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EVERY CAUSE OF ACTION WAS ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED; THE PROPER CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE CORRECT STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined several causes of action including fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of constructive trust, and breach of contract should not have been dismissed as time-barred:

“‘[W]here an allegation of fraud is essential to a breach of fiduciary duty claim, courts have applied a six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213(8)'” … . * * * … [P]laintiffs discovered the alleged fraud in 2019 and the cause of action was timely commenced within two years. * * *

… [T]he statute of limitations on the cause of action for the imposition of a constructive trust did not begin to run until 2019, when [defendant] allegedly breached his promise … . …

“[I]n order to determine the statute of limitations applicable to an action for a declaratory judgment, a court must examine the substance of the action. Where it is determined that the parties’ dispute can be, or could have been, resolved in an action or proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily required, that limitation period governs” … . * * *

… Supreme Court erred in concluding that the causes of action alleging fraud in the inducement and promissory estoppel are time-barred. The statute of limitations for those causes of action is six years … . …

The statute of limitations applicable to a breach of contract cause of action is six years (see CPLR 213[2]), “and begins at the time of the breach, even when no damage occurs until later, and even though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of the wrong or injury” … . Statharos v Statharos, 2023 NY Slip Op 04226, Second Dept 8-9-23

Practice Point: Here the criteria for determining the applicable statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of constructive trust, declaratory judgment, promissory estoppel, fraud in the inducement and breach of contract are discussed in some detail.

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THE “TIME WHEN” ALLEGATIONS IN THE CLAIM IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT SUIT WERE SUFFICIENT, COURT OF CLAIMS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the Court of Claims, over an instructive concurrence, determined the claim in this Child Victims Act action sufficiently alleged the “time when” the sexual abuse allegedly occurred:

… [T]he date ranges provided in the claim, together with the other information set forth therein, were sufficient to satisfy the “time when” requirement of Court of Claims Act § 11(b). The claimant alleged, among other things, that “[i]n approximately 1987, when [he] was approximately sixteen (16) years old, [he] was admitted to” a State-operated psychiatric hospital “for inpatient residential treatment,” and that “[while] admitted to the . . . facility” he was “sexually abused and assaulted” by a staff member on two occasions. Additionally, the claimant identified his alleged abuser in the claim and set forth the details of the two alleged assaults, including the location within the facility where they allegedly occurred. The claimant also alleged that, before the second incident of abuse occurred, he reported to his treating psychiatrist, whom the claimant identified by name, that the alleged perpetrator made the claimant “uncomfortable.” “Given that the CVA allows claimants to bring civil actions decades after the alleged sexual abuse occurred, it is not clear how providing exact dates, as opposed to the time periods set forth in the instant claim, would better enable the State to conduct a prompt investigation of the subject claim” … . We note, however, “that our determination that the claimant met the ‘time when’ requirement in the context of this action brought under the CVA does not change our jurisprudence with respect to the ‘time when’ requirement under different contexts, such as where a ‘single incidence of negligence’ occurs on a discrete date or other situations where ‘a series of ongoing acts or omissions occur[ ] on multiple dates over the course of a period of time’ … . Rodriguez v State of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 04146, Second Dept 8-2-23

Practice Point: Here the allegations the sexual abuse took place in “approximately 1987” were deemed sufficient in this Child Victims Act suit.

 

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​ PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR A PISTOL PERMIT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED BASED UPON A 23-YEAR-OLD ARREST THAT DID NOT RESULT IN PROSECUTION; PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE OBJECTIONS TO THE APPLICATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined petitioner’s application for a residential/sportsman pistol permit should not have been denied based upon a single arrest 23 years before which did not result in prosecution. The Second Department noted that petitioner was not given the opportunity to respond to the objections to his application:

… [T]he respondent’s determination denying the petitioner’s application for a pistol permit was arbitrary and capricious … . Although the respondent was entitled to consider the petitioner’s prior arrest, the circumstances thereof did not, under the particular facts of this case, warrant the denial of the petitioner’s application. The record reflects, among other things, that the petitioner properly disclosed his arrest in his application, that the weapon in question belonged to a hitchhiker the petitioner picked up while driving his vehicle when he was 19 years old, that an investigation by the District Attorney’s office determined that the weapon belonged to the hitchhiker, that the petitioner testified before a grand jury in connection with the subject matter, that the grand jury entered a no true bill against the petitioner, and that the petitioner has no other criminal record in the 23 years between his single arrest and the date of the pistol permit application. Further, based upon the record before us, it is apparent that the respondent did not give the petitioner an opportunity to respond to the stated objections to his pistol permit application … . Matter of Cambronne v Russo, 2023 NY Slip Op 04121, Second Dept 8-2-23

Practice Point: Here the denial of petitioner’s pistol-permit application was deemed arbitrary and capricious because it was based on a 23-year-old arrest that did not result in prosecution.

Practice Point: An applicant for a pistol permit should be given an opportunity to respond to objections to the application.

 

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​ IN THIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS NOT “DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE;” THE PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THE MOTION TO DISMSS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to dismiss in this legal malpractice case should not have been granted because the evidence offered in support of the motion (a letter from the insurer denying coverage and the insurance policy) was not “documentary evidence.” In addition, the Second Department noted that any deficiencies in the complaint were remedied by plaintiff’s affidavit submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss. The complaint alleged defendant attorneys failed to timely file an action seeking recovery for personal injuries from a disability-insurance carrier:

“‘Whether the complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove its claims, of course, plays no part in the determination of a prediscovery CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss'” … . * * *

“A motion to dismiss on the ground that the action is barred by documentary evidence pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) may be granted only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes the plaintiff’s factual allegations, [thereby] conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law” … . “[T]o be considered ‘documentary,’ evidence must be unambiguous and of undisputed authenticity” … . “[J]udicial records, as well as documents reflecting out-of-court transactions such as mortgages, deeds, contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable, would qualify as documentary evidence in the proper case” … . “Neither affidavits, deposition testimony, nor letters are considered documentary evidence within the intendment of CPLR 3211(a)(1)” … . Maursky v Latham, 2023 NY Slip Op 04115, Second Dept 8-2-23

Practice Point: Irrespective of the possible result of a summary judgment motion, a motion to dismiss which depends on evidence and is not supported by “documentary evidence” will lose.

 

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THE DEFENDANT’S AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS NOT “DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE” WHICH UTTERLY REFUTED THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT; EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT MIGHT WIN AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE, THE PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR DISMSSAL ARE DIFFERENT AND WERE NOT MET (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant contractor’s motion to dismiss the complaint against him individually should not have been granted. Defendant, Gabbay, executed the subject home renovation contract on behalf of “Dansha Corp.,” an entity which does not exist. Defendant asserted in an affidavit submitted to support the motion to dismiss, that “Dansh Corp.” is a trade name for “Dansha Realty Corp.,” which does exist. Therefore, defendant argued, he can not be individually liable on the contract. However, irrespective of what might be determined in a motion for summary judgment, a motion to dismiss which relies on evidence must be supported by “documentary evidence.” Defendant’s affidavit does not constitute “documentary evidence:”

Where a party offers evidentiary proof on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and such proof is considered but the motion has not been converted to one for summary judgment, ‘the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether [the proponent] has stated one, and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it[,] . . . dismissal should not eventuate'” … . “‘Whether the complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove its claims, of course, plays no part in the determination of a prediscovery CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss'” … . “A motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) may be granted only if the documentary evidence submitted by the moving party utterly refutes the factual allegations of the complaint and conclusively establishes a defense to the claims as a matter of law” … . …

Although there is “no individual liability for principals of a corporation for actions taken in furtherance of the corporation’s business” … , “‘a person entering into a contract on behalf of a nonexistent corporate entity may be held personally liable on the contract'” … . Here, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the complaint states causes of action against Gabbay to recover damages for breach of contract … and money had and received … . There is no dispute that “Dansha Corp.,” the entity named as the general contractor in the contract, does not exist. Furthermore, the evidence submitted by Gabbay failed to conclusively establish that “Dansha Realty Corp.” was the intended party to the contract for purposes of a prediscovery CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss … . The affidavit submitted by Gabbay in support of the motion was not “documentary” within the meaning of CPLR 3211(a)(1) … , and the remainder of the evidence, including invoices sent to the plaintiff from “Dansha Corp.,” do not prove that “Dansha Corp.” is a trade name for “Dansha Realty Corp.” … . Churong Liu v Gabbay, 2023 NY Slip Op 04108, Second Dept 8-2-23

Practice Point: This decision illustrates the different proof requirements for a motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence and a motion for summary judgment. Irrespective of whether a party may win a summary judgment motion, a motion to dismiss supported by an affidavit which is not “documentary evidence” will not win.

 

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LYFT WAS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED SEXUAL ASSAULT BY A LYFT DRIVER; THE COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD BASED UPON THE ASSURANCES OF SAFETY ON LYFT’S WEBSITE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the vicarious liability and fraud causes of action against defendant Lyft, a livery cab service, should have been dismissed. The complaint alleged infant plaintiff used a mobile app to hire a Lyft driver, Singh, who began masturbating after she got in the car. The complaint failed to allege the driver was acting within the scope of his employment when the alleged sexual assault occurred. The complaint also failed to allege the elements of fraud based on the claim on the Lyft website that its service was safe and the drivers had been screened:

“[W]here an employee’s actions are taken for wholly personal reasons, which are not job related, the challenged conduct cannot be said to fall within the scope of employment” … . “A sexual assault perpetrated by an employee is not in furtherance of an employer’s business and is a clear departure from the scope of employment, having been committed for wholly personal motives” … . Here, assuming that Singh engaged in the sexual misconduct as alleged in the complaint, it is clear that such conduct was a departure from his duties as a Lyft driver and was committed solely for personal motives unrelated to Lyft’s business. As such, the sexual misconduct cannot be said to have been within the scope of employment … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of Lyft’s motion which was to dismiss the cause of action alleging vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. …

“The elements of a cause of action for fraud require a material misrepresentation of a fact, knowledge of its falsity, an intent to induce reliance, justifiable reliance by the plaintiff and damages” … . “Each of the foregoing elements must be supported by factual allegations containing the details constituting the wrong sufficient to satisfy CPLR 3016(b)” … . “To establish causation, the plaintiff must show that defendant’s misrepresentation induced plaintiff to engage in the transaction in question (transaction causation) and that the misrepresentations directly caused the loss about which plaintiff complains (loss causation)” … .

Here, although the complaint alleges that the plaintiffs were aware of alleged representations on Lyft’s website that the Lyft service was safe to use, it fails to sufficiently specify which statements on Lyft’s website were false, and when those representations were made or accessed by the plaintiffs … . Moreover, the complaint fails to set forth any facts sufficient to show that any alleged misrepresentations on Lyft’s website regarding the safety of Lyft rides directly and proximately caused the plaintiffs’ alleged damages, which were otherwise alleged to have been caused directly by Singh’s sexual misconduct while operating the vehicle … . It is not sufficient to merely allege that the infant plaintiff would not have used the Lyft app but for Lyft’s alleged misrepresentations regarding safety … . Browne v Lyft, Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 04102, Second Dept 8-2-23

Practice Point: In a complaint alleging the employer is vicariously liable for the acts of its employee, unless it is alleged the employee was acting within the scope of employment the cause of action will be dismissed. Here the alleged sexual assault by defendant Lyft driver was not alleged to be within the scope of the driver’s employment.

Practice Point: Here the plaintiff alleged she was sexually assaulted by defendant Lyft driver. The fraud cause of action alleged the assertions on Lyft’s website that the service was safe and the drivers were screened were false. That was not enough to state a cause of action for fraud.

 

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PURSUANT TO THE RECENTLY ENACTED FORECLOSURE ABUSE PREVENTION ACT (FAPA) THE BANK COULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SIX-MONTH EXTENSION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BECAUSE THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the foreclosure action was dismissed as abandoned and therefore the bank could not take advantage of the six-month extension of the statute of limitations:

The recently enacted Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (…hereinafter FAPA) replaced the savings provision of CPLR 205(a) with CPLR 205-a in actions upon instruments described in CPLR 213(4) … . Under CPLR 205-a(a), “[i]f an action upon an instrument described under [CPLR 213(4)] is timely commenced and is terminated in any manner other than . . . a dismissal of the complaint for any form of neglect, including, but not limited to those specified in . . . [CPLR 3215] . . . , the original plaintiff, or, if the original plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives, his or her executor or administrator, may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences within six months following the termination, provided that the new action would have been timely commenced within the applicable limitations period prescribed by law at the time of the commencement of the prior action and that service upon the original defendant is completed within such six-month period.” Here, the complaint in the 2009 action was dismissed insofar as asserted against Santos as abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) … . Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of the savings provision of CPLR 205(a) or 205-a. U.S. Bank N.A. v Santos, 2023 NY Slip Op 03942, Second Dept 7-26-23

Practice Point: Where a foreclosure action has been dismissed as abandoned, the bank cannot take advantage of the six-month extension of the statute of limitations. The provisions of the newly enacted Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) are explained.

 

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A MOTION TO MODIFY THE CUSTODY PROVISIONS IN A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, WHERE THERE ARE CONTESTED FACTS, SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED WITHOUT A FULL HEARING (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion for a modification of custody allowing mother the relocate should not have have been granted without a hearing:

“Since a court has an obligation to make an objective and independent evaluation of the circumstances, a custody determination should be made only after a full and fair hearing at which the record is fully developed” … . “This allows the court to fulfill its duty to make an enlightened, objective and independent evaluation of the circumstances” … . “[A]s a general rule, it is error to make an order respecting custody based upon controverted allegations without the benefit of a full hearing” … .  Rizea v Rizea, 2023 NY Slip Op 03935, Second Dept 7-26-23

Practice Point: Any modification of custody, where there are contested facts, requires a full hearing.

 

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DESPITE MOTHER’S DEFAULT, CUSTODY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED WITHOUT A HEARING AND FINDINGS ON THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, although mother defaulted, the court should not have made a custody ruling without a hearing and findings on the best interests of the child:

Courts may generally proceed by default when a party has failed to comply with an order of the court … . “This authority, however, in no way diminishes the court’s primary responsibility to ensure that an award of custody is predicated on the child’s best interests, upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, after a full and comprehensive hearing and a careful analysis of all relevant factors” … . “A custody determination, whether made upon the default of a party or not, must always have a sound and substantial basis in the record” … . “Although the determination of whether to relieve a party of an order entered upon his or her default is a matter left to the sound discretion of the Family Court, the law favors resolution on the merits in child custody proceedings” … .

Here, the Supreme Court made a custody determination without a hearing and without making any specific findings of fact regarding the best interests of the child. Under the circumstances, that branch of the mother’s motion which was to vacate an order .. awarding custody to the paternal grandmother, should have been granted in the interest of justice … . Accordingly, we remit the matter … for a hearing and a new determination thereafter of the paternal grandmother’s petition for custody of the child, to be held with all convenient speed … . Matter of Trammell v Gorham, 2023 NY Slip Op 03923, Second Dept 7-26-23

Practice Point; Even in the face of a parent’s default, a custody award should not be made without a hearing and findings on the best interests of the child.

 

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ORDERS COMPELLING ANSWERS TO DEPOSITION QUESTIONS OR PRECLUDING QUESTIONING ARE NOT APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT; A REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AFTER THE APPEAL IS PERFECTED IS GENERALLY DENIED; THE HOSPITAL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE SUBJECT MEDICAL RECORDS WERE PRIVILEGED AS PART OF A QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined (1) there is no appeal as of right from the denial of a motion to compel a witness to answer deposition questions, (2) there is no appeal as of right from a protective order precluding certain questioning, (3) an appellate court will generally not consider a request for permission to appeal made after the appeal is perfected, (4) the hospital did not demonstrate certain medical records were privileged as part of a quality assurance review:

… [T]he plaintiffs sought leave to appeal after their appeal was perfected. As this Court has repeatedly observed under comparable circumstances, “‘we are disinclined to grant leave to parties who have taken it upon themselves to perfect an appeal without leave to appeal'” … . * * *

Pursuant to Education Law § 6527(3), certain documents generated in connection with the “performance of a medical or a quality assurance review function,” or reports “required by the department of health pursuant to [Public Health Law § 2805-l],” are generally not discoverable … . Nyack Hospital, as the party seeking to invoke the privilege, had the burden of demonstrating that the documents sought were prepared in accordance with the relevant statutes … . Nyack Hospital merely asserted that a privilege applied to the requested documents without making any showing as to why the privilege attached. Martino v Jae Ho Lee, 2023 NY Slip Op 03915, Second Dept 7-26-23

Practice Point: If an order is not appealable as of right (here orders re: compelling answers or precluding questions during deposition), the appellate court will not generally grant permission to appeal after the appeal is perfected.

Practice Point:  Here in this med mal case the hospital did not demonstrate the medical records were privileged as part of a quality assurance review.

 

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