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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PROPERTY MANAGER LAUNCHED AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM WHEN A MINOR LEAK WAS REPAIRED.

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined the motion for summary judgment dismissing the negligence cause of action against defendant property manager was properly denied. Defendant contracted with the board of a cooperative to manage the property. Plaintiff alleged defendant’s attempt to fix a minor leak caused water to damage his unit:

Regardless of which party had the burden of proof on the Espinal exception, the evidence submitted on the motion established that defendant attempted to fix the leak or leaks on several occasions and that the problem persisted and culminated in a flood of water “cascading” into plaintiff’s apartment. Plaintiff testified that the leak began on March 8, 2010, and lasted a few days. The leak started again in May 2010, and reoccurred in August 2010 and December 2010, and finally, the “big finale” of water cascading into plaintiff’s unit occurred in August 2011. Defendant attempted to fix the leaks on several occasions. Invoices dated March 10, April 13, September 28, and December 30, 2010 indicate that plumbing work was done in response to plaintiff’s complaints about water leaks. The notations in these invoices do not definitively establish whether or not defendant’s plumbers “launched a force or instrument of harm.” Thus, contrary to the dissent’s contention, the evidence raises an issue of fact as to whether defendant’s attempts to fix the water leak exacerbated the condition that led to the more serious leak that occurred in August 2011. Karydas v Ferrara-Ruurds, 2016 NY Slip Op 05941, 1st Dept 9-1-16

NEGLIGENCE (ESPINAL EXCEPTION, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PROPERTY MANAGER LAUNCHED AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM WHEN A MINOR LEAK WAS REPAIRED)/CONTRACT LAW (NEGLIGENCE, ESPINAL EXCEPTION, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PROPERTY MANAGER LAUNCHED AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM WHEN A MINOR LEAK WAS REPAIRED)/TORT LIABILITY ARISING FROM CONTRACT (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PROPERTY MANAGER LAUNCHED AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM WHEN A MINOR LEAK WAS REPAIRED).ESPINAL EXCEPTION( QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PROPERTY MANAGER LAUNCHED AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM WHEN A MINOR LEAK WAS REPAIRED)

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ACTION SEEKING REFORMATION OF NOTE AND MORTGAGE PROPERLY DISMISSED UNDER DOCTRINE OF LACHES.

The Second Department determined plaintiffs’ action seeking reformation of a note and mortgage was properly dismissed under the doctrine of laches:

…[W]hile the plaintiffs may have, at one point, had a cause of action for reformation of the note and mortgage on the basis of mutual mistake … , the Supreme Court properly determined that such a cause of action is barred by the plaintiffs’ laches in asserting a right to reformation. ” The doctrine of laches is an equitable doctrine which bars the enforcement of a right where there has been an unreasonable and inexcusable delay that results in prejudice to a party'” … . Prejudice may be demonstrated “by a showing of injury, change of position, loss of evidence, or some other disadvantage resulting from the delay” … . The plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in asserting a right to reformation of the note and mortgage for almost six years, during which time they made payments in accordance with the terms of the note and mortgage. Further, the defendant would be prejudiced in defending the action at this time by the loss of evidence resulting from her husband’s death in 2012, approximately 4½ years after the note and mortgage were executed … . Diecidue v Russo, 2016 NY Slip Op 05907, 2nd Dept 8-31-16

 

CONTRACT LAW (ACTION SEEKING REFORMATION OF NOTE AND MORTGAGE PROPERLY DISMISSED UNDER DOCTRINE OF LACHES)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ACTION SEEKING REFORMATION OF NOTE AND MORTGAGE PROPERLY DISMISSED UNDER DOCTRINE OF LACHES)/LACHES (ACTION SEEKING REFORMATION OF NOTE AND MORTGAGE PROPERLY DISMISSED UNDER DOCTRINE OF LACHES)

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MAINTENANCE PORTION OF POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT UNCONSCIONABLE.

The Second Department, in an extensive decision covering several marital/separate property and equitable distribution issues not summarized here, determined the maintenance portion of a 1988 postnuptial agreement was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable:

Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that the maintenance provision of the 1988 postnuptial agreement, which provided the plaintiff with only $50,000 in full satisfaction of all claims, would be unconscionable by the time a final judgment would be entered in this action. At the time that the parties executed the 1988 postnuptial agreement, the defendant owned, among other things, a jewelry business worth at least $3 million, and he was in contract to buy a shopping center. Thereafter, during more than 25 years of marriage, the defendant’s jewelry business underwent tremendous growth while the plaintiff worked there, and the parties lived what can easily be described as a lavish lifestyle. Among other things, they owned numerous high-end automobiles and took numerous international vacations. For a time, they traveled regularly to the Bahamas on the defendant’s yacht. Under all the circumstances, the court properly determined that the maintenance provision in the 1988 agreement was unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable … . Maddaloni v Maddaloni, 2016 NY Slip Op 05851, 2nd Dept 8-24-16

FAMILY LAW (MAINTENANCE PORTION OF POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT UNCONSCIONABLE)/CONTRACT LAW (MAINTENANCE PORTION OF POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT UNCONSIONABLE)/UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT (MAINTENANCE PORTION OF POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT UNCONSCIONABLE)

DOCTRINE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE APPLIED TO REFORM NOTE AND MORTGAGE.

The Second Department determined the doctrine of mutual mistake applied and Supreme Court properly reformed the note and mortgage to correct the mistake:

“A party seeking reformation of a contract by reason of mistake must establish, with clear and convincing evidence, that the contract was executed under mutual mistake or a unilateral mistake induced by the other party’s fraudulent misrepresentation” … . “In a case of mutual mistake, the parties have reached an oral agreement and, unknown to either, the signed writing does not express that agreement” … . “Reformation is not granted for the purpose of alleviating a hard or oppressive bargain, but rather to restate the intended terms of an agreement when the writing that memorializes that agreement is at variance with the intent of both parties” … .

Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff established the existence of a mutual mistake by clear and convincing evidence … . The parties’ contract of sale clearly and unambiguously provided that the purchase price for the subject property was $550,000, which was to be paid, in part, by a $350,000 purchase money mortgage. Based upon the proof at trial, it was clear that the $206,065.79 balloon payment calculated by the plaintiff’s attorney and mutually agreed upon by the parties was the product of an inadvertent error, as it was inconsistent with the parties’ agreement that the mortgage was to be in the amount of $350,000. “[I]f, by the mistake of the scrivener or by any other inadvertence, [a] writing does not express the agreement actually made, it may be reformed by the court” … . Gunther v Vilceus, 2016 NY Slip Op 05847, 2nd Dept 8-24-16

CONTRACT LAW (DOCTRINE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE APPLIED TO REFORM NOTE AND MORTGAGE)/MUTUAL MISTAKE (DOCTRINE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE APPLIED TO REFORM NOTE AND MORTGAGE)

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PUBLICITY AGENT FOR A BROADWAY SHOW BREACHED THE COVENENT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BY SENDING EMAILS TO AN INVESTOR DESIGNED TO SINK THE PRODUCTION.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Friedman, determined a publicity agent for a broadway show breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in the agent’s contract with the show’s producer. The agent, Thibodeau, sent emails to an investor which were intended to sink the project, and the investor pulled out. The defamation and tortious interference causes of action will go to trial. But the breach of contract cause of action was demonstrated as a matter of law. The plaintiff is a limited partnership formed to put on the show, RBLP:

The record establishes that Thibodeau, without RBLP’s authorization, and using confidential information he had obtained as a result of his employment as RBLP’s press representative, sent an email directly to Runsdorf, a key potential investor who had desired to remain anonymous, causing Runsdorf to withdraw his financial commitment, all of which resulted in the cancellation of rehearsals and the play’s failure to open. Even assuming that his conduct did not violate the express terms of his agreement to act as the play’s press representative, Thibodeau breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by essentially defeating the purpose of the agreement by his actions … . Thibodeau was hired by RBLP to use his public relations skills to facilitate the production of a play; his actions, in which he made use of confidential information that RBLP had entrusted to him in the course of his employment, made it impossible for RBLP to produce the play as planned. It is difficult to imagine a plainer case of a party to a contract utterly defeating the purpose for which the other party had entered into that contract, or a more blatant example of an agent’s disloyalty to his principal .. . Rebecca Broadway L.P. v Hotton, 2016 NY Slip Op 05839, 1st Dept 8-18-16

CONTRACT LAW (PUBLICITY AGENT FOR A BROADWAY SHOW BREACHED THE COVENENT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BY SENDING EMAILS TO AN INVESTOR DESIGNED TO SINK THE PRODUCTION)/COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (PUBLICITY AGENT FOR A BROADWAY SHOW BREACHED THE COVENENT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BY SENDING EMAILS TO AN INVESTOR DESIGNED TO SINK THE PRODUCTION)/DEFAMATION (PUBLICITY AGENT FOR A BROADWAY SHOW BREACHED THE COVENENT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BY SENDING EMAILS TO AN INVESTOR DESIGNED TO SINK THE PRODUCTION)/TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT (PUBLICITY AGENT FOR A BROADWAY SHOW BREACHED THE COVENENT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BY SENDING EMAILS TO AN INVESTOR DESIGNED TO SINK THE PRODUCTION)

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IN THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, MORGAN STANLEY’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE DISCOVERY OF DEFECTIVE SECURITIES IS AN INDEPENDENT BREACH OF CONTRACT; GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED DESPITE SOLE REMEDY CONTRACTUAL PROVISION.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, in an action stemming from the sale of defective residential mortgage backed securities, determined defendant’s (Morgan Stanley’s) alleged failure to notify plaintiff of the discovery of defective securities constituted an independent breach of contract claim. The First Department further determined, despite the purported “sole remedy” contractual provision, the cause of action for gross negligence was adequately pled and should not have been dismissed:

… [U]nder similar RMBS agreements, a seller’s failure to provide the trustee with notice of material breaches it discovers in the underlying loans states an independently breached contractual obligation, allowing a plaintiff to pursue separate damages … .

… Where parties contractually agree to a limitation on liability, that provision is enforceable, even against claims of a party’s own ordinary negligence … . The purpose of provisions that limit liability or remedies available in the event of breach is to “allocat[e] the risk of economic loss in the event that the contemplated transaction is not fully executed” … . Courts will generally honor the remedies that the parties have contractually agreed to … . There are exceptions to this rule of law, however, and as a matter of long standing public policy, a party may not insulate itself from damages caused by its “grossly negligent conduct” … . Used in this context, “gross negligence” differs in kind, and not only degree, from claims of ordinary negligence. “It is conduct that evinces a reckless disregard for the rights of others or smacks’ of intentional wrongdoing” … . Morgan Stanley Mtge. Loan Trust 2006-13ARX v Morgan Stanley Mtge. Capital Holdings LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 05781, 1st Dept 8-11-16

CONTRACT LAW (IN THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, MORGAN STANLEY’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE DISCOVERY OF DEFECTIVE SECURITIES IS AN INDEPENDENT BREACH OF CONTRACT; GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED DESPITE SOLE REMEDY CONTRACTUAL PROVISION)/SECURITIES (IN THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, MORGAN STANLEY’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE DISCOVERY OF DEFECTIVE SECURITIES IS AN INDEPENDENT BREACH OF CONTRACT; GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED DESPITE SOLE REMEDY CONTRACTUAL PROVISION)/NEGLIGENCE  (IN THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, MORGAN STANLEY’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE DISCOVERY OF DEFECTIVE SECURITIES IS AN INDEPENDENT BREACH OF CONTRACT; GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED DESPITE SOLE REMEDY CONTRACTUAL PROVISION)/GROSS NEGLIGENCE (IN THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, MORGAN STANLEY’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE DISCOVERY OF DEFECTIVE SECURITIES IS AN INDEPENDENT BREACH OF CONTRACT; GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED DESPITE SOLE REMEDY CONTRACTUAL PROVISION)/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES (IN THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, MORGAN STANLEY’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE DISCOVERY OF DEFECTIVE SECURITIES IS AN INDEPENDENT BREACH OF CONTRACT; GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED DESPITE SOLE REMEDY CONTRACTUAL PROVISION

DOCTRINE OF INDEFINITENESS IMPROPERLY APPLIED TO ORAL CONTRACT; BOTH QUANTUM MERUIT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT PROPERLY PLED WHERE DEFENDANTS DENY EXISTENCE OF CONTRACT.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined questions of fact precluded summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff alleged breach of an oral contract and quantum meruit (unjust enrichment) causes of action. Although there was no express agreement that plaintiff was entitled to payment for work done before termination, the doctrine of indefiniteness should not have been applied to dismiss the breach of contract claim. In addition, because defendants alleged there was no enforceable contract, plaintiff’s quantum meruit cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff does not have to elect a remedy (breach of contract or quantum meruit) in that circumstance. With regard to the breach of oral contract cause of action, the court wrote:

An oral agreement may be enforceable as long as the terms are clear and definite and the conduct of the parties evinces mutual assent “sufficiently definite to assure that the parties are truly in agreement with respect to all material terms” … . However, not all terms of a contract need be fixed with absolute certainty, and courts will not apply the doctrine of indefiniteness to “defeat the reasonable expectations of the parties in entering into the contract” … . Where “there may exist an objective method for supplying the missing terms needed to calculate the alleged compensation owed plaintiff,” a claimed oral agreement is “not as a matter of law unenforceable for indefiniteness” … . Kramer v Greene, 2016 NY Slip Op 05776, 1st Dept 8-11-16

CONTRACT LAW (DOCTRINE OF INDEFINITENESS IMPROPERLY APPLIED TO ORAL CONTRACT; BOTH QUANTUM MERUIT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT PROPERLY PLED WHERE DEFENDANTS DENY EXISTENCE OF CONTRACT)/INDEFINITENESS DOCTRINE (CONTRACT LAW, DOCTRINE OF INDEFINITENESS IMPROPERLY APPLIED TO ORAL CONTRACT)/QUANTUM MERUIT (BOTH QUANTUM MERUIT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT PROPERLY PLED WHERE DEFENDANTS DENY EXISTENCE OF CONTRACT)/UNJUST ENRICHMENT (BOTH QUANTUM MERUIT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT PROPERLY PLED WHERE DEFENDANTS DENY EXISTENCE OF CONTRACT)/ORAL CONTRACT (DOCTRINE OF INDEFINITENESS IMPROPERLY APPLIED TO ORAL CONTRACT; BOTH QUANTUM MERUIT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT PROPERLY PLED WHERE DEFENDANTS DENY EXISTENCE OF CONTRACT)

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CONTRACT PROVISION WHICH PURPORTED TO EXTEND THE ACCRUAL OF BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY; ACTION TIME-BARRED.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, determined breach of contract causes of action stemming from contracts for the sale of defective residential mortgage backed securities were time-barred. The court rejected as against public policy contractual provisions which purported to extend the accrual of the causes of action:

In this appeal, we must decide whether the statute of limitations bars a breach of contract action that was brought more than six years after the seller made allegedly false representations and warranties as to loans underlying residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). We find that dismissal of the action is mandated by the Court of Appeals’ decision in ACE Sec. Corp., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-SL2 v DB Structured Prods., Inc. (25 NY3d 581 [2015]), which sets forth a clear rule that a breach of contract claim in an RMBS put-back action accrues on the date the allegedly false representations and warranties were made. Notwithstanding the parties’ sophistication and their assent to a contract provision specifying a set of conditions that would have delayed the cause of action’s accrual, we find that the accrual provision is unenforceable as against public policy, because it is tantamount to extending the statute of limitations based on an imprecise “discovery” rule, which the Court of Appeals has consistently rejected in the commercial sphere … . Moreover, the accrual provision does not compel defendant to undertake a promised future performance, separate from its obligations to cure or repurchase defective loans, so as to trigger the statute of limitations anew; nor does it contemplate a substantive condition precedent to defendant’s performance that would delay accrual of the breach of contract claim … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Flagstar Capital Mkts. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 05780, 1st Dept 8-11-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CONTRACT PROVISION WHICH PURPORTED TO EXTEND THE ACCRUAL OF BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY; ACTION TIME-BARRED)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (CONTRACT PROVISION WHICH PURPORTED TO EXTEND THE ACCRUAL OF BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY; ACTION TIME-BARRED)/SECURITIES (RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, CONTRACT PROVISION WHICH PURPORTED TO EXTEND THE ACCRUAL OF BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY; ACTION TIME-BARRED)/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CONTRACT PROVISION WHICH PURPORTED TO EXTEND THE ACCRUAL OF BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY; ACTION TIME-BARRED)

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NONSIGNATORY WHICH RECEIVED A DIRECT BENEFIT FROM AN AGREEMENT WITH AN ARBITRATION PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant, Gordon, was entitled to compel arbitration with an entity which was not a party to the document with the arbitration provision. Plaintiff, BGC Notes, loaned $700,000 to Gordon as part of an employment arrangement with another related entity, BGC Financial. The employment agreement contained the arbitration clause and the note for the loan required resolution of any disputes in the courts. Although BGC Notes was not was not a party to the employment agreement, it was deemed to receive a direct benefit from the employment agreement. Therefore BGC Notes was subject to the arbitration clause in the agreement:

Although BGC Notes was not a signatory to the employment agreement, which is the document actually containing the arbitration provision, BGC Notes nonetheless received a “direct benefit” directly traceable to the employment agreement … . Specifically, section 3(d) of the employment agreement provides that BGC Financial would “cause” BGC Notes to make a loan to Gordon by way of the very note that BGC Notes sues upon in this action, and BGC Notes received all the benefits that an entity ordinarily receives upon the giving of a loan … . Thus, BGC Notes derived benefits from the employment agreement, and BGC Notes’ contention that section 3(d) conferred a benefit only to Gordon, and at most an “indirect” benefit to BGC Notes itself, belies the terms of the employment agreement … . BGC Notes, LLC v Gordon, 2016 NY Slip Op 05775, 1st Dept 8-11-16

ARBITRATION (NONSIGNATORY WHICH RECEIVED A DIRECT BENEFIT FROM AN AGREEMENT WITH AN ARBITRATION PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION)/CONTRACT LAW (ARBITRATION, NONSIGNATORY WHICH RECEIVED A DIRECT BENEFIT FROM AN AGREEMENT WITH AN ARBITRATION PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION)

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AGREEMENT TO AGREE UNENFORCEABLE UNDER BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH, PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND FRAUD THEORIES. 

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the letter of intent constituted merely “an agreement to agree” which could not support breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel or fraud causes of action:

 

The letter of intent provided that parties “shall negotiate to arrive at mutually acceptable Definitive Agreements” regarding the potential joint venture and loan. The letter of intent further provided that the parties “each reserve the right to withdraw from further negotiations at any time if, in the sole judgment of either or both, it is in either Party’s best interest to do so, without further liability or obligation to the other.” * * *

The Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint, as documentary evidence, in the form of the letter of intent, utterly refuted the plaintiff’s factual allegations, thereby conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law … . ” [I]t is rightfully well settled in the common law of contracts in this State that a mere agreement to agree, in which a material term is left for future negotiations, is unenforceable'” … . Here, the letter of intent demonstrated that the plaintiff’s allegations of breach of contract related to a mere agreement to agree … . Further, causes of action sounding in promissory estoppel and fraud require reasonable reliance on an alleged promise or misrepresentation … . Here, in light of the language of the letter of intent, any reliance on the defendants’ alleged promises and representations would, as a matter of law, have been unreasonable … . Finally, the language of the letter of intent utterly refuted the plaintiff’s allegations regarding an alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing … . New York Military Academy v NewOpen Group, 2016 NY Slip Op 05706, 2nd Dept 8-3-16

 

CONTRACT LAW (AGREEMENT TO AGREE UNENFORCEABLE UNDER BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH, PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND FRAUD THEORIES)/AGREEMENT TO AGREE (AGREEMENT TO AGREE UNENFORCEABLE UNDER BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH, PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND FRAUD THEORIES)/LETTER OF INTENT (AGREEMENT TO AGREE UNENFORCEABLE UNDER BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH, PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND FRAUD THEORIES)/COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (AGREEMENT TO AGREE UNENFORCEABLE UNDER BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH, PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND FRAUD THEORIES)/PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL (AGREEMENT TO AGREE UNENFORCEABLE UNDER BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH, PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND FRAUD THEORIES)/FRAUD (AGREEMENT TO AGREE UNENFORCEABLE UNDER BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH, PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND FRAUD THEORIES)

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