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THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION ALLEGING THE COUNTY TAX MAP VERIFICATION FEES CONSTITUTED UNAUTHORIZED TAXES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiffs alleged that certain fees (tax map verification fees) charged by the county’s Real Property Tax Service Agency constituted taxes which were not legislatively authorized:

… [T]he tax map verification fees were not expressly authorized by the State Legislature through the 2019 revisions to CPLR 8019 and 8021. A tax is exacted from a citizen to “defray the general costs of government unrelated to any particular benefit received by that citizen” … . “The State Constitution vests the taxing power in the state legislature and authorizes the legislature to delegate that power to local governments” ( … see NY Const, art XVI, § 1). “‘[T]he delegation of any part of [the] power [of taxation] to a subdivision of the State must be made in express terms,’ and the delegation of any form of taxation authority ‘cannot be inferred'” … .. “The legislature must describe with specificity the taxes authorized by any enabling statute. In turn, local governments can only levy and collect taxes within the expressed limitations of specific enabling legislation” … .

Here, while the revisions to CPLR 8019 and 8021 reference the County’s authority to collect tax map verification fees … , the revisions do not provide an express delegation of taxing authority, nor do they provide for a review mechanism, as is constitutionally required … . Cella v Suffolk County, 2023 NY Slip Op 05387, Second Dept 10-25-23

Practice Point: Fees imposed by a county which are not justified by the related expenses may constitute unauthorized taxes.

 

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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF’S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IS NOT A BAR TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY, IT IS A VALID AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH IS RELEVANT TO DAMAGES; THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant’s comparative-negligence affirmative defense should not have been dismissed. Although plaintiff’s comparative negligence is no longer a bar to summary judgment on liability, it is relevant to damages:

Plaintiff was injured when he was struck by the wheelchair ramp of a bus. That bus was owned by defendants and operated by an employee of defendants. The bus operator testified that he deployed the ramp and saw it hit plaintiff. He testified that he gave warnings in a loud voice before lowering the ramp, which made a “very loud” beeping noise that was “excruciating.”

Plaintiff met his prima facie burden by submitting evidence, including his deposition testimony, that the operator was negligent in lowering the ramp onto the sidewalk when it was not reasonably safe to do so … . In opposition, defendants did not offer any nonnegligent explanation for the accident … . This accident was not within plaintiff’s exclusive knowledge, because it occurred in the presence of a potential witness, namely the operator … . Defendants’ remaining arguments effectively assert comparative negligence by plaintiff, which he was not required to disprove to be entitled to partial summary judgment … .

Supreme Court should not, however, have dismissed the affirmative defense of comparative negligence. At summary judgment, issues of credibility may not be resolved, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party … . Prendergast v New York City Tr. Auth., 2023 NY Slip Op 05378, First Dept 10-24-23

Practice Point: Even where a plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on liability, a defendant’s comparative-negligence affirmative defense remains relevant to damages.

 

HERE THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE APPLIED TO ALLOW ADDING A PARTY TO THE LAWSUIT AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the relation-back doctrine applied to add a party to a lawsuit after the statute of limitations had run:

The relation back doctrine applies when (1) the claims arise out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence; (2) the new party is “united in interest” with an original defendant and thus can be charged with such notice of the commencement of the action such that a court concludes that the party will not be prejudiced in defending against the action; and (3) the new party knew or should have known that, but for a mistaken omission, they would have been named in the initial pleading (see Buran v Coupal, 87 NY2d 173, 178 [1995]).

The doctrine focuses on the notice and prejudice to the added party. However, the doctrine does not apply when a plaintiff “intentionally decides not to assert a claim against a party known to be potentially liable” or when the new party was omitted “to obtain a tactical advantage in the litigation” (id. at 181). These exceptions minimize gamesmanship and manipulation of the CPLR (see id.).

Here, petitioners established that they satisfied the Buran test and that their omission of a necessary party was not a deliberate, informed litigation strategy to gain tactical advantage. The relation back doctrine applies, and petitioners’ claims against the newly added party were timely interposed under CPLR 203 (c). Matter of Nemeth v K-Tooling, 2023 NY Slip Op 05349, CtApp 10-24-23

Practice Point: If the criteria laid out in Buran, 87 NY2d 173, are met, the relation-back doctrine can be applied to allow adding a party to the lawsuit after the statute of limitations has run.

 

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A JUDGE CANNOT ENTER A JUDGMENT WHICH DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE ORDER; HERE THE JUDGMENT ELIMINATED MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN DAMAGES AND EXTINGUISHED A DEFENDANT’S LIABILITY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the judge did not have the power to, sua sponte, enter an judgment which did not conform to its order. The judgment eliminated millions of dollars in damages and extinguished liability with respect to a defendant:

“A written order [or judgment] must conform strictly to the court’s decision, and in the event of an inconsistency between a judgment and a decision or order upon which it is based, the decision or order controls” … . A court exceeds its authority when it sua sponte vacates its prior order, as it “has no revisory or appellate jurisdiction, sua sponte, to vacate its own order” … . Here, the court exceeded its authority in entering the judgment, which effectively reversed or vacated its prior confirmation order without notice. Accordingly, the court is directed to enter a revised judgment that conforms to the confirmation order with respect to damages and liability. Magna Equities II, LLC v Writ Media Group Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 05320, First Dept 10-19-23

Practice Point: A judge cannot effectively vacate a prior order by entering a judgment which does not conform to the order.

 

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​ THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD A CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; ADDING ALLEGATIONS WHICH INCREASE A DEFENDANT’S EXPOSURE TO LIABILITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages did not prejudice defendant (Eldridge) and should have been granted:

The court improvidently exercised its discretion and should have granted plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages against Eldridge based on his deposition testimony that he knowingly drove a truck on a public roadway with defective brakes, horn, and one inoperable windshield wiper, and was reaching for his cell phone that had fallen to the floor of the car when his truck collided with the rear of plaintiffs’ vehicle. A jury might find that such conduct sufficiently demonstrated a conscious and willful disregard of the interests of others … .

The court denied plaintiffs’ motion to reargue their … order upon a finding that the amendment would prejudice Eldridge because it subjected him to personal exposure in the accident. However, greater exposure to liability does not constitute prejudice. There must be some indication that defendant has been hindered in the preparation of its case or has been prevented from taking some measure to support its position, and the burden of demonstrating prejudice is on the party opposing amendment … . Eldridge failed to sustain his burden of showing prejudice. Owens v STD Trucking Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 05323, First Dept 10-19-23

Practice Point: Here the fact that the proposed amendment to the complaint exposed the defendant to greater exposure to liability does not constitute prejudice. The motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages should have been granted.

 

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THE MAJORITY HELD THE APPELLATE DIVISION SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED MOTHER’S APPEAL OF FAMILY COURT’S FINDING MOTHER DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING HER CUSTODY/HABEAS CORPUS PETITION STEMMING FROM THE OUT-OF-STATE FATHER’S FAILURE TO RETURN THE CHILDREN; THE MAJORITY SENT THE CASE BACK TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE STANDING ISSUE; THREE DISSENTERS ARGUED FAMILY COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE HABEAS CORPUS PETITION BECAUSE NO CUSTODY ORDER WAS IN PLACE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, over a three-judge comprehensive dissent, determined the Appellate Division erred when it refused to consider mother’s appeal of the denial of her habeas corpus petition seeking the return of her children. The children visited father out-of-state and one of them was not allowed to return. The Appellate Division erred when it found it did not have subject matter jurisdiction for the appeal. The matter was sent back for consideration of mother’s standing to bring the habeas corpus petition. The dissenters argued the habeas corpus petition was erroneously dismissed by Family Court on the ground that mother did not have standing because there was no custody order in place for the children. But the majority wanted the development of a record on the standing issue:

… Family Court denied the mother’s applications both for sole custody and habeas corpus relief. As the parties who have appeared before us agree, the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the mother’s ensuing appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. By dismissing the appeal upon a motion, and upon an undeveloped record, without full briefing and without providing all parties the opportunity to appear, the Appellate Division has rendered impossible meaningful appellate review of the weighty issues raised in this case. To the extent that the Appellate Division’s order on the motion to dismiss could be read, as the dissenters read it, to be a determination that the mother lacked standing to seek habeas corpus relief without an order of custody in place, the issue of standing did not impact the subject matter jurisdiction of the Appellate Division … . Regardless of whether that Court had the “power to reach the merits,” an issue on which we express no opinion, the Court did not lack the “competence to entertain” the appeal … . Therefore, we remit to the Appellate Division for an expeditious determination on the merits of the standing question presented herein and, if warranted, disposition of any other issues that the parties may raise. Matter of Celinette H.H. v Michelle R., 2023 NY Slip Op 05303, CtApp 10-19-23

Practice Point: The majority held the Appellate Division should not have refused to consider mother’s appeal on the ground she did not have standing to bring her custody/habeas corpus petition. The Appellate Division did not lack subject matter jurisdiction. The matter was sent back for a ruling on the standing question.

 

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A COMPLAINT THAT IS NEVER SERVED DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN “ACTION;” HERE A PRIOR COMPLAINT WAS NEVER SERVED; THEREFORE THE INSTANT COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED ON THE GROUND THERE WAS ANOTHER IDENTICAL ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint in this traffic accident case should not have been dismissed because it was identical to a prior action. The first complaint was never served so there was no prior action:

CPLR 3211(a)(4) provides that “[a] party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against [them] on the ground that . . . there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States.” However, a complaint must have been served in that other action, otherwise it is not “another action,” or a “prior action pending” … within the meaning of CPLR 3211(a)(4) … . Here, it is undisputed that the complaint in the prior action was not served. Quinones v Z & B Trucking, Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 05282, Second Dept 10-18-23

Practice Point: A complaint which is never served does not constitute an “action.” The subsequent identical complaint should not have been be dismissed on the ground there was a prior identical action.

 

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THE EXECUTOR WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE FEES AND DISBURSEMENTS AWARDED THE GUARDIAN OF DECEDENT’S PERSON AND PROPERTY; THE EXECUTOR WAS ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO CPLR 408 IN THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the executor of decedent’s estate (Oppedisano) was entitled to a hearing and discovery with respect to the fess and disbursements awarded to the guardian of decedent’s person and property:

… [T]here are disputed issues of fact as to the accuracy and completeness of the guardian’s final account, and whether the guardian failed to adequately investigate the alleged misappropriation of the decedent’s assets and should be denied fees and/or surcharged for breaching his fiduciary duties. Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court erred in denying Oppedisano’s objections to the guardian’s final account without conducting a hearing … .

Pursuant to CPLR 408, leave of court generally is required for disclosure in a special proceeding … . Insofar as discovery tends to prolong a case, and therefore is inconsistent with the summary nature of a special proceeding, such disclosure is granted only where it is demonstrated that there is need for such relief … . When leave of court is granted, disclosure takes place in accordance with CPLR 3101(a), which generally provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” … . The Court of Appeals has interpreted the phrase “material and necessary” liberally as requiring, upon request, disclosure “of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity. The test is one of usefulness and reason” … . * * *

Oppedisano demonstrated that the requested disclosure was material and necessary to establishing his objections that the guardian’s final account was inaccurate and/or incomplete and that the guardian breached his fiduciary duties and should be denied fees and/or surcharged, and there was no contravening demonstration that the proposed discovery would be prejudicial or unduly burdensome, would violate confidentiality, or would unduly delay the case. Matter of Giuliana M. (DeCarolis), 2023 NY Slip Op 05262, Second Dept 10-18-23

Practice Point: Here the executor was entitled to a hearing on his objections to the fees and disbursements awarded decedent’s guardian and was entitled to discovery pursuant to CPLR 408. In a special proceeding discovery is by leave of court.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED PURSUANT TO THE ADVOCATE-WITNESS RULE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s (Gamez’s) counsel should not have been disqualified pursuant to the advocate-witness rule:

“[T]he disqualification of an attorney is a matter which rests within the sound discretion of the court. A party’s entitlement to be represented in ongoing litigation by counsel of his or her own choosing is a valued right which should not be abridged absent a clear showing that disqualification is warranted, and the movant bears the burden on the motion” … . A party moving to disqualify counsel on the ground that he or she may be called as a witness must demonstrate that (1) the testimony of the opposing party’s counsel is necessary to his or her case, and (2) such testimony would be prejudicial to the opposing party … . “Testimony may be relevant and even highly useful but still not strictly necessary. A finding of necessity takes into account such factors as the significance of the matters, weight of the testimony, and availability of other evidence” … . Here, Lopez [defendant] failed to demonstrate that any anticipated testimony by Gamez’s counsel would be necessary to Lopez’s case and that such testimony would be prejudicial to Gamez … . Gamez v Lopez, 2023 NY Slip Op 05250, Second Dept 10-18-23

Practice Point: The criteria for the disqualification of counsel pursuant to the advocate-witness rule were not met here. The testimony of the opposing party’s counsel must be necessary to the moving party’s case, and the testimony must be prejudicial to the opposing party.

 

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PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT START PROCEEDINGS TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR AND DID NOT PRESENT AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY; THE MOTION TO DISIMISS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank in this foreclosure action did not seek a default judgment within one year and did not offer a reasonable excuse for the delay. Therefore there was no need for the court to consider whether plaintiff had a meritorious cause of action. The complaint should have been dismissed:

CPLR 3215(c) provides that “[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after [a] default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed.” “The language of CPLR 3215(c) is not, in the first instance, discretionary, but mandatory, inasmuch as courts ‘shall’ dismiss claims (CPLR 3215[c]) for which default judgments are not sought within the requisite one-year period, as those claims are then deemed abandoned” … . …

… [T]his matter was released from the settlement conference part in December 2011, and that the plaintiff failed to take steps to initiate proceedings for the entry of a default judgment by moving for leave to enter a default judgment and for an order of reference until March 2013, “which was too late for the plaintiff to ‘manifest an intent not to abandon the case'” … . … [Plaintiff] offered only vague, conclusory, and unsubstantiated assertions which were insufficient to excuse the plaintiff’s delay in moving for leave to enter a default judgment … .

Since [plaintiff] failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for the plaintiff’s delay, this Court need not consider whether the plaintiff had a potentially meritorious cause of action … . Citimortgage, Inc. v Kimmerling, 2023 NY Slip Op 05246, Second Dept 10-18-23

Practice Point: Pursuant to CPLR 3215(c). if the plaintiff does not start proceedings to enter a default judgment within a year and does not offer an adequate excuse for the delay, the complaint must be dismissed. There is no need for the court to consider whether plaintiff has a meritorious cause of action.

 

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