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ONCE AN ACTION TO RECOVER THE PRINCIPAL OF A BOND IS TIME-BARRED, THERE IS NO LEGALLY COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR POST-MATURITY INTEREST (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, determined that a bond issuer is not obligated to pay interest once a claim for the principal is time-barred:

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has asked us to decide …  “[i]f a bond issuer remains obligated to make biannual interest payments until the principal is paid, including after the date of maturity … , do enforceable claims for such biannual interest continue to accrue after a claim for principal of the bonds is time-barred?” We answer this question in the negative … . Pursuant to New York common law and the terms of the indenture, in the absence of a timely action to recover principal, a bondholder cannot enforce the conditional obligation to make post-maturity interest payments. * * *

The rule we reiterate today effectuates the agreement negotiated by the parties and reinforces our longstanding view of interest as generally dependent on principal. Moreover, it promotes the purposes underlying the statute of limitations … . For those reasons, we conclude that once a claim on the principal is time-barred, a claim to recover unpaid post-maturity interest payments is not legally cognizable. Ajdler v Province of Mendoza. 2019 NY Slip Op 02151, CtApp 3-21-19

 

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DEFENDANT SOLE SHAREHOLDER OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ACTION AGAINST HIM PREMISED UPON PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE WARRANTY PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT WERE VIOLATED AND WHETHER DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS STRIPPED OF ASSETS SUCH THAT IT COULD NOT MEET ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a partial dissent, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that defendant Brookstein, the sole shareholder of corporate defendant DKM, was not entitled to summary judgment in the action against him based upon piercing the corporate veil:

“The general rule, of course, is that a corporation exists independently of its owners, who are not personally liable for its obligations, and that individuals may incorporate for the express purpose of limiting their liability… . The concept of piercing the corporate veil is an exception to this general rule, permitting, in certain circumstances, the imposition of personal liability on owners for the obligations of their corporation … . A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must demonstrate that a court in equity should intervene because the owners of the corporation exercised complete domination over [the corporation] in the transaction at issue and, in doing so, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form, thereby perpetrating a wrong that resulted in injury to the plaintiff … .

A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil bears a heavy burden… . “Veil-piercing is a fact-laden claim that is not well suited for summary judgment resolution” … .

Here, Brookstein did not establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. It is undisputed that Brookstein dissolved DKM without making any reserves for contingent liabilities, despite the existence of a provision in the contract of sale pursuant to which DKM agreed to indemnify [plaintiff] for any breach of warranty for a period of 7½ years after the closing of the sale. This factor was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Brookstein stripped the corporation of assets, leaving DKM without sufficient funds to pay its contractual contingent liabilities … . Town-Line Car Wash, Inc. v Don’s Kleen Mach. Kar Wash, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 01443, Second Dept 2-27-19

 

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BANK ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment pursuant to the equitable subrogation theory in this foreclosure action:

… [T]he plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose a mortgage in the principal amount of $480,000, which it alleged was secured by real property in Brooklyn, owned by the defendants Tzilia Dalfin (hereinafter Tzilia) and Angel E. Daflin (hereinafter Angel), who have been divorced since the 1990s. It is undisputed that $453,900.03 of the proceeds of the mortgage were used to pay off Tzilia and Angel’s prior mortgage on the property as well as outstanding taxes. * ** *

Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, “[w]here property of one person is used in discharging an obligation owed by another or a lien upon the property of another, under such circumstances that the other would be unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefit thus conferred, the former is entitled to be subrogated to the position of the obligee or lien-holder” … . Even if, as Angel contends, his signature on the subject mortgage was forged, the plaintiff could still recover against him on the theory of equitable subrogation based upon its payoff of the prior mortgage and liens against his property at the closing of the subject mortgage … .

… [T]he plaintiff established its … entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on a theory of equitable subrogation by submitting evidence that $453,900.03 of the proceeds of the subject mortgage were used to pay off the prior mortgage and taxes for which Angel was liable … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Dalfin, 2019 NY Slip Op 01255, Second Dept 2-20-19

 

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THE CONTENTS OF A SAFE DEPOSIT BOX CONSTITUTED THE PROPERTY OF JOINT TENANTS WITH RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP, THEREFORE THE CONTENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO SATISFY A JUDGMENT AGAINST ONLY ONE OF THE JOINT TENANTS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, in a matter of first impression, determined the presumption of joint tenancy with rights of survivorship applied to the contents of a safe deposit box. The judgment debtor NYCB was owed $11 million by one of two persons (Rachel and Ari) who signed rental agreements for a safe deposit box. The First Department held that Supreme Court properly ordered the safe deposit box opened and the contents turned over to satisfy the judgment against Ari:

CPLR 5225(b) provides for an expedited special proceeding by which a judgment creditor can recover “money or other personal property” belonging to a judgment debtor “against a person in possession or custody of money or other personal property in which the judgment debtor has an interest” in order to satisfy a judgment … . When two or more persons open a bank account, making a deposit of cash, securities, or other property, a presumption of joint tenancy with right of survivorship arises (Banking Law § 675[b] …). If the presumption is applied, each named tenant “is possessed of the whole of the account so as to make the account vulnerable to the levy of a money judgment by the judgment creditor of one of the joint tenants” … .

By relying on the terms of the rental agreement, NYCB met its burden of establishing Ari and Rachel as joint tenants with rights of survivorship of the safe deposit box account. The safe deposit box is controlled by each of them, each of them has access to the box at all times, and each of them can deposit property into the box or remove property from it without each other’s permission. Should either one of them die, the survivor would have access to the box and could remove all its contents … . Matter of New York Community Bank v Bank of Am., N.A., 2019 NY Slip Op 00544, First Dept 1-24-19

 

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OIL AND GAS INVESTMENT SCHEME PROPERLY FOUND TO BE AN ABUSIVE TAX AVOIDANCE TRANSACTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, affirmed the Tax Appeals Tribunal’s determination that petitioner’s complex gas and oil drilling investment scheme constituted an abusive tax avoidance transaction. Therefore the notice of deficiency, penalties and interest assessed by the Department of Taxation and Finance were appropriate. The opinion is fact-specific and too complicated to fairly summarize here. The following quotation from the opinion is provided to demonstrate the nature of the issues:

The Tribunal’s determination that the overall financing structure artificially inflated the actual capital contributions of the Belle Isle partners [the petitioner oil and gas drilling company], allowing large tax deductions based upon IDCs [intangible drilling costs] derived through the inflated turnkey contract, is rationally based and supported by substantial evidence … . Beginning with the Belle Isle financing structure, particularly Sznajderman’s [petitioner general partner’s] subscription note, it is clear that Belle Isle did not have an intent to create a true debtor-creditor relationship as to 85% of the face value of the note. Specifically, while the face value of the subscription note was $540,000, the additional collateral agreement had the practical effect of satisfying the principal of said note by Sznajderman’s payment of only 15% of the face value, which was to be used by SS & T, the so-called creditor, to purchase bonds. Importantly, these bonds were not collateral; rather, they were ostensibly used to pay off the principal of the subscription note in 25 years. …

Further, Sznajderman’s payment of interest during the first year did not legitimize the debt because interest after the first year, which was designed to be paid from Sznajderman’s net operating proceeds, was only paid sporadically, despite such proceeds being available. We agree with the Tribunal that, based upon this sporadic collection of interest, it is highly unlikely that Belle Isle would attempt to collect “its partners’ very large interest accruals when the subscription notes mature.” … . As such, we find that substantial evidence supports the Tribunal’s conclusion that, while Sznajderman’s investment had economic substance in general, … the subscription note, to the extent of 85% of its face value, was artificially inflated and, as such, did not establish true debt and most certainly elevated form over substance … . Matter of Sznajderman v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 2019 NY Slip Op 00007, Third Dept 1-3-19

 

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THE STATE ACTION ON A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR DEBT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED ON CLAIM PRECLUSION OR RES JUDICATA GROUNDS BASED UPON THE DISMISSAL OF A FEDERAL ACTION AGAINST A DEFENDANT WHO WAS NOT A PARTY IN THE STATE ACTION, THE FACT THAT THE PLAINTIFFS IN THE STATE ACTION MAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO INTERVENE OR ASSIGN THEIR RIGHTS TO THE DEFENDANT IN THE FEDERAL ACTION WAS NOT A PROPER GROUND FOR CLAIM PRECLUSION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, reversing Supreme Court determined that the dismissal of action in federal court to recover on a multi-million dollar notes did not preclude the state action on claim preclusion (res judicata) grounds. The opinion is fact-specific and too complicated to be fairly summarized here:

Supreme Court dismissed the action with prejudice on claim preclusion grounds, and denied the motion to amend as moot. The court found that plaintiffs herein should have intervened in the federal action, or assigned their claims to [the defendant in the federal action,] Varshavsky. The failure to do so was a “blatant misuse of the federal forum,” which resulted in a “stunning” amount of discovery, and several motions, which Supreme Court found were wasted because plaintiffs herein failed to use the federal forum to resolve all “claims aris[ing] from a common nucleus of operative facts.” * * *

The doctrine of claim preclusion does not bar plaintiffs’ claims herein. Varshavsky, the sole defendant in the federal action, was not himself the creditor of the subject loans and had no standing to assert a counterclaim for recovery of plaintiffs’ loans in that action. Plaintiffs’ putative rights to intervene as party defendants in the federal action, or to assign their claims to Varshavsky, are far from clear. Either option, intervention or assignment, might have been rejected by the federal court as an attempt to evade the strictures of diversity jurisdiction. Apart from the efficacy of these options, even if intervention or assignment were possible, there is no legal doctrine that would compel plaintiffs herein to litigate in the federal action. In short, plaintiffs herein, as nonparties to the federal litigation, are not precluded from asserting claims that no party in the federal litigation had standing to pursue. To hold otherwise would mean that a debtor may, by suing a creditor’s principal or associate, require the creditor to participate in the action or have its claims precluded. Avilon Auto. Group v Leontiev, 2019 NY Slip Op 00058, First Dept 1-3-19

 

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ONCE THE CITY TAX LIENS HAD BEEN ASSIGNED PAYMENT TO THE CITY, INSTEAD OF THE LIENHOLDER, IS NOT APPLIED TO THE DEBT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the tax and sewer charges paid to the city by defendant after defendant had been notified that the tax liens had been assigned could not be applied to the debt:

Plaintiffs are the lawful assignees of certain City of New York water and sewer tax liens against property owned by defendant. The City complied fully with the provisions of Administrative Code of City of NY § 11-320, which requires, inter alia, that four notices of the sale of the liens be sent to the property owner at specified intervals before the sale and that another notice be sent 30 days after the sale … . The City’s four pre-sale notices informed defendant of the debt, of the impending sale, and of defendant’s obligation to pay the City, if at all, by August 1, 2011. The notices also informed defendant that, after the sale, it should make payment arrangements with the new lienholder’s representative.

Defendant did not pay the amounts owed by August 1, 2011. On the day after the tax liens were assigned to plaintiffs, defendant made payments to the City. The payments were not credited against defendant’s debt, because, once the assignment had taken place, payments had to be made to plaintiffs … .

Contrary to defendant’s argument, there is no tension between the Administrative Code’s provisions for tax liens and tax sales and the law generally governing payments of an assigned debt. Once a debtor has notice that the debt has been assigned, or has been put “on inquiry” as to an assignment of the debt, payments to the assignor (the original creditor) are not applied to the debt … . NYCTL 1998-2 Trust v 70 Orchard LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 09004, First Dept 12-27-18

 

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VOLUNTARY PAYMENT OF CERTAIN CHARGES ASSESSED IN CONNECTION WITH REFINANCING MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR LOANS WARRANTED DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WHICH ALLEGED THE CHARGES WERE UNENFORCEABLE PENALTIES AND WERE PAID UNDER DURESS (FIRST SEPT). ​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mazzarelli, affirmed the dismissal of a complaint alleging certain payments made in connection with refinancing multi-million dollar loans were unenforceable penalties and were paid under duress. The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here. The central issue was whether the voluntary payment of the charges in question without protest, i.e., the voluntary payment doctrine, warranted dismissal of the complaint. The issues were described as follows:

The relative sophistication of the parties is not a factor to be considered in assessing a claim of economic duress … . Economic duress exists where a party is compelled to agree to terms set by another party because of a wrongful threat by the other party that prevents it from exercising its free will. Accordingly, our analysis consists of two prongs: first, whether Blackrock’s [defendant’s] decision to demand the late charge and extra interest payment was lawful, that is, based on rights enumerated in the agreement; and second, if it was not, whether the demand placed plaintiff in a position such that it had no other choice but to accede. With respect to the first prong, Blackrock [argues] that, because the mezzanine loan agreement is part of the record, we can decide, even at this procedural posture, that, as a matter of law, the charges were not wrongful. … Defendant argues that … the agreement plainly establishes that it had the right to make the demand it did. Plaintiff, in contrast, asserts that the late charge provision is, at the very least, ambiguous with respect to how Blackrock was to calculate the charge, and that, even if the calculation was correct, it constitutes an unenforceable penalty. Beltway 7 & Props., Ltd. v Blackrock Realty Advisers, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 07844, First Dept 11-15-18

DEBTOR-CREDITOR (VOLUNTARY PAYMENT OF CERTAIN CHARGES ASSESSED IN CONNECTION WITH REFINANCING MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR LOANS WARRANTED DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WHICH ALLEGED THE CHARGES WERE UNENFORCEABLE PENALTIES AND WERE PAID UNDER DURESS (FIRST SEPT))/VOLUNTARY PAYMENT DOCTRINE (DEBTOR-CREDITOR, CONTRACT LAW, (VOLUNTARY PAYMENT OF CERTAIN CHARGES ASSESSED IN CONNECTION WITH REFINANCING MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR LOANS WARRANTED DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WHICH ALLEGED THE CHARGES WERE UNENFORCEABLE PENALTIES AND WERE PAID UNDER DURESS (FIRST SEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (DEBTOR-CREDITOR, VOLUNTARY PAYMENT OF CERTAIN CHARGES ASSESSED IN CONNECTION WITH REFINANCING MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR LOANS WARRANTED DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WHICH ALLEGED THE CHARGES WERE UNENFORCEABLE PENALTIES AND WERE PAID UNDER DURESS (FIRST SEPT))

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DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CURE A DEFAULT IN MONTHLY PAYMENTS ON A LOAN BEFORE PLAINTIFF SOUGHT TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN DEFENDANT OWING MORE THAN TWICE WHAT REMAINED TO BE PAID (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court determined plaintiff should have given defendant the opportunity to cure an inadvertent failure to make a monthly payment pursuant to stipulation of settlement. Defendant had repaid much of the debt and, based on the default, would owe more than twice the amount that remained to be paid:

… Supreme Court should have granted the alternate branch of the defendant’s motion, which was, in effect, to preclude the plaintiff from enforcing the default provision of the stipulation without affording the defendant a reasonable opportunity to cure his default. “Under almost any given state of facts, where to enforce a stipulation would be unjust or inequitable or permit the other party to gain an unconscionable advantage, courts will afford relief” … .

Here, the defendant’s default was inadvertent and minor in nature when measured against the harsh result that would be obtained upon literal enforcement of the default provision in the stipulation… . Insofar as the plaintiff failed to offer the defendant any opportunity to cure his default before seeking to recover the full amount due under the judgment, the plaintiff’s conduct could be interpreted as an attempt to take advantage of a technical default to obtain payment of the far greater sum which the plaintiff had originally sought, but agreed to forgo as part of the settlement … . RCS Recovery Servs., LLC v Mensah, 2018 NY Slip Op 07766, Second Dept 11-14-18

DEBTOR-CREDITOR (DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CURE A DEFAULT IN MONTHLY PAYMENTS ON A LOAN BEFORE PLAINTIFF SOUGHT TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN DEFENDANT OWING MORE THAN TWICE WHAT REMAINED TO BE PAID (SECOND DEPT))/STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT (DEBTOR-CREDITOR, DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CURE A DEFAULT IN MONTHLY PAYMENTS ON A LOAN BEFORE PLAINTIFF SOUGHT TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN DEFENDANT OWING MORE THAN TWICE WHAT REMAINED TO BE PAID (SECOND DEPT))/LOANS  (DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CURE A DEFAULT IN MONTHLY PAYMENTS ON A LOAN BEFORE PLAINTIFF SOUGHT TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN DEFENDANT OWING MORE THAN TWICE WHAT REMAINED TO BE PAID (SECOND DEPT))/DEFAULT (LOAN PAYMENTS, DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CURE A DEFAULT IN MONTHLY PAYMENTS ON A LOAN BEFORE PLAINTIFF SOUGHT TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN DEFENDANT OWING MORE THAN TWICE WHAT REMAINED TO BE PAID (SECOND DEPT))/CURE (LOANS, DEFAULT, DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CURE A DEFAULT IN MONTHLY PAYMENTS ON A LOAN BEFORE PLAINTIFF SOUGHT TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN DEFENDANT OWING MORE THAN TWICE WHAT REMAINED TO BE PAID (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT, DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CURE A DEFAULT IN MONTHLY PAYMENTS ON A LOAN BEFORE PLAINTIFF SOUGHT TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN DEFENDANT OWING MORE THAN TWICE WHAT REMAINED TO BE PAID (SECOND DEPT))

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COMPLAINT DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBE THE GOODS FOR WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS SEEKING PAYMENT IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 3016, THEREFORE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE TO SPECIFICALLY DISPUTE EACH ITEM, A GENERAL DENIAL WAS SUFFICIENT, PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this breach of contract action should not have been granted. The criteria for a motion pursuant to CPLR 3016 (f) alleging the failure to pay for delivered goods were not met because the complaint did not sufficiently describe the goods and the prices. Therefore a general denial, as opposed to specific denials re: the items listed in the complaint, was sufficient. In addition defendant alleged the goods were not timely delivered, which is a valid defense that does not require specifically disputing each item described in the complaint:

In an action involving, inter alia, goods sold and delivered, CPLR 3016(f) permits a plaintiff to “set forth and number in his [or her] verified complaint the items of his [or her] claim and the reasonable value or agreed price of each.” “To meet the requirements of CPLR 3016(f), a complaint must contain a listing of the goods or services provided, with enough detail that it may readily be examined and its correctness tested entry by entry'” … . If the complaint meets these requirements, the defendant may not generally deny allegations of the complaint, but must, instead, specifically dispute the items on the plaintiff’s list … .

Here, the complaint failed to comply with CPLR 3016(f). The three invoices failed to state the price of each individual invoice item, or the date when each item was delivered. Although it was acknowledged that partial payment was made, the plaintiff did not specify what the partial payment was for. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant made a partial payment toward one invoice without specifying to which of the invoiced items the defendant’s payment was applied … .

In any event, even assuming  CPLR 3016(f) was complied with, a general denial is sufficient where a defense to the cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3016(f) speaks to the “entirety of the parties’ dealings” … . In this case, the defense—that the plaintiff breached the contract by untimely delivering the items in the contract—goes to the entirety of the parties’ dealings. Further, damages awarded on the counterclaim may offset liability for goods sold and delivered if the circumstances warrant it … . SSG Door & Hardware, Inc. v APS Contr., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 07481, Second Dept 11-7-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (COMPLAINT DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBE THE GOODS FOR WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS SEEKING PAYMENT IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 3016, THEREFORE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE TO SPECIFICALLY DISPUTE EACH ITEM, A GENERAL DENIAL WAS SUFFICIENT, PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (COMPLAINT DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBE THE GOODS FOR WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS SEEKING PAYMENT IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 3016, THEREFORE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE TO SPECIFICALLY DISPUTE EACH ITEM, A GENERAL DENIAL WAS SUFFICIENT, PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/DEBTOR-CREDITOR (BREACH OF CONTRACT, CIVIL PROCEDURE, COMPLAINT DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBE THE GOODS FOR WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS SEEKING PAYMENT IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 3016, THEREFORE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE TO SPECIFICALLY DISPUTE EACH ITEM, A GENERAL DENIAL WAS SUFFICIENT, PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3016 (COMPLAINT DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBE THE GOODS FOR WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS SEEKING PAYMENT IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 3016, THEREFORE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE TO SPECIFICALLY DISPUTE EACH ITEM, A GENERAL DENIAL WAS SUFFICIENT, PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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