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DEFENDANT BICYCLIST WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WHEN HE STRUCK AND KILLED PLAINTIFF, EMPLOYER NOT VICARIOUSLY OR DIRECTLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant-bicyclist’s (Cook’s) employer (AGI) was not vicariously liable for the bicyclist’s actions. Cook was riding his own bicycle on his own time when he struck and killed plaintiff. Cook worked as a bicycling coach for AGI. The court also found that the negligent hiring and retention cause of action was properly dismissed:

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The motion court correctly determined that AGI could not be held vicariously liable for Cook’s alleged negligence, as Cook was acting outside the scope of his employment. At the time of the accident, Cook was engaged in a weekend bicycle ride, in a public park, using a bicycle that he purchased and equipped, was alone and was not coaching anyone, and was not acting in furtherance of any duties owed to AGI … .

Cook’s unsupported belief, as set forth in an affirmative defense, that his bicycle riding had a work component to it, and his unsworn Response to the Notice to Admit (see CPLR 3123[a]), which improperly sought admissions as to employment status, a contested issue central to the action … , do not create triable issues of fact as to whether Cook was acting in the scope of employment … . …[T]here is no indication that AGI was exercising any control over Cook at the time of the accident … .

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The motion court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s direct negligence claim against AGI. There is no evidence that AGI knew or should have known of Cook’s alleged propensity to dangerously ride his bicycle in Central Park, an element necessary to support the claim for negligent hiring and retention … , and plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of deficient training are insufficient to defeat summary judgment … . Fein v Cook, 2017 NY Slip Op 06603, First Dept 9-26-17

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NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT BICYCLIST WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WHEN HE STRUCK AND KILLED PLAINTIFF, EMPLOYER NOT VICARIOUSLY OR DIRECTLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (VICARIOUS LIABILITY, DEFENDANT BICYCLIST WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WHEN HE STRUCK AND KILLED PLAINTIFF, EMPLOYER NOT VICARIOUSLY OR DIRECTLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF’S AGE DISCRIMINATION AND BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in an extensive opinion by Justice Friedman, determined plaintiff’s age discrimination and breach of contract causes of action should be dismissed. Plaintiff’s position at a medical school was eliminated as part of a phasing out of her department and her age was not demonstrated to be a factor in the decision-making process. In addition, the breach of contract cause of action was based on a provision in the faculty handbook which did not apply to plaintiff:

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In this action for age discrimination in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) … and for breach of contract, plaintiff, a former member of the radiology department of defendant medical school and hospital, challenges defendant’s decision not to renew her employment at the expiration of the term of her last appointment. Although Supreme Court assumed (as do we) that plaintiff carried her “de minimis” burden of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination … , the court correctly determined that plaintiff, in response to defendant’s evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action, failed to present any evidence raising a triable issue as to whether bias against employees of her age played a role in that decision … .

… [D]efendant established that the non-specialized section of the radiology department in which plaintiff worked, which produced no research, was phased out as part of a restructuring of the department, at a time of financial constraint, to achieve greater focus on the specialized, research-producing sections of the department. Defendant further established that, as part of this restructuring, it retained three physicians from plaintiff’s section, each of whom was of approximately the same age as plaintiff (60), and reassigned them to specialized departments. Plaintiff, however, was reasonably deemed to lack the specialized expertise and the proclivity for research that defendant deemed necessary to maintain its status as a top-tier academic radiology department. Not only did plaintiff fail to present any evidence casting doubt on this explanation, she failed to present any evidence, either direct or circumstantial, suggesting that bias against employees of her age was even a partial motive for the ending of her employment. Hamburg v New York Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 2017 NY Slip Op 06635, First Dept 9-26-17

 

EMPLOYMENT LAW (PLAINTIFF’S AGE DISCRIMINATION AND BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (PLAINTIFF’S AGE DISCRIMINATION AND BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/AGE DISCRIMINATION (PLAINTIFF’S AGE DISCRIMINATION AND BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))

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EMAILS DID NOT EXPLICITLY WAIVE THE INITIAL AGREEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WOULD NOT BE BOUND UNTIL A FORMAL AGREEMENT WAS EXECUTED, NO CONTRACT WAS CREATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the complaint in this employment contract action was properly dismissed. The term sheet relied upon by plaintiff included a clause indicating neither party would be bound until a more formal agreement was executed. Subsequent emails including the phrase “firm and binding” did not waive the formal agreement required by the term sheet:

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Plaintiff’s allegations that his agent requested that any offer be “firm and binding,” that defendant’s agent acknowledged this request, that internal communications between defendant and its agents reveal an intention to make a firm offer, that the cover email transmitting the term sheet labeled the offer “firm and binding,” and that defendant later offered a fee to “kill” the contract are not sufficient to negate or demonstrate a waiver of the provision that the parties would not be bound until they executed a formal written agreement … .Morever, waiver of a contractual provision “should not be lightly presumed,” “must be unmistakably manifested, and is not to be inferred from a doubtful or equivocal act” … . Plaintiff’s agent’s demand for a firm offer and defendant’s agent’s acknowledgment of this request, before consulting with her client, prove nothing about what was ultimately agreed. Nor do defendant and its agents’ internal communications preceding the offer, to which plaintiff was not privy, prove what was ultimately agreed. Keitel v E*TRADE Fin. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 06624, First Dept 9-26-17

CONTRACT LAW (EMAILS DID NOT EXPLICITLY WAIVE THE INITIAL AGREEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WOULD NOT BE BOUND UNTIL A FORMAL AGREEMENT WAS EXECUTED, NO CONTRACT WAS CREATED (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (CONTRACT LAW, EMAILS DID NOT EXPLICITLY WAIVE THE INITIAL AGREEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WOULD NOT BE BOUND UNTIL A FORMAL AGREEMENT WAS EXECUTED, NO CONTRACT WAS CREATED (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF HOME HEALTH CARE WORKERS PROPERLY CERTIFIED TO BRING CLASS ACTION SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE PAY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the plaintiff home health care workers were properly certified to bring a class action suit alleging inadequate pay in violation of the minimum wage requirements of the Labor Law. The plaintiffs worked at clients’ residences in 24-hour shifts. They were paid an hourly rate for the 12 daytime hours of their 24-hour shifts and a flat rate for the 12 nighttime hours. The plaintiffs argue they were entitled to the minimum wage for each hour of their 24-hour shifts:

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The plaintiffs were required to be at the clients’ residences and were also required to perform services there if called upon to do so. To interpret that regulation to mean that the plaintiffs were not, during those nighttime hours, “required to be available for work” simply because it turned out that they were not called upon to perform services is contrary to the plain meaning of “available” … . …[T]o the extent that the members of the proposed class were not “residential” employees who “live[d] on the premises of the employer,” they were entitled to be paid the minimum wage for all 24 hours of their shifts, regardless of whether they were afforded opportunities for sleep and meals … . …

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… [T]he plaintiffs established the existence of the five prerequisites to class certification … , and none of the factors listed in CPLR 902 warranted a denial of the motion … . Andryeyeva v New York Health Care, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 06421, Second Dept 9-13-17

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Similar issues and result in Moreno v Future Care Health Servs., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 06439, Second Dept 9-13-17

 

EMPLOYMENT LAW (PLAINTIFF HOME HEALTH CARE WORKERS PROPERLY CERTIFIED TO BRING CLASS ACTION SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE PAY (SECOND DEPT))/LABOR LAW (PLAINTIFF HOME HEALTH CARE WORKERS PROPERLY CERTIFIED TO BRING CLASS ACTION SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE PAY (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLAINTIFF HOME HEALTH CARE WORKERS PROPERLY CERTIFIED TO BRING CLASS ACTION SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE PAY (SECOND DEPT))/CLASS ACTIONS (PLAINTIFF HOME HEALTH CARE WORKERS PROPERLY CERTIFIED TO BRING CLASS ACTION SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE PAY (SECOND DEPT))/HOME HEALTH CARE WORKERS (EMPLOYMENT LAW, PLAINTIFF HOME HEALTH CARE WORKERS PROPERLY CERTIFIED TO BRING CLASS ACTION SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE PAY (SECOND DEPT))/MINIMUM WAGE (PLAINTIFF HOME HEALTH CARE WORKERS PROPERLY CERTIFIED TO BRING CLASS ACTION SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE PAY (SECOND DEPT))

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FOR CAUSE FORFEITURE TERM OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION AGREEMENT NOT ELIMINATED BY A SUBSEQUENT FORM EXTENDING THE DUE DATE OF THE DEFERRED COMPENSATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant-employees’ motions for summary judgment were properly denied. Defendants were subject to deferred compensation agreements (DCA’s) which called for the “for cause” forfeiture of the deferred compensation. Here it was alleged the defendants violated a non-solicitation, non-competition clause and therefore forfeited the deferred compensation. The defendants argued a subsequent document, an “election form” which extended the date on which the deferred compensation was due and payable, and which did not include a “for cause” forfeiture provision, should control. The courts disagreed:

… [T]he Election Forms, by their express language, provide that any deferral of payment of deferred compensation is to be made “in accordance with the terms of the Deferred Compensation Agreement . . . .” The DCAs, as noted, clearly provide in paragraph 4 that deferred compensation is forfeited if the employee is terminated for cause, including violation of non-solicitation or noncompetition covenants. There is no mention in the Election Forms of any intent to override this provision.

Additionally, paragraph 5 of the DCAs specifically provides that their terms “may not be altered, modified, or amended except by written instrument signed by the parties hereto.” At a minimum, it is commercially reasonable to view the Election Forms, on their face, to be informal human resources administrative forms. In any case, they are not “written instrument[s] signed by the parties [to the DCAs],” as they lack any signature of plaintiffs, as required by paragraph 5 in order to amend the DCAs. Perella Weinberg Partners LLC v Kramer,2017 NY Slip Op 06341, First Dept 8-29-17

CONTRACT LAW (FOR CAUSE FORFEITURE TERM OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION AGREEMENT NOT ELIMINATED BY A SUBSEQUENT FORM EXTENDING THE DUE DATE OF THE DEFERRED COMPENSATION (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (CONTRACT LAW, FOR CAUSE FORFEITURE TERM OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION AGREEMENT NOT ELIMINATED BY A SUBSEQUENT FORM EXTENDING THE DUE DATE OF THE DEFERRED COMPENSATION (FIRST DEPT))/DEFERRED COMPENSATION AGREEMENT (FOR CAUSE FORFEITURE TERM OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION AGREEMENT NOT ELIMINATED BY A SUBSEQUENT FORM EXTENDING THE DUE DATE OF THE DEFERRED COMPENSATION (FIRST DEPT))

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SEX AND DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT PROPERLY AMENDED UNDER THE RELATION BACK STATUTE WITH OTHERWISE UNTIMELY CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined the relation-back statute (CPLR 203 (f)) allowed the amendment of a sex-and-disability-discrimination complaint to allege otherwise untimely employment discrimination causes of action based upon plaintiff’s sexual orientation. The original sex-and-disability-discrimination complaint did not mention plaintiff was a lesbian and had suffered discrimination because of her sexual orientation. The First Department held that the wording of the relation-back statute, which refers to “transactions” or “occurrences,” not “claims,” allowed the amendment in the absence of prejudice:

All of plaintiff’s claims are based on the same occurrences — namely the underlying employment actions taken against her – and the original complaint put defendants on notice of those occurrences. To be sure, plaintiff’s original complaint did not allege the specific facts that she is a lesbian, that defendants were aware of her sexual orientation, that defendants discriminated against her on that basis, or that another lesbian colleague was demoted for supporting her internal dispute … . Nevertheless, the motion court correctly determined that the new claims are based on “the same subject matter alleged in the original complaint.” Defendants need not have been put on notice of every factual allegation on which the subsequent claims depend, because the original complaint put them on notice of the occurrences that underlie those claims … .

Viewing “transactions [or] occurrences” through this broad lens for the purposes of relation back under CPLR 203(f) is especially important in the context of anti-discrimination actions – particularly those actions brought under the City HRL [Human Rights Law] – in which it is frequently difficult for plaintiffs to articulate their employers’ motivations for treating them less well than other employees … . O’Halloran v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 06237, First Dept 8-22-17

 

EMPLOYMENT LAW (HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, SEX AND DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT PROPERLY AMENDED UNDER THE RELATION BACK STATUTE WITH OTHERWISE UNTIMELY CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT))/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (GENDER AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION, SEX AND DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT PROPERLY AMENDED UNDER THE RELATION BACK STATUTE WITH OTHERWISE UNTIMELY CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT))/GENDER DISCRIMINATION  (HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, SEX AND DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT PROPERLY AMENDED UNDER THE RELATION BACK STATUTE WITH OTHERWISE UNTIMELY CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT))/SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION (HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, SEX AND DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT PROPERLY AMENDED UNDER THE RELATION BACK STATUTE WITH OTHERWISE UNTIMELY CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT))/SEX DISCRIMINATION (HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, SEX AND DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT PROPERLY AMENDED UNDER THE RELATION BACK STATUTE WITH OTHERWISE UNTIMELY CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT))

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ALLEGATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS FIRED BECAUSE OF EMPLOYER’S WIFE’S UNFOUNDED JEALOUSY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant-employers’ motion to dismiss the NYC and NYS Human Rights Law (NYCHRL, NYSHRL) gender discrimination causes of action should not have been granted. The employers were husband (Nicolai) and wife (Adams). The complaint alleged plaintiff-employee had nothing but a professional relationship with Nicolai. Adams allegedly sent an email to plaintiff telling her to stay away from her husband and family. Nicolai then allegedly sent an email to plaintiff telling her she was fired. The complaint further alleged defendants filed a complaint with the police falsely stating plaintiff had threatened them. Supreme Court allowed the defamation cause of action to stand, but dismissed the gender discrimination causes of action:

It is well established that adverse employment actions motivated by sexual attraction are gender-based and, therefore, constitute unlawful gender discrimination … . Here, while plaintiff does not allege that she was ever subjected to sexual harassment at [the workplace]. she alleges facts from which it can be inferred that Nicolai was motivated to discharge her by his desire to appease his wife’s unjustified jealousy, and that Adams was motivated to discharge plaintiff by that same jealousy. Thus, each defendant’s motivation to terminate plaintiff’s employment was sexual in nature.

Defendants’ reliance on certain cases in the “spousal jealousy” context is misplaced. … [A]ssuming the truth of the allegations of the amended complaint, as we are required to do upon a motion to dismiss, plaintiff had always behaved appropriately in interacting with Nicolai, and was fired for no reason other than Adams’s belief that Nicolai was sexually attracted to plaintiff. This states a cause of action for gender discrimination under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL … . Edwards v Nicolai, 2017 NY Slip Op 06235, First Dept 8-22-17

 

EMPLOYMENT LAW (HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, ALLEGATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS FIRED BECAUSE OF EMPLOYER’S WIFE’S UNFOUNDED JEALOUSY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT))/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (GENDER DISCRIMINATION,  ALLEGATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS FIRED BECAUSE OF EMPLOYER’S WIFE’S UNFOUNDED JEALOUSY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT))/GENDER DISCRIMINATION ( ALLEGATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS FIRED BECAUSE OF EMPLOYER’S WIFE’S UNFOUNDED JEALOUSY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT))/SEX DISCRIMINATION  (HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, ALLEGATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS FIRED BECAUSE OF EMPLOYER’S WIFE’S UNFOUNDED JEALOUSY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION (FIRST DEPT)

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UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that the city’s petition to permanently stay arbitration was properly dismissed. The court described the criteria for determining whether a matter is arbitrable pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The court further held that whether the underlying grievance was timely brought must be determined by the arbitrator because the CBA was silent on the issue. The city firefighters (Local 628) sought arbitration of whether medical treatment for line of duty injuries (General Municipal Law 207-a) was being unduly delayed or denied:

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“In analyzing whether the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute, a court is merely to determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA'” … . Here, the relevant arbitration provisions of the CBA are broad, as they provide for arbitration of any grievance “involving the interpretation or application of any provision of this Agreement,” which remains unresolved following completion of step two of the grievance procedure. Moreover, there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute, which involves the processing of General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits to firefighters injured in the line of duty, and Appendix C of the CBA which sets forth the procedures regulating “the application for, and the award of, benefits under section 207-a of the General Municipal Law” … .

The City’s contention that arbitration was precluded because Local 628’s grievance was not timely pursuant to step one of the grievance procedure is without merit. The “threshold determination of whether a condition precedent to arbitration exists and whether it has been complied with, is for the court to determine” … . By contrast, “[q]uestions concerning compliance with a contractual step-by-step grievance process have been recognized as matters of procedural arbitrability to be resolved by the arbitrators, particularly in the absence of a very narrow arbitration clause or a provision expressly making compliance with the time limitations a condition precedent to arbitration” … . Matter of City of Yonkers v Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 2017 NY Slip Op 06073, Second Dept 8-9-17

 

ARBITRATION (UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (ARBITRATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (ARBITRATION, UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (ARBITRATION, (UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT)) 

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EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW BASED ON A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING HIS OWN VEHICLE TO WORK AND WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that plaintiff motorcyclist was not entitled to summary judgment in this rear-end collision case. Although defendant did move into the plaintiff’s lane ahead of plaintiff in violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, conflicting deposition testimony about whether plaintiff was comparatively negligent (i.e., whether plaintiff had time to react) raised a question of fact. Defendant’s employer was entitled to summary judgment because defendant was driving to work in his own vehicle, and was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident:

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A driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that other drivers will obey the traffic laws requiring them to yield … . However, a driver with the right-of-way also has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid a collision … , and “[t]here can be more than one proximate cause of an accident” … . As a result, even where there is evidence that another driver involved in the accident was negligent as a matter of law due to a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, a plaintiff moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing freedom from comparative fault … . …

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The doctrine of respondeat superior renders a master vicariously liable for a tort committed by his [or her] servant within the scope of employment'” … . ” An act is considered to be within the scope of employment if it is performed while the employee is engaged generally in the business of his [or her] employer, or if his [or her] act may be reasonably said to be necessary or incidental to such employment'”… . Generally, “[a]n employee driving to and from work is not acting within the scope of his employment because the element of control is lacking” … .

[Defendant’s] deposition testimony demonstrated that, at the time of the accident, he was commuting to work from his home in his personal vehicle, he was not required to drive to work as part of his job, and he was not acting in furtherance of his employer’s business at the time …. . Beres v Terranera, 2017 NY Slip Op 05929, Second Dept 8-2-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW BASED ON A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING HIS OWN VEHICLE TO WORK AND WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW BASED ON A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING HIS OWN VEHICLE TO WORK AND WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/REAR-END COLLISIONS (EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW BASED ON A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING HIS OWN VEHICLE TO WORK AND WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (NEGLIGENCE, VICARIOUS LIABILITY, DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING HIS OWN VEHICLE TO WORK AND WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))

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MUNICIPAL RESOLUTION DID NOT CREATE A VESTED CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR RETIRED TOWN EMPLOYEES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined a 1983 municipal resolution health insurance for non-union town employees did not create a vested contractual right for continued benefits. Therefore the 2012 reduction of the town’s contributions to the retirees health insurance was valid, although the contributions could not be reduced below the levels mandated by the Civil Service Law:

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“A municipal resolution is, in general, a unilateral action that is temporary in nature and, thus, does not create any vested contractual rights” … . Nothing in the language of the October 13, 1983, resolution indicates that the Town intended to create a contractual or vested right … . Moreover, the appellants failed to submit any evidence, beyond the resolution, of a right to retirement health insurance benefits … .

Additionally, the Supreme Court properly found that the Town was not barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel from reducing the appellants’ retirement health insurance benefits … . To establish promissory estoppel, a party must prove a clear and unambiguous promise, reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, and an injury sustained in reliance on that promise … . Here, even assuming the appellants proved a clear and unambiguous promise, they failed to establish reliance thereon … .

However, the Supreme Court erred in determining that the Town was not required to contribute any amount for the retirement health insurance benefits of former Board members who retired prior to July 1, 2012. Civil Service Law § 167(2) provides, in relevant part, that participating employers, such as the Town, are required to contribute 50% of the cost of premiums for retired employees, and 35% of the cost of coverage for their dependents. … [T]he Town may not reduce its contribution rates below the legally mandated minimums … . Matter of Weaver v Town of N. Castle, 2017 NY Slip Op 05960, Second Dept 8-2-17

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (HEALTH INSURANCE, MUNICIPAL RESOLUTION DID NOT CREATE A VESTED CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR RETIRED TOWN EMPLOYEES (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, HEALTH INSURANCE, MUNICIPAL RESOLUTION DID NOT CREATE A VESTED CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR RETIRED TOWN EMPLOYEES (SECOND DEPT))/HEALTH INSURANCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW, MUNICIPAL RESOLUTION DID NOT CREATE A VESTED CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR RETIRED TOWN EMPLOYEES (SECOND DEPT))

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