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Delay In Retaining Expert Did Not Warrant Preclusion of Expert’s Testimony

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have precluded plaintiff’s expert from testifying based upon the timing of the retaining of the expert and the serving of his expert information.  There was no evidence the delay was intentional or willful,  and no showing of prejudice to the opposing party:

CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) “does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information at any specific time nor does it mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance with the statute,’ unless there is evidence of intentional or willful failure to disclose and a showing of prejudice by the opposing party” … . Here, the record does not support a conclusion that the plaintiff’s delay in retaining his expert or in serving his expert information was intentional or willful. Furthermore, any potential prejudice to the defendants was ameliorated by a two-month adjournment of the retrial agreed to by the parties … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion to preclude the plaintiff’s expert from testifying at the retrial … . Burbige v Siben & Ferber, 2014 NY Slip Op 01426, 2nd Dept 3-5-14

 

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New York Court Properly Declined to Exercise Jurisdiction Over Child Custody and Visitation Matters Due to Child’s Substantial Contacts with California

The Second Department determined Supreme Court had properly found that California, rather than New York, was the appropriate forum for determining child custody and visitation matters:

A court of this State which has jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Domestic Relations Law art 5-A) may decline to exercise jurisdiction if it finds that New York is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum (see Domestic Relations Law § 76-f[1]…). The factors to be considered in making this determination include the length of time the subject child has resided outside the state, any agreement between the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction, the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence, and the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation (see Domestic Relations Law § 76-f[2]…). “Particularly relevant to the jurisdictional determination is whether the forum in which the litigation is to proceed has optimum access to relevant evidence” … . “Maximum rather than minimum contacts with the State are required” … . Greenfield v Greenfield, 2014 NY Slip Op 01434, 2nd Dept 3-5-14

 

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Delay In Retaining Expert Did Not Warrant Preclusion of Expert’s Testimony

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have precluded plaintiff’s expert from testifying based upon the timing of the retaining of the expert and the serving of his expert information.  There was no evidence the delay was intentional or willful,  and no showing of prejudice to the opposing party:

CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) “does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information at any specific time nor does it mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance with the statute,’ unless there is evidence of intentional or willful failure to disclose and a showing of prejudice by the opposing party” … . Here, the record does not support a conclusion that the plaintiff’s delay in retaining his expert or in serving his expert information was intentional or willful. Furthermore, any potential prejudice to the defendants was ameliorated by a two-month adjournment of the retrial agreed to by the parties … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion to preclude the plaintiff’s expert from testifying at the retrial … . Burbige v Siben & Ferber, 2014 NY Slip Op 01426, 2nd Dept 3-5-14

 

Court Has Common-Law “Interest of Justice” Authority to Modify Its Own Order and/or a Stipulation Entered Into During Litigation

In affirming Supreme Court’s modifying its own order in the interest of justice, the Third Department explained the common law power to do so.  The order concerned the terms of a stipulation entered into during litigation:

A court has the common-law authority to, in its discretion, grant relief from a judgment or order in the interest of justice, considering “‘the facts of the particular case, the equities affecting each party and others affected by the judgment or order, and the grounds for the requested relief'” … . Even if the stipulation had not merged into an order of the court, the court has the “discretionary power to relieve parties from the consequences of a stipulation effected during litigation” … . Here, Supreme Court correctly noted that it had the authority to modify its own order. Hodge v Development at Helderberg Meadows LLC, 517046, 3rd Dept 2-27-14

 

Plaintiff Estopped from Bringing State Retaliation Claim/Issue Decided by District Court Which Dismissed Plaintiff’s Federal Title VII Constructive Discharge Claim

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, the First Department determined plaintiff was estopped from bringing her retaliation action in state court because the issue raised had necessarily been determined when the District Court dismissed her federal complaint. The plaintiff alleged she was retaliated against after she told management about allegedly discriminatory practices. The retaliation was alleged to have been the failure to act quickly to address a dispute with a coworker:

The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies where “[f]irst, the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue . . . had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination” … . “The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel has the burden of demonstrating the identity of the issues in the present litigation and the prior determination, whereas the party attempting to defeat its application has the burden of establishing the absence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action” (id. at 456).In considering plaintiff’s Title VII constructive discharge claim, the District Court examined, as it was obliged to do, the question of whether defendant “intentionally subjected her to an intolerable work environment”… . An integral part …of the court’s determination that defendant had not done so was its explicit finding that defendant “responded promptly after [p]laintiff’s complaint” and “the next day … attempted to address [p]laintiff’s concerns within the constraints of [defendant’s] staffing situation”… . Simmons-Grant v Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, 2014 NY Slip Op 01407, 1st Dept 2-27-14

 

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Application to Vacate Default Judgment in Tax Foreclosure Proceeding Governed by Two-Year Statute of Limitations (Under the Facts, the One-Month Statute Did Not Apply)/Deed Purporting to Transfer Property from Religious Organization Invalid for Failure to Comply with the Religious Corporation Law/Notice of Tax Foreclosure Sufficient Even Though Actual Owner Not Notified

The Third Department determined petitioner’s application to set aside a tax foreclosure judgment was timely, but determined the application was properly denied because the notice of the foreclosure proceeding was adequate, even though petitioner, the actual owner of the property, was not notified. Petitioner, a religious organization, had transferred the property by deed to Forbes, a minister, in 1985. Forbes paid property taxes for several years, but when the payments ceased the county moved to foreclose, naming Forbes as the owner. It turned out that the deed to Forbes was invalid because the transfer did not comply with the Religious Corporation Law. The actual owner, petitioner, was not notified of the foreclosure proceedings. In affirming the judgment of foreclosure, the court discussed the appropriate statute of limitations under the facts, the property-transfer requirements of the Religious Corporation Law, and the tax-foreclosure notice requirements:

Initially, Supreme Court erred in determining that petitioner’s application was untimely. Unlike a motion to vacate a default judgment in a tax foreclosure proceeding, which “may not be brought later than one month after entry of the judgment” (RPTL 1131…), a person or entity challenging the validity of a deed transferred in connection with a tax foreclosure proceeding faces a two-year statute of limitations (see RPTL 1137…). As petitioner was not a party to the foreclosure proceeding and now seeks to set aside the judgment on the basis that respondent failed to provide notice to the rightful owner, the application was timely (see RPTL 1137).The 1985 deed to Forbes was invalid. A religious corporation shall not sell “any of its real property without applying for and obtaining leave of the court” pursuant to N-PCL 511 (Religious Corporations Law § 12 [1]…). Under N-PCL 511 (b), the Attorney General must be notified before any sale may be finalized. Petitioner did not seek court approval in 1985 or thereafter (see Religious Corporations Law § 12 [1], [9]), nor was the Attorney General notified of the transfer of the property. Where court approval is not obtained for the transfer of real property from a religious corporation, the conveyance is invalid … . Accordingly, the 1985 deed was invalid and Forbes should not have had any legal right to the property. * * *When determining the reasonableness of the taxing authority’s attempts to provide notice to interested parties, the court may take into account the conduct of such parties … Here, petitioner indicated that it intended to convey the property to Forbes – its then-minister – in 1985 and was only unsuccessful due to their lack of legal knowledge. Additionally, petitioner did not take any action against Forbes to regain title, despite the deed having been filed for nearly 27 years at the time the foreclosure proceeding was commenced. Under the circumstances, including respondent’s provision of proper statutory notice to the owner of record, respondent complied with due process and satisfied its obligation of searching for interested parties, and petitioner has not demonstrated that any additional steps or more exhaustive search was required here… . Matter of City of Hudson…, 516690, 3rd Dept 2-27-14

 

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Unjust Enrichment Does Not Require a Wrongful Act by the One Enriched

The Second Department explained the criteria for determining a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and the elements of an unjust enrichment cause of action. Unjust enrichment does not require a wrongful act:

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . “Whether the complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove its claims, of course, plays no part in the determination of a prediscovery CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss” … .”The essential inquiry in any action for unjust enrichment or restitution is whether … it is against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is sought to be recovered” … . A plaintiff must show that (1) the other party was enriched, (2) at the plaintiff’s expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the other party to retain what is sought to be recovered … .”Unjust enrichment . . . does not require the performance of any wrongful act by the one enriched” … . “Innocent parties may frequently be unjustly enriched” … . “What is required, generally, is that a party hold property under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it'” … . Alan B Greenfield MD PC v Beach Imaging Holdings LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 01285, 2nd Dept 2-26-14

 

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Question of Fact Whether a “Special Relationship” Had Developed Such that the Insurance Broker Might Be Liable for Negligent Advice About Coverage

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Graffeo, over a dissent, the Court of Appeals determined there was a question of fact whether the relationship between the insurance broker and the plaintiff was a “special relationship” such that the broker might be liable for negligent advice about sufficient coverage. Plaintiff was a business owner who suffered losses for business interruption caused by several roof-failures. The issue was whether the insurance the broker advised plaintiff to purchase was sufficient for plaintiff’s needs. The court explained the general principles involved:

As a general principle, insurance brokers “have a common-law duty to obtain requested coverage for their clients within a reasonable time or inform the client of the inability to do so; however, they have no continuing duty to advise, guide or direct a client to obtain additional coverage” … . Hence, in the ordinary broker-client setting, the client may prevail in a negligence action only where it can establish that it made a particular request to the broker and the requested coverage was not procured. * * *Where a special relationship develops between the broker and client, we have also indicated that the broker may be liable, even in the absence of a specific request, for failing to advise or direct the client to obtain additional coverage … . In Murphy [90 NY2d at 272] , we recognized that “particularized situations may arise in which insurance agents, through their conduct or by express or implied contract with customers and clients, may assume or acquire duties in addition to those fixed at common law” and that the question of whether such additional responsibilities should be “given legal effect is governed by the particular relationship between the parties and is best determined on a case-by-case basis” … . We identified three exceptional situations that may give rise to a special relationship, thereby creating an additional duty of advisement:”(1) the agent receives compensation for consultation apart from payment of the premiums; (2) there was some interaction regarding a question of coverage, with the insured relying on the expertise of the agent; or (3) there is a course of dealing over an extended period of time which would have put objectively reasonable insurance agents on notice that their advice was being sought and specially relied on” … . Voss v The Netherlands Insurance Company…, 11, CtApp 2-25-14

 

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Despite the Contractual Agreement to Apply Delaware Law, Because There Was No Conflict Between Delaware and New York Law, and Because the Parties Disagreed About Which Law to Apply, the Court Applied New York Law

The First Department determined there was no conflict between Delaware and New York law concerning non-solicitation agreements. Therefore, because the parties disagreed about which law should be applied (despite the contractual agreement to apply Delaware law), the court applied New York law, the law of the forum state:

By their own terms, all of the nonsolicitation agreements were to be governed by and construed in accordance with Delaware law. Nonetheless, the parties differ as to whether New York law or Delaware law should be applied.In light of the parties’ disagreement as to which state’s law should apply, our first step is to determine whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of the jurisdictions involved … . For an actual conflict to exist, “the laws in question must provide different substantive rules in each jurisdiction that are relevant’ to the issue at hand and have a significant possible effect on the outcome of the trial'” … . Under New York law, an employee’s noncompetition agreement is reasonable and, therefore, enforceable “only if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public” … . The parties’ briefs disclose no conflict of laws that would have a ” significant possible effect on the outcome of the trial'” … . To be sure, the moving defendants argued before the motion court that “Delaware law does not differ significantly from New York law as to the test for enforceability” and that applying New York law “should not make a material difference to the outcome” of the case. Thus, we apply the law of New York, the forum state… . TBA Global LLC v Proscenium Events LLC 2014 NY Slip Op 01266, 1st Dept 2-25-14

 

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Allegedly Flawed Service Overlooked Under CPLR 5304 Where Defendant Agreed by Contract that English Courts Would Have Jurisdiction Over Disputes and Defendant Had “Fair Notice” of the Lawsuit/Motion for Judgment In Lieu of Complaint Granted

The Court of Appeals determined summary judgment in lieu of complaint should have been granted to the plaintiff. Under the terms of a contract to provide wholesale seafood, the parties agreed the courts of England would have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes. The defendant was served in England and defaulted, but argued in opposition to the summary judgment motion in New York that the person upon whom the documents were served was not authorized to accept service. The Court of Appeals held that service was sufficient under CPLR 5304 because the defendant had agreed by contract that the English courts have jurisdiction and the defendant had “fair notice” of the lawsuit:

Although CPLR article 53 generally provides that a foreign judgment will not be enforced in New York if the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant (CPLR 5304[a][2]), an exception may be made if, “prior to the commencement of the proceedings [defendant] had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject matter involved” (CPLR 5305[3]) and was afforded fair notice of the foreign court proceeding that gave rise to the judgment. We applied this principle in Galliano [15 NY3d 75], where we explained that enforcement of a foreign judgment is not repugnant to our notion of fairness if defendant was a party to a contract in which the parties agreed that disputes would be resolved in the courts of a foreign jurisdiction and defendant was aware of the ongoing litigation in that jurisdiction but neglected to appear and defend. We clarified that, so long as the exercise of jurisdiction by the foreign court does not offend due process, the judgment should be enforced without “microscopic analysis” of the underlying proceedings … . Landauer Limited v Monani Fish Co Inc, 27, CtApp 2-25-14

 

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