You are here: / Contract Law
,

CONTRACT WAS SUBJECT TO THE STATE FINANCE LAW AND WAS NOT VALID UNTIL APPROVED BY THE STATE COMPTROLLER, NO RECOVERY FOR DELAYS IN THE PERIOD BEFORE THE CONTRACT WAS APPROVED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined claimant, a company hired by defendant City University to install fire alarms, could not recover damages for alleged delays caused by the defendant prior to the approval of the contract by the comptroller. No contract with the state is valid until approval:

The parties’ contract was subject to State Finance Law § 112(2)(a), which, at the time, provided that any contract exceeding $15,000 made by “any state agency, department, board, officer, commission, or institution . . . shall first be approved by the comptroller and filed in his or her office” “[b]efore . . . be[ing] executed or becom[ing] effective” … . Moreover, the contract itself provided that it would “not be valid, effective or binding upon the State until it ha[d] been approved by the State Comptroller and filed in his [or her] office.” In light of these provisions, the claimants may not recover damages based on delay occurring before the contract was approved by the Comptroller … . C & L Elec., Inc. v City Univ. of N.Y., 2019 NY Slip Op 01051, Second Dept 2-13-19

 

,

COUNTERCLAIM ALLEGING PLAINTIFFS’ BREACH OF A HOME IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT WAS NOT VIABLE BECAUSE DEFENDANT CONTRACTORS DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE MECHANIC’S LIEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 771, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THEIR LIEN LAW CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that defendants-contractors’ breach of contract counterclaim should have been dismissed because defendants did not provide the mechanic’s lien notice required by General Business Law 771 and summary judgment on plaintiffs’ Lien Law cause of action should have been granted. The action concerned home improvement work done by defendants. The notice failure did not preclude defendants’ recovery pursuant to quantum meruit:

… [P]laintiffs established that the contract at issue failed to comply with General Business Law § 771 inasmuch as it did not “contain the following notice to the owner in clear and conspicuous bold face type: Any contractor, subcontractor, or materialman who provides home improvement goods or services pursuant to your home improvement contract and who is not paid may have a valid legal claim against your property known as a mechanic’s lien’ ” … [The] failure “to enter into a signed written home improvement contract in conformity with General Business Law § 771 bars recovery based upon breach of contract” … . …

Plaintiffs met their initial burden [on their Line Law cause of action] … by establishing that … defendants possessed trust funds within the meaning of the Lien Law and failed to keep the records required by that statute. Lien Law § 75 (4) provides that the “[f]ailure of the trustee to keep the books or records required by th[at] section shall be presumptive evidence that the trustee has applied or consented to the application of trust funds actually received by him [or her] . . . for purposes other than a purpose of the trust as specified in section seventy-one of this chapter”  The evidence submitted by … defendants in opposition to the motion … supported the conclusion that they neglected to comply with the … .requirements of Lien Law § 75 … . Weiss v Zellar Homes, Ltd., 2019 NY Slip Op 01024, Fourth Dept 2-8-19

 

, , ,

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL CONTROLLED THIS ARBITRATION PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE HEALTH BENEFITS FOR RETIRED FIREFIGHTERS PURSUANT TO THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined that collateral estoppel controlled this proceeding concerning firefighter health benefits as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The issue had been resolved in prior arbitration proceedings for firefighters who had retired before 2010. The instant proceeding was brought on behalf of firefighters who have or will retire after 2010:

Arbitration awards are entitled to collateral estoppel effect and will bar a party from relitigating a material issue or claim resolved in the arbitration proceeding after a full and fair opportunity to litigate … . It is undisputed that the arbitration award, rendered after a formal evidentiary hearing at which the parties were represented by counsel, afforded defendant a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues therein. Accordingly, the only question is whether plaintiffs, as the parties seeking to invoke collateral estoppel, satisfied their burden of “show[ing] the identity of the issues” between those resolved in the arbitration awards and those in play here … . * * *

The 2010 and 2012 arbitration awards were never vacated — indeed, the 2012 award was confirmed — and are binding. Inasmuch as plaintiffs retired during the period that the reimbursement was provided to retirees under CBAs containing section 27.1, the finding in those awards “that [defendant] is obligated to reimburse retired firefighters for these payments under the CBA is dispositive of the claims raised here” … . Holloway v City of Albany, 2019 NY Slip Op 00940, Third Dept 2-7-19

 

,

NURSING SCHOOL BREACHED ITS IMPLIED CONTRACT WITH GRADUATED STUDENTS WHO WERE DEEMED INELIGIBLE FOR THE LICENSE EXAMINATION AND WERE NOT PERMITTED TO ENROLL IN A COLLEGE PROGRAM (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant nursing school, AUA, breached an implied contract with the graduated students. but not with the students who withdrew from the program:

In a prior decision in this action, this Court expressly recognized that there were specific promises which established the existence of an implied contract between plaintiffs and defendant AUA when it stated that “AUA’s fact book’ aimed at prospective students promised, inter alia, that AUA graduates would be eligible to take the NCLEX [National Council License Examination for Registered Nurses], and, upon passing that exam, automatically matriculate’ into Lehman College’s one-year RN to BSN program'” … .

The record clearly establishes that defendant AUA breached these promises with regard to the graduated plaintiffs as it showed that they were (1) not eligible to take the NCLEX exam until after December 13, 2011 (when the New York State Education Department [NYSED] admitted the mistake and permitted AUA graduates to sit for the exam), and (2) were not permitted to enroll in Lehman College until 2011 when they enrolled in a standard BSN program (not the ASN to BSN program AUA had promised). Supreme Court properly found that a reasonable period of time should be inferred following graduation … . However, because the graduated plaintiffs did not have the opportunity to take the NCLEX exam or enroll in Lehman College’s ASN to BSN program in a timely fashion after graduation from AUA, AUA breached the implied contract. The graduated students also established the element of damages by submitting affidavits wherein each averred that they graduated from AUA and shortly thereafter, applied to take the NCLEX but were denied because all AUA students were “ineligible” to take the exam preventing them from obtaining their nursing license and begin their profession. Jeffers v American Univ. of Antigua, 2019 NY Slip Op 00987, First Dept 2-7-19

 

, , ,

THE TERMS OF THE PURCHASE CONTRACT INDICATED BUYER, WHO PURCHASED THE PROPERTY KNOWING IT WAS CONTAMINATED BY OIL, WOULD INDEMNIFY SELLER FOR COSTS RELATED TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER BUYER, WHO SIGNED THE CONTRACT ‘ON BEHALF OF AN ENTITY TO BE FORMED,’ WAS INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined that the terms of the purchase contract for property contaminated by oil indicated the buyer would indemnify the seller for costs associated with the condition of the property. The Fourth Department further held there was a question of fact whether the buyer signed the contract in his individual capacity in that he signed “on behalf of an entity to be formed:”

The purchase contract provided that a “Phase One Environmental report” had been completed on the property and that Marks, the “Buyer” of the property, was in receipt of the environmental report and “approve[d] of same.” The contract further provided that Atkin was the “Seller,” the property “was not in compliance with federal, state and/or local laws/ordinances,” the Buyer agreed to purchase the property “as is,” the “Buyer accept[ed] the property as is, with no representations or warranties as to environmental conditions” of the property, and the Buyer “release[d] and indemnifie[d] Seller with respect to any claims as to environmental conditions on or related to the property.” Thus, the terms of the contract establish that, prior to entering into the contract, both Atkin and Marks were generally aware of the property’s historical environmental contamination by the Exxon defendants and their predecessor, and the language in the indemnification provision, considered in light of the contract as a whole and the circumstances of the sale of the property, clearly and unambiguously expresses the intent of the parties that the Buyer would indemnify the Seller with respect to any claims regarding environmental conditions related to the property … . …

Although it is well settled that “[a]n individual who acts on behalf of a nonexistent corporation can be held personally liable” … , the determination “[w]hether a person is personally obligated on a preincorporation transaction depends on the intention of the parties” … . One Flint St., LLC v Exxon Mobil Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 00752, Fourth Dept 2-1-19

 

, , ,

THE LETTER OF ENGAGEMENT SPELLED OUT WHAT THE ATTORNEYS AGREED TO DO, DEFENDANT-ATTORNEYS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE COMPLAINT ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department found that the retainer agreement determined the scope of what the attorneys agreed to do and the motion to dismiss the legal malpractice complaint was properly granted. The plaintiff had retained the defendants after he was expelled form the New York College of Osteopathic Medicine:

The letter of engagement provided, in relevant part, that: “Our services will include all activities necessary and appropriate in our judgment to investigate and consider options that may be available to urge administrative reconsideration of your dismissal from the New York College of Osteopathic Medicine (the College’). This engagement does not, however, encompass any form of litigation or, to the extent ethically prohibited in this circumstance, the threat of litigation, to resolve this matter. This engagement will end upon your re-admittance to the College or upon a determination by the attorneys working on this matter that no non-litigation mechanisms are available to assist you. The scope of the engagement may not be expanded orally or by conduct; it may only be expanded by a writing signed by our Director of Public Service.” * * *

An attorney may not be held liable for failing to act outside the scope of a retainer (see AmBase Corp. v Davis Polk & Wardwell, 8 NY3d 428). Therefore, since the defendant’s alleged failure to negotiate with the school, its alleged failure to commence litigation against the school, and its alleged failure to properly advise the plaintiff on the efficacy of a defamation action against nonschool parties fell outside the scope of the parties’ letter of engagement, dismissal of the cause of action alleging legal malpractice was warranted, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), on documentary evidence grounds. Attallah v Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP,  2019 NY Slip Op 00583, Second Dept 1-30-19

 

, ,

IN THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM WORTHLESS RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, THE COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY PLED THAT GROSS NEGLIGENCE PRECLUDED ENFORCEMENT OF THE ‘SOLE REMEDIES’ CLAUSES AND THE DEMANDS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kahn, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the complaint in this residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) action sufficiently pled that gross negligence precluded enforcement of the “sole remedies” clauses in the contracts and that the demands for punitive damages and attorney’s fees should not have been dismissed:

On this appeal, which arises from the securitization and sale of residential mortgages, plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Trustee), as trustee of the Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-NC4 (Trust), challenges the motion court’s pre-answer dismissal of the Trustee’s cause of action for breach of contract to the extent that it included a demand for compensatory damages. The motion court dismissed the Trustee’s compensatory damages demand on the ground that the “sole remedies” clauses in the underlying securitization agreements precluded the Trustee from seeking such relief. The Trustee maintains, however, that it sufficiently pleaded gross negligence on the part of defendants Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC (MSMCH) and Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. (MSAC) to render the “sole remedies” clauses unenforceable. On that issue, we hold, consistent with our decision in Morgan Stanley Mortgage Mtge. Loan Trust 2006-13ARX v Morgan Stanley Mtge. Capital Holdings LLC (143 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2016]), that the complaint’s allegations of gross negligence in this case are sufficient to render the “sole remedies” clauses unenforceable. We are also called upon to decide whether the motion court properly dismissed the Trustee’s demands for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees. As to those issues, for the reasons that follow, we hold that those demands should not have been dismissed.

Specifically, this action arises from the securitization of subprime mortgages by Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. in 2007, shortly before the housing market collapsed. The Trustee, as trustee of the Trust, seeks damages for the numerous loan defaults that occurred, rendering the residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) it sold to outside investors virtually worthless. Matter of Part 60 Put-Back Litig., 2019 NY Slip Op 00368, First Dept 1-17-19

 

, ,

THERE IS NO HEIGHTENED PLEADING REQUIREMENT FOR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES STEMMING FROM A BREACH OF AN INSURANCE CONTRACT, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE INSURER’S DELAY IN PAYING THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGE TO PLAINTIFF’S BUILDING, WHICH SHIFTED WHEN WORK WAS DONE ON AN ADJOINING BUILDING, RESULTED IN AN ARRAY OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, THE CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ASPECT OF THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had sufficiently alleged consequential damages stemming from the insurer’s alleged delay in paying a claim for damage to plaintiff’s building which shifted after work on an adjoining building. The First Department noted that there is no heightened pleading requirement for consequential damages stemming from a breach of contract. The consequential damages aspect of the  complaint should not have been dismissed:

The complaint alleges that rather than pay the claim, defendant has made unreasonable and increasingly burdensome information demands throughout the three year period since the property damage occurred. Plaintiff contends that this was a tactic by defendant to make the claim so expensive to pursue that plaintiff would abandon it altogether. Plaintiff contends defendant’s investigatory process has taken so long and become so attenuated that the structural damage to the building has worsened. Among the consequential damages alleged are engineering costs, painting, repairs, monitoring equipment, and moisture abatement to address water intrusion, loss of rents, and other expenses attributable to mitigating further damage to the property. …

A plaintiff may sue for consequential damages resulting from an insurer’s failure to provide coverage if such damages (“risks”) were foreseen or should have been foreseen when the contract was made … . … [T]he inquiry is not whether plaintiff will be able to establish its claim, but whether plaintiff has stated a claim.

Here, plaintiff’s allegations meet the pleading requirements of the CPLR with respect to consequential damages, whether in connection with the first cause of action or the second cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the context of an insurance contract … . … [T]here is no heightened pleading standard requiring plaintiff to explain or describe how and why the “specific” categories of consequential damages alleged were reasonable and forseeable at the time of contract. There is no heightened pleading requirement for consequential damages …. Furthermore, an insured’s obligation to “take all reasonable steps to protect the covered property from further damage by a covered cause of loss” supports plaintiff’s allegation that some or all the alleged damages were forseeable … . D.K. Prop., Inc. v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 2019 NY Slip Op 00347, First Dept 1-21-19

 

, , ,

IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE PARKING LOT WAS THE SUBJECT OF A LICENSE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY AND THE ATHLETIC CLUB, NOT A LEASE, THEREFORE THE OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD DOCTRINE WAS NOT APPLICABLE, ALTHOUGH THE LICENSE AGREEMENT REQUIRED THE ATHLETIC CLUB TO MAINTAIN THE PARKING LOT, THE LICENSE AGREEMENT IMPOSED CERTAIN MAINTENANCE DUTIES ON THE CITY AS WELL, THE CITY’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant city did not demonstrate that it had relinquished control over the parking lot where plaintiff allegedly fell into an access pit. The access pit was exposed because a snow removal contractor pushed the cover off when plowing snow. The city had a license agreement with an athletic club, Fitmar, which required Fitmar to maintain the parking lot. Fitmar had hired the snow removal contractor. The city argued it was an out of possession landlord and the parking lot was solely Fitmar’s responsibility. The Second Department held that the parking lot was subject to a license agreement, not a lease, and therefore the out of possession landlord doctrine did not apply. The Second Department went on to find that the terms of the license agreement did not demonstrate as a matter of law that the city had relinquished control over the maintenance of the parking lot:

… [T]he license agreement granted Fitmar a license to use the premises, and not a leasehold interest … . Thus, the standard applied to out-of-possession landlords is inapplicable here … . Rather, the City, “as landowner, remains in presumptive control over its property and subject to the attendant obligations of ownership until it is found that control was relinquished” … .

The City failed to meet its prima facie burden of demonstrating that it relinquished control of the premises such that it owed no duty to the plaintiff to remedy the allegedly defective condition. While the license agreement assigned responsibility for maintenance of the premises, and specifically of the parking lot, to Fitmar, it vested the City with ultimate approval authority over Fitmar’s operating procedures. The City had unfettered access to the premises and could sponsor or promote its own special events at the premises. The agreement required a yearly inspection of the premises by the City to determine the extent of any repairs to be performed by Fitmar, and the City was permitted to inspect the premises at any time and direct Fitmar to undertake repairs. The City could maintain field personnel at the premises to observe the means and methods of anticipated construction work by Fitmar, and also reserved the right for the City to perform construction or maintenance work at the premises at any time. Fitmar’s former general manager testified at his deposition that the City conducted regular inspections of the premises, and that representatives of the Parks Department would often show up unannounced to conduct inspections. Agbosasa v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 00250, Second Dept 1-16-19

 

, ,

INSURER SOUGHT A DECLARATION IT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO DEFEND THE PROPERTY OWNER IN THIS FATAL ACCIDENT CASE, THE COURT ACCEPTED IN EVIDENCE A COPY OF THE POLICY WHICH DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court and ordering a new trial, determined that the best evidence rule was violated when the court accepted a copy of the insurance policy. The plaintiff insurer (PLM) sought a declaration it was not obligated to defend the property owner in the action brought by a worker who fell through a skylight and was killed:

The copy of the policy admitted into evidence … did not specify a location for which the policy applied. Moreover, the copy of the policy admitted into evidence provided a different description of an endorsement titled “Exclusion- Designated Ongoing Operations” than a copy of the policy that PLM had produced during discovery. …

The best evidence rule requires the production of an original writing where its contents are in dispute and are sought to be proven … . Under an exception to the rule, “secondary evidence of the contents of an unproduced original may be admitted upon threshold factual findings by the trial court that the proponent of the substitute has sufficiently explained the unavailability of the primary evidence and has not procured its loss or destruction in bad faith” … . The proponent of the secondary evidence “has the heavy burden of establishing, preliminarily to the court’s satisfaction, that it is a reliable and accurate portrayal of the original” … .

Here, PLM failed to offer any explanation as to the unavailability of the primary evidence, i.e., the original policy. PLM also did not establish that the copy of the policy proffered at trial was a “reliable and accurate portrayal of the original” … . Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v B&F Land Dev. Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 00292, Second Dept 1-16-19

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy