Employment Law – Page 53 – New York Appellate Digest

ALLEGATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS FIRED BECAUSE OF EMPLOYER’S WIFE’S UNFOUNDED JEALOUSY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant-employers’ motion to dismiss the NYC and NYS Human Rights Law (NYCHRL, NYSHRL) gender discrimination causes of action should not have been granted. The employers were husband (Nicolai) and wife (Adams). The complaint alleged plaintiff-employee had nothing but a professional relationship with Nicolai. Adams allegedly sent an email to plaintiff telling her to stay away from her husband and family. Nicolai then allegedly sent an email to plaintiff telling her she was fired. The complaint further alleged defendants filed a complaint with the police falsely stating plaintiff had threatened them. Supreme Court allowed the defamation cause of action to stand, but dismissed the gender discrimination causes of action:

It is well established that adverse employment actions motivated by sexual attraction are gender-based and, therefore, constitute unlawful gender discrimination … . Here, while plaintiff does not allege that she was ever subjected to sexual harassment at [the workplace]. she alleges facts from which it can be inferred that Nicolai was motivated to discharge her by his desire to appease his wife’s unjustified jealousy, and that Adams was motivated to discharge plaintiff by that same jealousy. Thus, each defendant’s motivation to terminate plaintiff’s employment was sexual in nature.

Defendants’ reliance on certain cases in the “spousal jealousy” context is misplaced. … [A]ssuming the truth of the allegations of the amended complaint, as we are required to do upon a motion to dismiss, plaintiff had always behaved appropriately in interacting with Nicolai, and was fired for no reason other than Adams’s belief that Nicolai was sexually attracted to plaintiff. This states a cause of action for gender discrimination under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL … . Edwards v Nicolai, 2017 NY Slip Op 06235, First Dept 8-22-17

EMPLOYMENT LAW (HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, ALLEGATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS FIRED BECAUSE OF EMPLOYER’S WIFE’S UNFOUNDED JEALOUSY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT))/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (GENDER DISCRIMINATION, ALLEGATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS FIRED BECAUSE OF EMPLOYER’S WIFE’S UNFOUNDED JEALOUSY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT))/GENDER DISCRIMINATION ( ALLEGATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS FIRED BECAUSE OF EMPLOYER’S WIFE’S UNFOUNDED JEALOUSY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT))/SEX DISCRIMINATION (HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, ALLEGATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS FIRED BECAUSE OF EMPLOYER’S WIFE’S UNFOUNDED JEALOUSY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT)

August 22, 2017

Arbitration, Employment Law, Municipal Law

UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that the city’s petition to permanently stay arbitration was properly dismissed. The court described the criteria for determining whether a matter is arbitrable pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The court further held that whether the underlying grievance was timely brought must be determined by the arbitrator because the CBA was silent on the issue. The city firefighters (Local 628) sought arbitration of whether medical treatment for line of duty injuries (General Municipal Law 207-a) was being unduly delayed or denied:

“In analyzing whether the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute, a court is merely to determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA'” … . Here, the relevant arbitration provisions of the CBA are broad, as they provide for arbitration of any grievance “involving the interpretation or application of any provision of this Agreement,” which remains unresolved following completion of step two of the grievance procedure. Moreover, there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute, which involves the processing of General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits to firefighters injured in the line of duty, and Appendix C of the CBA which sets forth the procedures regulating “the application for, and the award of, benefits under section 207-a of the General Municipal Law” … .

The City’s contention that arbitration was precluded because Local 628’s grievance was not timely pursuant to step one of the grievance procedure is without merit. The “threshold determination of whether a condition precedent to arbitration exists and whether it has been complied with, is for the court to determine” … . By contrast, “[q]uestions concerning compliance with a contractual step-by-step grievance process have been recognized as matters of procedural arbitrability to be resolved by the arbitrators, particularly in the absence of a very narrow arbitration clause or a provision expressly making compliance with the time limitations a condition precedent to arbitration” … . Matter of City of Yonkers v Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 2017 NY Slip Op 06073, Second Dept 8-9-17

ARBITRATION (UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (ARBITRATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (ARBITRATION, UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (ARBITRATION, (UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))

August 9, 2017

Employment Law, Negligence

EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW BASED ON A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING HIS OWN VEHICLE TO WORK AND WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that plaintiff motorcyclist was not entitled to summary judgment in this rear-end collision case. Although defendant did move into the plaintiff’s lane ahead of plaintiff in violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, conflicting deposition testimony about whether plaintiff was comparatively negligent (i.e., whether plaintiff had time to react) raised a question of fact. Defendant’s employer was entitled to summary judgment because defendant was driving to work in his own vehicle, and was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident:

A driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that other drivers will obey the traffic laws requiring them to yield … . However, a driver with the right-of-way also has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid a collision … , and “[t]here can be more than one proximate cause of an accident” … . As a result, even where there is evidence that another driver involved in the accident was negligent as a matter of law due to a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, a plaintiff moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing freedom from comparative fault … . …

The doctrine of respondeat superior renders a master vicariously liable for a tort committed by his [or her] servant within the scope of employment'” … . ” An act is considered to be within the scope of employment if it is performed while the employee is engaged generally in the business of his [or her] employer, or if his [or her] act may be reasonably said to be necessary or incidental to such employment'”… . Generally, “[a]n employee driving to and from work is not acting within the scope of his employment because the element of control is lacking” … .

[Defendant’s] deposition testimony demonstrated that, at the time of the accident, he was commuting to work from his home in his personal vehicle, he was not required to drive to work as part of his job, and he was not acting in furtherance of his employer’s business at the time …. . Beres v Terranera, 2017 NY Slip Op 05929, Second Dept 8-2-17

NEGLIGENCE (EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW BASED ON A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING HIS OWN VEHICLE TO WORK AND WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW BASED ON A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING HIS OWN VEHICLE TO WORK AND WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/REAR-END COLLISIONS (EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW BASED ON A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING HIS OWN VEHICLE TO WORK AND WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (NEGLIGENCE, VICARIOUS LIABILITY, DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING HIS OWN VEHICLE TO WORK AND WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))

August 2, 2017

Employment Law, Municipal Law

MUNICIPAL RESOLUTION DID NOT CREATE A VESTED CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR RETIRED TOWN EMPLOYEES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined a 1983 municipal resolution health insurance for non-union town employees did not create a vested contractual right for continued benefits. Therefore the 2012 reduction of the town’s contributions to the retirees health insurance was valid, although the contributions could not be reduced below the levels mandated by the Civil Service Law:

“A municipal resolution is, in general, a unilateral action that is temporary in nature and, thus, does not create any vested contractual rights” … . Nothing in the language of the October 13, 1983, resolution indicates that the Town intended to create a contractual or vested right … . Moreover, the appellants failed to submit any evidence, beyond the resolution, of a right to retirement health insurance benefits … .

Additionally, the Supreme Court properly found that the Town was not barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel from reducing the appellants’ retirement health insurance benefits … . To establish promissory estoppel, a party must prove a clear and unambiguous promise, reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, and an injury sustained in reliance on that promise … . Here, even assuming the appellants proved a clear and unambiguous promise, they failed to establish reliance thereon … .

However, the Supreme Court erred in determining that the Town was not required to contribute any amount for the retirement health insurance benefits of former Board members who retired prior to July 1, 2012. Civil Service Law § 167(2) provides, in relevant part, that participating employers, such as the Town, are required to contribute 50% of the cost of premiums for retired employees, and 35% of the cost of coverage for their dependents. … [T]he Town may not reduce its contribution rates below the legally mandated minimums … . Matter of Weaver v Town of N. Castle, 2017 NY Slip Op 05960, Second Dept 8-2-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (HEALTH INSURANCE, MUNICIPAL RESOLUTION DID NOT CREATE A VESTED CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR RETIRED TOWN EMPLOYEES (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, HEALTH INSURANCE, MUNICIPAL RESOLUTION DID NOT CREATE A VESTED CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR RETIRED TOWN EMPLOYEES (SECOND DEPT))/HEALTH INSURANCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW, MUNICIPAL RESOLUTION DID NOT CREATE A VESTED CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR RETIRED TOWN EMPLOYEES (SECOND DEPT))

August 2, 2017

Contract Law, Employment Law

AN AGREEMENT TO PAY COMMISSIONS CAN BE PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR AND THEREFORE IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 3RD DEPT.

The Third Department noted that an agreement to pay commissions is an agreement that can be performed in one year, so an oral agreement to pay commissions is not subject to the statute of frauds:

“An agreement to pay an at-will employee commissions earned during the period of his or her employment is capable of performance within one year and does not violate the [s]tatute of [f]rauds” … . Here, the gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is not about renewal commissions that accrued after his resignation from WorldClaim … . Rather, plaintiff seeks the payment of commissions that he claims were earned while he was still employed by WorldClaim … . Indeed, the complaint alleged that plaintiff, “[d]uring the period from approximately April 2011 to January 2012, . . . earned $104,525 in commissions from sales, [and] $25,000 in monthly bonuses.” Given that plaintiff was still employed by WorldClaim during this alleged time period, the statute of frauds does not bar plaintiff’s claim for unpaid commissions … . Kieper v The Fusco Group Partners Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 05782, 3rd Dept 7-20-17

EMPLOYMENT LAW (STATUTE OF FRAUDS, COMMISSIONS, AN AGREEMENT TO PAY COMMISSIONS CAN BE PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR AND THEREFORE IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 3RD DEPT)/CONTRACT LAW (EMPLOYMENT LAW, COMMISSIONS, STATUTE OF FRAUDS, AN AGREEMENT TO PAY COMMISSIONS CAN BE PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR AND THEREFORE IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 3RD DEPT)/STATUTE OF FRAUDS (EMPLOYMENT LAW, COMMISSIONS, AN AGREEMENT TO PAY COMMISSIONS CAN BE PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR AND THEREFORE IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 3RD DEPT)

July 20, 2017

Arbitration, Civil Procedure, Employment Law, Insurance Law

A CLAUSE IN AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT PURPORTING TO WAIVE THE RIGHT TO BRING A CLASS ACTION SUIT AND SUBMIT COLLECTIVE CLAIMS TO ARBITRATION VIOLATED THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND IS UNENFORCEABLE 1ST DEPT.

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moskowitz, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined an arbitration provision in plaintiff insurance agent’s employment contract was unenforceable with respect to collective actions, here a class action concerning wage and hour claims:

… [W]e conclude … that arbitration provisions such as the one in [plaintiff’s] contract, which prohibit class, collective, or representative claims, violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and thus, that those provisions are unenforceable.

In reaching this conclusion, we agree with the reasoning in Lewis v Epic Sys. Corp. (823 F3d 1147 [7th Cir 2016], cert granted __ US __, 137 S Ct 809 [2017]), the recent case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which addressed the enforceability of arbitration agreements prohibiting collective actions. In Lewis, the plaintiff employee agreed to an arbitration agreement mandating that wage and hour claims could be brought only through]individual arbitration and requiring employees to waive “the right to participate in or receive money or any other relief from any class, collective, or representative proceeding” … . The arbitration agreement also included a clause stating that if the waiver were unenforceable, “any claim brought on a class, collective, or representative action basis must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction” … .

… The plaintiff [in Lewis] argued that the arbitration clause violated the NLRA because it interfered with employees’ right to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection, and was therefore unenforceable … .

The Seventh Circuit denied the employer’s motion to proceed under the arbitration clause, declining to enforce a clause that precluded employees from “seeking any class, collective, or representative remedies to wage-and-hour disputes” because the clause “violate[d] Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA” (id. at 1161). According to the Court, section 7 of the NLRA provided that employees have the right to engage in concerted activities, and concerted activities “have long been held to include resort to . . . judicial forums” (id. at 1152) [internal quotation marks omitted]. The Seventh Circuit also found that a lawsuit filed “by a group of employees to achieve more favorable terms or conditions of employment” is considered to constitute “concerted activity” under section 7 of the NLRA (id.) [internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court held, contracts such as the one at issue were unenforceable under the NLRA because they “stipulate away employees’ [s]ection 7 rights or otherwise require actions unlawful under the NRLA” (id. at 1155). Gold v New York Life Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 05695, 1st Dept 7-18-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CLASS ACTIONS, EMPLOYMENT LAW, A CLAUSE IN AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT PURPORTING TO WAIVE THE RIGHT TO BRING A CLASS ACTION SUIT AND SUBMIT COLLECTIVE CLAIMS TO ARBITRATION VIOLATED THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND IS UNENFORCEABLE 1ST DEPT)/CLASS ACTIONS (EMPLOYMENT LAW, A CLAUSE IN AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT PURPORTING TO WAIVE THE RIGHT TO BRING A CLASS ACTION SUIT AND SUBMIT COLLECTIVE CLAIMS TO ARBITRATION VIOLATED THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND IS UNENFORCEABLE 1ST DEPT)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (CLASS ACTIONS, ARBITRATION, A CLAUSE IN AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT PURPORTING TO WAIVE THE RIGHT TO BRING A CLASS ACTION SUIT AND SUBMIT COLLECTIVE CLAIMS TO ARBITRATION VIOLATED THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND IS UNENFORCEABLE 1ST DEPT)/ARBITRATION (EMPLOYMENT LAW, CLASS ACTIONS, A CLAUSE IN AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT PURPORTING TO WAIVE THE RIGHT TO BRING A CLASS ACTION SUIT AND SUBMIT COLLECTIVE CLAIMS TO ARBITRATION VIOLATED THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND IS UNENFORCEABLE 1ST DEPT)/CONTRACT LAW (EMPLOYMENT LAW, ARBITRATION, A CLAUSE IN AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT PURPORTING TO WAIVE THE RIGHT TO BRING A CLASS ACTION SUIT AND SUBMIT COLLECTIVE CLAIMS TO ARBITRATION VIOLATED THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND IS UNENFORCEABLE 1ST DEPT)/INSURANCE LAW (EMPLOYMENT LAW, ARBITRATION, A CLAUSE IN AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT PURPORTING TO WAIVE THE RIGHT TO BRING A CLASS ACTION SUIT AND SUBMIT COLLECTIVE CLAIMS TO ARBITRATION VIOLATED THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND IS UNENFORCEABLE 1ST DEPT)

July 18, 2017

Defamation, Employment Law, Immunity, Municipal Law

QUESTIONS OF FACT RAISED WHETHER DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS WERE MOTIVATED SOLELY BY MALICE, THEREBY OVERCOMING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AND WERE MADE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, THEREBY RENDERING THE EMPLOYER VICARIOUSLY LIABLE.

The Fourth Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined the defamation causes of action properly survived summary judgment with respect to the speaker (Cramer) and the defamation causes of action against Cramer’s employers (the village and fire department), based upon vicarious liability, should not have been dismissed. Cramer had made statements to her employer that plaintiff was a child molester and she had tapes to prove it. There was evidence the statements were motivated solely by malice (and therefore not protected by qualified immunity) and were made within the scope of Cramer’s employment:

We conclude that defendants met their initial burden of establishing that any alleged statements are protected by a qualified privilege inasmuch as they were made between members of the organization in connection with plaintiff’s application for membership, and thus “the burden shifted to plaintiff[] to raise a triable issue of fact whether the statements were motivated solely by malice’ ” … . “If [Cramer’s] statements were made to further the interest protected by the privilege, it matters not that [she] also despised plaintiff. Thus, a triable issue is raised only if a jury could reasonably conclude that malice was the one and only cause for the publication’ ” … . Plaintiff provided the deposition testimony of the assistant fire chief, who testified that Cramer told him to “go tell [plaintiff] for me that if he continues with this application I’m going to pull out tapes that I have that shows he’s a child molester and that it’s going to ruin his life.” Plaintiff also provided the deposition testimony of a woman who was at the Fire Department … and heard Cramer call plaintiff a “child molester”; that same witness heard Cramer call plaintiff a pedophile in 2011. A Fire Department employee testified in his deposition that he heard Cramer say to her husband that she had proof that plaintiff was a “child molester.” In light of that evidence, we therefore conclude that plaintiff raised an issue of fact whether Cramer’s statements were motivated solely by malice and thus are not protected by a qualified privilege.

“An employer may be held vicariously liable for an allegedly slanderous statement made by an employee only if the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time that the statement was made”… . We further conclude that defendants failed to establish their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law that Cramer was not acting within the scope of her employment when she allegedly made the statements to the assistant fire chief and/or at the meeting … . Stevenson v Cramer, 2017 NY Slip Op 05353, 4th Dept 6-30-17

June 30, 2017

Civil Procedure, Employment Law

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL POST-JUDGMENT DISCOVERY TO DETERMINE DAMAGES SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER HAD BEEN STRUCK FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A DISCOVERY ORDER AND A DEFAULT JUDGMENT HAD BEEN GRANTED.

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff’s motion seeking discovery to determine damages after defendants’ answer had been struck should have been granted. Plaintiff alleged defendants had breached “noncompete” provisions of an employment agreement. Defendant (Morrow) did not show up for a deposition and defendants did not provide discovery. Supreme Court granted plaintiff’s motion to strike the answer and enter judgment for plaintiff, but denied plaintiff’s motion for post-judgment discovery:

We agree with plaintiff that it is entitled to discovery in order to establish its damages … . A “defendant’s obligation to afford [a] plaintiff the opportunity to pursue discovery [is not] terminated when the answer [is] stricken,” inasmuch as a plaintiff should not be “handicapped in the proof of its damages by [a] defendant’s prior defiance of orders, notices, or subpoenas calling for his production of records or the taking of a deposition” … . Thus, a “plaintiff, if it chooses to do so, may press its right to discovery in advance of the inquest, whether for direct use as evidence in proving its damages or for the procurement of information that may lead to such evidence” … . Here, plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling Morrow’s compliance with the discovery demands insofar as those demands are “material and necessary” to establish plaintiff’s damages (CPLR 3101 [a]). We therefore reverse the order insofar as appealed from and grant that part of the motion seeking an order to compel discovery from Morrow with respect to damages only. ICM Controls Corp. v Morrow, 2017 NY Slip Op 05355, 4th Dept 6-30-17

June 30, 2017

Employment Law, Human Rights Law

THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SUPERVISORS’ FAILURE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION ON COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION BY THE COMPANY PRESIDENT CONSTITUTED AIDING AND ABETTING DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the sexual discrimination and retaliation causes of action against supervisors, to whom plaintiffs complained about the alleged sexual harassment by the president of the company, should not have been dismissed. It was alleged the supervisors failed to take appropriate action on the complaints and thereby aided and abetted the discrimination and (re: one supervisor) the retaliation causes of action:

An employee who did not participate in the primary violation itself, but who aided and abetted that conduct, may be individually liable based on those actions under both the NYSHRL [New York State Human Rights Law] and the NYCHRL [New York City Human Rights Law] … . The NYSHRL and the NYCHRL each provide that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden [thereunder], or to attempt to do so” … . Where a defendant provided, or attempted to provide, assistance to the individual or individuals participating in the primary violation, he or she may be found liable for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct … .

“[T]he law is clear that a supervisor need not make derogatory comments or unwelcome sexual advances to subject himself or herself to liability under the [NYSHRL]. Rather, . . . a supervisor’s failure to take adequate remedial measures can rise to the level of actual participation’ under [the NYSHRL]” … . Indeed, a failure to conduct a proper and thorough investigation or to take remedial measures upon a plaintiff’s complaint of discriminatory conduct is sufficient to impose liability on an aiding and abetting theory … . * * *

… [The]submissions demonstrated that triable issues of fact exist as to whether [defendant supervisor] had the “power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others”… and, thus, may be held individually liable for the alleged retaliation. Ananiadis v Mediterranean Gyros Prods., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 05058, 1st Dept 6-21-17

EMPLOYMENT LAW (HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SUPERVISORS’ FAILURE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION ON COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION BY THE COMPANY PRESIDENT CONSTITUTED AIDING AND ABETTING DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION)/SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION (EMPLOYMENT LAW, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SUPERVISORS’ FAILURE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION ON COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION BY THE COMPANY PRESIDENT CONSTITUTED AIDING AND ABETTING DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION)/RETALIATION (EMPLOYMENT LAW, SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SUPERVISORS’ FAILURE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION ON COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION BY THE COMPANY PRESIDENT CONSTITUTED AIDING AND ABETTING DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION)/AIDING AND ABETTING (SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION, EMPLOYMENT LAW, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SUPERVISORS’ FAILURE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION ON COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION BY THE COMPANY PRESIDENT CONSTITUTED AIDING AND ABETTING DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION)/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (EMPLOYMENT LAW, SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION, RETALIATION, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SUPERVISORS’ FAILURE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION ON COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION BY THE COMPANY PRESIDENT CONSTITUTED AIDING AND ABETTING DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION)

June 21, 2017

Education-School Law, Employment Law

SCHOOL DISTRICT’S UNILATERALLY CONTRACTING WITH AN OUTSIDE AGENCY FOR A PREKINDERGARTEN PROGRAM WAS NOT AN IMPROPER PRACTICE UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW (TAYLOR LAW).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Devine, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the respondent school district’s unilaterally contracting with an outside party for a prekindergarten program, without first negotiating with the teachers’ union, did not constitute an improper practice:

Respondent Lawrence Union Free School District (hereinafter the District) implemented a universal prekindergarten program pursuant to Education Law § 3602-e. Program tasks were first performed by employees working in a collective bargaining unit exclusively represented by petitioner [teachers’ union] but, in 2012, the District unilaterally contracted with an outside eligible agency to staff and operate it. Petitioner filed an improper practice charge with respondent Public Employment Relations Board (hereinafter PERB) alleging a violation of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (… the Taylor Law… ), namely, that the District did not negotiate in good faith about outsourcing the work … . * * *

The Legislature … created a “comprehensive package for a school district’s decision to” fashion a prekindergarten program plan and “withdr[e]w that decision from the mandatory bargaining process,” crafting a mechanism for public consultations that included affected collective bargaining units and left little time for traditional collective bargaining… . A school district was empowered by Education Law § 3602-e (5) (d) to contract without interference in implementing a plan crafted after that process … .

… “[T]here is no absolute bar to collective bargaining over” the outsourcing of prekindergarten work to an outside agency… and, as we have held, an agreement reached after collective bargaining on the subject is enforceable… . Inasmuch as the clear language of Education Law § 3602-e compels the conclusion that negotiation is not required to begin with, however, PERB was right to determine that the absence of negotiation did not constitute an improper practice under the Taylor Law. This does not preclude petitioner from seeking impact negotiations in the future. Matter of Lawrence Teachers’ Assn., NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO v New York State Pub. Relations Bd., 2017 NY Slip Op 04944, 3rd Dept 6-15-17

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (TAYLOR LAW, SCHOOL DISTRICT’S UNILATERALLY CONTRACTING WITH AN OUTSIDE AGENCY FOR A PREKINDERGARTEN PROGRAM WAS NOT AN IMPROPER PRACTICE UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW (TAYLOR LAW))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (TEACHERS’ UNION, TAYLOR LAW, SCHOOL DISTRICT’S UNILATERALLY CONTRACTING WITH AN OUTSIDE AGENCY FOR A PREKINDERGARTEN PROGRAM WAS NOT AN IMPROPER PRACTICE UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW (TAYLOR LAW))/COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, PREKINDERGARTEN PROGRAM, SCHOOL DISTRICT’S UNILATERALLY CONTRACTING WITH AN OUTSIDE AGENCY FOR A PREKINDERGARTEN PROGRAM WAS NOT AN IMPROPER PRACTICE UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW (TAYLOR LAW))/PREKINDERGARTEN PROGRAM (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, TAYLOR LAW, TEACHERS’ UNION, SCHOOL DISTRICT’S UNILATERALLY CONTRACTING WITH AN OUTSIDE AGENCY FOR A PREKINDERGARTEN PROGRAM WAS NOT AN IMPROPER PRACTICE UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW (TAYLOR LAW))/TAYLOR LAW (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, PREKINDERGARTEN PROGRAM, TEACHERS’ UNION, SCHOOL DISTRICT’S UNILATERALLY CONTRACTING WITH AN OUTSIDE AGENCY FOR A PREKINDERGARTEN PROGRAM WAS NOT AN IMPROPER PRACTICE UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW (TAYLOR LAW))/IMPROPER PRACTICE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, TEACHERS’ UNION, PREKINDERGARTEN PROGRAM, SCHOOL DISTRICT’S UNILATERALLY CONTRACTING WITH AN OUTSIDE AGENCY FOR A PREKINDERGARTEN PROGRAM WAS NOT AN IMPROPER PRACTICE UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW (TAYLOR LAW))

June 15, 2017