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Violent Felony Conviction for which Defendant Not Yet Sentenced Can Be Considered in SORA Assessment

The First Department determined a violent felony conviction for which the defendant had not yet been sentenced could be used as a risk factor in a SORA risk level assessment.  People v Franco, 2013 NY Slip Op 03168, 1st Dept, 5-2-13

 

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Post-Arrest Search of Purse Not in Grabbable Area and Not in Vehicle Invalid

The Third Department made a careful analysis of the police actions after receiving an anonymous tip that two women in car were taking drugs.  The court determined the police acted properly in escalating the police intrusion from questioning to arrest, including the search of the car without a warrant.  However, the Third Department held that the post-arrest search of a purse that was not inside the car, and was not in the defendant’s “grabbable area,” was not valid.  In addition the Third Department held the defendant’s answer to a police officer’s question about who owned the purses should have been suppressed, because, at the time of the question, the defendant would not have reasonably believed she was free to go and she had not waived her right to remain silent.  But because her statement was not “involuntary” it would be available for impeachment at trial should she testify.  People v Boler, 104092, 3rd Dept, 5-2-13

SUPPRESSION, SUPPRESS

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Issue Whether Son of Sam Law Supersedes Retirement and Social Security Law Protection of Pension Benefits Not Preserved for Review​

This case was remitted to the Third Department after the Court of Appeals determined the issue whether the Son of Sam Law (allowing the victims of crimes to seek compensation from the perpetrator) superseded Retirement and Social Security Law 110, which protects pension payments from creditors, had not been preserved for review.  The Third Department made it clear that it believes the Son of Sam Law does supersede the Retirement and Social Security Law, but the court was prohibited from addressing the subject due to the procedural posture of the case.  Matter of NYS Office of Victim Services v Raucci, 513039, 3rd Dept, 5-2-13

 

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Department of Corrections Has Right to Force-Feed Inmate on Hunger Strike

The Court of Appeals determined that the state has the right to force-feed an inmate (Dorsey) who is on a hunger strike, once the inmate’s life is in jeopardy.  The opinion by Judge Graffeo is lengthy and deals with preservation requirements, the mootness doctrine, as well as the constitutional rights implicated in the refusal of medical care.  Judge Lippman dissented, addressing primarily his view that the issues discussed on appeal had not been preserved and the “exception to mootness” doctrine had been misapplied.  Judge Graffeo wrote:

It is therefore evident that DOCCS’ decision to intervene when Dorsey’s hunger strike progressed to the point that his life was in jeopardy was reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives. Taking action to interrupt an inmate hunger strike not only serves to preserve life and prevent a suicide but also to maintain institutional order and security. There was no way that DOCCS could effectuate these interests other than to seek a judicial order permitting feeding by nasogastric tube — less intrusive means had been attempted without success. Dorsey had been moved to the infirmary and medical staff within the facility had repeatedly counseled him in an attempt to get him to voluntarily abandon the hunger strike (as he had done before) to no avail. Matter of Bezio v Dorsey, No 65, CtApp, 5-2-13

 

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Conviction Reversed on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Grounds

After reviewing a litany of errors made by defense counsel which demonstrated a lack of familiarity with the procedural and evidentiary principles underlying a criminal prosecution, the Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, reversed defendant’s conviction because of the ineffectiveness of his counsel:

In order to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a court must consider whether defense counsel’s actions at trial constituted “‘egregious and prejudicial’ error such that defendant did not receive a fair trial” ….. While a single error by defense counsel at trial generally does not constitute ineffective assistance …, courts must examine defense counsel’s entire representation of defendant …. “[T]he claim of ineffectiveness is ultimately concerned with the fairness of the process as a whole” …. “Defense counsel are charged with managing the day-to-day conduct of defendant’s case and making strategic and tactical decisions” …. Counsel’s performance in fulfilling this role is “objectively evaluated” …”to determine whether it was consistent with strategic decisions of a ‘reasonably competent attorney'” ….  While defense counsel’s errors in thiscase individually may not constitute ineffective assistance, “the cumulative effect of defense counsel’s actions deprived defendant of meaningful representation” …. Defense counsel’s actions throughout this case showed an unfamiliarity with or disregard for basic criminal procedural and evidentiary law. At the very least, a defendant is entitled to representation by counsel that has such basic knowledge, particularly so, when that defendant is facing a major felony with significant liberty implications. Considering the seriousness of the errors in their totality, we conclude that defendant was deprived of a fair trial by less than meaningful representation. People v Oathout, No 81, CtApp, 5-2-13

 

Procedure for Sentencing a Second Felony Offender Not Followed

The Second Department sent the matter back for resentencing because of the sentencing court’s failure to follow the statutory procedure for adjudicating defendant a second felony offender:

As the People correctly concede, the sentencing court adjudicated the defendant a second felony offender (see Penal Law § 70.06) absent any indication of compliance with the procedural requirements of CPL 400.21, or any showing that the defendant was given notice and an opportunity to be heard …. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the County Court, Suffolk County, for resentencing in accordance with the mandates of CPL 400.21 ….  People v Puca, 2013 NY Slip Op 03114, 2nd Dept, 5-1-13

 

Failure to Cooperate with Probation Department Is Valid Reason for Enhanced Sentence

The Second Department determined defendant’s failure to cooperate with the probation department in violation of his plea agreement was a valid ground for an enhanced sentence:

The condition of the defendant’s plea that he cooperate with the probation department was explicit and objective, and was acknowledged, understood, and accepted by the defendant as part of the plea agreement …. The defendant’s violation of that condition, by refusing to be interviewed by the probation officer, allowed the Supreme Court to impose the enhanced sentence.  People v Patterson, 2013 NY Slip Op 03113, 5-1-18

 

Procedure for Sentencing as Persistent Felony Offender Not Followed

In sending the matter back for resentencing, the Second Department noted that the statutory procedure for sentencing as a persistent felony offender had not been followed:

The Supreme Court erred in failing to provide proper notice of the persistent felony offender hearing pursuant to CPL 400.20(1)-(4), and to set forth specific reasons supporting its determination to sentence the defendant as a persistent felony offender (see Penal Law § 70.10[2]…). People v Brown, 2013 NY Slip Op 03111, 2nd Dept, 3-1-13

 

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Evidence of Physical Injury (re Assault) Insufficient

In reversing an Assault 3rd conviction, the Second Department determined, under a weight of the evidence analysis, the proof of “physical injury” was insufficient:

Upon reviewing the record here, we find that the verdict of guilt was against the weight of the evidence, since the evidence presented at trial did not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the complainant sustained a “physical injury” within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00(9). Physical injury is defined as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain” (Penal Law § 10.00[9]). The complainant testified that he sustained bruising and scraping to his right arm, neck, and back, but he did not seek any medical treatment or miss any work. The complainant also provided no details that would corroborate his subjective description of pain, nor did he take any pain medication. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence that the complainant suffered a “physical injury”…, and the judgment must be reversed and the indictment dismissed. People v Boley, 2013 NY Slip Op 03109, 2nd Dept, 5-1-13

 

Sentencing Court Need Not Inform Defendant of Possible Consequences of Violating Postrelease Supervision

In finding that a defendant need not be informed at sentencing of the consequences of violating postrelease supervision, the Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Read, explained:

We have repeatedly held that a trial court “must advise a defendant of the direct consequences of [a] plea,” but “has no obligation to explain to defendants who plead guilty the possibility that collateral consequences may attach to their criminal convictions” * * *. By contrast, collateral consequences are “peculiar to the individual and generally result from the actions 104 taken by agencies the court does not control”* * *. … [T]he consequences of violating postrelease supervision are uncertain at the time of the plea, depending, as they do, upon how a defendant acts in relation to a condition tailored to his circumstances and imposed in the future. Thus, such consequences are properly described as “peculiar” to the individual. Second, the New York State Board of Parole — not the courts — is responsible for establishing the conditions of a defendant’s postrelease supervision * * *. In sum, the ramifications of a defendant’s violation of the conditions of postrelease supervision are classic collateral consequences of a criminal conviction – – i.e., they are “peculiar to the individual” and the product of “actions taken by agencies the court does not control”… . People v Monk, No 77, CtApp, 4-30-13

 

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