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UNION REPRESENTING CITY EMPLOYEES HAS STANDING TO CONTEST THE CREATION OF A NEW CITY DEPARTMENT AFFECTING THOSE EMPLOYEES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the labor union representing employees of the city’s Office of the Building Inspector and Bureau of Code Enforcement had standing to contest an executive order issued by the mayor and related regulations which created a new Building Department:

“[S]tanding is a threshold determination and a litigant must establish standing in order to seek judicial review, with the burden of establishing standing being on the party seeking review” … . A petitioner challenging governmental action must “show ‘injury in fact,’ meaning that [the petitioner] will actually be harmed by the challenged [governmental] action[,]” and, further, that the injury “fall[s] within the zone of interests or concerns sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the [governmental entity] has acted” … . For an organization to have standing, it must establish “‘that at least one of its members would have standing to sue, that it is representative of the organizational purposes it asserts and that the case would not require the participation of individual members'” … .

Petitioners allege that the Mayor unlawfully engaged in a legislative act by creating the Buildings Department and that this unlawful legislative act brought the union’s members under the auspices/jurisdiction of the Commissioner, who used that unlawful grant of authority to enact a regulation that respondents have relied on to supplant the members’ negotiated rights regarding disciplinary proceedings, as set forth in the applicable collective bargaining agreement. In our view, these allegations would, if proven, demonstrate the requisite harm flowing from the executive order, which would fall within the zone of interests … . Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v City of Schenectady, 2019 NY Slip Op 09342, Thrid Dept 12-26-19

 

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PLAINTIFF POLICE OFFICER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DRIVER OF THE TRACTOR TRAILER WHICH STRUCK HIM WHEN HE WAS STANDING IN THE ROADWAY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT NO LONGER NEED BE SHOWN; OTHER ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE DECISION INCLUDE THE EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY, THE TRUCK RENTAL COMPANIES’ LIABILITY, THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court determined plaintiff police officer was entitled to summary judgment against the driver of the tractor trailer which struck the officer who was standing in the roadway both under a common law negligence theory and under General Municipal Law 205-e. The court dealt with several other issues including: (1) whether a second police officer was engaged in an emergency operation, giving rise to the reckless disregard standard, when he stopped to assist the plaintiff who had made a traffic stop (the answer is no); (2) whether the second officer was liable based upon the position of his car (the answer is no, the car furnished a condition for the accident but was not the cause); (3) whether the injured officer’s recovery was confined to Workers’ Compensation (there is a question of fact whether the injury was “grave”); (4) whether the Graves Amendment protected the truck rental companies (the answer is yes); (5) whether vicarious liability applies to the truck driver’s employer (there is a question of fact on that issue). With respect to the common law negligence and the General Municipal Law 205-e causes of action, the court wrote:

… [T]he plaintiffs were not required to demonstrate that the injured plaintiff was free from comparative negligence in order to obtain summary judgment on the issue of Burke’s [the truck driver’s] liability on the first cause of action [negligence]. * * *

When the light changed, Burke began his left turn onto northbound Midland Avenue. Prior to beginning his turn, Burke was aware that there was a police officer conducting a traffic stop on foot and a police car parked on the northbound side of Midland Avenue. Although Burke believed he could make the turn safely, the rear of the trailer hit the injured plaintiff. * * *

The plaintiffs also established … Burke’s liability as to … a violation of General Municipal Law § 205-e. … [T]hat statute permits a police officer to bring a tort claim for injuries sustained “while in the discharge or performance at any time or place of any duty imposed by . . . superior officer[s]” where such injuries occur “directly or indirectly as a result of any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person or persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the federal, state, county, village, town or city governments” … . In order to recover under the statute, “a police officer must demonstrate injury resulting from negligent noncompliance with a requirement found in a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear duties” … .

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146(a) requires a driver to “exercise due care to avoid colliding with any . . . pedestrian.” Here, the unrebutted evidence established a prima facie violation of § 1146(a), as it demonstrated that Burke failed to exercise due care to avoid hitting the injured plaintiff. Cioffi v S.M. Foods, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 09251, Second Dept 12-24-19

 

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ALTHOUGH THE CONTRACT WAS NEVER SIGNED, IT IS CLEAR THE PARTIES INTENDED TO BE BOUND BY IT (FIRST DEPT)

The First Department noted that a contract need not be signed to be valid. Here the contract was a “termination agreement” which addressed a real estate broker’s entitlement to commissions for sales pending upon termination:

It is true that neither party signed the Termination Agreement. However, where the evidence supports a finding of intent to be bound, a contract will be unenforceable for lack of signature only if the parties “positive[ly] agree[d] that it should not be binding until so reduced to writing and formally executed” … . While the Termination Agreement contained a counterparts clause and signature lines indicating that it could be accepted by signature and countersignature, it did not positively state that the parties could assent only by signing. By contrast, the Engagement Agreement, also drafted by defendants, expressly provided that “in unsigned form [it] does not become an offer of any kind and does not become capable of acceptance.” Thus, defendants knew how to draft an agreement that could be accepted only by signature, but they did not so draft the Termination Agreement. The evidence, i.e., the parties’ months-long email exchanges, during which plaintiff submitted his list of pending transactions, defendants drafted the Termination Agreement and forwarded it to plaintiff, and the parties disagreed about the extent to which transactions listed by plaintiff were covered, supports a finding that the parties intended to be bound by the Termination Agreement, despite their failure to sign it … . Lerner v Newmark & Co. Real Estate, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 08611, First Dept 12-3-19

 

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CITY’S DETERMINATION IT WOULD NOT DEFEND A POLICE OFFICER IN A SUIT ALLEGING THE OFFICER’S USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS; HIS CONDUCT CONSTITUTED “INTENTIONAL WRONGDOING” WHICH WAS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a brief memorandum decision, over a two-judge dissenting opinion, determined the City of Buffalo’s ruling that petitioner police officer was not entitled to defense and indemnification by the City in an action against the officer alleging use of excessive force. The facts were described in the dissent as follows: “Numerous Buffalo police officers, including Officer Corey Krug, were deployed to keep order at Chippewa Street, a popular location for late-night drunken revelry. In the course of doing his job, a 30-second excerpt of a video filmed by a local TV station crew shows Officer Krug performing his duties with what appears to be excessive force: asking an unarmed young man, Devin Ford, why he returned to the area, throwing him onto the hood of a car, striking him in the leg several times with a baton and stopping only when another officer saw the incident and told him to stop. Criminal charges were filed against Officer Krug for the use of excessive force, and Mr. Ford filed a civil suit against him.” The Court of Appeals upheld the determination that Officer Krug was not acting within the scope of his employment when he dealt with Mr. Ford:

Given the narrow question before us and under the circumstances presented here, we cannot say that the City’s determination was “irrational or arbitrary and capricious”… . Insofar as the record supports the City’s conclusion that petitioner was not “acting within the scope of his public employment” under Buffalo City Code § 35-28 because his conduct constituted “intentional wrongdoing” and violated the City’s rules regarding the use of force, the City’s determination was not “taken without regard to the facts” … . Matter of Krug v City of Buffalo, 2019 NY Slip Op 08546, CtApp 11-26-19

 

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BRUTAL, UNPROVOKED ATTACK ON CLAIMANT, AN INMATE, BY CORRECTION OFFICERS WAS DEEMED TO HAVE NO RELATION TO THE DUTIES OF A CORRECTION OFFICER; THEREFORE THE ATTACK WAS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE OFFICERS’ EMPLOYMENT AND THE STATE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IS NOT LIABLE UNDER A RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR THEORY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a three-judge dissent, determined that the state’s motion for summary judgment in this assault and battery action by an inmate was properly granted. Claimant was brutally beaten, without cause, by three correction officers and sued the state under a respondeat superior, vicarious liability theory.  The Court of Appeals held the state had demonstrated the officers were not acting within the scope of their employment when they assaulted the claimant:

Correction officers are authorized to use physical force against inmates in limited circumstances not present here, such as in self-defense or to suppress a revolt (see Correction Law § 137 [5]; 7 NYCRR 251-1.2 [a], [b]). DOCCS regulations require correction officers to exercise “[t]he greatest caution and conservative judgment” in determining whether physical force against an inmate is necessary (7 NYCRR 251-1.2 [a]). To be sure, correction officers at times use excessive force. Such conduct will not fall outside the scope of employment merely because it violates department rules or policies or crosses the line of sanctioned conduct. Under our multi-factored common-law test for determining respondeat superior liability, an employee’s deviation from directions or governing standards is only one consideration in the analysis. Here, the gratuitous and utterly unauthorized use of force was so egregious as to constitute a significant departure from the normal methods of performance of the duties of a correction officer as a matter of law. This was a malicious attack completely divorced from the employer’s interests.

Further, there is no evidence in the record that DOCCS should — or could — have reasonably anticipated such a flagrant and unjustified use of force, in which, assisted by other officers who immobilized and handcuffed claimant, Wehby [the primary assailant] repeatedly punched and kicked him during a prolonged assault, removing claimant’s protective helmet in order to facilitate more direct blows to his head. As such, based on the uncontested facts, it is evident that claimant’s injuries were not caused by actions taken within the scope of employment and thus, there were no triable issues of fact as to the State’s vicarious liability for assault and battery. Rivera v State of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 08521, Ct App 11-25-19

 

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THIS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITHOUT A HEARING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner’s employment discrimination claim should not have been dismissed without a hearing by the State Division of Human Rights (SDHR):

SDHR is free to dismiss a complaint without conducting a formal hearing where it finds no probable cause to conclude that an employer engaged in discriminatory practices, and we will only disturb that determination “if it is arbitrary, capricious or lacks a rational basis” … . Those flaws are present in a determination that stems from “an inadequate or abbreviated investigation” by SDHR … , such as one in which the agency does not afford the complainant “a full and fair opportunity to present evidence on his [or her] behalf and to rebut the evidence presented by the employer” … . Petitioner argues, among other things, that she was deprived of that opportunity when SDHR refused to consider her response to the notes of a one-party conference at which various individuals associated with [the employer] gave their accounts of her tenure with the firm.

We agree. … [T]he determination must be annulled and the matter remitted so that SDHR may conduct an investigation that is “neither abbreviated nor one-sided” and affords petitioner “a full and fair opportunity to . . . rebut the submissions of [the employer] in opposition to her complaint” … . Matter of Hong Wang v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 2019 NY Slip Op 08463, Third Dept 11-21-19

 

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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TOLLED BY THE FILING OF SIMILAR ACTIONS ALLEGING THE UNDERPAYMENT OF WAGES TO HOME HEALTH AIDES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendants’ motion to dismiss these “wage-underpayment” actions as time-barred to the extent they seek damages for underpayment more than six years before the suits were brought was properly denied. The Second Department held that, pursuant to American Pipe & Constr. Co. v Utah, 414 US 538, the statute of limitations was tolled based upon the filing of prior similar actions:

The plaintiffs, home health aides who were employed by the defendants Americare Certified Special Services, Inc., and Americare, Inc. (hereinafter together Americare), and who often worked 24-hour “live in” shifts, seek to recover damages for underpayment of minimum, overtime, and “spread of hours” wages in violation of the Labor Law and New York State Department of Labor wage orders and regulations. * * *

We find that … applying American Pipe tolling under the circumstances, where a court has not previously addressed the impropriety of class certification, is consistent with the policies underlying the tolling doctrine: avoiding multiplicity of suits and vexatious litigation … . Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss … . Badzio v Americare Certified Special Servs., Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 08389, Second Dept 11-20-19

 

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FALSE ARREST AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ACTIONS AGAINST THE RESTAURANT FRANCHISOR PROPERLY DISMISSED IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE OF CONTROL OVER THE DAY TO DAY OPERATION OF THE RESTAURANT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court in this false arrest and malicious prosecution action, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted because the video evidence raised questions of fact. The court noted that the action against the franchisor, Denny’s, where the confrontation between plaintiff and the restaurant security guards took place, was properly dismissed:

… [T]he court properly granted that part of the cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint against Denny’s. ” The mere existence of a franchise agreement is insufficient to impose vicarious liability on the franchisor for the acts of its franchisee; there must be a showing that the franchisor exercised control over the day-to-day operations of its franchisee’ ” … . Defendants established that Denny’s did not exercise control over the day-to-day operations of its franchisee or specifically maintain control over the security of the restaurant, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect thereto … . Hernandez v Denny’s Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 08302, Fourth Dept 11-15-19

 

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THREE AND A HALF MONTH DELAY IN NOTIFYING THE INSURER OF THE LAWSUIT VIOLATED THE POLICY PROVISION REQUIRING NOTICE AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE; THE DISCLAIMER MAILED 29 DAYS AFTER NOTICE OF THE SUIT WAS RECEIVED BY THE INSURER WAS TIMELY AND PRECLUDED SUIT AGAINST THE INSURER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant did not timely notify the insurer of the action and the insurer’s disclaimer on that ground was timely. Plaintiff alleged she was sexually assaulted by defendant Braun, an employee of defendant APS. Braun received the summons and complaint on October 31, 2008. Braun was deemed an agent of his employer APS. The insurer was not notified of the suit until February 12, 2009. The disclaimer was mailed on March 16, 2009. The claim was settled with the defendants for more than $3 million. Plaintiff then sued the insurer:

Braun’s receipt of the October 31, 2008, letter with the summons and complaint was within the scope of his employment as an officer of APS, and, as an insured under the policies, he had a duty to notify the insurers of the claim … . Moreover, given that the plaintiff, and not APS, was the victim of Braun’s conduct, there is no adversity to negate the imputation of Braun’s knowledge to the corporation [i.e., the adverse interest exception did not apply]. …

Since APS had knowledge of the claim against it as of October 31, 2008, but did not give notice to the insurers until February 12, 2009, it failed to provide notice as soon as practicable, in violation of the policy conditions … . …

Here, the insurers timely disclaimed coverage following a thorough and diligent investigation. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the insurers did not have all the information they needed to disclaim coverage on February 12, 2009, and they properly commenced an investigation to determine the specifics surrounding the incident and to verify when APS first acquired knowledge of the claim … . Issuance of the disclaimers 29 days after the insurers’ receipt of notice was therefore reasonable as a matter of law under the circumstances. Plotkin v Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 08233, Second Dept 11-13-19

 

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PETITIONERS’ EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION CLAIMS UNDER THE STATE AND CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AGAINST THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, determined petitioners’ retaliation and discrimination claims against the NYC Department of Transportation (DOT) should not have been dismissed. The facts of the case are too complex to fairly summarize here:

It is undisputed that petitioners sufficiently stated the first two elements of an employment discrimination claim on behalf of Bharat and Kubair under both the State and City HRLs[Human Rights Law’s] — namely, that they are both members of a protected class and were well qualified for their respective positions …. Petitioners also sufficiently stated the third element — that they were adversely (State HRL) or differently treated (City HRL) …. In particular, petitioners allege that DOT’s failure to upgrade Bharat to SMME II status (a position with greater salary and pension benefits) was discriminatory conduct as a less qualified white employee received the upgrade. * * *

Bharat’s allegations are sufficient, at the pleading stage, to permit the inference that the reason he was not awarded an upgrade and the determination was issued against him was because of his involvement in the prior federal action against the DOT, which resulted in the issuance of a consent decree that subjected the DOT to significant damages … . The petition provides additional support for an inference of retaliation in the fact that an employee with less experience was upgraded over Bharat shortly after the consent decree was issued. Matter of Local 621 v New York City Dept. of Transp., 2019 NY Slip Op 08014, First Dept 11-6-19

 

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