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AN ANSWER OR A COMPLAINT VERIFIED BY AN ATTORNEY DOES NOT PROVE THE CONTENTS (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, noted that an answer verified by an attorney (as opposed to the defendant) and a complaint verified by an attorney (as opposed to the plaintiff) do not prove the contents:

… [A]n answer verified by an attorney is insufficient to demonstrate that the defendant has a potentially meritorious defense … . …

… [A]lthough a verified complaint “may be used as the affidavit of the facts constituting the claim,” the complaint “must contain evidentiary facts from one with personal knowledge since a pleading verified by an attorney pursuant to CPLR 3020(d)(3) is insufficient to establish its merits” … . Since the complaint in this case was verified only by the plaintiff’s attorney, and not by the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not rely on its contents to supply proof of the facts constituting the claim. Pemberton v Montoya, 2023 NY Slip Op 02674, Second Dept 5-17-23

Practice Point: Answers and complaints verified by the attorney and not by the party do not prove the contents.

 

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THE BANK DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF STANDING TO FORECLOSE; THE EVIDENCE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE ALLONGE WAS FIRMLY ATTACHED TO THE NOTE; EVIDENCE FIRST OFFERED IN REPLY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank did not demonstrate it had standing to foreclose because the evidence the allonge was firmly attached to the note was insufficient. The court noted Supreme Court should not have considered evidence first submitted in reply:

Although the vice president of loan documentation attested in her affidavit, based on her review of the plaintiff’s business records, that an allonge containing an endorsement in blank by “Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation As Receiver of AmTrust Bank fka Ohio Savings Bank” was attached to the consolidated note, she did not aver that the allonge was “firmly affixed” to the consolidated note within the meaning of UCC 3-202(2). “Although the foundation for the admission of a business record may be provided by the testimony of the custodian, it is the business record itself, not the foundational affidavit, that serves as proof of the matter asserted” … . Moreover, the affidavit was sworn to on January 9, 2020, subsequent to the commencement of this action, and the affiant did not state when she reviewed the copy of the note and the allonge. Thus, her affidavit was insufficient to establish, prima facie, that the allonge was “so firmly affixed [to the consolidated note] as to become a part thereof” (UCC 3-202[2]) at the time of commencement of either the 2014 action or the 2015 action … . Nor did the affidavit of the employee of the plaintiff’s attorneys establish compliance with the requirements of UCC 3-202(2), as it made no reference to an allonge to the consolidated note.

Affidavits submitted by the plaintiff with its reply papers, asserting that the allonge was attached to the consolidated note at the time of commencement of the 2015 action, should not have been considered by the Supreme Court, since a party moving for summary judgment “cannot meet its prima facie burden by submitting evidence for the first time in reply” … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Mitselmakher, 2023 NY Slip Op 02709, Second Dept 5-17-23

Practice Point: To demonstrate standing to foreclose the bank must show the allonge was “firmly attached” to the note within the meaning of UCC 3-303(2). The bank’s evidence here was insufficient.

Practice Point: Evidence first submitted in reply should not be considered in support of the prima facie burden for summary judgment.

 

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THE ESTATE WAS A NECESSARY PARTY IN THE FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE NECESSARY PARTY CAN BE SUMMONED AND, IF NOT, WHETHER THE ACTION CAN CONTINUE IN THE PARTY’S ABSENCE; THE FACT THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN DOES NOT PRECLUDE SUMMONING THE NECESSARY PARTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, explained the proper procedure where it is alleged the complaint should be dismissed for failure to include a necessary party, here the failure to include an estate in a foreclosure action. First the court should determine whether the party can be summoned, noting that the expiration of the statute of limitations is does not bar summoning the party. Second, if the party cannot be summoned the court should determine whether the action can continue in the party’s absence:

“Pursuant to RPAPL 1311 (1), ‘necessary defendants’ in a mortgage foreclosure action include, among others, ‘[e]very person having an estate or interest in possession, or otherwise, in the property as tenant in fee, for life, by the courtesy, or for years, and every person entitled to the reversion, remainder, or inheritance of the real property, or of any interest therein or undivided share thereof, after the determination of a particular estate therein'” … . “Particularly where, as here, the plaintiff seeks a deficiency judgment, and alleges a default in payment subsequent to the death of the deceased mortgagor, the estate of the mortgagor is a necessary party to the foreclosure action” … .

When a necessary party has not been made a party and is “subject to the jurisdiction” of the court, the proper remedy is not dismissal of the complaint, but rather for the court to order that the necessary party be summoned (see CPLR 1001[b] …). Contrary to the intervenors’ contention, the Supreme Court’s ability to direct joinder of a representative of [the] estate at this juncture is not affected by the purported running of the statute of limitations, because the expiration of a statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional defect … .  … [W]hen jurisdiction over an absent necessary party “can be obtained only by [that party’s] consent or appearance, the court, when justice requires, may allow the action to proceed without [that party],” upon consideration of various enumerated factors (CPLR 1001[b] …). U.S. Bank Trust N.A. v Germoso, 2023 NY Slip Op 02704, Second Dept 5-17-23

Practice Point: Here an estate was a necessary party in the foreclosure action. The proper procedure is for the court to determine if the party can be summoned, and, if not, whether the action can continue in the party’s absence. The fact that the statute of limitations had run did not preclude summoning the estate.

 

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THE HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND SEX DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS WERE NOT UNTIMELY BECAUSE A CONTINUING COURSE OF CONDUCT LEADING UP TO THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT WAS ALLEGED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s hostile work environment and sex discrimination claims should not have been dismissed as untimely because a continuing pattern was sufficiently alleged:

The allegations supporting plaintiff’s hostile work environment and sex discrimination claims are timely, as she has sufficiently alleged facts comprising “a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct extending into the [limitations] period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint” … . The complaint alleges that, following Corn’s sexual assault on plaintiff in February 2015, he continued to stare at her, lurked by her desk, made inappropriate, flirtatious comments toward her, disclosed intimate details about his marriage, and frequently pressured her to go out drinking, within the limitations period. It cannot be said that, as a matter of law, these acts were not part of a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct supporting her hostile work environment and discrimination claims … .

Moreover, under the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107) and amended New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296[h]), the allegations that Corn sexually assaulted plaintiff in 2015 and engaged in a pattern of gender-based misconduct in the workplace, demonstrate that she was subjected to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of her gender … . Crawford v American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 02611, First Dept 5-16-23

Practice Point: Here the hostile work environment and sex discrimination claims should not have been dismissed as untimely because a continuing course of conduct up until the filing of the complaint was alleged.

 

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AN ORDER TO EFFECT SERVICE OF PROCESS IN A MANNER WHICH CANNOT BE COMPLIED WITH PRECLUDES PERSONAL JURISDICTION; PETITIONER DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ELECTION FRAUD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) the order to show cause specified a method of service which could not be complied with; therefore personal jurisdiction over Williams was not obtained: (2) election fraud on Williams part was not demonstrated:

Since the method of service provided in the order to show cause was jurisdictional in nature, and the affidavit of service is deficient on its face for identifying an address for mailing purportedly obtained from a document that did not exist, the court should have granted that branch of Williams’s motion which was, in effect, to dismiss the amended petition for lack of personal jurisdiction. …

“A candidate’s designating petition or independent nominating petition ‘will be invalidated on the ground of fraud if there is a showing that the entire petition is permeated with fraud'” … . “Absent permeation with fraud, a designating [or independent nominating] petition may be invalidated where the candidate has participated in or is chargeable with knowledge of the fraud” … . Here, Stark [petitioner] failed to meet her burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the designating petition was permeated with fraud or that Williams participated in or was chargeable with knowledge of any fraud … . Matter of Stark v Williams, 2023 NY Slip Op 02583, Second Dept 5-11-23

Practice Point: If an order to show cause directs service of process to be made in a manner which cannot be complied with, personal jurisdiction is precluded even if the affidavit of service purports to have complied with the order.

 

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THE ADMINISTRATOR’S MOTION TO BE SUBSTITUED AS PLAINTIFF IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, INITIALLY DENIED, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED UPON THE MOTION TO RENEW; THE CRITERIA FOR A MOTION TO RENEW, AND A MOTION TO BE SUBSTITUTED FOR A DECEASED PARTY ARE EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the administrator’s (Walter’s) motion to renew in this medical malpractice action should not have been granted. Walter moved to be substituted as plaintiff. Initially the motion was denied but upon Walter’s motion to renew, the motion was granted:

“A motion for leave to renew . . . shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination” and “shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion” … . “CPLR 2221(e) has not been construed so narrowly as to disqualify, as new facts not offered on the prior motion, facts contained in a document originally rejected for consideration because the document was not in admissible form” … . However, “[w]hile it may be within the court’s discretion to grant leave to renew upon facts known to the moving party at the time of the prior motion, a motion for leave to renew is not a second chance freely given to parties who have not exercised due diligence in making their first factual presentation”… . “Thus, the court lacks discretion to grant renewal where the moving party omits a reasonable justification for failing to present the new facts on the original motion”… . “While law office failure can be accepted as a reasonable excuse in the exercise of the court’s sound discretion, the movant must submit supporting facts to explain and justify the failure, and mere neglect is not accepted as a reasonable excuse” … .

“If a party dies and the claim for or against him [or her] is not thereby extinguished the court shall order substitution of the proper parties” (CPLR 1015[a]). “A motion for substitution may be made by the successors or representatives of a party or by any party” … . “If the event requiring substitution occurs before final judgment and substitution is not made within a reasonable time, the action may be dismissed as to the party for whom substitution should have been made” … . “In determining reasonableness, a court should consider the plaintiff’s diligence in seeking substitution, prejudice to the other parties, and whether the action is shown to have potential merit” … . “Even if the plaintiff’s explanation for the delay is not satisfactory, the court may still grant the motion for substitution if there is no showing of prejudice and there is potential merit to the action, in light of the strong public policy in favor of disposing of matters on the merits” … . Tollinchi v Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2023 NY Slip Op 02554, Second Dept 5-10-23

Practice Point: The criteria for a motion to renes, and for a motion to be substituted as a party after the death of a party explained in some depth. Here the motion to renew and the motion to be substituted as a party should have been denied.

 

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WHERE, AS HERE, A PARTY IS A DEFENDANT IN ONE ACTION AND A PLAINTIFF IN ANOTHER ACTION, BOTH OF WHICH STE,M FROM THE SAME TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, THE ACTIONS SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the two actions stemming from a single traffic accident should have been consolidated. Decedent leased a truck from defendant Travis and had an accident. Decedent sued Travis alleging negligent maintenance of the truck, Travis sued decedent for the damage to the truck. The two actions should have been consolidated:

CPLR 602(b) provides that “[w]here an action is pending in the supreme court it may, upon motion, remove to itself an action pending in another court and consolidate it or have it tried together with that in the supreme court.” Although a motion pursuant to CPLR 602 “is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, consolidation or joinder for trial is favored to avoid unnecessary duplication of trials, save unnecessary costs and expense, and prevent an injustice which would result from divergent decisions based on the same facts. Where common questions of law or fact exist, a motion . . . to consolidate [or for a joint trial] should be granted, absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right by the party opposing the motion” … .

Here, the two actions involve significant common questions of law and fact; a failure to try them jointly would result in a duplication of trials, unnecessary costs and expense, and a danger of an injustice resulting from divergent decisions; and there has been no showing of prejudice by Travez … . Sherpa v Ford Motor Co., 2023 NY Slip Op 02550, Second Dept 5-10-23

Practice Point: Where two actions arise from the same traffic accident and a party is a defendant in one action and a plaintiff in the other, the actions should be consolidated pursuant to CPLR 602(b).

 

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IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE WHERE “SERIOUS INJURY” WAS AN ISSUE, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF PLAINTIFF TAKEN BEFORE THE DEPOSITION AND AFTER A DISCOVERY ORDER WAS PRECLUDED FROM BOTH THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE AND TRIAL; THERE IS NO SPECIFIC DEADLINE FOR PROVIDING VIDEO SURVEILLANCE GATHERED AFTER THE DEPOSITION; THE POST-DEPOSITION VIDEO SURVEILLANCE WAS NOT PRECLUDED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, determined that video surveillance of the plaintiff taken prior to the deposition in this traffic accident case, and after a discovery order requiring disclosure of video surveillance had been issued, could not be used in support of a summary judgment motion re: “serious injury” or at trial. However, video surveillance taken after the deposition need not be provided to the plaintiff by any specific deadline and was not precluded:

… [W]e conclude that the defendant’s noncompliance with the plaintiff’s discovery notice and two court orders, over an extended period of time, was willful and strategic with regard to the [pre-deposition] surveillance video. … [T]he defendant should have been precluded from using the … surveillance video of the plaintiff …, as it was not disclosed prior to the plaintiff’s deposition … . * * *

CPLR 3101(i) contains no language prohibiting the acquisition of surveillance video of a party after that party has testified at a deposition. Nor does any decisional authority. Indeed, CPLR 3101(h) recognizes that disclosure is a continuing obligation, requiring parties to amend or supplement discovery responses when later information is obtained that renders an earlier response inaccurate or incomplete when made or when the prior response, though correct and complete when made, is materially no longer so. And parties are not required to be more forthcoming with surveillance videos than they would with any ordinary discovery material under CPLR 3101(a) … .

That said, CPLR 3101(i) provides no fixed deadline for the disclosure of post-deposition surveillance video footage … . Rather, trial courts may regulate issues of timing through their preliminary and compliance conference orders … , subject to their authority and discretion to manage their calendars and determine whether to preclude evidence under CPLR 3126(2) for any noncompliance with court-imposed deadlines … . Pizzo v Lustig, 2023 NY Slip Op 02541, Second Dept 5-10-23

Practice Point: Here surveillance video of the plaintiff which was gathered before the deposition and after a disclosure order was precluded from both the summary judgment stage and the trial. There is no specific deadline for turning over video surveillance of the plaintiff gathered after deposition and that video evidence was not precluded.

 

PLAINTIFF, ON THE DAY OF TRIAL, REQUESTED AND WAS GRANTED A DISCONTINUANCE WITHOUT PREJUDICE; PLAINTIFF COULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SIX-MONTH EXTENSION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AFFORDED BY CPLR 205(A) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the discontinuance of the action without prejudice, which plaintiff requested on the day of trial, did not entitle plaintiff to the six-month extension of the statute of limitations afforded by CPLR 205(a):

CPLR 205(a) “extends the time to commence an action after the termination of an earlier related action, where both actions involve the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences” … . The statute “provides a six-month grace period” where the previous action has been dismissed in “any ‘other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits'” … .

In this case, CPLR 205(a) was not available to extend the limitations period beyond the termination of the 2001 action, since that action was terminated by means of a voluntary discontinuance. The plaintiff affirmatively requested the discontinuance, and it was granted at his behest and over his adversary’s objection. An action may be voluntarily discontinued either by a stipulation or notice, pursuant to CPLR 3217(a), or by a court order, pursuant to CPLR 3217(b). Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, a discontinuance sought by a plaintiff and effectuated by a court order under CPLR 3217(b) is no less voluntary within the meaning of CPLR 205(a) than a discontinuance effectuated by a stipulation or notice under CPLR 3217(a) … . Islam v 495 McDonald Ave., LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 02501, Second Dept 5-10-23

Practice Point: A discontinuance without prejudiced granted to plaintiff over objection is a voluntary discontinuance to which the six-month extension of the statute of limitations afforded by CPLR 205(a) does not apply.

 

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IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT ACTION, THE JUDGE CORRECTLY STRUCK INFLAMMATORY LANGUAGE FROM THE COMPLAINT BUT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEALED THE COMPLAINT WITHOUT MAKING WRITTEN FINDINGS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the judge was correct in striking inflammatory language from this Child Victims Act complaint but should not have sealed the complaint:

Pursuant to CPLR 3024 (b), “[a] party may move to strike any scandalous or prejudicial matter unnecessarily inserted in a pleading.” “[I]t is generally held that the test under this section is whether the allegation is relevant, in an evidentiary sense, to the controversy and, therefore, admissible at trial” … . Although “factual averments about sexual abuse are necessary in any action where those allegations form the predicate for an award of damages, to state a cause of action generally and pursuant to the CVA [Child Victims Act] specifically” … , the language struck by the court does not contain any factual averments necessary to plaintiff’s causes of action. Further, the court’s decision to strike the inflammatory language does not preclude plaintiff from attempting to prove at the trial stage that defendant committed acts of sexual abuse against her. We thus conclude that “there is no prejudice to plaintiff as a result of the order, whereas if [the language is] not stricken prejudice may result to defendant” … .

We further conclude, however, that the court erred in granting that part of the cross-motion seeking to seal the complaint without making “a written finding of good cause, . . . specify[ing] the grounds thereof,” as required by 22 NYCRR 216.1 (a) … . LG 101 Doe v Wos, 2023 NY Slip Op 02404, Fourth Dept 5-5-23

Practice Point: In this Child Victims Act case, the judge properly struck inflammatory language from the complaint but should not have sealed the complaint absent written findings of good cause.

 

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