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EVEN THOUGH THE DEBTOR TRANSFERRED THE PROPERTY TO THE NON-DEBTOR CODEFENDANT YEARS BEFORE FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY, THE BANKRUPTCY TOLLED THE FORECLOSURE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE ACTION AGAINST THE DEBTOR; THE TOLL DID NOT APPLY TO THE ACTION AGAINST THE NON-DEBTOR WHICH NEVER FILED FOR BANKRUPTCY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Connolly, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the foreclosure statute of limitations was tolled by the bankruptcy stay for the action against the defendant who filed for bankruptcy, but not for the defendant to which the property was transferred (who did not file for bankruptcy):

This appeal requires us to examine whether the stay provided by section 362 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code (11 USC § 362[a]) operates as a “statutory prohibition” under CPLR 204(a) to toll the statute of limitations to commence a mortgage foreclosure action against a defendant debtor who no longer owns the property that is the subject of the mortgage foreclosure action. We hold that the bankruptcy stay pursuant to subsection 362(a)(1) (see 11 USC § 362[a][1]) tolls the statute of limitations for commencing a mortgage foreclosure action against the defendant debtor, regardless of whether that defendant owns the property at the time of the bankruptcy filing.

This appeal also requires us to determine whether the bankruptcy stay pursuant to subsection 362(a) applies to a nondebtor codefendant to which the defendant debtor transferred the property years before filing for bankruptcy. On the record before this Court, the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of raising a question of fact as to whether the bankruptcy stay applied to the nondebtor codefendant. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v DeMatteis, 2023 NY Slip Op 05242, Second Dept 10-18-23

Practice Point: Filing for bankruptcy tolls the foreclosure statute of limitations, even if the property had been transferred before the filing.

 

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THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE NOTICE OF CLAIM DID NOT PRESENT A NEW THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE; THE MOTION TO AMEND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to amend the notice of claim should have been granted. The amendments merely fleshed out the theory of negligence described in the original notice and did not present a new theory of liability:

The purpose of prohibiting new theories of liability in notices of claim is to prevent prejudicing the city in its ability to timely investigate the claim and provide an adequate defense … . Contrary to defendants’ argument, to the extent the notice of claim alleges affirmative negligence, plaintiff did so in the first instance. Plaintiff’s original notice of claim alleged that his injuries were caused by New York City’s “negligent . . . design, maintenance, construction and installation . . .” of the “the traffic island/extra curb/bumper” in question. Plaintiff only adds that his injuries were related to the “design, installation, and maintenance” of the delineators and bollards which are specific elements of the traffic island. This addition only alleges specific facts related to the theories of liability contained in the original claim, unlike in cases cited by defendants … . Accordingly, we find that this amendment does not seek to assert a new theory of liability, and instead merely clarifies the facts alleged in the claim, as permitted by General Municipal Law § 50-e. Burnes v City of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 05221, First Dept 10-17-23

Practice Point: The motion to amend the notice of claim merely fleshed out the theory of negligence in the original notice and did not present a new theory. Therefore the motion should have been granted.

 

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THE PETITIONERS BROUGHT A HYBRID ARTICLE 78/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION CHALLENGING A LOCAL LAW PROHIBITING SHORT-TERM RENTAL PROPERTIES; THE COURT NOTED THAT THE SUMMARY PROCEDURE AVAILABLE UNDER ARTICLE 78 SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO THE DECLARATORY-JUDGMENT ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, noted that in a hybrid Article 78/declaratory judgment/damages action, the summary procedure under Article 78 does not apply to the declaratory judgment. In order to summarily dispose of the declaratory judgment/damages aspect of the action, a party must request it or the court must notify the parties. Here the petitioners, owners of short-term rental properties, challenged the local law prohibiting rental periods of less than 14 days:

“In a hybrid proceeding and action, separate procedural rules apply to those causes of action which are asserted pursuant to CPLR article 78, on the one hand, and those to recover damages and for declaratory relief, on the other hand. The Supreme Court may not employ the summary procedure applicable to a CPLR article 78 cause of action to dispose of causes of action to recover damages or seeking a declaratory judgment” … . “[W]here no party makes a request for a summary determination of the causes of action which seek to recover damages or declaratory relief, it is error for the Supreme Court to summarily dispose of those causes of action”… .

Here, the record contains no indication that the Supreme Court gave notice to the parties that it was contemplating the summary dismissal of the declaratory judgment causes of action, or that the respondents/defendants had made an application for such relief. Therefore, the court erred in summarily disposing the causes of action for declaratory relief … . Matter of Jellyfish Props., LLC v Incorporated Vil. of Greenport, 2023 NY Slip Op 05136, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: In a hybrid Article 78/declaratory judgment action, the summary procedure available under Article 78 cannot be used to dispose of the declaratory judgment action unless a party requests it or the court so notifies the parties.

 

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THE FIVE-YEAR DELAY BETWEEN PLAINTIFF-DECEDENT’S DEATH AND THE MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE AN ADMINISTRATOR DID NOT WARRANT DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION; DECEDENT HAD BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the four year delay in appointment of an administrator and the addition one year in moving for substitution in this traffic accident case did not warrant dismissal of the action:

… [T]he approximately four-year delay in obtaining letters of administration followed by an approximately one-year delay in moving for substitution shows a lack of diligence … . However, even if the “explanation for the delay is not satisfactory, the court may still grant the motion for substitution if there is no showing of prejudice and there is potential merit to the action, in light of the strong public policy in favor of disposing of matters on the merits” … .

Here, where the decedent was awarded summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants, the action has potential merit … . Further, the defendants provided mere “conclusory allegations of prejudice based solely on the passage of time” … . This record reflects that the defendants will suffer little or no prejudice as a result of the delay, particularly because this case, which is set for a trial on damages only, is likely to turn on medical records and an extant deposition transcript … . Hemmings v Rolling Frito-Lay Sales, LP, 2023 NY Slip Op 05125, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: Plaintiff had been awarded summary judgment on liability in this traffic accident case. Plaintiff died and there was a five-year delay before the motion to substitute an administrator. The action should not have been dismissed.

 

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THE “TIME WHEN” THE ALLEGED SEXUAL ABUSE TOOK PLACE IN 1997 WAS ADEQUATELY ALLEGED IN THE CLAIM IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT SUIT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the claim in this Child Victims Act action sufficiently described when the alleged sexual abuse took place:

… [T]he Court of Claims incorrectly determined that the claim was insufficient to satisfy Court of Claims Act § 11(b)’s “time when” requirement … . The claimant’s allegations, including that the abuse occurred in approximately 1997 when she was approximately 15 years old by a named employee of the facility shortly after her arrival at the facility, provided sufficient information to enable the State to investigate and ascertain its liability under the circumstances … . Ford v State of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 05124, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: In Child Victims Act cases where the alleged sexual abuse took place decades ago, the courts are forgiving when determining the sufficiency of the “time when” allegations. Here the allegations claimant was abused by a named employee in 1997, when she was 15, shortly after her arrival at the facility, were deemed sufficient.

 

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THE MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, NO NEED TO DEMONSTRATE A REASONABLE EXCUSE; THE LOAN AGREEMENT WAS CRIMINALLY USURIOUS; THE MOTION TO DISIMISS BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the default judgment should have been vacated in the interest of justice and the complaint dismissed based on documentary evidence. The loan which was the basis of the action was criminally usurious:

“CPLR 5015(a) ‘does not provide an exhaustive list as to when a default judgment may be vacated'” … . “In addition to the grounds set forth in section 5015(a), a court may vacate a default ‘for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice'” … . “[A] party is not necessarily required to establish a reasonable excuse in order to be entitled to vacatur in the interest of justice” … . * * *

The plaintiff does not dispute that the agreement effected an annual interest rate exceeding the criminally usurious threshold of 25% (see Penal Law § 190.40).

… “Under CPLR 3211(a)(1), a dismissal is warranted only if the documentary evidence utterly refutes plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law” … . Here, … the defendants conclusively established through the submission of the agreement that it constituted a criminally usurious loan … . Crystal Springs Capital, Inc. v Big Thicket Coin, LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 05121, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: A motion to vacate a default in the interest of justice does not require a reasonable excuse.

Practice Point: The usurious loan agreement justified dismissal based on documentary evidence.

 

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IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REOPEN THE INQUEST ON DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined it was an abuse of discretion to deny plaintiff’s motion to reopen the inquest on damages. Although the motion was untimely, there was no prejudice to the defendants:

… [T]he Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was, in effect, to reopen the inquest in order to permit the plaintiff to submit what the court had indicated was crucial evidence … . Moreover, there was no evidence that the defendants would be prejudiced … . Although the plaintiff’s motion was not made in a timely fashion, a factor which ordinarily weighs against granting such relief … , the record here reflects that the delay may have been due in part to the plaintiff’s confusion regarding the court’s directive as to how to proceed … . Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v Islam, 2023 NY Slip Op 05119, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff sought to reopen the inquest on damages to present crucial evidence which had been requested by the judge. Although the request was untimely, there was no prejudice to the defendants. It was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion.

 

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THE FACT THAT THE HOME WAS ILLUMINATED WHEN THE PROCESS SERVER ATTEMPTED SERVICE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT WAS EVADING SERVICE; THE PROCESS SERVER DID NOT ATTEMPT SERVICE AT DEFENDANT’S PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT; THE “NAIL AND MAIL” SERVICE WAS INVALID (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the “nail and mail” service of process was invalid because the process server’s affidavit did not demonstrate “due diligence” in attempting other methods of personal service:

“Service of process must be made in strict compliance with [the] statutory ‘methods for effecting personal service upon a natural person’ pursuant to CPLR 308” … . Here, the plaintiff purportedly served the defendant by the “affix and mail” method pursuant to CPLR 308(4). Service pursuant to CPLR 308(4) may be used only where service pursuant to CPLR 308(1) or (2) cannot be made with “due diligence” … . “The due diligence requirement of CPLR 308(4) must be strictly observed, given the reduced likelihood that a summons served pursuant to that section will be received” … .

Here, … the process server made prior attempts at personal delivery of the summons and complaint at the defendant’s residence at different times of the day between Thursday, December 21, 2017, and Friday, December 29, 2017. Although one of those times was on December 23, 2017, a Saturday, the attempts at service occurred at the height of the holiday season, when the defendant may have had reasons not to be home … . The process server noted that holiday lights were on in the windows of the residence on December 23, 2017, and that both floors of the residence were illuminated on December 26, 2017. Nevertheless, considering the holiday season, the process server’s observations were not a sufficient basis to believe that the defendant was evading service. Moreover, the process server stated that he was “unable” to speak to a neighbor regarding the defendant’s whereabouts.

In addition, in the year prior to the commencement of this action, the defendant was granted a loan modification, and as part of his application for a loan modification, the defendant was required to and did, in fact, disclose his employer and address of employment to the plaintiff. No attempts were made to serve the defendant at his place of employment. Bank of Am., N.A. v Fischer, 2023 NY Slip Op 05112, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: Here the process server’s affidavit did not demonstrate “due diligence” in attempting service at defendant’s home and there was no attempt to serve defendant at his place of employment. The “nail and mail” service was deemed invalid.

 

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A DEFENDANT WHO MOVES TO VACATE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOES NOT NEED TO DEMONSTRATE A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DEFAULT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to vacate a default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction should not have been treated as a motion to vacate based on an excusable default. The defendant raised a question of fact about whether he was properly served by demonstrating the address at issue did not exist. There was no requirement that defendant demonstrate a reasonable excuse:

Where, as here, a defendant moves to vacate a judgment entered upon [the defendant’s] default in appearing or answering the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction [under CPLR 5015 (a) (4)], the defendant is not required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense” … . Thus, contrary to the court’s determination, it is immaterial when defendant first learned of the judgment.

With respect to the merits, defendant contended in support of his motion that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he was not properly served with the supplemental summons and amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 308 (4) (see CPLR 5015 [a] [4]). “Ordinarily, the affidavit of a process server constitutes prima facie evidence that the defendant was validly served[, but] . . . a sworn denial of service containing specific facts generally rebuts the presumption of proper service established by the process server’s affidavit” … . We agree with defendant that, by submitting uncontradicted evidence that the address listed in the affidavit of service does not exist, he overcame the presumption of proper service and created “a genuine question” whether the “nail and mail” service used here was effected in accordance with the statute … . L&W Supply Corp. v Built-Rite Drywall Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 05079, Fourth Dept 10-6-23

Practice Point: Here defendant was purportedly served by “nail and mail.” Defendant demonstrated the address in the affidavit of service did not exist. Therefore defendant was entitled to a hearing. There was no need for defendant to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default.

 

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THE MOTION TO BIFURCATE THE LIABILITY AND DAMAGES ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; STATEMENTS MADE TO HEALTHCARE PERSONNEL AND MEDICAL RECORDS WERE RELEVANT TO LIABILITY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant’s motion to bifurcate the trial (liability versus damages) in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. Plaintiff made statements to medical personnel which were relevant to liability:

Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries that he allegedly sustained when he fell from an “upper patio or balcony” of an apartment building … . We agree with plaintiff that Supreme Court abused its discretion in granting defendants-respondents’ motion to bifurcate the trial with respect to the issues of liability and damages. “As a general rule, issues of liability and damages in a negligence action are distinct and severable issues which should be tried separately” … . Here, however, we conclude that the issue of liability is not distinct from the issue of plaintiff’s injuries because plaintiff made statements to several of his medical care providers following his fall that render the testimony of several medical witnesses as well as hospital and medical records relevant to the liability phase of the trial. Plaintiff has thus established that bifurcation would not “assist in a clarification or simplification of issues and a fair and more expeditious resolution of the action” … .  Bogumil v Greenbaum Family Holdings, LP, 2023 NY Slip Op 05069, Fourth Dept 10-6-23

Practice Point: It is usual to bifurcate the liability and damages aspects of negligence trials. Here plaintiff’s statements to medical personnel and his medical records were relevant to liability as well as damages. The motion to bifurcate should not, therefore, have been granted.

 

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