You are here: / Criminal Law
,

THE PRESENTENCE INTERVIEW WAS CANCELLED DUE TO TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES; THEREFORE THE PRESENTENCE REPORT WAS DEVOID OF INFORMATION ABOUT DEFENDANT’S EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, HEALTH STATUS, MENTAL HEALTH AND DEFENDANT’S MOTIVE; ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT, THE DEFICIENT PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION AND REPORT REQUIRED VACATION OF THE SENTENCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s negotiated sentence, determined the failure to interview the defendant before creating the presentence report  was tantamount to the failure to conduct the mandatory presentence investigation. The defendant did not take any action to avoid the presentence interview which was scheduled but cancelled due to technical difficulties:

At sentencing, defense counsel confirmed that the presentence report was prepared without any interview because of technical difficulties. The court remarked this was “not unusual,” but directed that defendant be arraigned for sentence. In response to the court’s invitation for the parties to address any issues relevant to sentence, defense counsel stated only that he relied on the promised sentence. The court proceeded to impose sentence with no further discussion of the presentence report.

Presentence investigations of persons convicted of felonies are statutorily mandated, and a court may not pronounce sentence until it has received a written report of such an investigation (see CPL 390.20[1] …). The presentence report may be “the single most important document at both the sentencing and correctional levels of the criminal process” … , as it contains multiple categories of information concerning the defendant’s background and the subject offense … .

Because there was no presentence interview, the presentence report in this case was seriously deficient. The report was devoid of information regarding defendant’s education, employment history, health status, and mental health, each a statutorily prescribed category … . The report also noted that it had no information as to defendant’s motive. People v Pizzaro, 2025 NY Slip Op 03025, First Dept 5-20-25

Practice Point: A presentence report which is incomplete because the defendant was never interviewed requires vacation of the sentence, notwithstanding that the sentence was in accordance with the plea agreement.

 

, , ,

DEFENDANT IN THIS GRAND LARCENY CASE WAS DETAINED BY STORE SECURITY GUARDS; DEFENSE COUNSEL FIRST LEARNED THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF THE STORE’S SECURITY PERSONNEL ON THE EVE OF THE HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SECURITY GUARDS WERE LICENSED TO EXERCISE POLICE POWERS OR WERE AGENTS OF THE POLICE; THEREFORE DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT TO SUBPOENA THE STORE’S EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court and ordering a new “state action” hearing, determined defense counsel’s request for an adjournment to subpoena information about the store security guards’ employment should have been granted. The issue is whether the store security guards who detained the defendant in this grand larceny case were licensed to exercise police powers or acted as agents of the police. Defense counsel learned the name of the store’s lead investigator at the time of defendant’s detention on the eve of the state action hearing. The First Department noted that defense counsel could not properly subpoena the employment information without knowing the identities of the people involved:

… [W]e find that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying defense counsel a short adjournment. In denying the requested adjournment, the court found that defendant “could have done that [subpoena … records] a long time ago, maybe even when this appeal was being perfected.” On this appeal, the People make a similar argument that the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the adjournment because defense counsel could have subpoenaed the materials during the pendency of this appeal. The problem with these arguments is that this Court had already recognized that, without information about the identity of the officers involved in defendant’s arrest, defense counsel was not in a position to meaningfully subpoena records … .

Contrary to the court’s suggestion, this is not the situation where defense counsel failed to exercise due diligence. In fact, as we held, without knowing the names of the store security guards involved in defendant’s detention, defendant was in no better position to subpoena the employer material than when he filed his initial motion. Thus, it was only upon learning the identity of one member of the security team that the defense could meaningfully begin to investigate whether the security guards were state actors. People v Sneed, 2025 NY Slip Op 03026, First Dept 5-20-25

Practice Point: If a defendant is detained by store security guards, the detention may implicate constitutional protections if the security guards are licensed to exercise police powers or are agents of the police. The defense, therefore, may be entitled to a so-called “state action” hearing. To subpoena the appropriate store employment records, defense counsel is entitled to the identities of the security guards involved in defendant’s detention.

 

, ,

GIVING THE CORRECT “PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE” JURY INSTRUCTION THREE TIMES WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING THE ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR; CROSS-EXAMINATION ABOUT A CIVIL SUIT AGAINST A POLICE OFFICER WHO ALLEGEDLY SHOT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED; THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE HELD AN IN CAMERA REVIEW OF A POLICE OFFICER’S DISCIPLINARY RECORD (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, determined: (1) although the judge accurately instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence three times, the judge failed to acknowledge the erroneous instruction, requiring reversal; (2) the judge should have allowed cross-examination of a police officer about a civil case in which the officer was alleged to have shot the plaintiff after plaintiff was subdued; and (3) the judge should have granted defendant’s motion for an in camera review of a police officer’s disciplinary record:

Notwithstanding that the court instructed the trial jury accurately and at length with regard to the presumption in its preliminary instructions, in another instruction at a break in the testimony of the first witness, and in its closing instructions, the court did not satisfy the requirement, clearly enunciated in People v Harrison (85 NY2d 891 [1995]), that “to obviate an erroneous instruction upon a material point, it must be withdrawn in such explicit terms as to preclude the inference that the jury might have been influenced by it” … . A withdrawal in explicit terms cannot be accomplished without acknowledging the erroneous instruction, identifying the error, and providing a correct instruction … .

… [T]he court improvidently exercised its discretion, under the standard set forth in People v Smith (27 NY3d 652 [2016]), in not permitting cross-examination regarding the underlying facts of a civil suit, in which a testifying police officer in the present case was a defendant alleged to have shot the plaintiff in the leg in that case after he was subdued by police officers. The existence of the suit provided a “good faith basis for inquiring,” and the allegations of excessive force were “relevant to the credibility of the law enforcement witness” … . In light of the principle “that the right of cross-examination is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation and helps assure the accuracy of the truth-determining process” … , the seriousness of the allegation that the officer accidentally shot a [*2]suspect in the leg was sufficient to allow inquiry into the facts underlying the lawsuit.

… [T]he court should have granted defendant’s motion pursuant to People v Gissendanner (48 NY2d 543 [1979]) to the extent of conducting an in camera review of the officer’s disciplinary record, rather than forbidding all cross-examination regarding the allegations in an underlying civil suit. … The defendant’s motion should be granted when the defendant “put[s] forth in good faith . . . some factual predicate which would make it reasonably likely that the file will bear such fruit and that the quest for its contents is not merely a desperate grasping for straws” … . Here, defendant alleged that the officer inflicted pain on him by twisting his wrist when he was already subdued, and the defense learned of two lawsuits in which the officer was alleged to have engaged in similar conduct. People v Fishbein, 2025 NY Slip Op 02996, First Dept 5-15-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for (1) the procedure for correcting an erroneous jury instruction, (2) the criteria for allowing the cross-examination of a police officer about a civil suit in which it is alleged the officer shot the plaintiff, and (3) the criteria for granting a motion to conduct an in camera review of a police officer’s disciplinary record.

 

, ,

BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT CONSENT TO THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING THE PEOPLE’S DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS, THE JUDGE WAS REQUIRED TO HOLD A HEARING; MATTER REMITTED; ON REMITTAL THE PEOPLE SHOULD PROVIDE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE REQUEST TO DEFENSE COUNSEL AND, TO FACILITATE ANY REQUEST FOR AN EXPEDITED REVIEW, DEFENSE COUNSEL SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH A COPY OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, vacating the protective order and remitting the matter, determined the County Court failed to hold the hearing which is required where defense counsel did not consent to the issuance of a protective order. The Third Department offered guidance on how the further proceedings should be conducted, i.e., defense counsel should be given advanced written notice of the request for a protective order (a motion by order to show cause), and, to facilitate an expedited review, defense counsel should be provided with a copy of the protective order:

Pursuant to CPL 245.70 (3), “[u]pon request for a protective order, unless the defendant voluntarily consents to the people’s request for a protective order, the court shall conduct an appropriate hearing within three business days to determine whether good cause has been shown.” Here, it is undisputed that defense counsel did not consent to the People’s proposed protective order for the disputed materials…. . …

… [I]t is true that, under certain circumstances and in an appropriate case, CPL 245.70 (1) permits a court to conduct ex parte proceedings and accept in camera submissions. … “[T]he better practice, in most cases, would be for the People to provide the defendant with advanced written notice, by way of motion brought on by order to show cause, that certain information had not been disclosed and a protective order was being sought under CPL 245.70” … . Proceeding in this manner would “allow defense counsel to see the portions of the People’s written application that contained legal argument or other matter that would not reveal the information sought to be covered by the protective order” … , and ensure that defense counsel has a meaningful opportunity to participate in the hearing to the fullest extent practicable. …

… [R]ecognizing that CPL 245.70 (6) provides an opportunity for expedited review of a protective order by a Justice of the Appellate Division, “within two business days of the adverse or partially adverse ruling,” the party seeking such expedited review should be provided a copy of the subject order. While the papers submitted in support of the People’s application for a protective order and the hearing transcript may be appropriately sealed to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information … , the same does not hold true for the protective order itself. That said, in drafting a protective order, the court should be mindful not to discuss the protected materials or include confidential information that would obviate the basis for granting the protective order or sealing the documents and materials considered. People v Murphy, 2025 NY Slip Op 02975, Third Dept 5-15-25

Practice Point: Where defense counsel does not consent to a protective order, the statute requires the judge to conduct a hearing. Failure to hold the hearing requires vacation of the protective order.

Practice Point: The better practice is to notify defense counsel of the request for a protective order by a motion brought by an order to show cause.

Practice Point: Defense counsel who seeks an expedited review should be provided with a copy of the protective order.

 

, ,

THERE IS NO FEDERAL SEX-OFFENDER-REGISTRATION REGIME; THEREFORE A FEDERAL CHILD-PORNOGRAPHY CONVICTION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A “FELONY IN ANY OTHER JURISDICTION FOR WHICH THE OFFENDER IS REQUIRED TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CORRECTION LAW; DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED AS A “SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENDER” BASED UPON THE “FOREIGN-FELONY” PROVISION OF THE CORRECTION LAW (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing (modifying) the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined defendant should not have been classified as a sexually violent offender because his federal child pornography conviction did not require registration as a sex offender. The Correction Law defines a “sexually violent offender” to include a defendant who has been convicted of a felony in a foreign jurisdiction and is required to register as a sex offender in that jurisdiction. Because there is no federal sex-offender-registration regime, the foreign-conviction provision of the Correction Law does not apply here:

The primary issue on this appeal from a Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) risk assessment determination is whether defendant was properly designated as a sexually violent offender under Correction Law § 168-a (3). SORA defines three circumstances under which such a designation is appropriate. Relevant here is the third circumstance: where a defendant stands convicted of “a felony in any other jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred” (Correction Law § 168-a [3] [b]). A plain reading of the statutory language, and application of our precedent in this area, establish that defendant was not required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which his conviction occurred and, therefore, was improperly designated as sexually violent. * * *

Applying the clear and unambiguous statutory language in this case, defendant cannot be designated as “sexually violent” because he was not required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which his conviction occurred. This is so because the federal government does not maintain a sex offender registry of the sort that states are required to operate by federal mandate. Although the federal government maintains two sex offender databases, the information contained in them merely represents a collection of registration information acquired from registries maintained by individual state and territorial jurisdictions (see 34 USC § § 20921; 20922). People v Sherlock, 2025 NY Slip Op 02966, CtApp 5-15-25

Practice Point: There is no federal sex-offender-registration regime. Therefore a federal child pornography conviction does not constitute a “felony in any other jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender” within the meaning of the Correction Law. Therefore a federal child pornography conviction does not trigger a “sexually violent offender” SORA designation.

 

,

DEFENDANT’S FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO A JUROR REQUIRED FURTHER INQUIRY BY THE JUDGE; IN THE ABSENCE OF A SUFFICIENT INQUIRY AND THE ELICITATION OF AN UNEQUIVOCAL ASSURANCE OF THE ABILITY TO BE IMPARTIAL, THE DENIAL OF THE CHALLENGE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, determined that a for-cause challenge to a juror should have been should have been granted:

… [T]he People provided evidence that the defendant had engaged in a campaign of harassment, intimidation, and embarrassment over a period of more than two years in which he, inter alia, shared nude photographs and sexually explicit videos of the complainant with her family and employers, accessed the complainant’s social media accounts and posted similarly explicit material, and repeatedly called emergency service providers and requested emergency responses to the complainant’s home in Queens. * * *

… [D]uring voir dire, prospective juror No. 16, J. M., acknowledged a prior experience being a defendant in what he characterized as a “frivolous” civil suit. J. M. initally stated that he did not “think” his experience would affect his ability to evaluate the case fairly, and then later affirmed that he could not give his complete assurance that he would be able to put the experience aside. Based on the totality of the record, these statements raised a serious doubt about J. M.’s ability to be impartial. At that point, it was incumbent upon the Supreme Court to conduct a follow-up inquiry to elicit some unequivocal assurance of J. M.’s ability to be impartial or to excuse the prospective juror … . Since the defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges, the denial of his for-cause challenge to J. M. constitutes reversible error … . People v Wilson, 2025 NY Slip Op 02940, Second Dept 5-14-25

Practice Point: If a juror cannot state he or she will be able to evaluate the case fairly, the judge must make an attempt to elicit an unequivocal assurance of the juror’s ability to be impartial. Absent such an unequivocal assurance, the denial of defendant’s for cause challenge is reversible error (where, as here, all of defendant’s peremptory challenges have been exhausted).

 

,

ALTHOUGH THE INFORMANT WHO CALLED 911 ABOUT A “MAN WITH A GUN” WAS KNOWN TO THE POLICE AND MAY BE PRESUMED TO BE RELIABLE, THERE WAS NO TESTIMONY AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING ABOUT THE BASIS FOR THE INFORMANT’S KNOWLEDGE; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE POLICE HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE DEFENDANT; THE SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined the suppression motion should have been granted. Although the informant who made the 911 call was known to the police, there was no testimony at the suppression hearing about the basis of the informant’s knowledge. The stop of defendant’s vehicle for failure to use a turn signal did not justify removing defendant from the vehicle and handcuffing him:

When the People seek to rely on information provided by an informant to establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a vehicle stop, “‘it [is] essential that at least some showing be made of the basis of the informant’s knowledge'” … . Where there is no testimony demonstrating how the informant knew the defendant was engaged in illegality, such as the possession of a weapon, reasonable suspicion cannot be found … .

… Neither the sergeant nor the officer testified as to how the informant, who had called the 911 emergency number, knew that the defendant had a gun. Therefore, the People failed to demonstrate that the information provided by the informant constituted “more than unsubstantiated rumor, unfounded accusation or conclusory characterization” … .

In the absence of the People eliciting testimony at the suppression hearing that sufficiently explained how the informant knew the defendant was in possession of a weapon, the County Court erred in concluding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant … . Moreover, while the informant did identify the defendant from across the street, this identification occurred well after the defendant had been stopped and detained by the officers. “‘Where a police encounter is not justified in its inception, it cannot be validated by a subsequently acquired suspicion'” … .

… [W]hile the informant, who was known to the responding officers, may be presumed to be reliable, the basis of his knowledge was not sufficiently established at the suppression hearing. People v Thomison, 2025 NY Slip Op 02938, Second Dept 5-14-25

Practice Point: At a suppression hearing, the People have the burden to prove the legality of the police conduct. Where an informant known to the police calls 911 to report a “man with a gun,” the reliability of the informant may be presumed. But the People must still prove the basis for the informant’s knowledge. Where, as here, there is no testimony demonstrating how the informant learned about the “man with a gun,” the People have not met their burden of proof.

 

,

IN THIS STREET-STOP-FRISK CASE, THE POLICE OFFICER TESTIFIED HE SAW DEFENDANT PUT A BLACK OBJECT IN HIS JACKET POCKET, BUT HE DID NOT TESTIFY HE HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION THE OBJECT WAS A FIREARM; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGALITY OF THE STOP AND FRISK; THE SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECON DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court’s denial of the suppression motion in this street-stop case, determined the police officer, Espinal, did not have a reasonable suspicion that the object defendant put in his pocket was a firearm. Therefore the officer did not have a sufficient reason to grab defendant’s pocket:

While driving down 193rd Street toward a dead end, Detective Espinal spotted a vehicle illegally parked in the middle of the dead end’s cul-de-sac. Detective Espinal testified that there appeared to be an individual in the driver’s seat and another individual standing outside the vehicle by the driver’s window. Detective Espinal observed that the individual standing outside the vehicle, who was later identified as the defendant, was holding a black object in his right hand, although Detective Espinal could not identify the object. Detective Espinal testified that when the defendant made eye contact with him, the defendant put the object into the right front pocket of the jacket that he was wearing and proceeded to walk toward the police vehicle with his hands in his jacket pockets. As the defendant continued to walk toward the police vehicle, Detective Espinal exited the vehicle and directed the defendant to take his hands out of his jacket pockets and put his hands up. Although the defendant initially complied, as Detective Espinal got closer, the defendant began to reach down toward his right jacket pocket. Upon seeing the defendant reach for his jacket pocket, Detective Espinal grabbed the pocket and felt a firearm inside. Detective Espinal withdrew a firearm from the defendant’s pocket and instructed one of his partners to place the defendant under arrest. * * *

… Detective Espinal did not have the required reasonable suspicion to frisk the defendant. Detective Espinal’s testimony is clear. He saw the defendant outside the illegally parked vehicle and watched as the defendant placed a black object in his jacket pocket. Detective Espinal did not testify as to what he thought the object was or whether he had any reasonable suspicion to believe that the object was a weapon of any kind, let alone a firearm. The only instance of illegality that Detective Espinal testified to was the illegally parked vehicle, which would not have provided the officers with a basis to frisk the defendant … . People v Taylor, 2025 NY Slip Op 02937, Second Dept 5-14-25

Practice Point: The People have the burden of demonstrating the legality of the police conduct in a stop and frisk. Here the officer testified he saw defendant put a black object in his pocket, but he did not testify he suspected the object was a firearm. The fact that the incident took place in a high-crime area was not enough to provide reasonable suspicion sufficient for a stop and frisk.​

 

,

THE INITIAL JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE WAS INCORRECT; ALTHOUGH THE CORRECT INSTRUCTION WAS SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN, THE INCORRECT INSTRUCTION WAS NEVER WITHDRAWN; CONVICTIONS REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s convictions on several counts and ordering a new trial, determined that the judge committed reversible error by not withdrawing the original erroneous justification jury instruction. Subsequently giving the correct jury instruction without withdrawing the initial incorrect jury instruction requires reversal:

Supreme Court’s initial jury instruction charging the justified use of ordinary physical force was erroneous under the circumstances. As the People acknowledge on appeal, the only possible justification defense available to the defendant based on the evidence presented at trial would have been a charge of justified use of deadly physical force (Penal Law § 35.15[2] …). Although the court eventually furnished a proper charge on the justified use of deadly physical force to the deliberating jury, it did not withdraw its previous justification instruction, thereby leaving the jury with competing charges on a material issue. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to conclude that the jury rendered its verdict with a complete and accurate understanding of the applicable law. “Inasmuch as it is impossible to determine the basis for the jury’s verdict, there must be a reversal” … . People v Cherry, 2025 NY Slip Op 02930, Second Dept 5-14-25

Practice Point: If a judge gives an incorrect jury instruction, it is not sufficient to subsequently give the correct instruction. The erroneous instruction must be explicitly withdrawn.

 

, ,

DEFENDANT’S STEPMOTHER COULD NOT CONSENT TO THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S BACKPACK, WHICH WAS IN THE STEPMOTHER’S APARTMENT, BECAUSE THE POLICE KNEW THE BACKPACK BELONGED TO DEFENDANT; AN APPELLATE COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AFFIRM A LOWER COURT RULING ON A GROUND NOT RULED ON BY THE LOWER COURT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court and dismissing the indictment, determined defendant’s motion to suppress a firearm seized from a backpack should have been granted. The police knew the backpack, which was in his stepmother’s apartment, belonged to the defendant. Therefore defendant’s stepmother could not consent to the search. That First Department noted that the arguments raised by the People for the first time on appeal (defendant had abandoned the backpack and the emergency exception to the warrant requirement applied) could not be considered because the lower court did not rule on them (a prerequisite for appellate jurisdiction):

Supreme Court incorrectly denied defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence recovered from defendant’s bag based on his stepmother’s consent to search her apartment … . The testimony at the hearing was explicit that the officer conducting the search knew that the bag belonged to defendant and not defendant’s stepmother before he picked it up and felt what he believed to be a firearm inside. Therefore, she did not “possess[] common authority over . . . [the] effects sought to be inspected”—here, defendant’s backpack—and could not consent to a search of it … .

While the People argue, in the alternative, that defendant was trespassing and abandoned the bag when he left it in the apartment to surrender himself to the police, they did not advance this argument before the suppression court, and they are foreclosed from doing so now … . The same is true of their argument that search of the bag was permissible under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement … . Furthermore, the hearing court did not rule on these issues in denying suppression, “and therefore did not rule adversely against defendant on this point” … . Thus, this Court “lacks jurisdiction to affirm the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress” the firearm on this alternative ground … . People v Gonzalez, 2025 NY Slip Op 02883, First Dept 5-13-25

Practice Point: Here defendant’s backpack was in defendant’s stepmother’s apartment. The police knew the backpack belonged to defendant. Therefore defendant’s stepmother could not consent to the search of the back pack.​

Practice Point: Here the People sought to affirm the lower court’s denial of the suppression motion on grounds which where not raised or ruled upon by the motion court. The appellate court does not have jurisdiction to affirm on a ground not ruled upon by the lower court.

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy