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THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING THE NYC PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM DISCRIMINATES AGAINST BLACK AND LATINO STUDENTS FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing (modifying) the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over a partial dissent and a dissenting opinion, determined the complaint alleging the NYC public education system discriminates against Black and Latino students failed as a matter of law. The opinion is too complex to fairly summarize here:

Plaintiffs allege that the New York City public education system, through its admissions and screening policies, curriculum content, and lack of diversity among the teacher workforce, discriminates against and disproportionately affects Black and Latino students, leading to unequal educational opportunities and negative outcomes for those students. Plaintiffs further allege that these practices and policies deprive Black and Latino students of a sound basic education in contravention of the Education Article of the State Constitution (NY Const, art XI, § 1), denies them equal protection of the laws (NY Const, art I, § 11), and denies them access to educational facilities in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [4]). Although plaintiffs identify troubling aspects of New York City’s public education system, the claims as presented in the complaint fail as a matter of law. IntegrateNYC, Inc. v State of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 05870, CtApp 10-23-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for a detailed discussion of the issues raised by a claim that a public school system discriminates against minority students. Here the court acknowledged the complaint identified “troubling aspects” of New York City’s public education system, but held the causes of action failed as a matter of law.

 

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THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE SCHOOL DISTRICT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE ALLEGED SEXUAL ABUSE OF PLAINTIFF-STUDENT IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendants in this Child Victims Act case against the school district for negligent hiring, retention and supervision did not demonstrate a lack of constructive notice of the alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff-student by a custodian. Therefore the defendant’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted:

“To establish a cause of action based on negligent hiring, negligent retention, or negligent supervision, it must be shown that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for the conduct which caused the injury” … .

Here, the defendants’ evidence included testimony given by the plaintiff during his deposition that he was abused on dozens of occasions over three to four years, that there were several other students who were similarly abused, and that other custodians employed by the District were present in the school building after hours and on weekends and saw the plaintiff alone with the custodian in the building. Thus, contrary to the defendants’ contention, they failed to establish, prima facie, that the District lacked constructive notice of the custodian’s alleged abusive propensities and conduct … . PC-14 Doe v Lawrence Union Free Sch. Dist., 2025 NY Slip Op 05693, Second Dept 10-15-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into how a question of fact is raised about a school-defendant’s constructive notice of sexual abuse of a student by a school employee.

 

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IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE BASED ON ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE BY A TEACHER IN THE 70’S, EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT WHICH SUPPORTED THE NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, TRAINING AND HIRING AND RETENTION CAUSES OF ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court in this Child Victims Act case, determined the negligent supervision, negligent training, and negligent hiring and retention causes of action against the school district, based on allegations of sexual abuse of plaintiff by a music teacher in the 70’s, should not have been dismissed. The evidence presented by the plaintiff and defendants included the observed behavior of the music teacher by another teacher, the dismissal of the music teacher from other schools, the conflicting information about arrests in the teacher’s employment applications, the suspicions of other teachers and the failure to report those suspicions:

… [P]laintiff submitted an affidavit wherein he averred that on two occasions the music teacher entered the boys’ locker room while plaintiff and his classmates were changing and that on each occasion the gym teacher instructed the music teacher to leave. Although the gym teacher denied observing the music teacher in the boys’ locker room during his deposition, plaintiff submitted an affidavit that the gym teacher executed in an unrelated case wherein he averred that he had “heard rumors from many students” that the music teacher had a sexual interest in the male students at the school and that he was “suspicious that [the music teacher] may have had inappropriate relationships with students.” The affidavit reflects that the gym teacher was “vigilant” and “kept an eye on” the music teacher—meeting weekly with another coach to “see if the other had witnessed any inappropriate behavior” by the music teacher—but nonetheless permitted the music teacher to transport students to and from games and swim meets.

* * * [[P]laintiff submitted the music teacher’s testimony, wherein he testified that he had “always” had students visit him at his home and that other teachers were aware that students would visit him at his home, where the abuse of plaintiff is, in part, alleged to have occurred … . …

Plaintiff also submitted an expert affidavit asserting that defendants failed to appropriately train and supervise other teachers and staff to report their knowledge of inappropriate behavior. * * *

… [D]efendants submitted the music teacher’s employment applications, wherein he submitted contradictory responses about whether he had been arrested; a reference from the principal of a junior high school where the music teacher had taught, who stated that the music teacher had been “dismissed or denied tenure” and “had a tendency to more or less pal with his seventh grade male students”; and a reference completed by a school counselor employed by a different district, who stated that the music teacher had been “dismissed or denied tenure” and that she would not employ him as a teacher in her school system. Harper v Buffalo City Sch. Dist., 2025 NY Slip Op 05595, Fourth Dept 10-10-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the nature of the proof which will raise questions of fact in a Child Victims Act case against a school district alleging negligent supervision, training, hiring and retention.

 

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IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE BY A TEACHER, PLAINTIFF-STUDENT’S DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST THE SCHOOL PROPERLY SURVIVED THE MOTION TO DISMISS, BUT THE DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST THE DIOCESE DID NOT; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, over a dissent, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, over a dissenting opinion, affirmed the denial of the school’s and the Episcopal Diocese’s motions to dismiss the complaint in this Child Victims Act action stemming from the alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff-student by a teacher (Mr. Bravo). The majority affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the request for punitive damages against the school but dismissed the demand for punitive damages against the Diocese. The dissent argued the demand for punitive damages against the school should also have been dismissed:

Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages against the School was … properly sustained at this prediscovery stage of the litigation … . Contrary to the dissent’s position, this Court has found claims for punitive damages may be appropriate in certain negligence cases … . Specifically,”[p]unitive damages in actions involving negligent hiring, retention, or supervision generally require conduct evincing a high degree of moral culpability, so flagrant as to transcend simple carelessness, or which constitutes willful or wanton negligence or recklessness so as to evince a conscious disregard for the rights of others” … . A “conscious disregard” requires knowledge, or actual notice, of the potential of harm to others … . The complaint alleges that the School was given actual notice that Mr. Bravo was sexually abusing plaintiff and then failed to adequately investigate the allegations to such an extent that suggests ulterior motives. Further, the dissent is mistaken in its belief that plaintiff’s denial of the abuse during a meeting with school administrators negates the actual notice received by the School from the parents of her friends and a therapist, which, by itself, triggered a statutorily required response that the School did not fully implement … . * * *

Given that punitive damages are “awarded only in ‘singularly rare cases,'” they are appropriately reserved for those cases which allege that the defendants, despite having actual knowledge of the perpetrator’s propensity for the sexual abuse of children, concealed that knowledge or otherwise knowingly underresponded to that information so as to suggest that they dismissed all concern for the rights of others in favor of their own self-interest … . As plaintiff here has not alleged the knowledge required to infer any improper state of mind on behalf of the Episcopal Diocese, her demand for punitive damages against the Episcopal Diocese should be dismissed … . C.R. v Episcopal Diocese of N.Y., 2025 NY Slip Op 05144, First Dept 9-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a discussion of the allegations in a Child Victims Act complaint which will support the denial of a motion to dismiss a request for punitive damages.

 

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EXPULSION OF PETITIONER-STUDENT FROM THE PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT PROGRAM “SHOCKED [THE COURT’S] SENSE OF FAIRNESS;” PETITONER WAS REINSTATED IN GOOD STANDING (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the student’s petition to vacate her college’s determination to expel her from the physician assistant program should have been granted. The petitioner-student had written recommendations for friends seeking admission to the program. Although the recommendations clearly indicated the petitioner was still a student, the digitally generated designation PA-C (Physician Assistant-Certified) appeared on the recommendations instead of PA-S (Physician Assistant -Student). The First Department found expulsion was not supported by the record and ordered the student reinstated in good standing:

“It is well settled that a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board or body it reviews unless the decision under review is arbitrary and unreasonable and constitutes an abuse of discretion . . .” … . A review of the record makes it clear that the faculty members of the College’s Professional Conduct Review Committee and Academic Performance Committee unreasonably failed to view the totality of the circumstances and abused their discretion. This mistake harmed no one; petitioner consistently maintained that the mistake was inadvertent, as supported by petitioner’s digital signature on the letter with her student email address as well as the multiple references in the accompanying CASPA form to petitioner as a “student”; and the typographical mistake of the use of PA-C was rectified on all documentation … .

Pursuant to the College’s policy, petitioner’s inadvertent mistake simply warranted counseling or, at worst, probation. Here, the College’s imposition of the ultimate academic sanction of expulsion is “so disproportionate to the offense as to shock our sense of fairness” … as to warrant its vacatur. Matter of Mirza v College of Mount St. Vincent, 2025 NY Slip Op 05156, First Dept 9-25-25

Practice Point: Here the appellate court found that the expulsion of a college student “shock[ed] our sense of fairness.” The court vacated the expulsion and reinstated the student in good standing.

 

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CLAIMANT, A PER DIEM SUBSTITUTE TEACHER, WAS GIVEN REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS BETWEEN THE ACADEMIC TERMS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, determined the finding that claimant, a per diem substitute teacher, was entitled to unemployment benefits between school years because she was not given reasonable assurance of continued employment was not supported by the record:

… [The] “record gave no reason to believe that the employer’s assurances [of continued employment] . . . were illusory” … . Accordingly, the Board’s finding that the employer failed to provide claimant with a reasonable assurance of continued employment is not supported by substantial evidence and its decision must be reversed … . Matter of Caruso (Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist.–Commissioner of Labor), 2025 NY Slip Op 05132, Third Dept 9-25-25

 

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PLAINTIFF, A DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED STUDENT, WAS KNOCKED OVER BY ANOTHER STUDENT; THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL HAS A DUTY TO PROPERLY SUPERVISE ITS STUDENTS; QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT SCHOOL (THE YOUNG ADULT INSTITUTE, INC.) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact precluding summary judgment in favor of defendant in this negligent supervision case. Plaintiff, a developmentally disable adult and a member of defendant Young Adult Institute, Inc. (YAI) was knocked over in a parking lot by a fellow student:

Programs such as YAI that provide services to developmentally disabled adults have a duty to adequately supervise such students in their care, “and are liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” … . “‘[I]n determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated'” … . “‘Even if a breach of the duty of supervision is established, it must [also] be demonstrated that such negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries sustained'” … . “‘The test for causation is whether under all the circumstances the chain of events that followed the negligent act or omission was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the school’s negligence'” … . Sclafani v Young Adult Inst., Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 04266, Second Dept 7-23-25

Practice Point: ​A provider of services to developmentally disabled adults has a duty to adequately supervise its students. Here there were questions of fact about whether supervision was adequate. Plaintiff student was knocked over by another student in a parking lot.

 

THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION LAW REQUIRES SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO PROVIDE FREE EDUCATION TO INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES UNTIL THE DAY BEFORE THEY TURN 22 (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Reynolds Fitzgerald, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the New York State Education Department (SED) properly held that school districts, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Law, are required to provide free education to individuals with disabilities until the day before they turn 22. The opinion resolved a conflict between applicable laws and is too complex to fairly summarize here. Matter of Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist. v New York State Educ. Dept., 2025 NY Slip Op 04214, Third Dept 7-17-25

Same issues and result in Matter of Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free Sch. Dist. v New York State Educ. Dept., 2025 NY Slip Op 04211, Third Dept 7-17-25

 

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HERE THE ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT WHO WAS HANDED THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IN THIS PROPERTY-DAMAGE ACTION WAS AN AUTHORIZED AGENT OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT; THEREFORE THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLETE PROPER SERVICE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Voutsinas, reversing Supreme Court, determined the assistant superintendent who was handed the summons and complaint in this property-damage action against the school district was an authorized agent of the district. Therefore the complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to complete proper service:

It is evident, however, that the role of assistant superintendent was intended, under Education Law § 2(13), to be considered another appointive officer whose duties generally relate to the administration of affairs within a school district. An assistant superintendent … directly carries out duties that typically would be carried out by the superintendent. These duties fit closely with the statutory definition of “school officer” as contemplated by Education Law § 2(13).

Moreover, as set forth in the Education Law, the role of assistant superintendent is generally created directly by an elected board of education, such as the defendant’s Board of Education. Specifically, Education Law § 2503(5), applicable to the defendant herein, grants the Board of Education the ability to “create, abolish, maintain and consolidate such positions . . . as, in its judgment, may be necessary for the proper and efficient administration of its work” and “shall appoint properly qualified persons to fills such positions, including a superintendent of schools” and “such associate, assistant and other superintendents . . . as said board shall determine necessary for the efficient management of the schools.” Here, the defendant, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Education Law, has given … the assistant superintendent for curriculum and instruction … authority and command to administer the affairs of the defendant and its superintendent as it pertains to the offering of the curriculum to the student body and the instruction of each student. It is evident that [the assistant superintendent], in this role, reports directly to the superintendent of schools and the Board of Education and is charged with administering functions that otherwise would be tasked to the Board of Education and/or the superintendent of schools. Aideyan v Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist., 2025 NY Slip Op 03787, Second Dept 6-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision if you need to know who is authorized to accept service on behalf of a school district.

 

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THE REGULATIONS WHICH ALLOW THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER A NONPUBLIC SCHOOL OFFERS EDUCATION SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT TO THAT OFFERED BY LOCAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS WERE PROPERLY PROMULGATED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined the regulations which allow the Commissioner of Education to enforce the requirement that nonpublic schools provide an education “substantially equivalent” to that provided by local public schools were properly promulgated:

​Petitioners argue that 8 NYCRR 130.6 (c) (2) (i) and 8 NYCRR 130.8 (d) (7) (i) are invalid because they compel parents to “unenroll” their children from schools deemed not substantially equivalent, authorizing and necessarily leading to school closures, and that this exceeds the authority of the Commissioner. * * *

The regulatory provisions at issue here state that, in the event of a negative substantial equivalency determination, “the nonpublic school shall no longer be deemed a school which provides compulsory education fulfilling the requirements of Article 65 of the Education Law” … . A determination that a nonpublic school has failed to meet the substantial equivalence requirement leads naturally to this acknowledgement—that the nonpublic school fails to comply with the Education Law’s substantial equivalency mandate and thus is not a school that fulfills the statutory requirement for compulsory education. Far from exceeding the Commissioner’s statutory authority, the regulations simply establish a mechanism by which the statutory mandate is enforced. In this regard, instead of being contrary to the statute’s purpose, the challenged regulations are a natural consequence flowing from the statutory language itself.

Contrary to petitioners’ claims, nothing in these provisions requires that parents “unenroll” their children from a nonpublic school deemed not to provide substantially equivalent instruction. Nor do the regulations authorize school closures. The provisions merely state that the nonpublic school does not provide substantially equivalent instruction—a determination well within the authority provided to the Commissioner by the statute. The parent or custodian must determine how then to ensure their compliance with the Education Law. Matter of Parents for Educ. & Religious Liberty in Schs. v Young, 2025 NY Slip Op 03689, CtApp 6-18-25

 

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