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STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF GOING-PRIVATE MERGERS ANNOUNCED; SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION CHALLENGING THE GOING-PRIVATE MERGER DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, determined a shareholder class action complaint challenging a going-private merger was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The court adopted a Delaware standard of review for going-private mergers, i.e., where the controlling shareholder seeks to buy out all the outstanding shares and, in effect, take the publicly-traded company private. Plaintiff argued the “entire fairness” review standard should be applied. Defendants argued the “business judgment” review standard should be applied. The Court of Appeals chose a middle ground (the Delaware standard) which is essentially the business judgment standard with added protections for minority shareholders:

Plaintiff urges that we apply the entire fairness standard, which places the burden on the corporation's directors to demonstrate that they engaged in a fair process and obtained a fair price. Defendants seek application of the business judgment rule, with or without certain conditions. We are persuaded to adopt a middle ground. Specifically, the business judgment rule should be applied as long as the corporation's directors establish that certain shareholder-protective conditions are met; however, if those conditions are not met, the entire fairness standard should be applied.

[The adopted Delaware standard has been summarized as follows:] … “[I]n controller buyouts, the business judgment standard of review will be applied if and only if: (i) the controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the approval of both a Special Committee and a majority of the minority stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee is independent; (iii) the Special Committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and to say no definitively; (iv) the Special Committee meets its duty of care in negotiating a fair price; (v) the vote of the minority is informed; and (vi) there is no coercion of the minority” … . Matter of Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc, 2016 NY Slip Op 03545, CtApp 5-5-16

CORPORATION LAW (STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF GOING-PRIVATE MERGERS ANNOUNCED; SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION CHALLENGING THE GOING-PRIVATE MERGER DISMISSED)/SHAREHOLDER ACTIONS (STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF GOING-PRIVATE MERGERS ANNOUNCED; SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION CHALLENGING THE GOING-PRIVATE MERGER DISMISSED)/GOING PRIVATE MERGER (CORPORATION LAW, STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF GOING-PRIVATE MERGERS ANNOUNCED; SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION CHALLENGING THE GOING-PRIVATE MERGER DISMISSED)

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COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO APPROVE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT GIVE OUT OF STATE SHAREHOLDERS THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined Supreme Court properly refused to approve a settlement in a class action challenging a corporate merger because there was no opt-out provision for out-of-state shareholders. Because the suit included claims for damages, effectively prohibiting out-of-state shareholders from bringing actions in other jurisdictions would deprive them of a property right:

While the complaint seeks predominately equitable relief, the settlement would also release any damage claims relating to the merger by out-of-state class members. The broad release encompassed in the agreement bars the right of those class members to pursue claims not equitable in nature, which … are constitutionally protected property rights. Jiannaras v Alfant, 2016 NY Slip Op 03548, CtApp 5-5-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO APPROVE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT GIVE OUT OF STATE SHAREHOLDERS THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT)/CLASS ACTIONS (COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO APPROVE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT GIVE OUT OF STATE SHAREHOLDERS THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT)/CORPORATION LAW (SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION, (COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO APPROVE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT GIVE OUT OF STATE SHAREHOLDERS THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT)/SHAREHOLDER ACTIONS (SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION, (COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO APPROVE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT GIVE OUT OF STATE SHAREHOLDERS THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT)

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PARENT CORPORATION NOT LIABLE, UNDER A STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORY, FOR ASBESTOS-CONTAINING PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED AND DISTRIBUTED BY A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the products liability complaint against Ford USA, based upon asbestos brake linings manufactured and distributed by Ford UK, should have been dismissed. The Court of Appeals concluded Ford USA could only be held liable for a product manufactured and distributed by a wholly owned subsidiary by piercing the corporate veil, a theory unsupported by the facts alleged:

Ford USA was not a party within the distribution chain, nor can it be said that it actually placed the parts into the stream of commerce. Although plaintiff submitted evidence tending to show that Ford USA provided guidance to Ford UK in the design of certain tractor components, absent any evidence that Ford USA was in fact a manufacturer or seller of those components, Ford USA may not be held liable under a strict products liability theory … . * * *

Ford USA, as the parent corporation of Ford UK, may not be held derivatively liable to plaintiff under a theory of strict products liability unless Ford USA disregarded the separate identity of Ford UK and involved itself directly in that entity's affairs such that the corporate veil could be pieced … a conclusion that neither Supreme Court nor the Appellate Division reached in this instance. Finerty v Abex Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 03411, CtApp 5-3-16

PRODUCTS LIABILITY (PARENT CORPORATION NOT LIABLE, UNDER A STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORY, FOR ASBESTOS-CONTAINING PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED AND DISTRIBUTED BY A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY)/CORPORATION LAW (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, PARENT CORPORATION NOT LIABLE, UNDER A STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORY, FOR ASBESTOS-CONTAINING PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED AND DISTRIBUTED BY A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY)/PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, PARENT CORPORATION NOT LIABLE, UNDER A STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORY, FOR ASBESTOS-CONTAINING PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED AND DISTRIBUTED BY A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY)

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CORPORATE VEIL PIERCED TO ENFORCE JUDGMENTS.

The Second Department determined petitioners were properly granted summary judgment piercing the corporate (Diontech) veil to enforce judgments:

Equity will intervene to pierce the corporate veil and permit the imposition of individual liability on owners for the obligations of their corporations in order to avoid fraud or injustice … . A party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must establish that (1) the owners exercised complete domination of the corporation with respect to the transaction at issue, and (2) such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong against the party seeking to pierce the corporate veil which resulted in the injury to that party … . The decision whether to pierce the corporate veil in a given instance will depend on the circumstances of the case … .

Here, the petitioners demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on so much of the petition as sought to pierce Diontech’s corporate veil by submitting evidence showing, inter alia, that the appellants dominated Diontech, that Diontech did not adhere to any corporate formalities such as holding regular meetings and maintaining corporate records and minutes, that the appellants used corporate funds for personal purposes, and that the appellants stripped Diontech of assets as they wound down the business, leaving it without sufficient funds to pay its creditors, including the petitioners… . Matter of Agai v Diontech Consulting, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 02646, 2nd Dept 4-6-16

CORPORATION LAW (CORPORATE VEIL PIERCED TO ENFORCE JUDGMENTS AGAINST PRINCIPALS)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CORPORATE VEIL PIERCED TO ENFORCE JUDGMENTS AGAINST PRINCIPALS)/DEBTOR-CREDITOR (CORPORATE VEIL PIERCED TO ENFORCE JUDGMENTS AGAINST PRINCIPALS)/PIERCING CORPORATE VEIL (CORPORATE VEIL PIERCED TO ENFORCE JUDGMENTS AGAINST PRINCIPALS)

DERIVATIVE SUIT AGAINST JP MORGAN CHASE STEMMING FROM SUBPRIME MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES DISMISSED.

The First Department determined a derivative suit against the board of directors of JP Morgan Chase stemming from subprime mortgage-backed securities was properly dismissed for failure to demonstrate the futility of a presuit demand upon the board. The decision includes particularly clear explanations of what must be alleged to sufficiently demonstrate futility under Delaware law pursuant to the “Aronson” and “Rales” tests. With regard to one of the two “Aronson” tests, the court wrote:

Plaintiffs contend that the board's action, including the adoption of the January 2007 resolution delegating authority to a management committee, was not a valid exercise of business judgment. However, this factual assertion examines the board's course of action in hindsight and hinges on certain warning signs that plaintiff alleges the board failed to heed, including some losses that reverted back to JPMorgan's balance sheet by September 2008. Delaware law presumes that in making a business decision the board of directors acts in good faith and in the honest belief that the action is taken in the best interests of the company … . In order to satisfy the second prong of the Aronson test, plaintiffs are required to plead particularized facts sufficient to raise a reason to doubt that [1] the action was taken honestly and in good faith or [2] the board was adequately informed in making the decision … . These facts do not rebut the presumption of regularity of the board's decision making process … . Although risky, the conduct plaintiff challenges, the board's authorization of the securitization and sale of investments, involves “legal business decisions that were firmly within management's judgment to pursue” … . The fact that investors later sued or made repurchase demands does not raise a reasonable doubt that the decision to engage in such transactions was not a valid exercise of business judgment … . Asbestos Workers Phila. Pension Fund v Bell, 2016 NY Slip Op 02510, 1st Dept 3-31-16

CORPORATION LAW (DERIVATIVE SUIT AGAINST JP MORGAN CHASE STEMMING FROM SUBPRIME MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES DISMISSED)/MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (DERIVATIVE SUIT AGAINST JP MORGAN CHASE STEMMING FROM SUBPRIME MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES DISMISSED)/SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTION (DERIVATIVE SUIT AGAINST JP MORGAN CHASE STEMMING FROM SUBPRIME MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES DISMISSED)

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PLAINTIFF MINORITY SHAREHOLDER ALLOWED TO REPLEAD DIRECT CLAIMS UNDER CAYMAN ISLANDS LAW AGAINST THE CORPORATION STEMMING FROM DISPROPORTIONATE PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BETWEEN DIRECTORS AND PLAINTIFF.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Andrias, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined two causes of action which improperly alleged both direct and derivative claims by a shareholder against the corporation were properly dismissed but could be repled to make direct claims under Cayman Islands law. The dissent argued leave to replead was not warranted by the facts alleged:

Plaintiff should be given an opportunity to replead to remedy the pleading deficiencies … . Although a challenge to a decision to pay dividends would generally be derivative, plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that his claim is direct because the disproportionate payment of dividends is discriminatory and directly harmed him as a minority shareholder. Thus, rather than corporate mismanagement, plaintiff asserts unequal treatment in the form of an intentional, premeditated plan to pay the Investors huge windfall dividends while freezing out minority shareholders in order to induce them to sell their shares to the Investors at a steep discount. * * *

… [P]laintiff should [also] be given leave to replead to separate his direct claim of being induced by the Directors to part with his common shares … for less than their true value from his derivative claim alleging harm to the company … , and to set forth facts to establish the special circumstances necessary under Cayman Islands law to create a fiduciary duty between the Directors and plaintiff as a minority shareholder. Davis v Scottish Re Group Ltd., 2016 NY Slip Op 01756, 1st Dept 3-10-16

CORPORATION LAW (SHAREHOLDER’S DIRECT CLAIMS STEMMING FROM DISPROPORTIONATE PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BETWEEN SHAREHOLDER AND DIRECTORS)/DIVIDENDS (DIRECT CLAIM AGAINST CORPORATION STEMMING FROM DISPROPORTIONATE PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS)/FIDUCIARY DUTY (CORPORATION LAW, DUTY OWED SHAREHOLDER BY DIRECTORS AS BASIS FOR DIRECT CLAIM)

NEW YORK COURTS DO NOT HAVE THE POWER TO DISSOLVE A FOREIGN CORPORATION.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, overruling its own precedent, determined New York courts do not have jurisdiction over the dissolution of a foreign corporation:

 

We agree with the near-universal view that the courts of one state do not have the power to dissolve a business entity formed under another state’s laws. Because a business entity is a creature of state law, the state under whose law the entity was created should be the place that determines whether its existence should be terminated … . Matter of Raharney Capital, LLC v Capital Stack LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 01425, 2nd Dept 2-25-16

CORPORATION LAW (NEW YORK COURTS CANNOT DISSOLVE A FOREIGN CORPORATIOIN)/JURISDICTION (NEW YORK COURT’S CANNOT DISSOLVE A FOREIGN CORPORATION)/ FOREIGN CORPORATIONS (NEW YORK COURTS CANNOT DISSOLVE)

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COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE MAY APPLY TO SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS.

The First Department determined Supreme Court should have conducted an in camera review of documents sought from Morgan Stanley by the petitioner to see whether the documents are privileged under a “common interest privilege.”  Even though a third party, NaturEner, was privy to the documents, and despite a debtor-creditor relationship between Morgan Stanley and NaturEner, because Morgan Stanley and NaturEner shared a common interest in the underlying contract dispute, the common interest privilege may apply:

The common interest privilege is an exception to the rule that the presence of a third party will waive a claim that a communication is confidential. It requires that the communication otherwise qualify for protection under the attorney-client privilege and that it be made for the purpose of furthering a legal interest or strategy common to the parties asserting it … .

We find that Morgan Stanley and NaturEner shared a common interest in their desire to have plaintiff comply with its contractual obligations under the Rim Rock agreements. The fact that respondent and defendant were in a debtor-creditor relationship did not make their interests adverse in all matters and at all times … . Under the circumstances, the court should have ordered an in camera inspection, the limited relief requested in the petition … . Matter of San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v Morgan Stanley Senior Funding, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 01238, 1st Dept 2-18-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE MAY APPLY TO SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS, PARTIES COOPERATING IN LAWSUIT)/COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE (PARTIES COOPERATING IN LAWSUIT)/PRIVILEGE (COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE, PARTIES COOPEERATING IN LAWSUIT)

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DE FACTO MERGER OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS FASHIONED BY THE COURT.

The First Department determined questions of fact were raised about whether there was a de facto merger of two nonprofit corporations. If a de facto merger is found in the sale of a corporation, the liabilities of the seller become the liabilities of the buyer. Because the established “de facto merger” law does not address nonprofits (which have no “owners”), the First Department fashioned a “nonprofit de facto merger” analytical framework:

Since, unlike for-profit corporations, nonprofits do not have owners, we hold that continuity of ownership is not a sine qua non of de facto merger of nonprofits, as it is for a finding of a de facto merger of for-profits … . Thus, it is necessary to examine the other elements of de facto merger.

Plaintiffs satisfied the second and third elements, “cessation of ordinary business operations and the dissolution of the selling corporation as soon as possible after the transaction,” and “the buyer’s assumption of the liabilities ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of the seller’s business”… . …

Triable issues of fact exist as to the fourth element of de facto merger, “continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets and general business operation”… . Ring v Elizabeth Found. for the Arts, 2016 NY Slip Op 01127, 1st Dept 2-16-16

CORPORATION LAW (DE FACTO MERGER OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK)/DE FACTO MERGER (DE FACTO MERGER OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK)/NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS (DE FACTO MERGER OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK)

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BOARD OF RESIDENTIAL COOPERATIVE CORPORATION UNREASONABLY WITHHELD CONSENT TO TRANSFER SHARES AND PROPRIETARY LEASE TO TWO SONS OF THE DECEASED APARTMENT RESIDENTS.

The First Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the board of defendant residential cooperative corporation unreasonably withheld consent for the shares and proprietary lease to be transferred to the two sons of the deceased holders of the shares and proprietary lease. The case turned on the language of the proprietary lease. The application was made by the two sons, only one of whom was to live in the apartment. The dissent emphasized the term “a family member,” arguing the proprietary lease did not allow a transfer to more than one family member. Estate of Del Terzo v 33 Fifth Ave. Owners Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 01039. 1st Dept 2-11-16

CORPORATION LAW (RESIDENTIAL COOPERATIVE, BOARD UNREASONABLY WITHHELD CONSENT TO TRANSFER OF SHARES AND PROPRIETARY LEASE)/RESIDENTIAL COOPERATIVE (BOARD UNREASONABLY WITHHELD CONSENT TO TRANSFER OF SHARES AND PROPRIETARY LEASE)/PROPRIETARY LEASE (RESIDENTIAL COOPERATIVE, BOARD UNREASONABLY WITHHELD CONSENT TO TRANSFER OF SHARES AND PROPRIETARY LEASE)

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