THE COVID STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TOLLS EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, explained how the COVID toll of the statute of limitations works:

“A toll does not extend the statute of limitations indefinitely but merely suspends the running of the applicable statute of limitations for a finite and, in this instance, readily identifiable time period” … . “[T]he period of the toll is excluded from the calculation of the time in which the plaintiff can commence an action” (id.). In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, on March 20, 2020, the Governor issued [an] Executive Order … , which tolled “any specific time limit for the commencement, filing, or service of any legal action, notice, motion, or other process or proceeding, as prescribed by the procedural laws of the state, including but not limited to . . . the civil practice law and rules . . . from the date of this order until April 19, 2020.” The Governor later issued a series of nine subsequent executive orders that extended the tolling period through November 3, 2020 … . Thus, here, the statute of limitations was tolled from March 20, 2020, at which time 289 days remained in the limitations period, until November 3, 2020, and thereafter the “statute of limitations began to run again, expiring on [August 19, 2021]” … . State of New York v Williams, 2024 NY Slip Op 00709, Fourth Dept 2-9-24

Practice Point: The number of days left on the statute of limitations when the COVID toll was imposed remains when the toll is lifted.

 

FAILURE TO SUBMIT PROOF OF MAILING THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CPLR 308 (2) IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the failure to offer any proof of mailing the summons and complaint was a jurisdictional defect:

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with CPLR 308(2)’s mailing requirement was not a mere “technical infirmity” that may be overlooked by the court pursuant to CPLR 2001 … . “‘In deciding whether a defect in service is merely technical, courts must be guided by the principle of notice to the defendant — notice that must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections'” … . The court found that a late mailing under CPLR 308(2) was not a mere technical infirmity, as it increased the likelihood that the defendant did not receive proper notice of the legal proceeding (id. at 1251). We likewise hold that a plaintiff’s complete failure to comply with CPLR 308(2)’s mailing requirement greatly increases the likelihood that a defendant will not receive the pleadings and have an opportunity to answer. Accordingly, plaintiff’s failure to offer proof of mailing under CPLR 308(2) was a jurisdictional defect requiring denial of plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment. Williams v MTA Bus Co., 2024 NY Slip Op 00692, First Dept 2-8-24

Practice Point: Both delivery and mailing of the summons and complaint is required to effect service of process pursuant to CPLR 308 (2). Failure to submit proof of mailing is a jurisdictional, not a technical, defect.

 

FAILURE TO FILE AFFIDAVITS OF SERVICE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT WITHIN 20 DAYS IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT; SERVICE IS DEEMED COMPLETE 10 DAYS AFTER FILING A MOTION FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITH THE AFFIDAVITS OF SERVICE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department noted that the “nail and mail” service of process was valid and the failure to file affidavits of service within 20 days was not a jurisdictional defect:

… [E]ach affidavit of service states that the process servers made three separate attempts at serving the individual defendants at various dates and times before resorting to “nail and mail” service (CPLR 308(4) …). Plaintiffs’ failure to file affidavits of service with the clerk of the court within 20 days of service is a “mere irregularity” rather than a jurisdictional defect and does not render the service of process a “nullity” … . In any event, service was deemed complete 10 days after plaintiffs filed their initial motion for default judgment with the affidavits of service … . General Ins. v Leandre, 2024 NY Slip Op 00598, First Dept 2-6-24

Practice Point: The “nail and mail” service was valid despite the failure to fine affidavits of service with the clerk of the court within 20 days of service.

Practice Point: Here service was deemed complete ten days after the motion for a default judgment was filed with the affidavits of service.

 

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WHERE THERE ARE UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS OF FACT CONCERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND MUST RULE BEFORE ANY RELATED ACTION CAN BE BROUGHT IN SUPREME COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Workers’ Compensation Board had primary jurisdiction and must rule on defendant’s eligibility for benefits before Supreme Court can hear an action by the insurer for reimbursement of no-fault payments made to defendant:

In July 2018, the subrogors of the plaintiff no-fault insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, allegedly were injured in a motor vehicle accident while traveling in a vehicle insured by the plaintiff. After the plaintiff provided payments for medical services on behalf of the subrogors, it learned that the subrogors had applied for workers’ compensation benefits and that the Workers’ Compensation Board had directed the defendant workers’ compensation insurer, Amtrust North America, Inc., to pay for necessary medical treatments for the subrogors. Thereafter, the plaintiff demanded that the defendant reimburse it for the full amount of no-fault benefits the plaintiff had provided on behalf of its subrogors. * * *

“[W]here the availability of workmen’s compensation hinges upon the resolution of questions of fact or upon mixed questions of fact and law, the plaintiff may not choose the courts as the forum for the resolution of such questions” … . “Since ‘primary jurisdiction with respect to determinations as to the applicability of the Workers’ Compensation Law has been vested in the Workers’ Compensation Board,’ it is ‘inappropriate for the courts to express views with respect thereto pending determination by the board'” … . State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Amtrust N. Am., Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 00646, Second Dept 2-7-24

Practice Point: Where there are unresolved questions of fact about a party’s eligibility for Workers’ Compensation benefits, any action in Supreme Court should be transferred to the Workers’ Compensation Board, which is vested with primary jurisdiction.

 

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THE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE IN THE NURSING HOME ADMISSION AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the forum selection clause in the nursing-home admission was valid and enforceable:

“‘A contractual forum selection clause is prima facie valid and enforceable unless it is shown by the challenging party to be unreasonable, unjust, in contravention of public policy, invalid due to fraud or overreaching, or it is shown that a trial in the selected forum would be so gravely difficult that the challenging party would, for all practical purposes, be deprived of its day in court’ … . …

In opposition to the defendant’s prima facie showing of the parties’ agreement which includes a forum selection clause, the plaintiff was required to show that enforcement of the forum selection clause would be unreasonable, unjust, or would contravene public policy, or that the forum selection clause was the result of fraud or overreaching … . Here, the plaintiff failed to do so. Johnson v Seagate Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., 2024 NY Slip Op 00620, Second Dept 2-7-24

Practice Point: To contest a forum selection clause in a nursing home admission agreement, the plaintiff must show that enforcement of the forum selection clause would be unreasonable, unjust, or would contravene public policy, or that the forum selection clause was the result of fraud or overreaching.

 

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A HABEAS CORPUS PETITION WAS AN AVAILABLE METHOD FOR MOTHER TO SEEK CUSTODY DURING FAMILY COURT’S COVID MORATORIUM ON NONESSENTIAL MATTERS; THE PETITION PROVIDED FAMILY COURT WITH JURISDICTION WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY LOST BECAUSE THE CHILDREN WERE TAKEN OUT OF STATE; FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE CONVERTED THE HABEAS PETITION TO A CUSTODY PROCEEDING PURSUANT TO CPLR 103 (C) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Family Court, determined that the habeas corpus petition filed by mother during the COVID moratorium on nonessential matters provided Family Court with jurisdiction over mother’s custody matter. Because the children had been out state for more than six months when mother made a subsequent custody application, Family Court did not have jurisdiction over them. Family Court should have converted the habeas corpus petition to a custody proceeding:

Family Court had jurisdiction over the parties to decide the mother’s custody petition pursuant to article 6 of the Family Court Act and, upon that basis and the unique circumstances presented in this case, should have converted the action from a writ of habeas corpus to a custody proceeding pursuant to CPLR 103(c) … .

The mother could not have even filed a custody petition in 2020 as a result of the Family Court’s Covid-19 moratorium on all nonessential matters but petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus was an available option to seek the return of the children to New York at the time. By the time the restriction was lifted, the children had already been out of state for more than six months, and Family Court had no jurisdiction over them which resulted in dismissal of the mother’s subsequently-filed custody application. * * * Although the mother was initially able to serve the father with the writ, her subsequent attempts at serving him were unsuccessful. Matter of Celinette H.H. v Michelle R., 2024 NY Slip Op 00456, First Dept 2-1-24

Practice Point; A habeas corpus petition was an appropriate vehicle for seeking custody during the Family Court COVID moratorium on nonessential matters.

 

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SUCCESSIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS WHICH ARE NOT BASED ON INFORMATION WHICH WAS NOT AVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF THE PRIOR MOTIONS SHOULD NOT BE ENTERTAINED BY THE COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, held that the bank violated the prohibition of successive summary judgment motions:

“Generally, successive motions for summary judgment should not be entertained, absent a showing of newly discovered evidence or other sufficient cause” … . “Evidence is not newly discovered simply because it was not submitted on the previous motion” … . “Rather, the evidence that was not submitted in support of the previous summary judgment motion must be used to establish facts that were not available to the party at the time it made its initial motion for summary judgment and which could not have been established through alternative evidentiary means” … . “Successive motions for summary judgment should not be made based upon facts or arguments which could have been submitted on the original motion for summary judgment” … .

Here, the plaintiff failed to submit any newly discovered evidence on the subject motion that could not have been submitted on either of its prior two motions, and did not demonstrate sufficient cause why the third motion should have been entertained … . Thus, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Kelly, 2024 NY Slip Op 00448, First Dept 1-31-24

Practice Point: Unless based on new evidence not available for a prior motion, successive summary judgment motions should not be entertained by the court.

 

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WHERE THE MUNICIPALITY HAS TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE POTENTIAL LAWSUIT AND HAS CONDUCTED A TIMELY INVESTIGATION INTO THE ALLEGATIONS, LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT BE DENIED SOLELY BECAUSE PETITIONER DOES NOT HAVE A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILING TO FILE ON TIME (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined leave to file a late notice of claim against the town should have been granted. Petitioner was convinced a neighbor had trapped her cat and taken the cat to the town animal shelter. She communicated with the shelter many times and ultimately petitioner sought to sue the town for conversion and replevin. The Second Department determined the late notice of claim would not prejudice the town because the town was aware of petitioner’s’ claims from the beginning and had conducted investigations of those claims. The fact that petitioner did not have a reasonable excuse for failing to file a timely notice of claim did not justify denying leave to file:

Although the petitioner failed to establish a reasonable excuse for her delay in seeking leave to serve a late notice of claim, “where, as here, there is actual knowledge and an absence of prejudice, the lack of a reasonable excuse will not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim” … . Matter of Anghel v Town of Hempstead, 2024 NY Slip Op 00420, Second Dept 1-31-24

Practice Point: This case illustrates that the most important factor in whether leave to file a late notice of claim against a municipality should be granted is whether the municipality had timely knowledge of the nature of the claim. Where there has been timely knowledge and a timely investigation by the municipality, the absence of a reasonable excuse for failure to timely file the notice of claim will be ignored.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A UNIFIED TRIAL (LIABILITY AND DAMAGES) IN THIS PEDESTRIAN-VEHICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE NATURE OF THE INJURIES WAS RELEVANT TO HOW THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the defense verdict and ordering a new trial, determined plaintiff’s motion for a unified trial on liability and damages should have been granted. Plaintiff was crossing a street when she was struck by defendant’s vehicle which was making a left turn across the crosswalk. Defendant alleged plaintiff walked into the side of defendant’s van. Plaintiff’s treating physician opined that the injury was consistent with plaintiff being in front of the van when she was struck. Because the injuries were relevant to the liability aspect of the trial, a unified trial was necessary:

Judges are encouraged to direct a bifurcated trial of the issues of liability and damages in any action to recover damages for personal injuries “where it appears that bifurcation may assist in a clarification or simplification of issues and a fair and more expeditious resolution of the action” … . “Although bifurcation is encouraged in appropriate settings, bifurcation is not an absolute given and it is the responsibility of the trial judge to exercise discretion in determining whether bifurcation is appropriate in light of all relevant facts and circumstances presented by the individual cases” … . A unified trial is appropriate where the nature of the plaintiff’s injuries has “an important bearing on the issue of liability” … .

Here, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for a unified trial on the issues of liability and damages. The plaintiff and the defendant driver, the only witnesses to the accident, offered conflicting accounts of how the accident occurred, and the plaintiff demonstrated that evidence regarding the nature of her injuries was probative in determining how the accident occurred … . Marisova v Collins-Brewster, 2024 NY Slip Op 00414, Second Dept 1-31-24

Practice Point: Plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck by defendant’s van in a crosswalk. Defendant alleged plaintiff walked into the side of the van and obtained a defense verdict. Plaintiff’s injuries indicated she was struck by the front of the van. Plaintiff’s motion for a unified trial should have been granted.

 

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THE 2020 AMENDMENTS BROADENING THE REACH OF THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE DO NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM BASED UPON THE AMENDED STATUTE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s counterclaim under the anti-SLAPP statute should have been dismissed. Plaintiff, an attorney, brought this action for libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on letters and emails written by defendant which allegedly were intended to damage plaintiff’s reputation in the legal profession. The counterclaim alleged the defendant’s letters and emails were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute in the Civil Rights Law. The Second Department determined the 2020 amendments to that statute, which expanded its reach, do not apply retroactively and defendant, therefore, could not take advantage of those amendments: The counterclaim should have been dismissed:

The first counterclaim alleged that this action was a strategic lawsuit against public participation (hereinafter SLAPP) and sought, among other things, attorney’s fees, costs, and damages pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a. * * *

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the broadened definition of public petition and participation in the amended section 76-a does not apply retroactively to this action … . The complaint, therefore, is governed by the prior statutory definition of an action involving public petition and participation … . Burton v Porcelain, 2024 NY Slip Op 00291, Second Dept 1-24-24

Practice Point: The 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute do not apply retroactively. Lawsuits started before the amendments cannot take advantage of the broader reach of the amendments.