all references to the discipline imposed from petitioner’s personnel file… .  Matter of Kilduff v Rochester City School District, 518, 4th Dept, 6-14-13

 

,

Collective Bargaining Agreement Did Not Allow Private Suit Against Employer

After a member of the Faculty Association (FA) decided not to continue with a college employee’s grievance, the employee sued the college directly.  In affirming the dismissal of the employee’s private suit (because the suit was not allowed by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA)), the Third Department wrote:

“As a general proposition, when an employer and a union enter into a collective bargaining agreement that creates a grievance procedure, an employee subject to the agreement may not sue the employer directly for breach of that agreement but must proceed, through the union, in accordance with the contract”….  Exceptions include where the collective bargaining agreement grants an employee a right to sue directly or where the union fails in its duty of fair representation … .  Plaintiff acknowledges that he is not alleging that FA breached its duty of representation.  He contends, however, that, under the CBA, decisions related to promotions are excepted  from the grievance procedure and, thus, he can pursue an action directly against defendants. The ultimate decision about a promotion is not subject to a grievance under the CBA. Nonetheless, the lengthy procedures an associate professor must follow over several years to become eligible for consideration of a promotion to full professor are set forth in the CBA and are not explicitly excepted  from  the grievance process. It is the purported failure by defendants to follow these promotion procedures that plaintiff challenges, and the CBA does not carve out a separate right regarding these procedures that can be enforced by an  employee directly against defendants … .  Altman v Rossi, 515888, 3rd Dept, 6-13-13

 

National Labor Relations Board Had First Crack at Collective Bargaining Agreement Matter Under Preemption Doctrine

The Fourth Department determined the National Labor Relations Board, under the doctrine of federal preemption of state law, had first crack at determining whether it had jurisdiction over a collective bargaining matter, as opposed to the NYS Public Employment Relations Board (PERB):

We agree with petitioners, however, that Supreme Court erred in determining that PERB properly exercised jurisdiction over those matters.    Inasmuch as the two collective bargaining matters “arguably” fall within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)…, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has primary jurisdiction “to determine in the first instance” whether its jurisdiction preempts PERB’s jurisdiction …..  Under the circumstances of this case, and in the interest of judicial economy, we hold the case pending a determination of the NLRB whether the NLRA applies to the collective bargaining matters herein at issue and thus preempts PERB’s jurisdiction… . Buffalo United Charter School, et al v NYS Public Employment Relations Board, et al, 515, 4th Dept, 6-7-13

 

, , ,

Qualified Privilege in Defamation Action Against School District Explained

In the course of a lengthy decision dealing with many issues raised by a defamation/stigma-plus proceeding brought by a school district employee against a school district, the Third Department explained qualified privilege in this context. The plaintiff was a coach whose boyfriend [Broxmeyer] had raped a student at another school.  Plaintiff alleged that defendant Arbes, principal of the high school, “stated at a meeting with several staff members that plaintiff should avoid private one-on-one  conversations with students and should take a leave of absence ‘for the safety of the students.’ “.  The Third Department wrote:

Qualified privilege provides a  complete defense to a claim of slander, and attaches to an otherwise defamatory statement “made to persons who have some common interest in the subject matter” … .  A privileged communication is one which, but for the occasion on which it is uttered, would be defamatory and actionable'”….The  defense does  not apply, however,  “where the motivation for making such statements was spite or ill will (common-law malice) or where the ‘statements [were] made with [a] high degree of awareness of their probable falsity’ … .Arbes made the statement at issue at a meeting where she, plaintiff and three other individuals were present. Plaintiff acknowledges that Keeler, the junior varsity field hockey coach and union president, had a common interest in the subject, as did a union employee who was present.  The third individual may have had the same interest because Keeler averred that the individual was a union representative. Additionally, she was a guidance counselor, and Arbes averred that guidance counselors were being made available to students who may have had difficulty dealing with the situation surrounding  Broxmeyer’s arrest, the police investigation and plaintiff’s suspension and later termination.  As all of the persons present for the meeting had a common interest in the subject matter and the record lacks any evidence of malice, Supreme Court correctly determined that Arbes’ statement at the meeting was not actionable based on the qualified privilege.  Wilcox v Newark Valley Central School District, 515906, 3rd Dept, 6-6-13

 

, , ,

Notice of Claim (Pursuant to Court of Claims Act) Not Specific Enough

The Third Department upheld the Court of Claims’ dismissal of a claim because the notice of claim was not specific enough.  In describing the statutory criteria, the Third Department wrote:

Pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), a claim must set forth the nature of the claim, the time when and place where it arose, the damages or injuries and  the total sum  claimed. “Because suits against [defendant] are allowed only by [defendant’s] waiver of sovereign immunity and  in derogation of the common law, statutory requirements conditioning suit must be strictly construed”….   Although “absolute exactness” is not required…, the claim must “‘provide a  sufficiently detailed  description  of  the  particulars of the claim to enable [defendant] to investigate and promptly ascertain the existence and  extent of its liability'” … .  Morra v State of New York, 515751, 3rd Dept, 6-6-13

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, EMPLOYEE

,

Defendant Did Not Demonstrate Plaintiff was Special Employee​

The Second Department determined the defendant did not demonstrate plaintiff was its special employee and therefore plaintiff was not restricted to Workers’ Compensation as his remedy:

In determining whether a special employment relationship exists, a court should consider factors such as the right to control the employee’s work, the method of payment, the furnishing of equipment, and the right to discharge…. “A significant and weighty factor . . . is who controls and directs the manner, details and ultimate result of the employee’s work'”….

Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the defendant failed to come forward with sufficient evidence of a special employment relationship to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, since its submissions on the motion did not establish, inter alia, that it controlled and directed the manner, details, and ultimate result of the plaintiff’s work… . Nolan v Irwin Contr, Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 03648, 2nd Dept, 5-22-13

 

, , ,

Teachers’ and School Administrators’ Grievances Re Staff Cuts Stemming from School Closings Deemed Arbitrable​

The First Department determined the teachers’ and school administrators’ unions’ grievances concerning staff cuts inherent in the Department of Education’s (DOE’s) plan to close 24 underperforming schools were arbitrable, rejecting the DOE’s argument.  The arbitrator ruled the plan violated the collective bargaining agreement’s (CBA’s) requirements that staff cuts be done on the basis of seniority:

While broadly referencing educational laws and regulations, the DOE fails to identify any law that “prohibit[s], in an absolute sense, [the] particular matters [to be] decided”… [“[i]t is only when the interest in maintaining adequate standards is attached to a well-defined law that public policy is implicated”]). The underlying grievance in no way impinges on the authority of the SED (State Education Department] to approve a plan for the closure or the reopening of the 24 underperforming schools as new schools under the Education law (Education Law § 2590-h). Nor can the DOE rely on its own inclusion of proposed staffing changes in its plan to close schools to support its argument that staffing issues are now a state policy, law or regulation having the effect of law, which removes them from the dispute resolution regimen provided in the CBAs. Matter of Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of NY v Mulgrew, 2013 NY Slip Op 03580, 1st Dept, 5-16-13

 

, ,

Ratified Release Precluded Employment Discrimination Action

The First Department reversed Supreme Court and granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs employment discrimination, retaliation and hostile work environment claims.  Plaintiffs signed a release and received severance pay based upon the terms of the release.  The First Department determined plaintiffs’ claims that the signed the release under duress were foreclosed by their ratification of the release (accepting the severance pay):

The motion court should have dismissed the complaint in its entirety. “Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release” …. A release will not be treated lightly because it is a “a jural act of high significance without which the settlement of disputes would be rendered all but impossible” …. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the release is binding on the parties unless it is shown that it was procured by fraud, duress, overreaching, illegality or mutual mistake … . *  *  *

Assuming arguendo that issues of fact exist as to duress and overreaching, plaintiffs are nevertheless barred from challenging the releases on those grounds because they ratified the releases. Ratification occurs when a party accepts the benefits of a contract and fails to act promptly to repudiate it…. Thus, a plaintiff cannot claim that he or she was compelled to execute an agreement under duress while simultaneously accepting the benefits of the agreement …  Allen v Riese Org, Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 03547, 1st Dept, 5-16-13

 

, ,

Elements of Retaliatory Termination Described

The Second Department explained the elements of retaliatory termination as follows:

Pursuant to Executive Law § 296, it is unlawful to retaliate against an employee because he or she opposed statutorily forbidden discriminatory practices …. To make a prima facie showing of retaliation under Executive Law § 296, a claimant is required to show that (1) the claimant was engaged in protected activity, (2) the claimant’s employer was aware that he or she participated in such activity, (3) the claimant suffered an adverse employment action based upon his or her activity, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action …. Once this initial showing is made, the burden then shifts to the defendant to present legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons to support its actions. Assuming the defendant meets this burden, the claimant would then have the obligation to show that the reasons put forth were merely a pretext … .  Adeniran v State of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 03441, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy