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TENANT’S MOTION TO REMOVE AN EVICTION PROCEEDING FROM CIVIL COURT AND CONSOLIDATE IT WITH A BREACH-OF-LEASE ACTION IN SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; LEASE PROVISIONS PRECLUDED THE COUNTERCLAIMS AND EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THE EVICTION PROCEEDING, BUT THAT RELIEF IS AVAILABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff’s (tenant’s) motion pursuant to CPLR 602(b) to remove a summary proceeding (eviction proceeding) from Civil Court and consolidate it with the breach-of-lease proceeding in Supreme Court should have been granted:

On January 1, 2015, the plaintiff executed a five-year commercial lease with the defendant for a condominium unit in a building in Brooklyn for the purpose of operating a medical practice on the premises. In May 2017, the defendant commenced a summary proceeding against the plaintiff in the Civil Court, Kings County, to recover possession of the premises and unpaid rent. In October 2017, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant in the Supreme Court, Kings County, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of the lease. The plaintiff also moved, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 602(b) to remove the summary proceeding from the Civil Court to the Supreme Court and to consolidate it with the instant action. … Although the Civil Court is the preferred forum for the resolution of landlord-tenant disputes when the tenant may obtain full relief in a summary proceeding … , here, the lease provisions preclude the plaintiff from asserting counterclaims in the summary proceeding and the equitable relief sought by the plaintiff in the Supreme Court is unavailable to it in the summary proceeding in Civil Court … . Barkagan v S&L Star Realty, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 03759, Second Dept 7-8-20

 

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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS ARCHITECTURAL MALPRACTICE/BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact about whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the statute of limitations in this architectural malpractice/breach of contract action. Defendant’s decedent was hired by plaintiff to construct a four-story condominium. Although the work was completed in 2008 there were problems getting approval by the city and new architectural services contracts were entered in 2015 and 2018. The court noted that, where a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 is made on statute-of-limitations grounds, a plaintiff may remedy any defects in the pleadings in an affidavit:

“[A]n action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” is subject to a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[6] … ). Such an action, founded upon “defective design or construction accrues upon the actual completion of the work to be performed and the consequent termination of the professional relationship” … . However, “a professional malpractice cause of action asserted against an architect or engineer may be tolled under the continuous representation’ doctrine if the plaintiff shows its reliance upon a continued course of services related to the original professional services provided” … . * * *

Even if the defendant had met her prima facie burden, the plaintiff raised a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation toll applied. Specifically, the plaintiff averred in an affidavit in opposition to the motion that [defendant’s decedent] continued to work on the project from 2008 through the time that the parties entered into the 2015 agreement, including by continuing to revise the plans so as to subdivide the property, regularly meeting with the plaintiff, renewing building permits with the plaintiff, meeting with a “commissioner” at the DOB [NYC Department of Buildings] to discuss revised plans, and filing an application concerning the project with the DOB in 2014. Anderson v Pinn, 2020 NY Slip Op 03636, Second Dept 7-1-20

 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS COMPLEX BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION INVOLVING THE SALE OF A BUSINESS AND A RELATED LEASE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED; THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACTS WERE UNAMBIGUOUS AND NEITHER THE DOCTRINE OF PREVENTION NOR THE DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE APPLIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mazzarelli, determined plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in this complex business-sale and lease breach of contract action was properly granted. The transaction involved the sale of an ambulatory surgery business and lease of the premises to the buyer. More specifically, the transaction included an asset purchase agreement, an administrative services agreement, a lease agreement and a personal guarantee. The facts are too involved to fairly summarize. Essentially, the buyers (defendants) defaulted on several aspects of the contracts and their defenses were rejected. The First Department held the terms of the contracts were clear and unambiguous, the doctrine of prevention did not apply, and the frustration of purpose doctrine did not apply:

“`[U]nder the doctrine of prevention, when a party to a contract causes the failure of the performance of the obligation due, it cannot in any way take advantage of that failure'” … . In other words, “a party to a contract cannot rely on the failure of another to perform a condition precedent where he has frustrated or prevented the occurrence of the condition” … . …

“In order to invoke the doctrine of frustration of purpose, the frustrated purpose must be so completely the basis of the contract that, as both parties understood, without it, the transaction would have made little sense” … . Examples of a lease’s purposes being declared frustrated have included situations where the tenant was unable to use the premises as a restaurant until a public sewer was completed, which took nearly three years after the lease was executed … , and where a tenant who entered into a lease of premises for office space could not occupy the premises because the certificate of occupancy allowed only residential use and the landlord refused to correct it  … .

However, “frustration of purpose . . . is not available where the event which prevented performance was foreseeable and provision could have been made for its occurrence” … . Center for Specialty Care, Inc. v CSC Acquisition I, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 03631, First Dept 6-25-20

 

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THE ACTION TO ENFORCE THE POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT WAS GOVERNED BY THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW, NOT THE SIX-YEAR CONTRACT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN CPLR 213; THEREFORE THE ACTION WAS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the statute of limitations with respect to the enforcement of a postnuptial agreement is that provided for in Domestic Relations Law 250, not the six-year statute of limitations for contract actions generally:

… [T]he six-year statute of limitations that pertains to breach of contract causes of action (see CPLR 213[2]) is not applicable. Rather, the applicable statute of limitations is provided for in Domestic Relations Law § 250. Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 250, the statute of limitations for claims arising from prenuptial and postnuptial agreements is three years and that period is tolled, as relevant here, until process has been served in a matrimonial action. The language of the statute makes it broadly applicable to claims arising from prenuptial and postnuptial agreements, such that it applies equally where a party seeks to invalidate the agreement and where a party seeks to enforce it … .

Here, the defendant did not assert his claim to enforce the postnuptial agreement until more than 4½ years after he was served with process in the matrimonial action. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim is untimely, and should have been rejected. Washiradusit v Athonvarangkul, 2020 NY Slip Op 03562, Second Dept 6-24-20

 

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THE COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY ALLEGED THE TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PURSUANT TO THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF PRIVITY BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANT ARCHITECT; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint alleging architectural malpractice should not have been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211. Plaintiff leased the first floor of a building to operate a pizza restaurant. Plaintiff hired a contractor which in turn hired an architect for the heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) design. The gas line hookup was completed in 2014. Subsequently, in 2016, National Grid shut off the gas, alleging plaintiff was stealing gas. In 2017 the defendant architect allegedly attempted to remedy the problem with the gas line. The complaint adequately pled the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine and a privity-like relationship between the plaintiff and the architect:

“The law recognizes that the supposed completion of the contemplated work does not preclude application of the continuous representation toll if inadequacies or other problems with the contemplated work timely manifest themselves after that date and the parties continue the professional relationship to remedy those problems” … . In support of its motion, the architect submitted documentary evidence which included a final invoice issued by it dated August 14, 2014, and a letter of completion issued by the New York City Department of Buildings to the architect stating that its work was completed on December 20, 2014. In opposition, the plaintiffs’ submissions, which included evidence of continuing communications between [plaintiff] and the architect, and evidence of the architect’s efforts to remedy the alleged error uncovered by National Grid regarding the gas line connection for the premises, raised a question of fact as to the application of the continuous representation doctrine and supported the denial of those branches of the architect’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (5) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it … . Contrary to the architect’s contention, the fact that two years had elapsed between the completion of its services and its subsequent efforts to remedy the problem does not render the continuous representation doctrine inapplicable as a matter of law … .

We also reject the architect’s contention, as an alternative ground for affirmance, that dismissal of the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it was warranted pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7), on the ground that it was not in privity with the plaintiffs. The evidence submitted by the architect, which included a copy of the contract entered into between it and the contractor, failed to utterly refute the factual allegations supporting the plaintiffs’ contention that a relationship existed between them and the architect that was the “functional equivalent of privity” … . Creative Rest., Inc. v Dyckman Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 03499, Second Dept 6-24-20

 

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UNDER THE TERMS OF THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT AND THE APPLICABLE INSURANCE LAW PROVISIONS, AND UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT, PLAINTIFF EMPLOYEE, NOT DEFENDANT EMPLOYER, WAS ENTITLED TO THE DEMUTUALIZATION PROCEEDS WHEN THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CARRIER CONVERTED FROM A MUTUAL TO A STOCK INSURANCE COMPANY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT EMPLOYER PAID THE POLICY PREMIUMS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mulvey, dealt with insurance law, employment law, contract law, unjust enrichment and stare decisis in this dispute between defendant employer and plaintiff employee over the “demutualization” proceeds of an insurance policy. Plaintiff was employed as a certified nurse midwife by defendant. As part of the employment agreement defendant was required to maintain and pay the premiums for a malpractice insurance policy. When the insurance company (MLMIC) converted from a mutual insurance company to a stock insurance company (demutualization) the policyholder was entitled to nearly $75,000. Plaintiff-employee claimed the money was hers and brought an action for a declaratory judgment. Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff but, because there was no on-point appellate decision by the Court of Appeals or the Third Department, Supreme Court was required to follow a First Department decision and, based on that decision, found in favor of defendant-employer. The Third Department noted that it, unlike Supreme Court, was not bound by stare decisis and reversed:

… [P]er the relevant statute [(Insurance Law § 7307 [e] [3])] and the conversion plan’s definitions, plaintiff was entitled to the cash consideration … . * * *

… [T]he parties’ employment agreement provided that plaintiff would perform professional services for defendant. In exchange, defendant would pay her a stated salary and provide specified benefits including, as relevant here, obtaining and paying the premiums for professional liability insurance covering plaintiff. The record indicates that defendant purchased, controlled and maintained such a policy from MLMIC in plaintiff’s favor. Defendant was the policy administrator, selected the coverage and terms, and was responsible for all financial aspects of the policy. Notably, defendant paid annual premiums of approximately $25,710; plaintiff paid nothing toward the premiums and those amounts were not counted as income to plaintiff. Defendant received from MLMIC dividends, premium reductions and the return of premiums when the policy was canceled upon plaintiff leaving defendant’s employ, all without any objection by plaintiff. * * *

The reality is that neither party here bargained for the demutualization proceeds. Moreover, neither party actually paid for them, because membership interests in a mutual insurance company are not paid for by policy premiums; such rights are “acquired . . . at no cost, but rather as an incident of the structure of mutual insurance policies,” through operation of law and the company’s charter and bylaws … . * * *

Neither party changed its position based on demutualization and plaintiff’s conduct was neither tortious nor fraudulent. … [W]e conclude that defendant failed to meet its burden to establish its affirmative defense and counterclaim alleging unjust enrichment. Schoch v Lake Champlain OB-GYN, P.C., 2020 NY Slip Op 03444, Third Dept 6-18-20

 

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ALTHOUGH THE RELEASE EXECUTED BY PLAINTIFF WITH RESPECT TO TWO DEFENDANTS PRECLUDED AN ACTION FOR CONTRIBUTION BY A THIRD DEFENDANT WHICH WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE RELEASE, IT DID NOT PRECLUDE AN ACTION FOR COMMON-LAW INDEMNIFICATION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the release executed by plaintiff in this workplace injury case precluded a contribution action by a defendant which was not a party to the release, but did not preclude an action for common-law indemnification:

In 2016, plaintiff was allegedly injured while working at a commercial construction site. Plaintiff accepted $2,000 in settlement of his claims against third-party defendants, Village Air and Electric, Inc. and Jimerico Construction, Inc. — his employer and the contractor that retained it to do work at the construction site, respectively — and executed a release agreeing to hold them harmless. He then commenced this action against defendant, another contractor whose employees had allegedly caused the condition that led to his injuries. Defendant answered and impleaded Village Air and Jimerico, claiming that it was entitled to contribution and/or indemnification.

Jimerico moved … to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that the release executed by plaintiff defeated the contribution and indemnification claims (see CPLR 3211 [a] [5]; General Obligations Law § 15-108) … .

… [T]he release executed by plaintiff “relieve[d] [Jimerico] from liability to any other person for contribution” pursuant to CPLR article 14 and, as a result, Supreme Court should have dismissed defendant’s contribution claim against Jimerico (General Obligations Law § 15-108 [b] …). In contrast, Jimerico’s “settlement with . . . plaintiff did not preclude [defendant] from seeking common-law indemnification from” it … . Koretnicki v Northwoods Concrete, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 03445, Third Dept 6-18-20

 

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THE MEANING OF ‘GROSS EARNED INCOME’ IN THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT AFFECTED THE CALCULATION OF CHILD SUPPORT; THE TERM WAS AMBIGUOUS REQUIRING A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the settlement agreement was ambiguous. The meaning of the term “gross earned income” in the agreement affected the child support calculation. The court should have held a hearing to ascertain the intent of the parties. Instead, the court deferred to the definition of “income” in the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA):

“A stipulation of settlement entered into by parties to a divorce proceeding constitutes a contract between them subject to the principles of contract interpretation” … . “Where the intention of the parties is clearly and unambiguously set forth, effect must be given to the intent as indicated by the language used” … . “A court may not write into a contract conditions the parties did not insert or, under the guise of construction, add or excise terms, and it may not construe the language in such a way as would distort the apparent meaning” … . “Whether a writing is ambiguous is a matter of law for the court, and the proper inquiry is whether the agreement on its face is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation” … . In making this determination, the court also should examine the entire contract and consider the relation of the parties and the circumstances under which the contract was executed … . Where a contract is ambiguous, “the court may consider the construction placed on the contract by the parties to help ascertain the meaning” … . “The role of the court is to determine the intent and purpose of the stipulation based on the examination of the record as a whole” … .

Here, the term “gross earned income,” in the context of the parties’ stipulation, is ambiguous … . However, instead of deferring to the CSSA’s definition of “income,” the Support Magistrate should have held a hearing to determine the parties’ intent in including the word “earned” … . Matter of Abramson v Hasson, 2020 NY Slip Op 03418, Second Dept 6-17-20

 

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THE TITLE INSURANCE POLICY GAVE THE INSURER THE RIGHT TO PROSECUTE A TITLE CLAIM BUT NOT THE OBLIGATION TO PROSECUTE A TITLE CLAIM; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT ALLEGING DEFENDANT BREACHED THE POLICY BY NOT PROSECUTING THE CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s action against a title insurance company should have been dismissed based upon the language of the policy. Plaintiff had requested that defendant take action against a party plaintiff believed was using plaintiff’s land. Defendant refused. The title insurance policy gave defendant the right but not the obligation to bring such an action:

A dismissal of a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) is warranted if “the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law” … . Plaintiffs alleged that defendant breached section 5 (b) of the policy, which provides, in relevant part, that defendant “shall have the right . . . to institute and prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any other act that in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish the Title, as insured, or to prevent or reduce loss or damage to the Insured.” Defendant’s “right” to prosecute an action is not equivalent to an “obligation” … . Inasmuch as the policy submitted by defendant on the motion did not require defendant to prosecute the action against the property owner, defendant is entitled to dismissal of the complaint insofar as it sought attorneys’ fees and costs that plaintiffs had already incurred for the prosecution of that action … . We further conclude that defendant is entitled to a declaration that it is not obligated to pay for the attorneys’ fees and costs necessary to prosecute that action in the future … . Irma Straus Realty Corp. v Old Republic Natl. Tit. Ins. Co., 2020 NY Slip Op 03307, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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NO APPEAL LIES FROM A NONFINAL ORDER, HERE ORDERS WHICH DID NOT RESOLVE THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES; IN A SUCCESSFUL SHAREHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE ACTION ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE PAID BY THE CORPORATION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined no appeal lies from a nonfinal order and, in a successful shareholders’ derivative action, the corporation is liable for attorney’s fees. The facts of the case are too complex to fairly summarize here. Defendant limited liability company was formed to develop a residential subdivision. The action alleged breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and sought dissolution of the LLC:

… “[A]lthough all of the substantive issues between the parties were resolved, the order was facially nonfinal, since it left pending the assessment of attorneys’ fees—a matter that plainly required further judicial action of a nonministerial nature” … . Further, plaintiffs’ “request for attorneys’ fees was an integral part of each of the asserted causes of action rather than a separate cause of action of its own,” and therefore that issue cannot be implicitly severed from the other issues … . Thus, the order … does not constitute a ” final order’ ” within the meaning of CPLR 5501 (a) (1) and does not bring up for our review any prior non-final order … . * * *

… [W]e agree with defendant that the court erred in determining that plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees and disbursements in his status as a derivative plaintiff acting on the LLC’s behalf and in awarding such fees and disbursements … . “The basis for an award of attorneys’ fees in a shareholders’ derivative suit is to reimburse the plaintiff for expenses incurred on the corporation’s behalf . . . . Those costs should be paid by the corporation, which has benefited from the plaintiff’s efforts and which would have borne the costs had it sued in its own right” … . Thus, plaintiff’s success as a derivative plaintiff is not an acceptable basis for an award of attorneys’ fees and disbursements against defendant individually. Howard v Pooler, 2020 NY Slip Op 03347, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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