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Curtailing of Defense Counsel’s Summation Argument Re: Lack of Motive Was (Harmless) Error

Although the Second Department found the error harmless, the court noted that the trial court improperly curtailed defense counsel’s summation argument concerning the lack of a motive.  People v Papas, 2013 NY Slip Op 07065, 2nd Dept 10-30-13

 

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Admission of Cell-Phone-Location Data Did Not Required Frye Hearing; Prior Crime Evidence Properly Admitted to Prove Defendant’s Identity as Perpetrator of Charged Crime

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mastro, the Second Department affirmed the defendant’s murder conviction.  One piece of evidence against the defendant was location-data based on the use of defendant’s cell phone.  The Second Department determined there was no need for a Frye hearing before expert testimony about cell-phone location was presented because no novel scientific theory was involved. The Second Department also determined prior crimes demonstrating a similar unique pattern to that of the charged offense were admissible to prove identity.  With respect to some of the prior crime evidence, which did not sufficiently match the pattern of the charged crime to be admissible on the issue of identity, the erroneous admission of that evidence was deemed harmless. In discussing the prior-crime evidence, the court wrote:

In this case, the evidence of other crimes was offered to establish the defendant’s identity as [the victim’s] killer. Such evidence may be admitted if, as a threshold matter, the defendant’s identity is in issue and is not “conclusively established” by other evidence …, and it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is the same person who committed the other crimes …. Here, it cannot be said that the defendant’s identity as the killer was conclusively established so as to warrant the preclusion of other crimes evidence to prove identity. Indeed, while the evidence that the defendant was the person who killed [the victim] was compelling, it was also entirely circumstantial. Moreover, the defendant vigorously contested the identification issue and presented as a defense the assertion that his employer… had been the actual killer. Thus, the identity of the murderer was a disputed issue in the case, and any admissible evidence tending to establish identification was relevant… . People v Littlejohn, 2013 NY Slip Op 07063, 2nd Dept 10-30-13

 

Judge’s Failure to Comply with CPL Re: Response to Jury Note Required Reversal

The Second Department held that the trial court’s failure to comply with Criminal Procedure Law 310.10 with respect to responding to a note from the jury concerning accomplice liability required reversal (despite the absence of an objection):

A new trial is required due to the trial court’s failure to meaningfully comply with CPL 310.10. During deliberations, the jury sent four notes to the trial court. The record reflects that, on the fourth occasion, the court did not disclose the contents of the note to the prosecutor and defense counsel until serially reading, and immediately responding to, the questions contained therein in the presence of the jury. All three of the questions in this note concerned the subject of accomplice liability.

The jury’s requests for further explanation of the meaning of accomplice liability within the context of this case required a “substantive response”, rather than a merely “ministerial” one … . As such, the trial court’s failure to afford defense counsel “the opportunity to provide suggestions” … regarding the court’s responses to the jury’s questions constituted “a mode of proceedings error . . . requiring reversal” …, despite defense counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s handling of the jury’s fourth note … .  People v Gadson, 2013 NY Slip Op 07059, 2nd Dept 10-30-13

 

(Harmless) Error for Prosecutor to Ask If Other Witnesses’ Testimony Was Untrue and to Ask About Defendant’s Silence Upon Apprehension

The Second Department noted that it was error for the prosecutor to ask defendant on cross-examination whether testimony which contradicted defendant’s was untrue, and to ask about his silence after he was apprehended. The errors were deemed harmless, however:

The defendant correctly contends that the prosecutor improperly asked him on cross-examination whether a prosecution witness’s testimony was “not true” because it contradicted the defendant’s recollection of events… . We also agree with the defendant that the prosecutor improperly cross-examined him about his silence when he was apprehended by the police …. However, under the facts of this case, the errors were harmless and did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial … . Indeed, with respect to the questions concerning the defendant’s silence after being apprehended, the trial court alleviated any prejudice by sustaining defense counsel’s objections to the two offending questions, striking the second question and answer from the record, and directing the jury to disregard the second question and answer. People v Cosme, 2013 NY Slip Op 07057, 2nd Dept 10-30-13

 

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Invocation of Right to Counsel When Not in Custody Can Be Withdrawn Without Attorney Present

The Third Department determined defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel when he was not in custody (on September 4, 2004) could be withdrawn without an attorney present and did not, therefore, require the suppression of subsequent statements made three weeks later:

The right to counsel indelibly attaches in two limited situations – where formal judicial proceedings against a defendant have commenced and where an uncharged defendant, who is in custody, has retained or requested an attorney … .  However, “[a] suspect who is not in custody when he or she invokes the right to counsel can withdraw the request and be questioned by the police” … .  As defendant was not in custody at the time he invoked his right to counsel on September 4, 2009, he was free to withdraw that request or waive such right and speak with the police without having an attorney present – particularly in view of the approximately three weeks that elapsed between his initial request for an attorney and his subsequent statements to law enforcement … . People v Cade, 103443, 3rd Dept 10-24-13

 

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Loss of Teeth is “Serious Injury” Re: Assault Second

The First Department determined the loss of teeth (in an assault) was a “serious injury” within the meaning of Penal Law 10.00 (10) because the loss of teeth constituted a “serious and protracted disfigurement” notwithstanding replacement by a prostheses:

The element of serious physical injury (Penal Law § 10.00[10]) was established, because the victim’s permanent loss of four front teeth constituted a protracted impairment of her health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily organ … . Since the teeth are lost, the victim can never eat with them, notwithstanding that she has been fitted with a prosthetic device; accordingly, her loss is not just protracted, but permanent. While the fact that damage to an organ has been successfully repaired may affect whether the injury qualifies as serious …, this does not apply when the organ is permanently lost, irrespective of whether it is replaced by a prosthesis.

Furthermore, the victim’s loss of four front teeth also constituted a “serious and protracted disfigurement,” since “a reasonable observer would find her altered appearance distressing or objectionable” … . The fact that the victim received a removable prosthetic device did not ameliorate the seriousness of her injuries, since whenever she removes the device, the disfigurement will be readily apparent.  People v Everett, 2013 NY Slip Op 06954, 1st Dept 10-24-13

 

 

Partial Closure of Courtroom During Testimony of Undercover Police Okay

he Second Department determined partial closure of the courtroom during the testimony of undercover police detectives was proper:

…[T]he court providently adopted a reasonable alternative to full closure of the courtroom, excluding the general public and allowing the defendant’s sister and the defendant’s friend to be present during the testimony of the two undercover detectives, and placing a blackboard in front of the detectives so as to shield their identities from the sister and the friend. The two undercover detectives testified at a Hinton hearing … that they had conducted a long-term undercover operation in the particular housing project where the defendant had been arrested, and that there were unapprehended or “lost” subjects from that investigation. Further, they both testified that they had been threatened by subjects in the past and their safety would be jeopardized if their identities were revealed, that they both planned to conduct future narcotics operations in the area and that one detective planned to return to the particular housing project, that they currently had pending cases in the courthouse in which they were testifying, and that they took special precautions when testifying in court so as to protect their identities. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, this testimony exceeded mere “unparticularized impressions of the vicissitudes of undercover narcotics work in general” and included particularized references to their own work which established a specific link between their safety concerns and open-court testimony in this case … . People v Tate, 2013 NY Slip Op 06882, 2nd Dept 10-23-13

 

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Effect of Witness’ Invocation of Fifth Amendment Privilege on Fairness Explained

The Second Department explained when a witness’ asserting the privilege against self-incrimination constitutes reversible error and noted that the introduction of a photograph of the murder victim when he was alive was (harmless) error:

“[A] witness’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege may amount to reversible error in two instances: one, when the prosecution attempts to build its case on inferences drawn from the witness’s assertion of the privilege, and two, when the inferences unfairly prejudice defendant by adding critical weight’ to the prosecution’s case in a form not subject to cross-examination” … . “Absent a conscious and flagrant attempt by the prosecutor to build a case out of the inferences arising from the use of the testimonial privilege or without some indication that the witness’s refusal to testify adds critical weight to the People’s case in a form not subject to cross-examination, reversal is not warranted” … . Under the circumstances presented here, invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by a prosecution witness did not add critical weight to the prosecution’s case, and the defendant was not deprived of his right to a fair trial by that testimony… .  People v Berry, 2013 NY Slip Op 06872, 2nd Dept 10-23-13

 

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Error to Preclude Witness for Sexual Offender in Article 10 Proceeding

In a Mental Hygiene Law article 10 proceeding to determine whether Enrique D, a sexual offender, suffered from a mental abnormality justifying civil confinement, the Court of Appeals determined the judge erred in refusing to allow a former girlfriend, Naomi N, to testify about whether Enrique ever tried to offend against her and whether Enrique respected her “boundaries:”

In the circumstances of this case, Supreme Court abused its discretion by precluding Naomi N. from testifying.  Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08 (g) provides that a respondent in an article 10 proceeding “may, as a matter of right, testify in his or her own behalf, call and examine other witnesses, and produce other evidence in his or her behalf.”  This provision manifestly does not limit a respondent to expert witnesses.  The pertinent question is whether a witness — expert or lay — has material and relevant evidence to offer on the issues to be resolved.

Here, Naomi N.’s rejected testimony was relevant to the State expert’s diagnosis of paraphilia NOS — non-consent.  The jury was asked to decide whether Enrique D. suffered a condition, disease, or defect that predisposed him to commit sex offenses, and whether that condition caused him serious difficulty in controlling his sex offending conduct.  With respect to the first prong, Naomi N.’s testimony would have called into question whether Enrique D. exhibited a longstanding fixation on nonconsenting women; as to the second, her testimony was relevant to show whether he experienced difficulty controlling his sexual behavior.  Matter of State of New York v Enrique D, 168, CtApp 10-22-13

 

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Recklessness Demonstrated In Operation of Vehicle

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Graffeo, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions for reckless manslaughter and reckless assault after defendant’s car struck another car head on.  There was evidence defendant was deliberately speeding (134 mph) in an area he knew to include a sharp turn.  The court explained the difference between recklessness and criminal negligence in this context:

The mental states of recklessness and criminal negligence share many similarities.  Both require that there be a “substantial and unjustifiable risk” that death or injury will occur; that the defendant engage in some blameworthy conduct contributing to that risk; and that the defendant’s conduct amount to a “gross deviation” from how a reasonable person would act (compare Penal Law § 15.05 [3] [Recklessly] with Penal Law  § 15.05 [4] [Criminal Negligence]).  The only distinction between the two mental states is that recklessness requires that the defendant be “aware of” and “consciously disregard” the risk while criminal negligence is met when the defendant negligently fails to perceive the risk … .

In the context of automobile accidents involving speeding, we have held that the culpable risk-creating conduct necessary to support a finding of recklessness or criminal negligence generally requires “some additional affirmative act” aside from “driving faster than the posted speed limit” … .  Here, there was ample proof that defendant did more than merely drive faster than the legal limit — indeed, there was eyewitness testimony that he was traveling at more than double the posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour.  Moreover, before the collision, defendant stopped his vehicle in the middle of the unlit road and revved the engine. He then hit the gas pedal and accelerated to an extremely high rate of speed before crossing the double line into oncoming traffic.  Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence showed that defendant used a public road as his personal drag strip to showcase the capabilities of his modified sports car.  Although the jury acquitted defendant of driving while ability impaired (by alcohol), there was evidence that he had been drinking and smoking marijuana that evening … .  The evidence therefore demonstrated that defendant engaged in conduct exhibiting “the kind of seriously blameworthy carelessness whose seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community’s general sense of right and wrong” … .

Furthermore, the proof was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that defendant acted recklessly — by consciously disregarding the risk he created — as opposed to negligently failing to perceive that risk.  Defendant was familiar with the curve in the road …, having driven by there on a number of prior occasions, and he had been warned twice about speeding into that very section of the road. People v Asaro, 158, CtApp 10-22-13

 

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