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Failure to Allege “Demand Futility” as Required Under Delaware Law Required Dismissal of the Derivative Causes of Action

The First Department determined the derivative claims in the complaint against a Delaware corporation were properly dismissed for failure to allege demand futility, as required under Delaware law:

Under Delaware law, where, as here, no demand has been made on corporate directors to bring a lawsuit, a derivative action may be brought on the corporation’s behalf only where the complaint alleged particularized facts that such a demand would have been futile … . To allege demand futility, the complaint must set forth particularized facts sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that either (1) the directors are disinterested and independent, or (2) the challenged transaction was the result of a protected business judgment … . Whitecap (US) Fund I, LP v Siemens First Capital Commercial Fin LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 07297, 1st Dept 10-28-14

 

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Corporations Owned by the Individual Operating the Businesses Were Not the “Alter Ego” of the Individual Owner—Criteria for Piercing the Corporate Veil Not Met—Corporation Which Leased the Property from the Corporation Which Owned the Property Was Entitled to Compensation for Fixtures

The Second Department determined there was insufficient evidence to support piercing the corporate veil with respect to corporations owned by the individual operating the relevant businesses.  The corporations were formed for legitimate purposes, including owning and leasing back the subject property, and there was no evidence of any fraud.  The relevant criteria were explained.  In addition, the Second Department determined the tenant corporation was entitled to compensation for the fixtures on the condemned property and explained the relevant criteria:

In general, “a corporation has a separate legal existence from its shareholders even where the corporation is wholly owned by a single individual” … . Although “[o]ne of the primary legitimate purposes of incorporating is to limit or eliminate the personal liability of corporate principals” …, “the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil allows a corporation's separate legal existence to be disregarded to prevent fraud and achieve equity” … . “A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must demonstrate that a court in equity should intervene because the owners of the corporation exercised complete domination over it in the transaction at issue and, in doing so, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form, thereby perpetrating a wrong that resulted in injury to the plaintiff” … .

Here, the petitioner points to Botur's sole ownership of Tennisport and his acknowledged day-to-day control over Nixbot, and argues that, on this basis, the Supreme Court properly determined that Tennisport and Nixbot were essentially Botur's alter egos. However, as this Court has observed, “if, standing alone, domination over corporate conduct in a particular transaction were sufficient to support the imposition of personal liability on the corporate owner, virtually every cause of action brought against a corporation either wholly or principally owned by an individual who conducts corporate affairs could also be asserted against that owner personally, rendering the principle of limited liability largely illusory. Thus, the party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must also establish that the owners, through their domination, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form'” … . Thus, in determining whether an owner has “abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form,” a court may consider, inter alia, whether there was a “failure to adhere to corporate formalities, inadequate capitalization, commingling of assets, and use of corporate funds for personal use” … . * * *

Where the condemnor appropriates land to which a tenant has annexed fixtures, the tenant is entitled to compensation “for his [or her] interest in any annexations to the real property which but for the fact that the real property has been taken, he [or she] would have had the right to remove at the end of his [or her] lease” … . This is true even where the condemnor has no use for the fixtures attached, because “condemnation is a forced sale that places the State and the claimant in the position of vendee and vendor” … . As the Court of Appeals has observed, “[t]he law of fixtures was evolved by the judiciary in order to ameliorate the harsh result to those who substantially improved property but who had less than a fee interest. These rules, when applied in an eminent domain proceeding, protect the owner of this type of property from being deprived of compensation when the land upon which they are situated is condemned” … . Thus, an award for the taking of fixtures is properly seen as “just compensation to the claimant, not a windfall” … . Matter of Queens W Dev Corp…, 2014 NY Slip OP 06983, 2nd Dept 10-15-14

 

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Derivative-Shareholder-Claim Versus Direct-Individual-Claim Explained/Out-of-Pocket Damages Rule for Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims Briefly Discussed

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, with one exception, affirmed Supreme Court’s dismissal of defendant’s (Lipper’s) cross-claims because the cross-claims were deemed derivative claims by a shareholder, not direct, individual claims.  Lipper alleged damages stemming from the overvaluation of Lipper’s hedge fund assets by defendant Pricewaterhouse Coopers. In addition to the “derivative versus direct claim” issue, the court briefly discussed the “out of pocket” damages rule re: the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims stemming from Lipper’s payment of gift taxes based upon the overvalued assets given to his daughters:

It is black letter law that a stockholder has no individual cause of action against a person or entity that has injured the corporation. This is true notwithstanding that the wrongful acts may have diminished the value of the shares of the corporation, or that the shareholder incurs personal liability in an effort to maintain the solvency of the corporation …, or that the wrongdoer may ultimately share in the recovery in a derivative action if the wrongdoer owns shares in the corporation … . An exception exists, however, where the wrongdoer has breached a duty owed directly to the shareholder which is independent of any duty owing to the corporation … . This is a narrow exception, and Lipper’s cross claim must be factually supportable by more than complaints that conflate his derivative and individual rights … . In addition, Lipper may not obtain a recovery that otherwise duplicates or belongs to the corporation … .

Recognizing the difficulty in determining whether a claim is direct or derivative in the recent case of Yudell v Gilbert (99 AD3d 108 1st Dept [2012]), this court adopted the test developed by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Tooley v Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. (845 A2d 1031, 1039 [Del 2004]) as a common sense approach to resolving such issues. We held that the Delaware test is consistent with existing New York State law. In order to distinguish a derivative claim from a direct one, the court considers “(1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders individually)” … . If there is any harm caused to the individual, as opposed to the corporation, then the individual may proceed with a direct action … . On the other hand, even where an individual harm is claimed, if it is confused with or embedded in the harm to the corporation, it cannot separately stand… . * * *

…[W]e find that recoupment of [gift] taxes paid violates New York’s out-of-pocket damages rule applicable to both the fraud and negligent misrepresentation cross claims Lipper has asserted … . Pursuant to the New York rule, recovery is denied where it leaves the claimant in a better position than the claimant would have been in the absence of wrongdoing … . Lipper contends that he would not have made the gifts to his daughters if he had known the true value of his holdings. The payment of taxes was a consequence of making that gift. The relief he seeks would put him in a better financial position than had the claimed wrongdoing not occurred … . Serino v Lipper,2014 NY Slip Op 06551, 1st Dept 9-30-14

 

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Shareholders’ Requests for Documents for Investigation of Possible Wrongdoing by Corporation Were Facially Legitimate Under the Business Corporation Law (BCL) and Common Law–No Need for Shareholders to Bring a Shareholders’ Derivative Action to Procure the Documents

The First Department determined shareholders’ (petitioners’) requests for documents from the respondent corporation were facially legitimate pursuant to the Business Corporation Law (BCL) and common law and disputes about the propriety of the requests should be resolved in a hearing.  Supreme Court’s ruling that the petitioners were required to institute a shareholders’ derivative action was reversed.  The shareholders were investigating whether respondent’s board of directors failed to oversee wrongdoing by S & P, a credit rating agency wholly owned by respondent:

Under New York law, shareholders have both statutory and common-law rights to inspect a corporation’s books and records so long as the shareholders seek the inspection in good faith and for a valid purpose … . The statutory right supplemented, but did not replace, the common-law right … .

Here, petitioners sufficiently showed that they were acting in good faith and for a proper purpose in seeking to enforce their common-law right to inspect respondent’s books and records. Specifically, the petition alleges that petitioners seek to investigate alleged mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duty by respondent’s board of directors in failing to oversee purported wrongdoing by S & P; this alleged wrongdoing, petitioners assert, exposed respondent to substantial potential liability in multiple civil actions and investigations. These allegations form a proper basis for petitioners’ request … .

Contrary to respondent’s contentions, investigating alleged misconduct by management and obtaining information that may aid legitimate litigation are, in fact, proper purposes for a BCL § 624 request, even if the inspection ultimately establishes that the board had engaged in no wrongdoing … . Indeed, petitioners identified several reasons for making their demand, including assessment of policies that the board had implemented when issuing credit ratings and investigation of possible wrongdoing by the respondent’s board of directors. Each of these purposes adequately justifies petitioners’ access to certain board documents. Moreover, because the common-law right of inspection is broader than the statutory right, petitioners are entitled to inspect books and records beyond the specific materials delineated in BCL § 624(b) and (e) … . Retirement Plan for Gen Empls of City of N Miami Beach vs McGraw-Hill Cos Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 06154, 1st Dept 9-11-14

 

Allegation Corporation Was Deliberately Rendered Judgment Proof by Parent Corporation Is Sufficient to Support Action in Equity to Pierce the Corporate Veil

The First Department explained the nature of “wrongdoing” which will support a complaint in equity seeking to pierce the corporate veil:

….[T]he allegations that defendant [parent corporation], through its domination of [its subsidiary] PFLLC, misrepresented the value of the assets sold and then caused PFLLC to become judgment proof, are … sufficient to support claims that defendant perpetrated a wrong or injustice against plaintiff, thus warranting intervention by a court of equity … . Wrongdoing in this context does not necessarily require allegations of actual fraud. While fraud certainly satisfies the wrongdoing requirement, other claims of inequity or malfeasance will also suffice … . Allegations that corporate funds were purposefully diverted to make it judgment proof or that a corporation was dissolved without making appropriate reserves for contingent liabilities are sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirement of wrongdoing which is necessary to pierce the corporate veil on an alter-ego theory … . Baby Phat Holding Co LLC v Kellwood Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 05925, 1st Dept 8-21-14

 

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Corporation Dissolved for Failure to Pay Franchise Taxes Can Be Sued On Its Pre-Dissolution Obligations

The Second Department explained that a corporation that has been dissolved by the Secretary of State for failure to pay franchise taxes continues to exist for winding up its affairs and may be sued on its pre-dissolution obligations:

Pursuant to Tax Law § 203-a, a corporation can be dissolved by proclamation of the Secretary of State for failure to pay its franchise taxes. A dissolved corporation may not carry on new business (see Business Corporation Law § 1005[a][1]) and no longer has the right to commence an action in the courts of this State, except in specific circumstances permitted by statute … . Business Corporation Law § 1006 provides, in relevant part, that a dissolved corporation “may continue to function for the purpose of winding up the affairs of the corporation . . . The dissolution of a corporation shall not affect any remedy available to or against such corporation, its directors, officers or shareholders for any right or claim existing or any liability incurred before such dissolution, except as provided in sections 1007 . . . or 1008.”

A corporation therefore “continues to exist after dissolution for the winding up of its affairs, and a dissolved corporation may sue or be sued on its obligations, including contractual obligations and contingent claims, until its affairs are fully adjusted” … . The Business Corporation Law requires that the claim was to have existed before dissolution … . MMI Trading Inc v Nathan H Kelman Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 05632, 2nd Dept 8-6-14

 

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Failure to Comply with a Time-Limit for a Buy-Out in a Shareholders’ Agreement Was Trumped by the Overall Purpose of the Agreement—Shareholder Properly Compelled to Sell His Shares

The Third Department determined a shareholders’ agreement. although it did not address the particular problem at issue, must be read to avoid a result which would be at odds with the clear purposes of the agreement.  One of the three shareholders of the closely held corporation (the defendant) was convicted of a felony and the other shareholders terminated his employment and sought to buy his shares. The defendant sought to prohibit the buy-out by arguing it was untimely under the terms of the shareholders’ agreement.  Because the corporation distributed alcoholic beverages, if the defendant remained a shareholder the corporation would lose its distributor’s license:

A shareholders’ agreement — like any other contract — should be enforced according to its terms … . In so doing, “[t]he contract must be read as a whole to determine its purpose and intent, and it should be interpreted in a way [that] reconciles all its provisions, if possible” … . To that end, “the goal should be a practical construction of the language used so that the reasonable expectations of the parties are realized” …, and “the contract must be interpreted so as to give effect to, not nullify, its general or primary purpose” … .

Here, the shareholders’ agreement reflects “[t]he shareholders[‘] desire to establish a market value for their shares, to effectively control the management of the company, for their mutual best interests, and to protect against divisive relationships which would arise if outsiders with incompatible management philosophies gained interests in the company.” Consistent with that stated objective, the agreement further recognizes that “[t]he company is dependent upon and derives substantial benefit from the continued active interest and participation of those shareholders who participate in the management of the company.” In an attempt to preserve the closely-held nature of the corporation, the agreement provides that when a shareholder’s employment with the corporation ceases, “he or she shall be treated as though he or she were selling all of his or her shares under paragraph A of . . . [s]ection [t]wo [of the agreement],” which outlines the procedures to be followed when a shareholder, during the course of his or her lifetime, “transfer[s] any of his or her shares to anyone other than a family member.” In such case, the shareholder is to give notice of his or her intention to sell and, “[f]or a period of thirty [30] days after the notice is delivered, the [corporation] shall have an option to purchase all or any part of the offered shares on the payment terms specified in [s]ection [f]our [of the agreement].” If the corporation does not exercise such option, then the remaining shareholders are granted an additional 30-day option to purchase any or all of the available shares. * * *

…[R]eading the agreement as a whole and affording it a practical construction that is consistent with and gives proper effect to the parties’ stated intentions …, we are satisfied that Supreme Court properly granted plaintiffs’ motion to compel [defendant] to sell his shares to the corporation — even if that option to purchase was not timely exercised. To hold otherwise and permit [defendant] to retain his shares due to the asserted noncompliance with the time period set forth in the shareholders’ agreement not only would effectively rewrite the parties’ agreement and undermine its stated purpose, i.e., to retain managerial control within the closely-held family corporation, but would place the corporation at risk of losing its distributor’s license, thereby rendering its stock worthless… . A Cappione Inc v Cappione, 2014 NY Slip Op 05230, 3rd Dept 7-10-14

 

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Service Requirements of Business Corporation Law Trumped CPLR

The Third Department determined the service requirements of the Business Corporation Law trumped the CPLR:

It is well settled that the CPLR “govern[s] the procedure in civil judicial proceedings . . . except where the procedure is regulated by inconsistent statute” (CPLR 101…). As is relevant here, the procedure for the judicial dissolution of corporations is governed by Business Corporation Law article 11. Business Corporation Law § 1106 in particular provides that an order to show cause is to be served upon, among others, “the corporation[s] and upon each person named in the petition” (Business Corporation Law § 1106 [c]), while the petition need only be filed with the county clerk (see Business Corporation Law § 1106 [d]). As this is inconsistent with the requirements of CPLR 406 (b), the specific requirements of Business Corporation Law § 1106 control in this circumstance … . Matter of Gould Erectors & Rigging Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 05004, 3rd Dept 7-3-14

 

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Writing Which Omitted Certain Crucial Terms Was an “Agreement to Agree,” Not an Enforceable Real Estate Sales Contract

The First Department determined that a writing [the September 14 letter] which included some terms of the sale of church property for $15 million constituted an “agreement to agree” and not an enforceable real estate sales contract.  The writing identified the parties, the property, the amount of the downpayment and the price of the property.  At some point after the writing was signed, the defendant property owner told the plaintiff it was negotiating the sale of the property to another and, if the plaintiff wanted to buy, the price would be $17.5 million.  The plaintiff then sued for breach of contract and specific performance.  In finding the writing was not an enforceable real estate sales contract, the court noted that several crucial terms were missing, including the failure to mention the required court-approval of the sale of church property pursuant to the not-for-profit corporation law, and the failure to include details of the escrow agreement:

…[W]e agree with defendant that the September 14 letter did not contain all of the material terms which one would reasonably have expected to be included under the circumstances, rendering the September 14 letter unenforceable. For example, while the September 14 letter contemplated that the down payment would be held in escrow, it failed to identify who the escrow agent would be and left to future negotiations “a reasonably acceptable escrow agreement.” Since “[n];o contract for the sale of real property can be created when a material element of the contemplated bargain has been left for further negotiations,” …, and the details of an escrow arrangement are certainly material, this alone warranted the motion court’s conclusion that the letter was not a contract.

Further, the contemplated transaction was unique, insofar as it was contingent on approval by the court and the Attorney General. While we do not question that defendant was entitled to agree to a sale of the property prior to seeking such approval …, one would expect that an agreement would have contained such material terms as defendant’s duty to seek approval in a diligent manner, and the consequences of a failure to secure such approval. Indeed, it has been held that the contingency created by a condominium association’s right of first refusal is material to an agreement to sell an individual condominium apartment … .  Argent Acquisitions LLC v First Church of Religious Science, 2014 NY Slip Op 04048, 1st Dept 6-5-14

 

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In this Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit, Causes of Action Not Subject to the “Internal Affairs” Doctrine Should Not Have Been Dismissed

The First Department determined many of the causes of action in this shareholder derivative suit were not governed by Bermuda law under the “internal affairs” doctrine and, therefore, should not have been dismissed:

Plaintiffs — minority shareholders of Culligan Ltd. — bring this derivative action on behalf of that entity, a Bermuda company that does business in New York. Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss upon finding that Bermuda law applied to the case pursuant to the “internal affairs” doctrine. That doctrine “recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs — matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders”  Since the internal affairs doctrine does not apply to those defendants who are not current officers, directors, and shareholders of Culligan Ltd. … Bermuda law does not apply to claims asserted against them.

Nor does the internal affairs doctrine apply to claims based on sections of the Business Corporation Law (BCL) enumerated in BCL §§ 1317 and 1319. BCL § 1319(a)(1) expressly provides that BCL § 626 (shareholders’ derivative action) shall apply to a foreign corporation doing business in New York. Thus, the issue of plaintiffs’ standing to bring a shareholder derivative action is governed by New York law, not Bermuda law … . …

Pursuant to German-American Coffee Co. v Diehl (216 NY 57, 62-64 [1915]) and BCL §§ 1319(a)(1), 719(a)(1), and 510, New York law applies to the second cause of action, which alleges that the directors of Culligan Ltd. declared illegal dividends.

To the extent plaintiffs allege violations of BCL § 720 (e.g. waste and unlawful conveyance), which is made applicable to foreign corporations doing business in New York by BCL § 1317(a)(2), those claims are also governed by New York law … . However, to the extent plaintiffs allege a violation of a section of the Business Corporation Law not enumerated in BCL § 1317 (e.g. § 717, which is part of plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim), New York law does not apply … . Those claims are governed by Bermuda law …, and were thus correctly dismissed. Culligan Soft Water Co v Clayton Dubilier & Rice LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 03955, 1st Dept 6-3-14

 

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