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MANIFEST NECESSITY JUSTIFIED DECLARATION OF A MISTRIAL OVER DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION, COMPLAINANT IN THIS SEX OFFENSE TRIAL COULD NOT BE LOCATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined manifest necessity justified the declaration of the mistrial over the defendant’s objection because a crucial prosecution witness (the complainant in a sex offense prosecution) could not be located. Although there was no evidence the defendant caused the witness’s unavailability, there was evidence the witness’s mother was responsible:

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The petitioner was charged with course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree and predatory sexual assault against a child, and the case proceeded to trial. After the jury was sworn, but before opening statements were made and before any testimony was offered, the prosecutor requested three consecutive continuances, as the complainant and her mother could not be located . * * *

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When a mistrial is granted over the defendant’s objection or without the defendant’s consent, a retrial is precluded unless ” there was manifest necessity for the mistrial or the ends of public justice would be defeated'” … . ” Manifest necessity'” means a ” high degree of necessity'” based on reasons that are ” actual and substantial'”… . Moreover, before declaring a mistrial, a court must explore all appropriate alternatives and must provide a sufficient basis in the record for resorting to this “drastic measure” … . Where a mistrial is premised upon the claimed unavailability of crucial prosecution evidence, including witnesses, the validity of that claim is subject to the “strictest scrutiny” since a prosecutor is not entitled to a mistrial merely to gain a more favorable opportunity to convict … .

Here, the prosecutor made a sufficient showing that the unavailability of the 13-year-old complainant, who had absconded to an unknown location with her mother, could be factually attributed to some person acting on the petitioner’s behalf … . Moreover, the trial court properly gave the prosecutor additional time to find the witness and considered other alternatives, including the prosecutor’s application for leave to introduce at the trial the witness’s grand jury testimony.  Matter of Palacios v Singas, 2017 NY Slip Op 06652, Second Dept 9-27-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (MANIFEST NECESSITY JUSTIFIED DECLARATION OF A MISTRIAL OVER DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION, COMPLAINANT IN THIS SEX OFFENSE TRIAL COULD NOT BE LOCATED (SECOND DEPT))/MISTRIAL (CRIMINAL LAW, MANIFEST NECESSITY JUSTIFIED DECLARATION OF A MISTRIAL OVER DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION, COMPLAINANT IN THIS SEX OFFENSE TRIAL COULD NOT BE LOCATED (SECOND DEPT))/MANIFEST NECESSITY (MISTRIAL, CRIMINAL LAW, MANIFEST NECESSITY JUSTIFIED DECLARATION OF A MISTRIAL OVER DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION, COMPLAINANT IN THIS SEX OFFENSE TRIAL COULD NOT BE LOCATED (SECOND DEPT))

JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON ARSON FOURTH (RECKLESS) AS A LESSER INCLUDED OF ARSON SECOND (INTENTIONAL), NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s arson second conviction, determined the jury should have been instructed on the lesser included offense of arson fourth:

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The relevant difference between these crimes in this case is that second-degree arson involves intentionally damaging a building by starting a fire, while fourth-degree arson involves recklessly damaging a building by intentionally starting a fire … . Viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, there was a reasonable view of the evidence that he did not intend to damage his apartment, or any other part of the building, by setting a fire to a video game console, and that his sole object in doing so was to kill himself through smoke inhalation. It cannot be said that the only interpretation of defendant’s actions was that he intended to damage the building by fire. Although a natural and probable consequence of setting the fire was that the fire would damage the building, this did not conclusively establish such an intent, which was for the jury to decide … . On these facts, the jury could have found that, rather than actually intending to cause damage, defendant was “aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [damage would] occur” … . People v Acevedo, 2017 NY Slip Op 06626, First Dept 9-26-17

CRIMINAL LAW (JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON ARSON FOURTH (RECKLESS) AS A LESSER INCLUDED OF ARSON SECOND (INTENTIONAL), NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, ARSON, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON ARSON FOURTH (RECKLESS) AS A LESSER INCLUDED OF ARSON SECOND (INTENTIONAL), NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE (ARSON, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON ARSON FOURTH (RECKLESS) AS A LESSER INCLUDED OF ARSON SECOND (INTENTIONAL), NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/ARSON (JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON ARSON FOURTH (RECKLESS) AS A LESSER INCLUDED OF ARSON SECOND (INTENTIONAL), NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))

FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR WHO EXPRESSED BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE CREDIBILITY OF POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the for cause challenge to a jury should have been granted. The juror exhibited a bias in favor of the credibility of police officers:

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The court should have granted defendant’s challenge for cause to a prospective juror, a police officer who stated on voir dire that he believed that the testimony of police witnesses would be accurate, except insofar as they were relaying inaccurate information provided by a victim or other witness. Pressed by defense counsel on whether he thought it was possible for a police witness to lie, exaggerate, or be mistaken, the prospective juror allowed that there was “a little room” for this and stated that he “suppose[d]” it was possible.

“[A] prospective juror whose statements raise a serious doubt regarding the ability to be impartial must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial” … . Bias expressed by a prospective juror is purged only when, in response to additional inquiry, the juror is able to “voice[] with conviction” that he or she will be able to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence and the court’s instructions … . The link between the biased state of mind previously indicated by the prospective juror’s statements and the assurance of the ability to render an impartial verdict “must be evident” … . “Where there remains any doubt in the wake of such statements, . . . the prospective jurors should be discharged for cause” … .

The panelist clearly showed a predisposition to believe that police officers testify truthfully … . Viewed as a whole, his responses to followup questions did not “expressly state that his prior state of mind . . . [would] not influence his verdict” … . People v Whitefield, 2017 NY Slip Op 06618, First Dept 9-26-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR WHO EXPRESSED BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE CREDIBILITY OF POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/JURORS (CRIMINAL LAW, FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR WHO EXPRESSED BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE CREDIBILITY OF POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/FOR CAUSE JUROR CHALLENGE  (FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR WHO EXPRESSED BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE CREDIBILITY OF POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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DEFENDANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND HE HAD A RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AT THE TIME HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE EVEN IF HE COULD NOT AFFORD ONE, BOTH STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined that the People did not demonstrate defendant understood he had a right to an attorney at the time he made statement, even if he could not afford one. Both of his statements should have been suppressed:

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… [T]he People failed to establish that defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights before giving oral and written statements to a detective at the precinct. In a videotaped statement to the prosecutor, made several hours after the statements to the detective, defendant said, “I cannot pay for a lawyer, why do I write yes or no.” The prosecutor then said, “[D]o you understand if you can’t, the Court will give you one?,” to which defendant responded, “[S]o I put no.” After the prosecutor reread the warnings defendant stated, “[Y]es, I need to have a lawyer . . . I cannot pay a lawyer.” The prosecutor next asked, “[B]ut do you understand that one will be provided if you cannot pay,” and defendant again stated “yes, but I can’t pay for a lawyer.” Finally, the prosecutor told defendant, “[O]kay, so you can write yes’ if you understand, and no’ if you don’t understand,” and defendant said, “[Y]es, I do understand.” Based on this exchange, the court correctly suppressed defendant’s videotaped statement. Given defendant’s failure to comprehend that he had the right to an attorney at the time of his statements if he could not afford one, it is evident that defendant’s previous statement to the detective should also be suppressed … .

We find that the error was not harmless, because there is a reasonable possibility that it contributed to defendant’s guilty plea … . People v Flores, 2017 NY Slip Op 06629, First Dept 9-26-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND HE HAD A RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AT THE TIME HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE EVEN IF HE COULD NOT AFFORD ONE, BOTH STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND HE HAD A RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AT THE TIME HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE EVEN IF HE COULD NOT AFFORD ONE, BOTH STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND HE HAD A RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AT THE TIME HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE EVEN IF HE COULD NOT AFFORD ONE, BOTH STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FIRST DEPT))/SUPPRESSION (STATEMENTS, CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND HE HAD A RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AT THE TIME HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE EVEN IF HE COULD NOT AFFORD ONE, BOTH STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FIRST DEPT))/MIRANDA WARNINGS DEFENDANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND HE HAD A RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AT THE TIME HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE EVEN IF HE COULD NOT AFFORD ONE, BOTH STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FIRST DEPT))

 

HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT A VEHICLE FOR RELIEF FOR ISSUES WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL AND IS NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL A PRISONER IS ENTITLED TO IMMEDIATE RELEASE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department noted that habeas corpus is not a vehicle for relief for issues which could have been raised on appeal and is not available until the maximum sentence has been served (must be entitled to immediate release):

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Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition, as “habeas corpus relief is not an appropriate remedy for resolving claims that could have been or that were raised on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion” … . Petitioner’s contentions regarding his sentence were or could have been raised on his direct appeal and in his CPL article 440 motions to vacate the judgment and sentence … . In addition, even if petitioner’s claims were determined to have merit and his sentences were to run concurrently, he would not be entitled to immediate release from prison and, consequently, habeas relief is not appropriate … . To that end, it is the expiration of the maximum sentence, and not the conditional release date, that is required to establish entitlement to release in a habeas corpus proceeding, and petitioner has not yet reached the maximum expiration of his sentences even if they were concurrent … . People v D’Amico, 2017 NY Slip Op 06574, Third Dept 9-21-17

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Similar issue and result in People v Kirkpatrick, 2017 NY Slip Op 06578, Third Dept 9-21-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT A VEHICLE FOR RELIEF FOR ISSUES WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL AND IS NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL A PRISONER IS ENTITLED TO IMMEDIATE RELEASE (THIRD DEPT))/HABEAS CORPUS (HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT A VEHICLE FOR RELIEF FOR ISSUES WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL AND IS NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL A PRISONER IS ENTITLED TO IMMEDIATE RELEASE (THIRD DEPT))

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FAILURE TO FILE PREDICATE FELONY STATEMENT REQUIRED RESENTENCING DESPITE FAILURE TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE MOTION TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the failure to file a predicate felony statement required resentencing, despite the failure to preserve the issue by an appropriate motion:

Defendant contends, among other things, that the resentence is invalid because a predicate felony statement was not filed in accordance with CPL 400.21 (2) before he was sentenced as a second felony drug offender … . Although this claim has not been preserved for our review due to defendant’s failure to make an appropriate motion … , under the particular circumstances presented, we exercise our discretion in the interest of justice to take corrective action … . The People concede and the record reveals that a predicate felony statement was never filed as is required by CPL 400.21 (2). In addition, there is no indication that defendant had notice that he would be sentenced as a second felony drug offender when he admitted to the probation violations or at resentencing. Consequently, defendant did not have an opportunity to contest his prior convictions. In view of this, the resentence must be vacated and the matter remitted to County Court for resentencing … . People v Fenner, 2017 NY Slip Op 06483, Third Dept 9-14-17

CRIMINAL LAW (FAILURE TO FILE PREDICATE FELONY STATEMENT REQUIRED RESENTENCING DESPITE FAILURE TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE MOTION TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PREDICATE FELONY, SENTENCING, FAILURE TO FILE PREDICATE FELONY STATEMENT REQUIRED RESENTENCING DESPITE FAILURE TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE MOTION TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, PREDICATE FELONY STATEMENT, PRESERVATION, FAILURE TO FILE PREDICATE FELONY STATEMENT REQUIRED RESENTENCING DESPITE FAILURE TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE MOTION TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (THIRD DEPT))/SENTENCING (PREDICATE FELONY STATEMENT, FAILURE TO FILE PREDICATE FELONY STATEMENT REQUIRED RESENTENCING DESPITE FAILURE TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE MOTION TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (THIRD DEPT))/PREDICATE FELONY STATEMENT (FAILURE TO FILE PREDICATE FELONY STATEMENT REQUIRED RESENTENCING DESPITE FAILURE TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE MOTION TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (THIRD DEPT))

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(HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE WITNESS ABOUT HER GANG AFFILIATION, GANG MEMBERSHIP HAD NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE CHARGES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in affirming defendant’s conviction, noted that it was error to allow the prosecutor to cross-examine a defense witness about the witness’s gang affiliation. Gang membership had no relationship to the charges:

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The Supreme Court erred in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine a defense witness regarding her possible gang affiliations since there was no connection between gang membership and the alleged crime … . It was also improper to allow the prosecutor to introduce extrinsic evidence to impeach that witness’s credibility when she denied being affiliated with a gang … . However, because there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt and no significant probability that these errors contributed to the defendant’s convictions, the errors were harmless … . People v Chinloy, 2017 NY Slip Op 06450, Second Dept 9-13-17

CRIMINAL LAW ((HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE WITNESS ABOUT HER GANG AFFILIATION, GANG MEMBERSHIP HAD NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE WITNESS ABOUT HER GANG AFFILIATION, GANG MEMBERSHIP HAD NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))/GANGS (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE WITNESS ABOUT HER GANG AFFILIATION, GANG MEMBERSHIP HAD NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))

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DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION BECAUSE HER GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS RELATED TO THE GRAND LARCENY CHARGE (STEALING REAL PROPERTY), HOWEVER SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY RE THE FORGED DEED CHARGES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined charges relating to a forged deed were not protected the by the transactional immunity afforded grand jury witnesses. Defendant had testified before a grand jury about a burglary at real property she claimed to own. Subsequently defendant was charged with grand larceny (stealing the real property), possessing a forged deed, filing the forged deed and perjury (in the grand jury proceeding). The Second Department determined the grand larceny count was properly dismissed because it directly related to defendant’s testimony before the grand jury (claiming  that she owned the real property). However, the charges forged deed charges were not related to her grand jury testimony and therefore those charges were reinstated:

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The defendant’s grand jury testimony that she was the owner of the real property would be relevant to establishing the defendant’s alleged intent to deprive the rightful owners of the real property … . Thus, the defendant testified to the “transaction, matter or thing” for which she stands indicted … , and her testimony may “tend to a conviction when combined with proof of other circumstances which others may supply” … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly found that the defendant’s testimony conferred immunity upon her from prosecution of grand larceny in the second degree. * * *

… [A]lthough the defendant testified that she owned the real property, she did not testify how she purportedly came into ownership of the real property. Her claim of ownership is not relevant to establishing her knowledge that the deed to the real property was forged, her intent to use that deed to defraud another person, her presentment of the deed to the City Register, or her belief that the deed would be accepted for filing … , and thus, does not “tend to a conviction when combined with proof of other circumstances which others may supply” … . Under these circumstances, the defendant was not entitled to immunity from prosecution for criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree and offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree, and counts two and three of the indictment must be reinstated. People v O’Neal, 2017 NY Slip Op 06461, Second Dept 9-13-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (IMMUNITY, GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION BECAUSE HER GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS RELATED TO THE GRAND LARCENY CHARGE (STEALING REAL PROPERTY), HOWEVER SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY RE THE FORGED DEED CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, IMMUNITY, GRAND JURY TESTIMONY,  DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION BECAUSE HER GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS RELATED TO THE GRAND LARCENY CHARGE (STEALING REAL PROPERTY), HOWEVER SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY RE THE FORGED DEED CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))/GRAND JURY (IMMUNITY, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION BECAUSE HER GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS RELATED TO THE GRAND LARCENY CHARGE (STEALING REAL PROPERTY), HOWEVER SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY RE THE FORGED DEED CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))/IMMUNITY (CRIMINAL LAW, GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION BECAUSE HER GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS RELATED TO THE GRAND LARCENY CHARGE (STEALING REAL PROPERTY), HOWEVER SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY RE THE FORGED DEED CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))

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(HARMLESS) ERROR TO SHOW THE INJURED CHILD TO THE JURY IN THIS SHAKEN BABY CASE, THE EXTENT OF THE LONG-TERM INJURIES WAS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in affirming defendant’s conviction, noted that it was (harmless) error to show the jury the injured child in this shaken baby case because the extent of the long-term effects of the injury was not an element of the crime:

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We agree with the defendant that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in allowing the People to display the injured child to the jury during the mother’s testimony, since the extent of the child’s long-term injuries was not an element of the crime … , and such display only served to prejudice the defense by arousing the emotions of the jury … . Nevertheless, the error was harmless … . Given the extensive and uncontroverted medical evidence supporting the diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome and that the child’s injuries could have only occurred when the child was with the defendant, the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. Moreover, there is no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error … . People v Narine, 2017 NY Slip Op 06460, Second Dept 9-13-17

CRIMINAL LAW ((HARMLESS) ERROR TO SHOW THE INJURED CHILD TO THE JURY IN THIS SHAKEN BABY CASE, THE EXTENT OF THE LONG-TERM INJURIES WAS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO SHOW THE INJURED CHILD TO THE JURY IN THIS SHAKEN BABY CASE, THE EXTENT OF THE LONG-TERM INJURIES WAS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME (SECOND DEPT))/SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME (CRIMINAL LAW, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO SHOW THE INJURED CHILD TO THE JURY IN THIS SHAKEN BABY CASE, THE EXTENT OF THE LONG-TERM INJURIES WAS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME (SECOND DEPT))

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(HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW THE LEAD DETECTIVE TO EXPLAIN THE ROLES PLAYED BY PERSONS RECORDED BY THE WIRETAPS, AND (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ADMIT THE WIRETAP ORDERS INTO EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in affirming the conviction of defendants as part of a large scale heroin distribution operation, determined it was error to allow the lead detective to explain to the jury the roles played by the persons recorded by the wiretaps. It was also error to admit the wiretap orders into evidence. Given the overwhelming evidence, however, the errors were deemed harmless:

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… [W]hile “it was error to permit the prosecutor to elicit testimony [from the investigating detective] as to the roles played by the individuals overheard in the phone calls[ ] and the relationships among them, . . . and the meanings of certain case-specific’ terms that he had discovered in the course of the investigation” … , the error was harmless, “as the proof of the defendant’s commission of the charged crimes was overwhelming, and there is no significant probability that, but for the error, the verdict . . . would have been less adverse'” … .

The County Court also improvidently exercised its discretion in admitting into evidence the wiretap court orders. Although the court orders were relevant, as authorizing the wiretapping that led to a large part of the People’s evidence, and their admission had a tendency to prove the existence of a material fact, i.e., that the wiretapping was authorized … , that same fact could have been established without the prejudice they caused. Nevertheless, here, too, the error was harmless. People v Guzman, 2017 NY Slip Op 06454, Second Dept 9-13-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW ((HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW THE LEAD DETECTIVE TO EXPLAIN THE ROLES PLAYED BY PERSONS RECORDED BY THE WIRETAPS, AND (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ADMIT THE WIRETAP ORDERS INTO EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW THE LEAD DETECTIVE TO EXPLAIN THE ROLES PLAYED BY PERSONS RECORDED BY THE WIRETAPS, AND (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ADMIT THE WIRETAP ORDERS INTO EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))/WIRETAPS (CRIMINAL LAW, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW THE LEAD DETECTIVE TO EXPLAIN THE ROLES PLAYED BY PERSONS RECORDED BY THE WIRETAPS, AND (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ADMIT THE WIRETAP ORDERS INTO EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))/EAVESDROPPING (CRIMINAL LAW, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW THE LEAD DETECTIVE TO EXPLAIN THE ROLES PLAYED BY PERSONS RECORDED BY THE WIRETAPS, AND (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ADMIT THE WIRETAP ORDERS INTO EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))

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