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Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Conversion, Partnership Law

ALTHOUGH THE CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PLED AS “CONVERSION” AND “UNJUST ENRICHMENT,” THEY STEMMED FROM ALLEGED BREACHES OF THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT; THEREFORE THE SIX-YEAR BREACH-OF-CONTRACT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED, NOT THE THREE-YEAR TORT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined that, although the causes of action were couched as “conversion” and “unjust enrichment,” they stemmed from the alleged breach of a partnership agreement. Therefore the six-year contract, not the three-year tort, statute of limitations applied:

… [T]he causes of action were subject to a six-year statute of limitations rather than a three-year statute of limitations. “In determining which limitations period is applicable to a given cause of action, the court must look to the substance of the allegations rather than to the characterization of those allegations by the parties” … . “[W]hen damage to property or pecuniary interests is involved, the six-year statute governs regardless of how the theory of liability is described, as long as the asserted liability had its genesis in the contractual relationship of the parties” … . Thus, “where liability is premised on a contractual relationship, the six-year statute of limitations applies” … . Fernandes v Fernandes, 2025 NY Slip Op 00848, Second Dept 2-13-25

Practice Point: Here the causes of action for conversion and unjust enrichment stemmed from alleged breaches of the partnership agreement, so the breach-of-contract, not the tort, statute of limitations applied.

 

February 13, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-02-13 10:29:082025-02-16 10:50:07ALTHOUGH THE CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PLED AS “CONVERSION” AND “UNJUST ENRICHMENT,” THEY STEMMED FROM ALLEGED BREACHES OF THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT; THEREFORE THE SIX-YEAR BREACH-OF-CONTRACT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED, NOT THE THREE-YEAR TORT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT). ​
Civil Procedure, Conversion, Lien Law

HERE THE MARINA OWNER SERVED THE BOAT OWNER WITH A NOTICE OF SALE (FOR FAILURE TO PAY STORAGE FEES) BY MAIL; THE LIEN LAW REQUIRES AN INITIAL ATTEMPT AT PERSONAL SERVICE OF THE NOTICE OF SALE BEFORE RESORTING TO SERVICE BY MAIL; THE FAILURE TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT AT PERSONAL SERVICE BEFORE SELLING THE BOAT VIOLATED THE LIEN LAW; THE SALE OF THE BOAT THEREFORE CONSTITUTED CONVERSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant did not properly serve the plaintiff pursuant to the Lien Law. Defendant, a marina-owner, sought to satisfy a garagekeeper’s lien by selling plaintiff’s boat because plaintiff had stopped making payments for storage of the boat. Defendant did not attempt personal service, as required by the Lien Law, and instead served plaintiff by mail. Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the conversion cause of action:

A lienor may satisfy a lien against personal property by selling such property … . However, before such sale is held, the lienor “must serve a notice of sale, by personal service, within the county where [the] lien arose, unless the person to be served cannot with due diligence be found within such county” (… see Lien Law § 201). After exercising due diligence in attempting personal service of the notice of sale, a lienor may then resort to service “by certified mail, return receipt requested, and by first-class mail” to the owner’s last known place of residence … . “[I]nasmuch as a garagekeeper’s lien is a statutory creation in derogation of common law,” the failure to comply with the statutory service requirements “renders service defective” … . The unauthorized disposition of property by a lienor to a third party without proper notice to the owner entitles the owner to damages for conversion … . …

… Since the defendant admitted that it had not exercised due diligence in attempting to serve the notice of sale by personal service before resorting to the statutory alternative of service by mail, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether it properly served the plaintiff with the notice of sale before disposing of the plaintiff’s boat … . Slattery v Strong’s Mar., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 04219, Second Dept 8-14-24

Practice Point: The Lien Law requires a garagekeeper to attempt to personally serve a notice of sale before resorting to service by mail. The failure to attempt personal service of the notice of sale essentially nullifies the notice. A subsequent sale of the property to satisfy the garagekeeper’s lien constitutes conversion.​

 

August 14, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-08-14 14:27:452024-08-21 11:04:25HERE THE MARINA OWNER SERVED THE BOAT OWNER WITH A NOTICE OF SALE (FOR FAILURE TO PAY STORAGE FEES) BY MAIL; THE LIEN LAW REQUIRES AN INITIAL ATTEMPT AT PERSONAL SERVICE OF THE NOTICE OF SALE BEFORE RESORTING TO SERVICE BY MAIL; THE FAILURE TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT AT PERSONAL SERVICE BEFORE SELLING THE BOAT VIOLATED THE LIEN LAW; THE SALE OF THE BOAT THEREFORE CONSTITUTED CONVERSION (SECOND DEPT).
Contract Law, Conversion, Landlord-Tenant

THE LEASE FOR THE LAND WHERE PLAINTIFF PLANTED CROPS HAD A MUTUAL 90-DAY TERMINATION PROVISION WHICH DEFENDANTS EXERCISED; DEFENDANTS THEN DESTROYED THE CROPS MONTHS BEFORE THEY COULD BE HARVESTED; PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND CONVERSION BASED UPON THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AND THE THEORY OF EMBLEMENTS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, over a partial dissent, determined the complaint stated causes of action for breach of contract and conversion. Plaintiffs leased land from defendants to grow crops. There was a provision in the lease allowing termination upon 90 days notice. Plaintiffs alleged they planted crops in the fall of 2019 which could not be harvested until the fall of 2020. Defendants elected to terminate the contract effective May 2020. In May 2020 defendants entered the land and destroyed the crops with herbicide: The Third Department found that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the theory of emblements should be harmonized with the termination provision:

… [T]he purpose of the lease agreement was clear and, since both parties were aware that the land was to be used to seed, maintain and harvest the crops[*3], defendants were under a contractual duty to allow plaintiffs to fulfill this purpose under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing … . Against this backdrop, both parties had the express right to terminate the lease agreement with 90 days’ notice. Therefore, plaintiffs’ right of possession would extinguish upon rightful termination and, as such, without an express or implied obligation, plaintiffs would be unable to recover on a breach of contract theory … . However, given the nature of the agricultural lease agreement, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the theory of emblements must be harmonized with the mutual termination provision. * * *

… [G]iven the purpose of the lease agreement as well as the early termination provision, the doctrine of emblements created an implied contractual term granting plaintiffs a right of reentry to harvest their crops in the event that defendants exercised the early termination provision. * * *

… [P]laintiffs have adequately alleged a possessory interest in the … crops because, under the doctrine of emblements, they retained a right to harvest and take away those crops after defendants terminated their tenancy early … . Together with plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants destroyed the cereal crops, plaintiffs’ conversion cause of action was improperly dismissed … . Van Amburgh v Boadle, 2024 NY Slip Op 04168, Third Dept 8-8-24

Practice Point: Here, although the land-lease for crop-growing included a mutual 90-day termination provision, the exercise of the termination provision must be harmonized with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the theory of emblements. Because defendants terminated the lease before plaintiffs could harvest the crops, the complaint stated causes of action for breach of contract and conversion.​

 

August 8, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-08-08 13:07:072024-08-10 13:38:06THE LEASE FOR THE LAND WHERE PLAINTIFF PLANTED CROPS HAD A MUTUAL 90-DAY TERMINATION PROVISION WHICH DEFENDANTS EXERCISED; DEFENDANTS THEN DESTROYED THE CROPS MONTHS BEFORE THEY COULD BE HARVESTED; PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND CONVERSION BASED UPON THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AND THE THEORY OF EMBLEMENTS (THIRD DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Conversion, Corporation Law, Evidence, Fraud

AN ACTION AGAINST A CORPORATION AND AN ACTION AGAINST INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPALS OF THE CORPORATION DO NOT HAVE AN “IDENTITY OF PARTIES” WHICH WOULD ALLOW DISMISSAL OF ONE OF THE COMPLAINTS; TEXT MESSAGES DO NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL OF A COMPLAINT BASED ON “DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE;” THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONVERSION; THE COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined certain causes of action should not have been dismissed. Dismissal of two causes action on the ground there existed identical causes of action in another lawsuit was error because the parties in the two lawsuits were not the same. It was error to dismiss a cause of action based on documentary evidence because text messages do not fit the definition of “documentary evidence.” It was also error to dismiss the action for conversion for failure to state a cause of action:

It is well settled that ” ‘[i]ndividual principals of a corporation are legally distinguishable from the corporation itself’ and a court may not ‘find an identity of parties by, in effect, piercing the corporate veil without a request that this be done and, even more importantly, any demonstration . . . that such a result is warranted’ ” … . * * *

… [T]he court erred in using text message excerpts to justify dismissal of the fourth cause of action or, indeed, any cause of action. Documents such as text messages “do not meet the requirements for documentary evidence” to support a CPLR 3211 (a) (4) motion … . To be considered documentary, evidence must be unambiguous and of undisputed authenticity, that is, it must be essentially unassailable” … . Here, the text messages do not even identify the person who is communicating with plaintiff. The names and numbers are redacted. Moreover, the text messages do not “conclusively establish[ ] a defense as a matter of law” with respect to the fourth cause of action … . * * *

The second cause of action alleges that defendants converted plaintiff’s personal property, including dental equipment, to their own use. “Two key elements of conversion are (1) plaintiff’s possessory right or interest in the property . . . and (2) [a] defendant’s dominion over the property or interference with it, in derogation of plaintiff’s rights” … . … [W]e conclude that the pleading includes sufficient allegations to support a cause of action for conversion. Plaintiff alleged that each defendant exerted dominion and control over property to which she had a possessory right or interest … . Nosegbe v Charles, 2024 NY Slip Op 02406, Fourth Dept 5-3-24

Practice Point: An action against a corporation and an action against individual principals of that corporation do not have “an identity of parties” which would subject one of the actions to dismissal.

Practice Point: Text messages are not “documentary evidence” which can be the basis for dismissal of a complaint.

 

May 3, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-05-03 11:07:302024-05-04 11:42:25AN ACTION AGAINST A CORPORATION AND AN ACTION AGAINST INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPALS OF THE CORPORATION DO NOT HAVE AN “IDENTITY OF PARTIES” WHICH WOULD ALLOW DISMISSAL OF ONE OF THE COMPLAINTS; TEXT MESSAGES DO NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL OF A COMPLAINT BASED ON “DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE;” THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONVERSION; THE COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD (FOURTH DEPT). ​
Banking Law, Civil Procedure, Conversion, Fraud, Judges

DENYING A MOTION TO DISMISS ON FORUM NON CONVENIENS GROUNDS WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION DESPITE THE PRIOR GRANTING OF AN IDENTICAL MOTION BY ANOTHER DEFENDANT; HOWEVER PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE NEW YORK’S PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER SEVERAL DEFENDANTS IN THIS INTERNATIONAL BANK-FRAUD AND MONEY-LAUNDERING CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pitt-Burke, determined the denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss on forum-non-conveniens grounds was a proper exercise of discretion, despite the fact that the identical motion by another defendant had already been granted. The case stems from an elaborate international fraud and money-laundering scheme which allegedly resulted in the theft by hackers of $81 million from plaintiff bank. The opinion addresses forum non conveniens, long-arm “conspiracy” jurisdiction and conversion but is too complex and detailed to fairly summarize here. With respect to forum non conveniens, the court wrote:

Forum non conveniens is a common-law doctrine that presumes jurisdiction … . … [T]the initial question before this Court is whether Supreme Court had the discretion to deny the … defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on forum non conveniens grounds when it had already granted another defendant’s motion to dismiss under the same doctrine. We answer this question in the affirmative and find that the … defendants have not demonstrated that Supreme Court’s denial was an improvident use of discretion. * * *

… [W]e find Supreme Court’s determination to deny each defendant’s motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds was not an abuse of discretion. However, this determination only represents half of our inquiry, as a finding that it was proper for Supreme Court to deny defendants’ motions to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds does not equate to a finding that Supreme Court had personal jurisdiction over all … defendants. Indeed … , plaintiff has failed to establish personal jurisdiction over Reyes, Pineda, Capina, and Agarrado. Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. 2024 NY Slip Op 01112, 2-29-24

Practice Point: Whether to grant a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds is discretionary. Here the denial of the motion was not an abuse of discretion despite the prior granting of an identical motion brought by another defendant.

 

February 29, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-02-29 08:52:172024-03-03 09:57:02DENYING A MOTION TO DISMISS ON FORUM NON CONVENIENS GROUNDS WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION DESPITE THE PRIOR GRANTING OF AN IDENTICAL MOTION BY ANOTHER DEFENDANT; HOWEVER PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE NEW YORK’S PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER SEVERAL DEFENDANTS IN THIS INTERNATIONAL BANK-FRAUD AND MONEY-LAUNDERING CASE (FIRST DEPT).
Conversion, Lien Law

HERE THE DEFENDANT SELF-STORAGE FACILITY DID NOT NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE CHANGED SALE-DATE AND DISPOSED OF PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY TO A THIRD PARTY AT THE TIME OF THE SALE; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON DEFENDANT’S VIOLATION OF THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF THE LIEN LAW AND DEFENDANT’S SUBSEQUENT CONVERSION OF THE PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment against defendant self-storage facility based upon defendant’s violation of the notice provisions of the Lien Law and conversion of the property:

… [T]he defendants failed to satisfy the notice requirements of Lien Law § 182(7). Specifically, the notice sent to the plaintiff failed to “include the time and place” of the sale of his property … , because the sale did not occur on the date set forth in the notice sent to the plaintiff, but was instead rescheduled without notice to him. …

… [A]lthough the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendants had a valid statutory lien and possessory interest in the plaintiff’s property (see Lien Law § 182[6]), such a showing is not sufficient to defeat the plaintiff’s cause of action for conversion in the case at bar. The plaintiff’s cause of action is not predicated upon the defendants’ unauthorized refusal to relinquish possession of the property upon his demand … , but rather upon the defendants’ unauthorized disposition of the property to a third party without proper notice … . Magomedov v Self Stor. Mgt., LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 05601, Second Dept 11-8-23

Practice Point: To sell property held by a self-storage facility, the Lien Law requires that the property-owner be notified of the time and date of the sale. Here the date of the sale was changed and plaintiff was not notified of the change. The self-storage facility was liable for the Lien Law violation and for conversion (the sale if the property).

 

November 8, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-11-08 14:39:532023-11-11 14:59:25HERE THE DEFENDANT SELF-STORAGE FACILITY DID NOT NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE CHANGED SALE-DATE AND DISPOSED OF PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY TO A THIRD PARTY AT THE TIME OF THE SALE; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON DEFENDANT’S VIOLATION OF THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF THE LIEN LAW AND DEFENDANT’S SUBSEQUENT CONVERSION OF THE PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT).
Conversion, Trusts and Estates

THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR UNDUE INFLUENCE, CONVERSION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff stated causes of action for conversion, unjust enrichment and undue influence exercised by the defendant with regard to changing the beneficiary on a $6 million account:

… [T]he circumstances requiring scrutiny include the alleged facts that plaintiff was decedent’s closest living relative, that they had a continuing close relationship, and that he had been the designated beneficiary for 10 years, while defendant was a neighbor and relatively recent friend … . Moreover, plaintiff sufficiently alleges defendant’s financial motive (the $6 million-plus value of the account), opportunity (that his aunt and defendant were neighbors, and his aunt’s advanced age, fragile physical health, and inability to print the change of beneficiary form independently), and actual exercise of undue influence (the execution and mailing of the change of beneficiary form and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the writing of a $15,000 check to defendant weeks later) … . Furthermore, accepting the pleadings as true, the allegations that plaintiff’s aunt attempted to stop payment on the $15,000 check and that she complained to others that defendant had tricked her into writing the check, and changed her will to remove defendant as her executor, but did not change or revoke the beneficiary form, together support an inference that the aunt either was not aware of the form or was not aware of its effect. Salitsky v D’Attanasio, 2023 NY Slip Op 01597, First Dept 3-23-23

Practice Point: The allegation that plaintiff’s aunt changed the beneficiary on a $6 million account from plaintiff to defendant, coupled with the allegations of the aunt’s fragile health and advanced age, stated causes of action for undue influence, conversion and unjust enrichment.

 

March 23, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-23 11:24:362023-03-25 19:09:21THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR UNDUE INFLUENCE, CONVERSION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (FIRST DEPT). ​
Attorneys, Contract Law, Conversion, Landlord-Tenant

ALTHOUGH THE PLAINTIFFS’ $96,000, CONSTITUTING TWO MONTHS’ RENT AND A SECURITY DEPOSIT, WAS TRANSFERRED TO DEFENDANT FROM AN ATTORNEY’S IOLA ACCOUNT, THE $96,000 CONSTITUTED AN “IDENTIFIABLE FUND” WHICH DEFENDANT “CONVERTED” WHEN IT WAS NOT RETURNED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rodriguez, over a two-justice dissent, determined the $96,000 transferred from an attorney’s IOLA account to defendant landlord was an “identifiable fund” which was a proper subject of this conversion action. The fund was for two months rent and a security deposit on a lease. But the lease was never signed. By keeping the $96,000 defendant had converted the “identified fund.” One of the points in the opinion was that the transfer of funds to an attorney’s IOLA account does not necessarily render the funds incapable of being “identified:”

… [W]e now clarify that our prior decision in SH575 Holdings [195 AD3d 429], which found that funds were not specifically identifiable by virtue of being transferred into the IOLA account of an attorney involved in a Ponzi scheme, should not be read to preclude a cause of action for conversion when funds at issue have been commingled to any extent. Here, notwithstanding the funds’ transmission through plaintiffs’ attorney’s IOLA account, the funds’ temporary presence in that account did not constitute commingling under any measure pertinent to this cause of action. While the funds were in plaintiffs’ attorneys’ IOLA account, they remained plaintiffs’ funds. Consequently, this conclusion is not at odds with this Court’s holding in SH575 Holdings. Family Health Mgt., LLC v Rohan Devs., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 03796, First Dept 6-9-22

Practice Point: Here the plaintiffs’ security deposit and two-months rent amounting to $96,000 were transferred to defendant landlord from an attorney’s IOLA account. However the lease was never signed and defendant did not return the money. Despite the fact that the money was deposited in the IOLA account, it remained an “identifiable fund” and was therefore a proper subject for this conversion action.

 

June 9, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-09 08:58:342022-06-11 09:30:02ALTHOUGH THE PLAINTIFFS’ $96,000, CONSTITUTING TWO MONTHS’ RENT AND A SECURITY DEPOSIT, WAS TRANSFERRED TO DEFENDANT FROM AN ATTORNEY’S IOLA ACCOUNT, THE $96,000 CONSTITUTED AN “IDENTIFIABLE FUND” WHICH DEFENDANT “CONVERTED” WHEN IT WAS NOT RETURNED (FIRST DEPT).
Conversion, Personal Property

DEFENDANTS’ OWN SUBMISSIONS DEMONSTRATED (1) PLAINTIFF OWNED THE PROPERTY LEFT IN THE HOUSE PURCHASED BY DEFENDANTS, (2) PLAINTIFF HAD REMOVED SOME OF THE PROPERTY, AND (3) PLAINTIFF ASKED FOR MORE TIME TO REMOVE MORE PROPERTY; THOSE FACTS NEGATED DEFENDANTS’ ALLEGATION PLAINTIFF HAD ABANDONDED THE PROPERTY; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE CONVERSION CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the conversion cause of action should not have been granted. Defendants’ own submissions demonstrated plaintiff’s ownership of the property, his removal of some of the property, and his request for more time to remove the rest. The property was in a house where plaintiff used to live, but which was purchased by the defendants. Defendants disposed of the remaining property, arguing plaintiff had abandoned it. Plaintiff then sued for conversion:

If the property can be deemed abandoned, then plaintiff’s possessory interest was forfeited and defendants’ actions were authorized, i.e., there can be no cause of action for conversion … . “The abandonment of property is the relinquishing of all title, possession or claim to or of it—a virtual intentional throwing away of it. It is not presumed. Proof supporting it must be direct or affirmative or reasonably beget the exclusive inference of the throwing away” … . …

… [D]efendants’ … own submissions establish that plaintiff was the owner of the personal property left on the premises, that he attempted to remove some of the property during the 30-day period, and that he made requests for additional time to retrieve his property…. . Cretaro v Huntington, 2022 NY Slip Op 01935, Fourth Dept 3-18-22

Practice Point: Here defendants purchased a house formerly owned by plaintiff and gave plaintiff 30 days to remove plaintiff’s personal property from the house. Defendants’ disposed of the property, arguing that plaintiff had abandoned it. Defendants’ own submissions demonstrated plaintiff owned the property, removed some of the property and asked for time to remove more. Defendants’ own submissions, therefore, demonstrated plaintiff had not abandoned the property. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s conversion cause of action should not have been granted.

 

March 18, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-03-18 12:59:222022-03-20 13:27:43DEFENDANTS’ OWN SUBMISSIONS DEMONSTRATED (1) PLAINTIFF OWNED THE PROPERTY LEFT IN THE HOUSE PURCHASED BY DEFENDANTS, (2) PLAINTIFF HAD REMOVED SOME OF THE PROPERTY, AND (3) PLAINTIFF ASKED FOR MORE TIME TO REMOVE MORE PROPERTY; THOSE FACTS NEGATED DEFENDANTS’ ALLEGATION PLAINTIFF HAD ABANDONDED THE PROPERTY; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE CONVERSION CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). ​
Civil Procedure, Conversion, Employment Law, Fiduciary Duty, Fraud

CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY DO NOT ACCRUE UNTIL THE FIDUCIARY DUTY IS OPENLY REPUDIATED; CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CONVERSION BASED UPON FRAUD ARE TIMELY SIX YEARS FROM THE CONVERSION OR TWO YEARS FROM DISCOVERY OF THE CONVERSION; THE RELEVANT CAUSES OF ACTION HERE, THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined causes of action alleging defendant Filardo, plaintiff car dealership’s employee, used fraudulent schemes to steal funds from plaintiff over a period of years, should not have been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, and/or on the ground the causes of action were not adequately pled:

The plaintiff asserted causes of action against Filardo for breach of fiduciary duty (first cause of action), breach of the duty of loyalty (second cause of action), faithless servant doctrine (third cause of action), conversion (fifth cause of action), fraudulent concealment by fiduciary (sixth cause of action), and promissory estoppel (ninth cause of action), and causes of action against both defendants for aiding and abetting fraud (fourth cause of action), civil conspiracy (seventh cause of action), fraud and deceit (eighth cause of action), unjust enrichment (tenth cause of action), money had and received (eleventh cause of action), and fraud by non-disclosure (twelfth cause of action). …

“The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging a breach of fiduciary duty does not begin to run until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been otherwise terminated” … Here, the plaintiff alleged that its relationship with Filardo was not terminated until November 2017, and there is no allegation that Filardo openly repudiated his employment obligations prior to that time … .

… [W]hen the allegations of fraud are essential to a cause of action alleging conversion based upon actual fraud, the cause of action is governed by the limitations period for fraud set forth in CPLR 213(8). That statute provides that, in an action based upon fraud, “the time within which the action must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” … .Star Auto Sales of Queens, LLC v Filardo, 2022 NY Slip Op 01476, Second Dept 3-9-22

Practice Point: The statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty does not start running until the fiduciary openly repudiates the duty.

Practice Point: The statute of limitations for conversion based upon fraud is six years from the conversion or two years from discovery of the conversion.

 

March 9, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-03-09 09:48:472022-03-13 10:19:54CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY DO NOT ACCRUE UNTIL THE FIDUCIARY DUTY IS OPENLY REPUDIATED; CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CONVERSION BASED UPON FRAUD ARE TIMELY SIX YEARS FROM THE CONVERSION OR TWO YEARS FROM DISCOVERY OF THE CONVERSION; THE RELEVANT CAUSES OF ACTION HERE, THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​
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