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DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED STRANGULATION SECOND DEGREE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ON THAT CHARGE ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction of strangulation second degree, determined the request to instruct the jury to consider the lesser included offense of attempted strangulation second degree should have been granted. There was a reasonable view of the evidence which would have allowed the jury to find the victim did not suffer physical injury:

… [T]he disputed issue is whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence supporting a determination of guilt on the lesser count but not the higher count. Strangulation in the second degree requires proof that the victim suffered stupor, loss of consciousness, or physical injury or impairment (Penal Law § 121.12). Inasmuch as there was no evidence that the complainant suffered stupor or loss of consciousness, defendant’s guilt of this offense rested entirely on the evidence that the complainant sustained a physical injury. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant … , we conclude that a reasonable view of the evidence would have supported a determination that the complainant did not sustain a physical injury and thus that defendant was guilty of only the lesser offense and not the greater … . People v Swift, 2021 NY Slip Op 03785, Fourth Dept 6-11-21

 

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DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GROUNDS; DEFENDANT AVERRED HE WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE RISK OF DEPORTATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE PLEA (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant was entitled to a hearing on his motion to vacate his conviction on ineffective assistance grounds. Defendant averred that he was not informed of the risk of deportation associated with his guilty plea:

… [I]n the context of a plea of guilty, an attorney’s failure to advise a criminal defendant, or affirmative misadvice to the defendant, regarding the clear removal consequences of the plea constitutes deficient performance” … . In such cases, relief will depend upon whether the defendant can demonstrate prejudice as a result thereof … . …

… [T]he defendant avers that he was not advised of the immigration consequences of his pleas of guilty, and there is no evidence in the transcript of the extremely brief plea proceeding that defense counsel advised the defendant of such consequences. Moreover, the defendant’s averments, including that he has been in a long-term relationship with a United States citizen, with whom he has four children, sufficiently alleged that a decision to reject the plea offer, and take a chance, however slim, of being acquitted after trial, would have been rational … . People v Bernard, 2021 NY Slip Op 03601, Second Dept 6-9-21

 

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DEFENDANT WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION AT THE TIME OF THE GUILTY PLEA; PLEA VACATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because defendant was not informed of the period of postrelease supervision:

… [F]or a plea of guilty to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the court must inform the defendant of either the specific period of postrelease supervision that will be imposed or, at the least, the maximum potential duration of postrelease supervision that may be imposed … . People v Benitez, 2021 NY Slip Op 03600, Second Dept 6-9-21

Similar issue and result in People v Dillon, 2021 NY Slip Op 03607, Second Dept 6-9-21

 

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IN DETERMINING WHETHER A PRIMA FACIE CASE HAS BEEN MADE OUT IN A FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING, CREDIBILITY IS IRRELEVANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the motion to dismiss the family offense petition for failure to make out a prima facie case should not have been granted, noting that the credibility of the evidence is not a factor to be considered at that stage:

In a family offense proceeding, the petitioner has the burden of establishing that the charged conduct was committed as alleged in the petition by a fair preponderance of the evidence (see Family Ct Act § 832 … ). “‘In determining a motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case, the evidence must be accepted as true and given the benefit of every reasonable inference which may be drawn therefrom . . . The question of credibility is irrelevant, and should not be considered'” ). Here, the Family Court failed to properly apply this standard. Viewing the petitioner’s evidence in the light most favorable to her, and accepting the evidence as true, it established a prima facie case … . Matter of Prince v Ford, 2021 NY Slip Op 03591, Second Dept 6-9-21

 

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A FAMILY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE VICTIM, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT WARRANT AN UPWARD DEPARTURE FROM THE SORA RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court’s imposition of an upward departure from the SORA risk assessment guidelines, explained that the existence of a family relationship with the victim, standing alone, does not warrant an upward departure:

People seek an upward departure, they must identify an aggravating factor that tends to establish a higher likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines, and prove the facts in support of the aggravating factor by clear and convincing evidence … .

Here, as we held in People v Rodriguez (_____ AD3d _____, 2021 NY Slip Op 03475 [2d Dept]), the existence of a familial relationship between the offender and the victim, standing alone, does not constitute an aggravating factor for purposes of granting an upward departure. That relationship has already been taken into account by the Guidelines … , in which the board deliberately excluded familial relationships from the assessment of points on the RAI [risk assessment instrument] and expressly determined that intrafamilial offenders do not pose a comparatively higher risk of recidivism or danger to the community … . People v Velasquez, 2021 NY Slip Op 03625, Second Dept 6-9-21

 

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THE BASES FOR THE UPWARD DEPARTURE WERE ALREADY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE SORA RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES; UPWARD DEPARTURE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court’s upward departure from the SORA guidelines, determined the bases for the departure had been taken into account by the guidelines:

County Court lacked the discretion to upwardly depart from the presumptive risk assessment level because the People failed, as a matter of law, to identify an aggravating factor that was not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines. In seeking an upward departure from the presumptive risk assessment level established at the hearing, the People relied upon the defendant’s prior conviction of public lewdness and indications in the record suggesting that he had not accepted responsibility for his sexual misconduct. The defendant’s prior conviction of public lewdness constituted a misdemeanor sex crime, which is already accounted for under risk factor 9 of the Guidelines … . Similarly, an offender’s lack of acceptance of responsibility is accounted for under risk factor 12 … . ​People v Mott, 2021 NY Slip Op 03621, Second Dept 6-9-21

 

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THE PEOPLE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT PROOF ON RISK FACTORS 2 AND 4, REQUIRING A 45 POINT REDUCTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reducing defendant’s risk assessment by 45 points, without explaining the facts, determined the People did not submit sufficient evidence on two risk factors:

Supreme Court improperly assessed 25 points under risk factor 2 (sexual contact with victim) and 20 points under risk factor 4 (continuing course of sexual misconduct), as the People failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence … that the defendant engaged in sexual contact with the victims or that, under the theory of accessorial liability, he shared the intent of the victims’ clients in engaging in sexual contact … . People v Canady, 2021 NY Slip Op 03618, Second Dept 6-9-21

 

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KINGS COUNTY SUPREME COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE EAVESDROPPING WARRANTS FOR DEFENDANT’S CELL PHONES BASED UPON WHERE THE INTERCEPTION WAS TO BE MADE (NEW YORK); THE CELL PHONES NEED NOT BE (AND WERE NOT) LOCATED IN NEW YORK (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a two-judge dissent, determined that Kings County Supreme Court had jurisdiction to issue eavesdropping warrants for defendant’s cell phones based up where the interception was to be made (New York). The cell phones need not be (and were not) located in New York:

The issue raised on defendant’s appeal is whether a Kings County Supreme Court Justice had jurisdiction to issue eavesdropping warrants for defendant’s cell phones, which were not physically present in New York, for the purpose of gathering evidence in an investigation of enterprise corruption and gambling offenses committed in Kings County. To resolve defendant’s jurisdictional challenge, we must decide whether the eavesdropping warrants were “executed” in Kings County within the meaning of Criminal Procedure Law § 700.05 (4). We hold that eavesdropping warrants are executed in the geographical jurisdiction where the communications are intentionally intercepted by authorized law enforcement officers within the meaning of CPL article 700. People v Schneider, 2021 NY Slip Op 03486, CtApp 6-3-21

 

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A FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SEX OFFENDER AND THE VICTIM (HERE DEFENDANT’S YOUNG STEPDAUGHTER) DOES NOT INCREASE THE RISK TO THE PUBLIC AND THEREFORE CANNOT, STANDING ALONE, BE THE BASIS FOR AN UPWARD DEPARTURE FROM THE RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mastro, determined the existence of a family relationship between the sex offender and the victim (here the defendant’s young stepdaughter) cannot, standing alone, be the basis for an upward departure from the risk assessment guidelines. The purpose of the risk assessment is to assess the threat posed to the public by a defendant. Abuse of a family member, as opposed to a stranger, does not pose a greater risk to the public:

… [T]he inclusion of familial relationships in … risk factor [7] was … expressly considered—and deliberately rejected—by the Board based on its determination that offenders who victimize family members do not pose the same risk of recidivism or danger to the community as offenders who target strangers. * * *

Inasmuch as the Board has already determined in the Guidelines that a familial relationship between an offender and his or her victim does not warrant the imposition of points on the RAI [risk assessment instrument] because it poses a comparatively lower risk of reoffense and danger to the public, that relationship, without more, likewise will not constitute an appropriate aggravating factor to justify an upward departure to a higher risk level. People v Rodriguez, 2021 NY Slip Op 03475, Second Dept 6-2-21

 

DEFENDANT WAS TOLD HE FACED A 45-YEAR SENTENCE AFTER TRIAL WHEN THE ACTUAL SENTENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPPED AT 20 YEARS; DEFENDANT’S DECISION TO PLEAD GUILTY WAS NOT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s guilty pleas, determined defendant’s pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because was told he could be sentenced to 45 years after trial when the sentence would have been capped at 20 years:

Defendant was told that he faced the possibility of serving three 15-year sentences, to run consecutively, if he chose to proceed to trial, when at most he was facing 20 years because of the statutory cap … . Thus, he was weighing a 9-year plea offer against what he was told was a maximum of 45 years’ imprisonment. Because defendant was not told about the capping statute, he did not have a “full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences” … .

This 25-year disparity between the true legal sentence and the sentence defendant was told he could receive was so significant alone as to render his plea involuntary … . As defendant explained in his affidavit, submitted in support of his CPL 440.10 motion, the prospect of spending 45 years in prison—and dying there—factored into the 42-year-old’s calculation of the relative pros and cons of accepting the plea … . People v Buchanan, 2021 NY Slip Op 03386, First Dept 5-27-21

 

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