You are here: / Criminal Law

DEFENSE COUNSEL, DURING VOIR DIRE, RELIED ON THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATION THAT THE COMPLAINANT WOULD NOT TESTIFY, BEFORE OPENING STATEMENTS DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INFORMED THE COMPLAINANT WOULD TESTIFY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined defense counsel had relied, during voir dire, on the People’s representation that the complainant could not be located and would not testify. After voir dire, but before opening statements, defense counsel was informed the complainant had been found and would testify:

The People had omitted the complainant from their witness list because they were unable to locate him in the two years between the incident and the trial. However, after the jury was selected, and just before opening arguments, they advised the court that they had located the complainant, and the court permitted him to testify the next day.

Defense counsel clearly “relied to her detriment on her expectation that the People would not call this witness,” the sole eyewitness to the incident, and was substantially prejudiced by the change of course… . Defense counsel had used voir dire to question jurors about other issues, including their ability to evaluate videotape evidence, believing that this would be the main evidence in the case, and she had not questioned prospective jurors about their ability to impartially evaluate a victim’s testimony. In addition, because the defense had represented to the jury during voir dire that no complainant would appear, the complainant’s appearance at trial would undermine the defense’s credibility.

Thus, as counsel pointed out, her questioning and selection of jurors was geared entirely to a trial without the complainant’s testimony, and was totally unsuited to a trial with his testimony. People v Kyser, 2018 NY Slip Op 01160, Frist Dept 2-20-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENSE COUNSEL, DURING VOIR DIRE, RELIED ON THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATION THAT THE COMPLAINANT WOULD NOT TESTIFY, BEFORE OPENING STATEMENTS DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INFORMED THE COMPLAINANT WOULD TESTIFY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/VOIR DIRE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL, DURING VOIR DIRE, RELIED ON THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATION THAT THE COMPLAINANT WOULD NOT TESTIFY, BEFORE OPENING STATEMENTS DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INFORMED THE COMPLAINANT WOULD TESTIFY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/WITNESSES (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL, DURING VOIR DIRE, RELIED ON THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATION THAT THE COMPLAINANT WOULD NOT TESTIFY, BEFORE OPENING STATEMENTS DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INFORMED THE COMPLAINANT WOULD TESTIFY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))

,

DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE SORA HEARING, NEW HEARING ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court, noted that a defendant has the right to be present at a SORA hearing, and here the defendant did not waive that right:

“A sex offender facing risk level classification under [SORA] has a due process right to be present at the SORA hearing” … . While a defendant may waive the right to be present at the hearing, in order to establish a valid waiver it must be shown, inter alia, that “the defendant was advised of the hearing date, of his right to be present, and that the hearing would be conducted in his absence”… . Here, there is no evidence that the defendant was notified of the adjourned hearing date. Therefore, as the People correctly concede, the record fails to establish that the defendant voluntarily waived his right to be present at the hearing … . People v Hunt, 2018 NY Slip Op 01087, Second Dept 2-14-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT, DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE SORA HEARING, NEW HEARING ORDERED (SECOND DEPT))/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE SORA HEARING, NEW HEARING ORDERED (SECOND DEPT))

,

EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS GANG ASSAULT CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the proof of serious physical injury in this gang assault case was insufficient:

The evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the injuries sustained by the victim constituted serious physical injury (see Penal Law § 10.00[10]), an element of gang assault in the first degree … . Although there was testimony that the victim still had some physical effects of the assault at the time of trial, the evidence on this was limited and, in any event, the record before the jury did not show that the injury was such that a reasonable observer would find the victim’s appearance distressing or objectionable … . It is also undisputed that the victim’s injuries did not impair his general health … . People v Garay, 2018 NY Slip Op 01117, First Dept 2-15-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS GANG ASSAULT CASE (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS GANG ASSAULT CASE (FIRST DEPT))/PHYSICAL INJURY (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS GANG ASSAULT CASE (FIRST DEPT))

NO NEED TO SPECIFY CRIME TO BE COMMITTED DURING A CHARGED BURGLARY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, RESTITUTION FOR AN UNCHARGED BURGLARY IMPROPERLY ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the superior court information (SCI) charging burglary did not need to specify the crime to be committed during the robbery. The court further found that it was error to impose restitution for a burglary which was not charged in SCI:

Defendant further asserts that the SCI is jurisdictionally defective because it did not identify the underlying crime that he intended to commit during the burglary. We are not persuaded. “A charging instrument that incorporates by reference the statutory provisions applicable to the crime charged has been held to allege the material elements of the crime sufficiently to survive a jurisdictional challenge”… . Here, the SCI specifically referenced Penal Law § 140.20, which defines burglary in the third degree. Significantly, the statute does not specify that the underlying crime must be identified (see Penal Law § 140.20), nor has this been held to be a requirement… . Consequently, we find that the SCI validly charged defendant with two counts of burglary in the third degree, to which he pleaded guilty. …

As for the restitution award, the People concede that County Court erroneously included the amount of $31,000 as compensation to the owner of the Halfmoon restaurant when there was no accusatory instrument filed charging defendant with any crimes related thereto. We must agree. “Penal Law § 60.27 permits a trial court to require restitution arising from ‘the offense for which a defendant was convicted, as well as any other offense that is part of the same criminal transaction or that is contained in any other accusatory instrument disposed of by any plea of guilty by the defendant to an offense'” … . People v Suits, 2018 NY Slip Op 01098, Third Dept 2-15-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, RESTITUTION, NO NEED TO SPECIFY CRIME TO BE COMMITTED DURING A CHARGED BURGLARY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, RESTITUTION FOR AN UNCHARGED BURGLARY IMPROPERLY ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))/BURGLARY (SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, RESTITUTION, NO NEED TO SPECIFY CRIME TO BE COMMITTED DURING A CHARGED BURGLARY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, RESTITUTION FOR AN UNCHARGED BURGLARY IMPROPERLY ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))/SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION (SCI) (BURGLARY, NO NEED TO SPECIFY CRIME TO BE COMMITTED DURING A CHARGED BURGLARY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, RESTITUTION FOR AN UNCHARGED BURGLARY IMPROPERLY ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))/RESTITUTION (BURGLARY, RESTITUTION FOR AN UNCHARGED BURGLARY IMPROPERLY ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))

,

EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CONVICTION, PRESENCE WHEN CONSPIRACY DISCUSSED BY OTHER GANG MEMBERS NOT ENOUGH (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over a two-judge dissent, affirming the appellate division, determined the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of conspiracy in the second degree. The defendant’s mere presence when the conspiracy was discussed by other gang members was not enough:

… [A]t the core of the People’s case is evidence of defendant’s presence at various gang meetings at which the crime intended was discussed by gang members other than defendant. Under the circumstances of this case, to conclude that defendant’s presence at such gatherings alone was sufficient to establish agreement to join a plot would be to equate his passive act of “being present” with the affirmative act of “agreeing” to engage in a criminal conspiracy discussed at those assemblies. The law does not contain a presumption of agreement based on sheer presence at a meeting at which a conspiracy is discussed … , and we share the view of the federal courts that mere “[k]nowledge of the existence and goals of a conspiracy does not itself make one a coconspirator” … . People v Reyes, 2018 NY Slip Op 01113, CtApp 2-15-18

CRIMINAL LAW (CONSPIRACY, EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CONVICTION, PRESENCE WHEN CONSPIRACY DISCUSSED BY OTHER GANG MEMBERS NOT ENOUGH (CT APP))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, CONSPIRACY, EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CONVICTION, PRESENCE WHEN CONSPIRACY DISCUSSED BY OTHER GANG MEMBERS NOT ENOUGH (CT APP))/CONSPIRACY (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CONVICTION, PRESENCE WHEN CONSPIRACY DISCUSSED BY OTHER GANG MEMBERS NOT ENOUGH (CT APP))

,

DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE MURDER INDICTMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, SIX-YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND GUILTY PLEA, SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a three-judge dissent, reversing the appellate division, determined that defendant was entitled to dismissal of the second degree murder indictment (to which he pled guilty) on constitutional speedy trial grounds. The opinion is fact-based, covers several significant legal issues (i.e. CPL 30.30 is not applicable, speedy trial is not a mixed question of law and fact, pre versus post-indictment delay, inter alia), and cannot be fairly summarized here. ” … [T]he People pursued a cooperation agreement with [codefendant] Armstead for approximately 2½ years. After that effort proved unsuccessful, they spent the next three years attempting to convict Armstead, trying him separately from defendant. After three mistrials, Armstead had been convicted of only criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, he had been acquitted on the top count of second-degree murder, and the People were no closer to securing his testimony against defendant. The time between defendant’s arrest on May 28, 2008 and defendant’s plea on September 23, 2014 spanned six years, three months, and 25 days, from when defendant was 16 years old until he was 22. Defendant spent the entirety of that period incarcerated.” The opinion goes through each of the Taranovich factors:

We analyze constitutional speedy trial claims using the five factors set forth in People v Taranovich (37 NY2d 442 [1975]): “(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay” (id. at 445). These factors are similar, but not identical, to the factors used in evaluating speedy trial claims under the federal constitution, which include the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant” … . “[N]o one factor or combination of the factors . . . is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim, but rather the particular case must be considered in light of all the factors as they apply to it” … . People v Wiggins, 2018 NY Slip Op 01111, CtApp 2-15-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SPEEDY TRIAL, APPEALS, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE MURDER INDICTMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, SIX-YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND GUILTY PLEA, SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT (CT APP))/SPEEDY TRIAL (DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE MURDER INDICTMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, SIX-YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND GUILTY PLEA, SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT (CT APP))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, SPEEDY TRIAL, EFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE MURDER INDICTMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, SIX-YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND GUILTY PLEA, SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT (CT APP))/MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, SPEEDY TRIAL, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE MURDER INDICTMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, SIX-YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND GUILTY PLEA, SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT (CT APP))

, ,

A DIAGNOSIS OF PARAPHILIA NOS (NONCONSENT) IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that Supreme Court properly found, after a Frye hearing ordered by the Second Department and held after the trial, the diagnosis of paraphilia NOS (nonconsent) is not generally accepted in the psychiatric and psychological communities. The evidence should not have been admitted at the sex offender’s civil commitment trial:

The evidence at the Frye hearing showed that there was no clear definition or criteria for the diagnosis, the diagnosis could not be reliably distinguished from other motivations for rape, the articles offered in support of the diagnosis did not reflect a wide, significant, or well-rounded body of research supporting the validity of the diagnosis, and the diagnosis was repeatedly rejected for inclusion in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (hereinafter DSM) or in the DSM appendix … . Thus, evidence of the paraphilia NOS (nonconsent) diagnosis should not have been admitted at trial. Since the error was not harmless, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a new trial on the issue of mental abnormality, excluding evidence of the paraphilia NOS (nonconsent) diagnosis, and, if necessary, a new dispositional hearing. Matter of State of New York v Richard S., 2018 NY Slip Op 01072, Second Dept 2-14-18

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (SEX OFFENDER, CIVIL COMMITMENT, A DIAGNOSIS OF PARAPHIILIA NOS (NONCONSENT) S NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))/SEX OFFENDERS (CIVIL COMMITMENT,  A DIAGNOSIS OF PARAPHILIA NOS (NONCONSENT) IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL COMMITMENT (SEX OFFENDERS, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, A DIAGNOSIS OF PARAPHILIA NOS (NONCONSENT) IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, SEX OFFENDERS, CIVIL COMMITMENT, A DIAGNOSIS OF PARAPHILIA NOS (NONCONSENT) IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))

, ,

A DIAGNOSIS OF UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the Frye hearing did not demonstrate that diagnosis of unspecified paraphilic disorder has achieved general acceptance in the psychiatric and psychological communities. Therefore the expert evidence on the disorder should not have been admitted at the trial to determine whether appellant sex offender should be subject to civil commitment:

At the Frye hearing, Dr. David Thornton and Dr. Kostas Katsavdakis, who testified for the State, and Dr. Joe Scroppo, who testified on behalf of the appellant, agreed that the forensic use of the diagnosis of unspecified paraphilic disorder, which was added to the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (hereinafter DSM-5) in 2013, was problematic and controversial, since there was no clear definition or criteria for the proposed disorder. Moreover, all of the experts testified that there was no research demonstrating the reliability of the unspecified paraphilic disorder diagnosis after its introduction in the DSM-5 in 2013. Notably, the experts were not aware of any published research, clinical trials, or field studies regarding unspecified paraphilic disorder.

Accordingly, we conclude that the State failed to establish that the diagnosis of unspecified paraphilic disorder has achieved general acceptance in the psychiatric and psychological communities so as to make expert testimony on that diagnosis admissible, and as such, that diagnosis should not have been admitted at the appellant’s trial. Since the admission of this testimony was not harmless, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a new trial on the issue of mental abnormality, excluding evidence of the unspecified paraphilic disorder diagnosis, and, if necessary, a new dispositional hearing. Matter of State of New York v Hilton C., 2018 NY Slip Op 01071, Second Dept 2-14-18

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (SEX OFFENDER, CIVIL COMMITMENT, A DIAGNOSIS OF UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))/SEX OFFENDERS (CIVIL COMMITMENT,  A DIAGNOSIS OF UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL COMMITMENT (SEX OFFENDERS, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, A DIAGNOSIS OF UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, SEX OFFENDERS, CIVIL COMMITMENT, A DIAGNOSIS OF UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))

JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED IT COULD CONSIDER THE ACTIONS OF COMPLAINANT’S HUSBAND IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE APPLIED IN THIS ASSAULT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the jury should have been instructed that it could consider the actions of the complainant’s husband in this assault case. The defendant raised the justification defense. The altercation leading to the assault charge involved both the complainant and her husband:

… [A] new trial is required because the trial court erroneously declined the defendant’s request that the jury be instructed that it could consider the actions of the complainant’s husband in determining whether the defendant’s use of force was justified … . Contrary to the People’s contention, the error cannot be deemed harmless, as the evidence to establish that the defendant was not justified was not overwhelming, and the jury may have reached a different conclusion had a proper and complete justification instruction been given … . Significantly, the defendant’s case rested on finding that he was justified in responding to the actions of the complainant’s husband … . People v Lijo, 2018 NY Slip Op 01081, Second Dept 2-14-18

CRIMINAL LAW (JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED IT COULD CONSIDER THE ACTIONS OF COMPLAINANT’S HUSBAND IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE APPLIED IN THIS ASSAULT CASE (SECOND DEPT))/JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE ( JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED IT COULD CONSIDER THE ACTIONS OF COMPLAINANT’S HUSBAND IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE APPLIED IN THIS ASSAULT CASE (SECOND DEPT))/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED IT COULD CONSIDER THE ACTIONS OF COMPLAINANT’S HUSBAND IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE APPLIED IN THIS ASSAULT CASE (SECOND DEPT))

,

YOUTHFUL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION PROPERLY CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING RISK LEVEL UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined that a youthful offender (YO) adjudication can be considered in assessing the risk level of a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Defendant contested the level three sex offender designation. The Court of Appeals held that consideration of the YO adjudication in this context did not violate the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL):

CPL 720.35 (2) provides the Board with access to YO-related documents. Defendant’s argument that access alone does not authorize use ignores that the CPL does not permit access for its own sake, but in furtherance of a statutory purpose. Here, that purpose is found in SORA, which requires the Board establish guidelines and make risk level determinations based, in part, on an offender’s past actions (Correction Law § 168-l [5]). * * *

Certainly, the youthful offender statute reflects the Legislature’s recognition of the difference between a youth and an adult, and the Legislature clearly made a policy choice to give a class of young people a distinct benefit. Nevertheless, in concluding that an earlier YO adjudication may be used in assessing points against defendant, the Board has not acted in violation of the CPL … . People v Francis, 2018 NY Slip Op 01017, CtApp 2-13-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT. YOUTHFUL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION PROPERLY CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING RISK LEVEL UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (CT APP))/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (OUTHFUL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION PROPERLY CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING RISK LEVEL UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (CT APP))/YOUTHFUL OFFENDER (SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT. YOUTHFUL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION PROPERLY CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING RISK LEVEL UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (CT APP))

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy