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PLAINTIFF SUED THE COUNTY SHERIFF SEEKING A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT A LOCAL COURT WHICH ISSUES A SECURING ORDER FOR A NONQUALIFYING OFFENSE VIOLATES THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT DETERMINED THERE WAS NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERY INVOLVING THE SHERIFF WHO IS BOUND TO OBEY A COURT’S SECURING ORDER; THE REAL DISPUTE IS WITH THE COURT WHICH ISSUES THE ORDER IN APPARENT VIOLATION OF A STATUTE (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court and dismissing the declaratory judgment action, determined there was no justiciable controversy. Plaintiff sued the County Sheriff seeking a declaration that “assigning a local court to arraign a criminal defendant with two previous felony convictions violates the constitutional rights of the accused because local courts lack the ability to order release or set bail under those circumstances.” The issue arose because of a conflict among provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law:

… City Court issued a securing order that committed [defendant] to the custody of the Sheriff on the basis of CPL 530.20 (2) (a) (double predicate provision). The double predicate provision states that a city, town, or village court (hereinafter, local court) may not order release on recognizance or bail when the criminal defendant, like plaintiff, has two previous felony convictions. Plaintiff further alleged that the double predicate provision conflicts with CPL 510.10 (4) (qualifying offense provision), which limits the court’s ability to issue a securing order imposing bail or remand to situations in which the criminal defendant stands charged with an enumerated qualifying offense (see also CPL 510.10 [3]). * * *

We conclude that plaintiff’s allegations fail to “demonstrate the existence of a bona fide justiciable controversy” inasmuch as there is no “real dispute between adverse parties, involving substantial legal interests for which a declaration of rights will have some practical effect” … . … “[T]he heart of the dispute is not any action taken by the Sheriff but rather whether the local . . . court must remand a given [criminal] defendant such as [plaintiff] to the custody of the Sheriff.” * * * Plaintiff’s real dispute is with the local court that issues a securing order ostensibly in violation of the qualifying offense provision, not with the Sheriff who is bound to obey the securing order. Where, as here, “there is no genuine dispute between the parties, the courts are precluded, as a matter of law, from issuing a declaratory judgment” … . Parker v Hilton, 2024 NY Slip Op 06456, Fourth Dept 12-20-24

Practice Point: Here the plaintiff’s dispute was not with the Sheriff, who is bound to obey a securing order, but was with the local court that issued the securing order which ostensibly violated a statute and the accused’s constitutional rights. Therefore there was no justiciable controversy between plaintiff and the Sheriff.

 

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THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE, ASSIGNED COUNSEL’S DISPARAGING REMARKS, AND ASSIGNED COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT DEPORTATION WAS MANDATORY, AMOUNTED TO A DEPRIVATION OF DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL; GUILTY PLEA WITHDRAWN AND VACATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to withdraw and vacate his guilty plea should have been granted. Defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel:

The People concede that defendant’s right to counsel was violated by the court’s ruling improperly prohibiting defendant from retaining an unpaid attorney who worked at a public defender organization which represented him on a related matter … , and by the conflict of interest between assigned counsel and defendant that arose from counsel’s disparaging statements, in court and in written submissions, about defendant and his possible defense of accidental stabbing.

Defendant was also deprived of effective assistance when his counsel advised him that because of his plea, he will most likely be deported, since it is clear that defendant’s conviction would trigger mandatory deportation … . People v Pan, 2024 NY Slip Op 06166, First Dept 12-10-24

Practice Point: The judge improperly prohibited defendant from obtaining counsel of his choice.

Practice Point: Assigned counsel’s disparaging remarks about defendant created a conflict of interest.

Practice Point: Assigned counsel’s failure to inform defendant deportation was mandatory constituted ineffective assistance.

 

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THE ZONING REGULATION WHICH REQUIRES PAYMENT TO AN “ARTS FUND” OF $100 PER SQUARE FOOT FOR CONVERSION OF “JOINT LIVING-WORK QUARTERS FOR ARTISTS” TO FULLY RESIDENTIAL USE IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, found unconstitutional a NYC Zoning Regulation (ZR) which required artists who wish to convert their “joint living-work quarters for artists (JLWQA)” to residential use to pay $100 per square foot to an “Arts Fund.” The fund did not have a sufficient connection with the government’s land-use interest:

The ZR amendment passed by the City, in establishing the Special SoHo-NoHo Mixed Use District (SNX District), provides current JLWQA unit owners a pathway to convert uses but also requires them, if and when they seek conversion, to contribute “$100.00 per square foot of floor area to be converted” to the Arts Fund, with annual increases … . “[T]he payment of such non-refundable contribution shall be a precondition to filing for or issuing of any building permit allowing the conversion [of] a joint living-work quarters for artists to a residence” … .

The Arts Fund fee constitutes a permit condition for which the “two-part test modeled on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine” applies … . Thus, the permit condition “must have an ‘essential nexus’ to the government’s land-use interest,” which “ensures that the government is acting to further its stated purpose” … , and the condition “must have ‘rough proportionality’ to the development’s impact on the land-use interest” … .

In applying the two-part test, we find that petitioners are entitled to a declaration that the Arts Fund fee requirement constitutes a taking without just compensation (US Const Amend V; NY Const art I, § 7[a]). Matter of Coalition for Fairness in Soho & Noho, Inc. v City of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 06118, First Dept 12-5-24

Practice Point: Here a zoning regulation which required payment of a fee of $100 per square foot to an “Arts Fund” as a precondition for a building permit was deemed an unconstitutional taking.

 

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OFFICIALS OF A NATIVE AMERICAN NATION CAN BE SUED IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS FOR OFF-RESERVATION ACTIONS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Connolly, over a partial concurrence and partial dissent, determined the trustees (officials) of a sovereign Native American nation may be sued in New York State courts for their off-reservation actions. Here the defendants constructed billboards within a highway right of way which traversed land owned by the Nation. The opinion addresses an issue of first impression and is too complex and detailed to fairly summarize here:

In March and April 2019, the defendants allegedly had trees cut and removed from within the highway right-of-way, without obtaining a work permit from the DOT, and the DOT allegedly issued two stop work orders to the defendants’ alleged contractors. Thereafter, the defendants allegedly began trenching and placed large equipment, a pile of stones, and support piles within the highway right-of-way, without a work permit from the DOT. The DOT allegedly issued another stop work order and a cease and desist letter to the defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants ignored the stop work orders and the cease and desist letter. * * *

… [N]otwithstanding sovereign immunity, Native Americans “going beyond reservation boundaries are subject to any generally applicable state law,” “[u]nless federal law provides differently” … . Here, the plaintiffs alleged that the structures are being constructed upon the subject property, over which the State has a permanent easement. The plaintiffs further alleged that the subject property is not aboriginal or sovereign land of the Nation, the Nation owns the subject property in fee simple, and the subject property is not part of the Reservation nor held in trust by the federal government. Thus, according to the plaintiffs, the Trustee defendants have engaged in conduct “beyond reservation boundaries,” and they are subject to generally applicable state laws … . Commissioner of the N.Y. State Dept. of Transp. v Polite, 2024 NY Slip Op 06023, Second Dept 12-4-24

Practice Point: Officials (trustees) of a Native American Nation can be sued in New York State courts for off-reservation actions. Here the trustees constructed billboards on a highway right of way which traversed land owned by the Nation.

 

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THE “MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION” IS GROUNDED IN THE FIRST AMEMDMENT AND MAY RESTRICT A STATE AGENCY’S REVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS MADE BY RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS; THE EXCEPTION IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, NOT A JURISDICTIONAL BAR, TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT ACTION UNDER THE NYS HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, reversing the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR) and the Appellate Division, determined the so-called “ministerial exception” was not a jurisdictional bar to the Nigerian priest’s, Ibhawa’s, hostile work environment claim under the NYS Human Rights Law. The “ministerial exception” is grounded in the First Amendment and may restrict state interference with employment decisions made by religious institutions.. The Court of Appeals clarified that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense in an employment discrimination action against a religious institution, not a jurisdictional bar to bringing the case:

Ibhawa filed an employment complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR) in November 2020, claiming that the Diocese had engaged in discriminatory employment practices in violation of the New York Human Rights Law (see Executive Law art 15). Ibhawa alleged that he had experienced racial discrimination at the Diocese, including from an employee who directed a racial slur at him and a parishioner who made xenophobic remarks to him. He further alleged that the Diocesan officials to whom he reported the incidents declined to investigate them, questioned his decision to terminate the employee who had used a racial slur, and made “highly insulting and offensive” remarks about “foreign priests.” At a subsequent meeting, two Diocesan officials offered to buy Ibhawa a plane ticket to Nigeria and told him that the “Bishop could remove [his] faculties.” Shortly afterwards, the Diocese informed Ibhawa that his employment had been terminated and his priestly faculties removed, which meant that that he could not apply for a position as a priest in the Diocese. The Diocese eventually hired a white priest to replace him. Based on these assertions, Ibhawa alleged claims of hostile work environment and unlawful termination on the basis of race and national origin. He sought, among other remedies, compensatory and punitive damages. * * *

DHR’s order dismissing Ibhawa’s hostile work environment claim was affected by an error of law. After noting the parties’ agreement that Ibhawa was “a priest serving as the pastor (Parish Administrator) of a church,” DHR found that his complaint “comes under the ministerial exception (relative to the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution).” On that basis, DHR concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Ibhawa’s claims. This determination was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s express holding that the “exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar” … . Matter of Ibhawa v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 2024 NY Slip Op 05872, CtApp 11-26-24

Practice Point: The “ministerial exception” is grounded in the First Amendment and may restrict a state agency’s review of employment decisions made by religious institutions. The exception is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar, to a hostile work environment action brought by a priest against his employer.

 

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THERE WAS NO PROOF THE WAIVER OF INDICTMENT WAS SIGNED IN OPEN COURT IN THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL; GUILTY PLEA VACATED AND SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating the guilty plea and dismissing the superior court information, determined the record did not demonstrate the defendant signed the waiver of appeal in open court in the presence of counsel:

… [T]he plea minutes are silent as to when the undated waiver was executed by defendant, and during the colloquy County Court referred to defendant as having “signed” the waiver in the past tense … . Neither the waiver nor the plea colloquy confirms that defendant signed the written waiver in the presence of counsel. Further, although County Court indicated in the undated order approving the waiver that it was generally satisfied that the requirements of CPL 195.10 and 195.20 had been met, nothing in the order explicitly confirms “that the waiver was signed in open court” in the presence of counsel . Thus, … the record does not reflect that defendant’s waiver of indictment passes constitutional and statutory muster, and it follows that defendant’s guilty plea must be vacated and the underlying SCI dismissed … . People v Trapani, 2024 NY Slip Op 05846, Third Dept 11-21-24

Practice Point: When a defendant waives his right to an indictment and agrees to plead to a superior court information, the record must reflect the waiver was made in open court and in the presence of counsel. Absent proof of those statutory and constitutional requirements the waiver is invalid.

Similar issue and result in People v Rupp, 2024 NY Slip Op 05845, Third Dept 11-21-24.

 

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THE NEW YORK STATUTE DESIGNATING DEFENDANT A SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENDER WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED IF THE CALIFORNIA OFFENSE UPON WHICH THE DESIGNATION IS BASED WAS NON-VIOLENT; MATTER REMITTED FOR A RULING WHETHER THE CALIFORNIA OFFENSE WAS VIOLENT OR NON-VIOLENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, remitting the matter to County Court, over a five-justice concurrence, determined County Court must rule on whether defendant’s California conviction involved a violent or a non-violent sexual offense. If the facts of the case indicate the California offense was non-violent, the New York statute which requires designation of the defendant as a sexually violent offender would be unconstitutional as applied:

Defendant appeals from an order insofar as it designated him a sexually violent offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act ([SORA] Correction Law § 168 et seq.). Due to the designation, which is based on a felony conviction in California requiring defendant to register as a sex offender in that state, defendant is subject to lifetime registration as a sex offender in New York even though County Court determined that he is only a level one risk. The designation was made pursuant to Correction Law § 168-a (3) (b) insofar as it defines a sexually violent offense as including a “conviction of a felony in any other jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred.” Although defendant concedes that he qualifies as a sexually violent offender under the foreign registration clause of § 168-a (3) (b), he contends that the provision is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution (US Const, 14th Amend, § 1), inasmuch as his out-of-state felony conviction was for a nonviolent offense. Defendant further contends that the foreign registration clause violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Federal Constitution … . * * *

If the felony of conviction, by virtue of its statutory elements … , involved sexually violent conduct, then the foreign registration clause of Correction Law § 168-a (3) (b) is not unconstitutional as applied to defendant inasmuch as he committed a violent sex offense even if it does not include all of the essential elements of one of the sexually violent offenses in New York enumerated in Correction Law § 168-a (3) (a). If, however, defendant was convicted of an out-of-state felony that is nonviolent in nature, we would conclude that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to defendant … . People v Grzegorzewski, 2024 NY Slip Op 05657, Fourth Dept 11-15-24

Practice Point: The statute which requires defendant be designated a sexually violent offender based upon an out-of-state conviction is unconstitutional as applied if the out-of-state offense was non-violent.

 

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DEFENDANT’S 2013 GUILTY PLEA WAS DEEMED DEFECTIVE BECAUSE THE JUDGE FAILED TO ENSURE THE DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD THE CHARGE; BECAUSE THE 2013 CONVICTION WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED, IT CANNOT BE A BASIS, IN 2020, FOR SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT AS A PERSISTENT VIOLENT PREDICATE FELON; SENTENCE VACATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, remanding the matter for resentencing, determined defendant should not have been sentenced as a persistent violent predicate felon based on a 2013 guilty plea because the plea to attempted burglary second was constitutionally invalid. In the plea allocution, defendant indicated he formulated the intent to steal after he entered the dwelling, prompting the need for further questioning by the judge. The intent to steal must be formulated before entry:

During the allocution on defendant’s 2013 plea to attempted burglary in the second degree, he asserted that, although he stole property from the subject dwelling, his intent at the time he unlawfully entered the premises was to tell its occupant to close the door. Because “the intent to commit a crime in the dwelling must be contemporaneous with the entry” under the burglary statute … , defendant’s statement that he formed the requisite intent “only after [he] had entered . . . the [premises] unlawfully” negated an element of the crime to which he pleaded guilty … . This statement triggered the court’s duty to make further inquiry in order to ensure that defendant understood “the nature of the charge and that the plea [was] intelligently entered” … . The court failed to do so. To the extent that the court conducted a further inquiry, its questions did no more than establish that defendant stole property once he was inside the dwelling, without refuting his statement that he had not intended to steal the property at the time of entry, nor did defendant confirm that he wished to waive a defense on that basis … . On this record, “we cannot conclude that defendant’s guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made” … . Accordingly, since the requirements for enhanced sentencing have not been met, defendant’s sentence as a persistent violent felony offender must be vacated … . People v Stewart, 2024 NY Slip Op 05546, First Dept 11-12-24

Practice Point: Here it appears defense counsel demonstrated the 2013 guilty plea was unconstitutionally obtained because of an error by the sentencing judge during the allocution. Defense counsel then successfully argued the 2013 conviction could not be a basis for the 2020 sentencing of defendant as a persistent violent predicate felon. The current status of the 2013 conviction was not discussed.

 

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THE RECORD ON APPEAL DID NOT SUPPORT FAMILY COURT’S RULING MOTHER HAD FORFEITED HER RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS TERMINATION-OF-PARENTAL-RIGHTS PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the record on appeal did not support Family Court’s ruling mother had forfeited her right to counsel in this termination-of-parental-rights proceeding.

​… Family Court granted a second application by the mother’s assigned counsel to be relieved and determined that the mother had forfeited her right to be assigned new counsel. The court’s determination was based upon, among other things, “suspicions” that the mother had been “involved” in a recent security compromise of the assigned counsel’s computer. The court also cited as a basis for its determination the fact that, over the course of the child protective proceeding and this proceeding, the mother had a total of three attorneys assigned to represent her or to act as her legal advisor. The record on appeal does not reflect how long the prior assigned attorneys represented the mother or why they ceased representing her. * * *

A respondent in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b has the right to the assistance of counsel … . A party may forfeit the fundamental right to counsel by engaging in “‘egregious conduct,'” but only as a matter of “‘extreme, last resort'” … . Here, the record fails to clearly reflect that the mother engaged in the sort of egregious conduct that would justify a finding that she forfeited her right to assigned counsel … .

The deprivation of the mother’s right to counsel requires reversal without regard to the merits of her position … . Matter of Sa’Nai F. B. M. A. (Chaniece T.), 2024 NY Slip Op 05440, Second Dept 11-6-24

Practice Point: Consult this decision for some insight into the criteria for finding a party in a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding has forfeited the right to counsel.​

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RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE FORECLOSURE ABUSE PREVENTION ACT (FAPA) WHERE FINAL JUDGMENT HAS NOT BEEN RENDERED DOES NOT VIOLATE PLAINTIFF’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS; HERE THE DEBT WAS ACCELERATED IN 2008 AND THE CURRENT FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING IS THEREFORE UNTIMELY PURSUANT TO THE FAPA (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, determined the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) applied retroactively to render the foreclosure action untimely because the debt had been accelerated by a prior foreclosure proceeding in 2008. The Third Department determined the retroactive application of the FAPA to foreclosure actions where final judgment has not been rendered did not violate plaintiff’s due process rights:

In drafting FAPA, the Senate and Assembly sponsors both expressed an urgent need to correct judicial interpretation with unintended consequences which allowed noteholders to unilaterally “manipulate statutes of limitations to their advantage” and to the detriment of homeowners … . … [W]e find that FAPA should be applied retroactively to effect its beneficial purpose … . * * *

… [W]e find that retroactive application of FAPA to foreclosure actions where a final judgment has not been enforced does not violate plaintiff’s due process rights … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Lynch, 2024 NY Slip Op 05261, Third Dept 10-24-24

Practice Point: Where there has been no final judgment, retroactive application of the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) to render a foreclosure action untimely does not violate a plaintiff’s due process rights.

 

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