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PLAINTIFF IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE ALLEGED DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS DEFENDANT COMPANY’S EMPLOYEE AND WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT; DEFENDANT COMPANY FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE DRIVER WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE; THE FACT THAT THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT USES THE TERM “INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR” IS NOT DISPOSITIVE OF THE ISSUE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant employer in this traffic accident case did not demonstrate the defendant driver was an independent contractor as opposed to an employee acting within the scope of employment:

… [Plaintiff] allegedly was injured when a vehicle he was operating collided with a vehicle owned and operated by the defendant Luis F. Leal. * * * The plaintiffs alleged … that Leal was [defendant] Publishers’ employee, and that Leal was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. …

“The doctrine of respondeat superior renders a master vicariously liable for a tort committed by his [or her] servant within the scope of employment. Conversely, the general rule is that an employer who hires an independent contractor is not liable for the independent contractor’s negligent acts” … . “[T]he critical inquiry in determining whether an employment relationship exists pertains to the degree of control exercised by the purported employer over the results produced or the means used to achieve the results” … . “Factors relevant to assessing control include whether the worker (1) worked at his [or her] own convenience, (2) was free to engage in other employment, (3) received fringe benefits, (4) was on the employer’s payroll and (5) was on a fixed schedule” … . “The fact that a contract exists designating a person as an independent contractor is to be considered, but is not dispositive” … . Whether an actor is an independent contractor or an employee is usually a factual issue for a jury … . Brielmeier v Leal, 2024 NY Slip Op 02163, Second Dept 4-24-24

Practice Point: An employer may be responsible for the negligence of an employee, but is not responsible for the negligence of an independent contractor. The fact that the employment contract uses the term “independent contractor” is not dispositive. The relevant criteria are explained.

 

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THE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM’S DENIAL OF COURT EMPLOYEES’ APPLICATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM THE COVID VACCINE MANDATE AFFIRMED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department affirmed the NYS Unified Court System’s (UCS’s) denial applications for religious exemptions from the COVID vaccine mandate. The issue was analyzed under both the US and NYS Constitutions. The USC held the petitioners (USC employees) failed to meet the qualifications for employment by not complying with the mandate. The decision is too detailed to fairly summarize here, but is well worth reading for the constitutional analyses:

Conducting the appropriate level of review, we find that the vaccine mandate was rationally related to the legitimate goals of slowing the spread of COVID-19 and fully reopening courts to “promote efficient access to justice” … . Indeed, “[w]hatever their merits or efficacy, it cannot be said that the State’s policies are an irrational means to achieve the legitimate goal of curbing the spread of COVID-19” … . Matter of Ferrelli v State of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 02012, First Dept 4-16-24

Practice Point: The NYS Unified Court System’s denial of employees’ applications for religious exemptions from the COVID vaccine mandate did not violate the US or NYS Constitutions.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY WAGES UNDER THE “NO WAGE THEFT LOOPHOLE ACT” AND RETALIATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s claims for failure to pay wages and retaliation pursuant to Labor Law sections 193, 198 and  215 should not have been dismissed:

The court incorrectly dismissed plaintiff’s Labor Law claims on the ground that the dispute was governed solely by the parties’ contract. Contrary to defendants’ contention, Labor Law claims for unpaid wages can be asserted alongside claims for breach of an employment contract … . …

The complaint … adequately states a claim for “unauthorized failure to pay wages” under the No Wage Theft Loophole Act … . Plaintiff alleges that his employment contract entitled him to an annual salary of $425,000 per year, which would increase in six months to $450,000 per year unless his performance was deemed “unsatisfactory,” and a cash bonus incentive … .” These “earnings . . . for labor or services rendered” constituted “wages” within the meaning of Labor Law 190(1) … . …

The complaint also states a claim for retaliation. Plaintiff’s notice of resignation subject to cure constituted protected activity, as plaintiff “made a complaint” to defendants that they had “engaged in conduct that [plaintiff], reasonably and in good faith, believe[d]” constituted unlawful withholding of his earned wages, specifically his nondiscretionary annual bonus (Labor Law § 215[1][a]). Plaintiff’s characterization of the bonus as “formulaic and a nondiscretionary wage” evidences his belief that he had a legal entitlement to the bonus and that defendants’ withholding of it was unlawful … . Neu v Amelia US LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 02019, First Dept 4-16-24

Practice Point: Here plaintiff alleged he was not paid the salary and bonuses called for in his employment contract. The complaint stated causes of action for “unauthorized failure to pay wages” and “retaliation” under the Labor Law.

 

THERE EXISTS A STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AN EMPLOYER’S FAILURE TO ADOPT AND IMPLEMENT A WHISTLEBLOWER POLICY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department noted that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a cause of action under N-PCL 715-b (a) based on the employer’s (ZOA’s) alleged failure to adopt and implement whistleblower policies:

… [P]laintiff has sufficiently alleged a cause of action under N-PCL 715-b(a). This statute requires certain nonprofit organizations to adopt and implement whistleblower policies to protect individuals who report suspected improper conduct from retaliatory conduct and defendants failed to refute plaintiff’s allegation that he was an employee rather than an officer of ZOA … . Rosen v Zionist Org. of Am., 2024 NY Slip Op 01770, First Dept 3-28-24

Practice Point: N-PCL 715-b (a) provides a cause of action against an employer for failure to adopt and implement a policy to protect whistleblowers.

 

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THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL DID NOT ELIMINATE TRIABLE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER IT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE TEACHER’S ABUSIVE PROPENSITIES; THE NEGLIGENT HIRING AND NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSES OF ACTION IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this Child Victims Act case, determined the negligent hiring and negligent supervision causes of action against defendant school stemming from a teacher’s alleged abuse of plaintiff-student should not have been dismissed. There was a question of fact about whether the school district had constructive notice of the teacher’s abusive propensities:

… [G]iven the frequency of the alleged abuse, which occurred over a three-year period, and always occurred inside the same classroom during the school day, the defendants did not eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether they should have known of the abuse … . Additionally, the defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether their supervision of the teacher or the plaintiff was not negligent, in light of, among other things, the teacher was on “probationary” status during the relevant period, the special education lessons during which the alleged abuse occurred were one-on-one and behind closed doors, the plaintiff testified at his deposition that the school principal “never came in” or “checked” on him during the lessons, and only a single observation report from Columbus Avenue Elementary School is available in the teacher’s employment file during the relevant period. MCVAWCD-DOE v Columbus Ave. Elementary Sch., 2024 NY Slip Op 01703, Second Dept 3-27-24

Practice Point: Here the defendant school did not eliminate questions of fact about whether it had constructive notice of the teacher’s abusive propensities in this Child Victims Act case. The alleged abuse took place often behind closed doors when the teacher, who was on probation, was alone with the plaintiff.

 

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IT WAS ALLEGEDLY EVIDENT FROM THE EMPLOYEE’S JOB APPLICATION THAT HE HAD BEEN IN PRISON; THE ALLEGED FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT IN SUPPORT OF THE NEGLIGENT HIRING AND SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION; THE CORRECTION LAW DOES NOT PROHIBIT CONSIDERATION OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the negligent hiring and supervision cause of action against defendant LLC stemming from an altercation between plaintiff and the LLC’s employee (McIntosh) should not have been dismissed. It was allegedly evident from McIntosh’s employment application that he had been in prison:

… [P]laintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether the LLC “should have known of the employee’s propensity for the conduct which caused the injury” … . It is well settled that “an employer has a duty to investigate a prospective employee when it knows of facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate that prospective employee” … . McIntosh’s handwritten job application provided facts that should have led the LLC to investigate, as he indicated that he worked at the address of a state prison, he earned a “stipend” instead of the typical hourly wage, and one of his supervisors was a corrections officer, or “C.O.” Although “the depth of inquiry prior to hiring, irrespective of convictions, may vary in reasonable proportion to the responsibilities of the proposed employment,” the record shows that the LLC made no effort to investigate … . Its owner-witness admitted that no background check was performed. She did not know whether a restaurant manager called McIntosh’s past employers, and she had no knowledge of his criminal background, as would have been revealed by a call to the past employer … . Contrary to the LLC’s contention, the Correction Law does not prohibit consideration of a job applicant’s prior convictions, but instead provides a balancing test to determine whether there was a “direct relationship between” a prior offense and the job or whether the employment “would involve an unreasonable risk . . . to the safety or welfare of . . . the general public” (Correction Law §§ 752[1]- Darbeau v 136 W. 3rd St., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 01672, First Dept 3-26-24

Practice Point: Where an applicant’s job application indicates the applicant had been incarcerated, an employer’s failure to investigate may support a negligent hiring and supervision cause of action. The Correction Law does not prohibit an inquiry into prior convictions.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S DEMAND FOR MONETARY DAMAGES AND EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THIS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASE DID NOT WAIVE THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL; PLAINTIFF COULD BE MADE WHOLE ENTIRELY BY A MONETARY AWARD (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the demand for both money damages and equitable relief in this employment discrimination case did not waive plaintiff’s right to a jury trial. The plaintiff could be made whole entirely with money damages:

CPLR 4101(1) provides, in pertinent part, that “issues of fact shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived,” in any action “in which a party demands and sets forth facts which would permit a judgment for a sum of money only.” The “deliberate joinder of claims for legal and equitable relief arising out of the same transaction” may constitute a waiver of the right to a jury trial … . However, the right to a jury trial must be determined by the facts alleged in the complaint and not by the prayer for relief … , and “[w]here a plaintiff alleges facts upon which monetary damages alone will afford full relief, inclusion of a demand for equitable relief in the complaint’s prayer for relief will not constitute a waiver of the right to a jury trial” … . A jury trial will not be waived if the equitable relief sought by the plaintiff is “incidental to [his or her] demand for money damages” … .

Here, the gravamen of the plaintiff’s action is to recover damages for employment discrimination. Therefore, the character of the action is essentially legal, and even though the prayer for relief in the complaint contains demands for equitable relief, only an award of monetary damages would afford the plaintiff a full and complete remedy … . Blackman v Metropolitan Tr. Auth., 2024 NY Slip Op 01530, Second Dept 3-20-24

Practice Point: Although a demand for equitable relief may waive the right to a jury trial, here there was no waiver because plaintiff could be made whole with a monetary award.

 

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WHERE A LAWSUIT AGAINST A UNION SEEKS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, AS OPPOSED TO MONETARY DAMAGES, THE COMPLAINT NEED NOT ALLEGE EVERY MEMBER OF THE UNION RATIFIED THE CHALLENGED CONDUCT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined the precedent (Martin v Curran (303 NY 276) prohibiting a lawsuit against a union (an unincorporated association) unless it was demonstrated every member of the union ratified the challenged action only applies when the lawsuit seeks monetary damages, not, as here, injunctive relief:

… [E]xtending [Martin v Curran (303 NY 276 [1951])] to bar union members from seeking any form of injunctive relief against a union, would have troubling implications. Respondents do not seriously dispute that, if Martin precludes petitioners’ claim here, union members would have no recourse to the courts even when incumbent union officials are allegedly manipulating elections to maintain power. Applying Martin to bar suits seeking to compel union officials to abide by their respective union constitutions and bylaws would have “far-reaching consequences” and risk “stifl[ing] all criticism” and democracy “within the union” … .

We therefore clarify that where, as here, union members seek only injunctive relief against the union and state no claim for pecuniary damages, the pleading is not governed by Martin and, as such, a plaintiff need not allege the participation of each individual member to bring a claim in accordance with General Associations Law § 13. The petition below was therefore improperly dismissed on that ground. Matter of Agramonte v Local 461, Dist. Council 37, Am. Fedn. of State, County & Mun. Empls., 2024 NY Slip Op 01332, CtApp 3-14-24

Practice Point: The complaint in a lawsuit against a union seeks injunctive relief, as opposed to monetary damages, the complaint need not allege that every member of the union ratified the challenged conduct.

 

 

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DECEDENT’S WORK-RELATED COVID DEATH ENTITLED DECEDENT’S DAUGHTER, DECEDENT’S “STATUTORY BENEFICIARY,” TO “ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS” UNDER A RECENT STATUTE; PETITIONER, DECEDENT’S PARTNER, WHO WAS DECEDENT’S “DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY” FOR “ORDINARY DEATH BENEFITS,” WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE “ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS” (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, determined the respondent Teachers’ Retirement System properly awarded “accidental death benefits” to decedent’s daughter under a recent law which classified certain work-related COVID death as “accidental.” The dispute here was between the “statutory beneficiary,” decedent’s daughter who received the “accidental death benefits,” and the “designated beneficiary,” decedent’s partner, who was entitled to any “ordinary death benefits:”

he statutory text refutes petitioner’s argument that respondent’s denial of her claim for ordinary death benefits was irrational. Retirement and Social Security Law § 607-i (a) (3) provides that the accidental death benefit “shall” be paid to a member’s statutory beneficiary if the member meets the stated criteria. This is consistent with the recognition in the legislative history that “[o]nce the statutory beneficiary demonstrates this proof, entitlement to the [a]ccidental [d]eath [b]enefit is mandatory” … . Additionally, preexisting law provided that an ordinary death benefit is only available when accidental death benefits are unavailable (see Retirement and Social Security Law § 606-a [a] [3]). Matter of Colon v Teachers’ Retirement Sys. of the City of N.Y., 2024 NY Slip Op 01331, CtApp 3-14-24

Practice Point: Here decedent’s daughter was the “statutory beneficiary” of “accidental death benefits” under the Retirement and Social Security Law, and decedent’s partner was the “designated beneficiary” for “ordinary death benefits” under the Retirement and Social Security Law. Decedent’s daughter was properly awarded the “accidental death benefits” under a recent statute covering work-related COVID deaths.

 

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​ THE DENIAL OFTHE NON-RESIDENT’S APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT IN NEW YORK CITY IS SUBJECT TO THE EMPLOYMENT-DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITIONS IN THE NEW YORK CITY AND NEW YORK STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (CT APP).

The Second Department, answering a certified question from the Second Circuit, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, determined that the denial of an non-New-York-resident’s application for employment in New York City is subject to the prohibitions of employment discrimination under the NYS and NYC Human Rights Law. Plaintiff was employed by defendant in Washington DC and sought, but was denied, a new position with the defendant in New York City:

… [A] nonresident who has been discriminatorily denied a job in New York City or State loses the chance to work, and perhaps live, within those geographic areas. The prospective employee personally feels the impact of a discriminatory refusal to promote or hire in New York City or State, because that is where the person wished to work (and perhaps relocate) and where they were denied the chance to do so. When applying the required liberal construction of “inhabitants” and “individual within this state” (Executive Law § 290 [3]; Administrative Code § 8-101), a prospective inhabitant or employee, who was denied a job opportunity because of discriminatory conduct, fits comfortably within the Human Rights Laws’ protection. Syeed v Bloomberg L.P., 2024 NY Slip Op 01330, CtApp 3-14-24

Practice Point: Plaintiff worked for defendant in Washington DC and sought, but was denied, a new position with defendant in New York City. Although a non-resident, plaintiff could bring a failure-to-hire/failure-to-promote employment-discrimination action in New York pursuant to the NYC and NYS Human Rights Law.

 

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