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CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON A LOAN PAYABLE UPON DEMAND ACCRUES WHEN THE LOAN IS MADE.

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s causes of action based upon loans repayable on demand accrued when the loan was made, rendering them time-barred, despite the provision that payment became due three months after a demand for payment:

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Here, the parties’ agreement … provided that the sums loaned to the defendants were repayable on demand. Accordingly, the plaintiff possessed a legal right to demand payment at the time that each loan was advanced to the defendants, and the statute of limitations began to run at each of those respective times … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the three-month period for repayment following a demand did not constitute a condition that had to be fulfilled before the right to final payment arose… . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss as time-barred so much of the first cause of action as was predicated upon loans that allegedly were made more than six years prior to the commencement of the action. Elia v Perla, 2017 NY Slip Op 03930, 2nd Dept 5-17-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON A LOAN PAYABLE UPON DEMAND ACCRUES WHEN THE LOAN IS MADE)/DEBTOR-CREDITOR (LOAN PAYABLE UPON DEMAND, CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON A LOAN PAYABLE UPON DEMAND ACCRUES WHEN THE LOAN IS MADE)

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CONSPIRACY JURISDICTION DISCUSSED IN THIS COMPLEX LITIGATION INVOLVING MANY INTER-RELATED INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD.

The First Department, in an issue-rich decision which is sparse on facts, determined several jurisdiction and choice of law issues in a complex lawsuit involving a great many inter-related international corporations and allegations of fraud. One of the many jurisdiction issues discussed is so-called “conspiracy jurisdiction;” a sample of that discussion follows:

The remaining possibility for obtaining jurisdiction over defendants-appellants is conspiracy jurisdiction … . Defendants contend that the complaint does not allege an agreement by the Citco defendants to participate in a conspiracy to defraud Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Retirement Fund (MBTARF) and that MBTARF failed to identify an overt act. However, we find that the complaint contains factual allegations from which such an agreement can be inferred … . It also alleges an overt act, namely, that alleged co-conspirators Mr. Fletcher and FAM took $7.1 million of MBTARF’s investment in nonparty Fletcher Fixed Income Alpha Fund, Ltd. (Alpha) and used it in violation of Alpha’s offering memorandum as partial repayment of Leveraged’s loan to Citco Bank and SFT … .

Turning to the additional requirements for conspiracy jurisdiction … , we must examine Leveraged’s and Fletcher Income Arbitrage Fund Ltd. (Arbitrage)’s conspiracy claims with respect to personal jurisdiction. Leveraged and Arbitrage’s conspiracy claims allege that Mr. Fletcher and FAM fraudulently transferred cash from plaintiff Fletcher International, Ltd. to Unternaehrer in the FIP Transaction. The transfer was made by instructing SFT to transfer money from FIP’s account to Citco Bank’s account at HSBC New York, for further credit to SFT, for further credit to Unternaehrer. Using a New York bank account for a fraudulent scheme constitutes a tort within New York … .

MBTARF’s conspiracy claim alleges that Mr. Fletcher and FAM made misrepresentations to it about how its investment would be used. It also alleges that they diverted its money. Drawing inferences in favor of plaintiffs … , we find that the misrepresentation and diversion occurred in New York because FAM and Mr. Fletcher were located there.

We find that the additional Lawati factors (102 AD3d at 428) are satisfied as to Citco Group but not Citco Global. Since Citco Group is the parent, it is logical to infer that Citco Cayman (a New York co-conspirator because it has not contested jurisdiction) acted under its control. However, since Citco Global is only a sibling of Citco Cayman, it is not as logical to infer that Citco Cayman acted under Citco Global’s control. FIA Leveraged Fund Ltd. v Grant Thornton LLP, 2017 NY Slip Op 03887, 1st Dept 5-16-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CONSPIRACY JURISDICTION DISCUSSED IN THIS COMPLEX LITIGATION INVOLVING MANY INTER-RELATED INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD)/JURISDICTION  (CONSPIRACY JURISDICTION DISCUSSED IN THIS COMPLEX LITIGATION INVOLVING MANY INTER-RELATED INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD)/CONSPIRACY JURISDICTION (CONSPIRACY JURISDICTION DISCUSSED IN THIS COMPLEX LITIGATION INVOLVING MANY INTER-RELATED INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD)/CORPORATION LAW (JURISDICTION, CONSPIRACY JURISDICTION DISCUSSED IN THIS COMPLEX LITIGATION INVOLVING MANY INTER-RELATED INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD)/FRAUD (CONSPIRACY JURISDICTION DISCUSSED IN THIS COMPLEX LITIGATION INVOLVING MANY INTER-RELATED INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD)

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ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM THE PURCHASE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES WERE TIME-BARRED, A LIMITED BACKSTOP GUARANTY CAUSE OF ACTION AND A FAILURE TO NOTIFY CAUSE OF ACTION WERE REINSTATED.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moskowitz, reinstated a couple of causes of action in a lawsuit stemming from the purchase of residential mortgage-backed securities, the bulk of which was deemed time-barred. A limited backstop guaranty cause of action and a cause of action stemming from the failure to notify of a material breach were reinstated. The intertwined contracts and guarantees and the legal reasoning stemming from recent similar cases are too detailed to fairly summarize here. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v WMC Mtge., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 03881, 1st Dept 5-11-17

 

SECURITIES (RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM THE PURCHASE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES WERE TIME-BARRED, A LIMITED BACKSTOP GUARANTY CAUSE OF ACTION AND A FAILURE TO NOTIFY CAUSE OF ACTION WERE REINSTATED)/CONTRACT LAW (RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM THE PURCHASE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES WERE TIME-BARRED, A LIMITED BACKSTOP GUARANTY CAUSE OF ACTION AND A FAILURE TO NOTIFY CAUSE OF ACTION WERE REINSTATED)/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM THE PURCHASE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES WERE TIME-BARRED, A LIMITED BACKSTOP GUARANTY CAUSE OF ACTION AND A FAILURE TO NOTIFY CAUSE OF ACTION WERE REINSTATED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM THE PURCHASE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES WERE TIME-BARRED, A LIMITED BACKSTOP GUARANTY CAUSE OF ACTION AND A FAILURE TO NOTIFY CAUSE OF ACTION WERE REINSTATED)

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REPORT REGARDING CARE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS NOT PART OF A MEDICAL OR QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM, WAS NOT PRIVILEGED UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW OR PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, AND WAS THEREFORE SUBJECT TO DISCOVERY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION. 

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that a report sought by plaintiffs was not part of a medical or quality assurance review function or participation in a medical malpractice prevention program and therefore was not privileged pursuant to Education Law § 6527 (3) and Public Health Law § 2805-m:

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…[W]we find that defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing the report’s privilege. Defendants did not submit an affidavit or other information from anyone with first-hand knowledge establishing that a review procedure was in place or that the report was obtained or maintained in accordance with any such review procedure … . Nevertheless, defendants argue that the face and content of the report clearly establish that it is a quality assurance review which is precluded from disclosure. Yet, nothing in the report reflects that the hospital’s Department of Patient Safety and Quality Improvement ever reviewed it … . Further, the report’s conclusory statement that it was prepared for quality assurance purposes and was shielded by the subject statutes is patently insufficient to satisfy the required standard … .

In short, the purpose of the Education Law and Public Health Law discovery exclusions is to encourage a candid peer review of physicians, and thereby improve the quality of medical care and prevent malpractice… , but such protections are not automatically available and do not prevent full disclosure where it should otherwise be provided … . Estate of Savage v Kredentser, 2017 NY Slip Op 03825, 3rd Dept 5-11-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DISCOVERY, REPORT REGARDING CARE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS NOT PART OF A MEDICAL OR QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM, WAS NOT PRIVILEGED UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW OR PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, AND WAS THEREFORE SUBJECT TO DISCOVERY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (REPORT REGARDING CARE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS NOT PART OF A MEDICAL OR QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM, WAS NOT PRIVILEGED UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW OR PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, AND WAS THEREFORE SUBJECT TO DISCOVERY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION)/PRIVILEGE  (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DISCOVERY, REPORT REGARDING CARE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS NOT PART OF A MEDICAL OR QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM, WAS NOT PRIVILEGED UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW OR PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, AND WAS THEREFORE SUBJECT TO DISCOVERY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION)

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MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF NYPD DOCUMENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED SOLELY BECAUSE FOIL REQUESTS FOR THE DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN DENIED.

The First Department determined Supreme Court should not have denied a motion to compel discovery of New York Police Department documents solely because prior requests for the documents under the Freedom of Information Law were denied. The “public interest” privilege did not justify outright denial of the motion:

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… [T]the court erred in denying defendants’ motion outright because of the prior denials of their requests for the same information under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). “CPLR article 31 is not a statute specifically exempt[ing]’ public records from disclosure under FOIL” and “no provision of FOIL bars simultaneous use of both” CPLR 3101 and FOIL to procure discovery … .

The “public interest” privilege did not justify the outright denial of defendants’ motion, because the court did not engage in the requisite balancing of the public interest in encouraging witnesses to come forward to cooperate in pending criminal investigations against defendants’ need for the documents to defend against plaintiffs’ claim … . Accordingly, we find that remittal to the motion court for in camera review of the requested files is appropriate in this case, to give the court the opportunity to conduct the proper balancing, in the first instance, of the interests of both parties … . Smith v Watson, 2017 NY Slip Op 03878, 1st Dept 5-11-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF NYPD DOCUMENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED SOLELY BECAUSE FOIL REQUESTS FOR THE DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN DENIED)/FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (CIVIL PROCEDURE, MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF NYPD DOCUMENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED SOLELY BECAUSE FOIL REQUESTS FOR THE DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN DENIED)/DISCOVERY LAW (CIVIL PROCEDURE, MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF NYPD DOCUMENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED SOLELY BECAUSE FOIL REQUESTS FOR THE DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN DENIED)/PRIVILEGE (PUBLIC INTEREST PRIVILEGE, MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF NYPD DOCUMENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED SOLELY BECAUSE FOIL REQUESTS FOR THE DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN DENIED)/PUBLIC INTEREST PRIVILEGE (MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF NYPD DOCUMENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED SOLELY BECAUSE FOIL REQUESTS FOR THE DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN DENIED)

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WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS WERE A COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS.

The Second Department determined the defendants had demonstrated at a collateral source hearing that plaintiff will receive $205 per week in Workers’ Compensation benefits for the rest of her life. Even though the benefits were awarded after an unrelated 2002 accident, the damages awards for past and future lost income were reduced by $205 per week from the time of the 2010 accident (plaintiff was planning to return to work, and thereby lose the benefits, at the time of the 2010 accident):

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In “[a]ctions for personal injury . . . where the plaintiff seeks to recover for the cost of medical care, dental care, custodial care or rehabilitation services, loss of earnings or other economic loss, evidence shall be admissible for consideration by the court to establish that any such past or future cost or expense was or will, with reasonable certainty, be replaced or indemnified, in whole or in part, from any collateral source, except for life insurance and those payments as to which there is a statutory right of reimbursement” (CPLR 4545[a]). The legislative intent of CPLR 4545(a) is to “eliminat[e] plaintiffs’ duplicative recoveries” … .. “The moving defendant bears the burden of establishing an entitlement to a collateral source reduction of an award for past or future economic loss” … .

“Reasonable certainty is understood as involving a quantum of proof that is greater than a preponderance of evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Each of the four judicial departments has interpreted reasonable certainty’ as akin to the clear and convincing evidence standard, that the result urged by the defendant be highly probable'” … . In order to determine whether a party has established with “reasonable certainty” a payment by a collateral source, the defendants first “must establish with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff has received, or will receive, payments from a collateral source” … , and, second, “that collateral source payments which have been or will be received by the plaintiff must be shown to specifically correspond to particular items of economic loss awarded by the trier of fact” … . “Each case involving potential future collateral source reductions to awards for economic loss must be judged on its own unique facts and merits” … . McKnight v New York City Tr. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 03740, 2nd Dept 5-10-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS WERE A COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES, NEGLIGENCE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS WERE A COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS)/WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (NEGLIGENCE, DAMAGES, COLLATERAL SOURCE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS WERE A COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS)/COLLATERAL SOURCE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, NEGLIGENCE, DAMAGES, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS WERE A COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS)/DAMAGES (CIVIL PROCEDURE, NEGLIGENCE, DAMAGES, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS WERE A COLLATERAL SOURCE, DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS)

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PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY UNDER 42 USC 1983 FOR VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had stated a cause of action under 18 USC 1983, against the county, for violation of his right to a speedy trial:

We reject the County’s argument that it cannot be held liable pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 for the alleged misconduct of the office of the District Attorney. Where, as here, a complaint alleges a failure to train and supervise employees regarding legal obligations, “liability for the District Attorney’s actions in his role as a manager of the District Attorney’s office rests with the county” …  and a claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 may therefore be maintained against the County for the conduct of the District Attorney’s office insofar as the District Attorney acted as a County policymaker … . Moreover, here, the complaint sufficiently alleges that the District Attorney’s office failed to train and supervise its assistant district attorneys with respect to the constitutional speedy trial rights of the accused persons with whom they interacted, to the extent that they manifested deliberate indifference to those rights … . Victor v County of Suffolk, 2017 NY Slip Op 03796, 2nd Dept 5-10-17

CRIMINAL LAW (PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY UNDER 18 USC 1983 FOR VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL)/CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (18 USC 1983) (SPEEDY TRIAL, PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY UNDER 18 USC 1983 FOR VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL)/MUNICIPAL LAW (SPEEDY TRIAL, PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY UNDER 18 USC 1983 FOR VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL)/SPEEDY TRIAL (CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION, PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY UNDER 18 USC 1983 FOR VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL)

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MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE PROPERLY GRANTED, THE JURY FOUND DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT BUT WENT ON TO FIND THE NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY.

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict in this personal injury case was properly granted. The jury found defendant negligent but went on to find the negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury:

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… [T]he plaintiff … was injured when an ammunition reloading device, owned by the defendant, exploded as the plaintiff attempted to remove what was purportedly a “dead” cartridge from the device. The defendant had inadvertently jammed a live round in the device two months earlier and had attempted to remove the combustible components before bringing it to the plaintiff and seeking his assistance in removing the jammed cartridge. * * *

… [T]here existed no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which the jury could rationally have found that the defendant’s negligent conduct was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Piro v Demeglio, 2017 NY Slip Op 03785, 2nd Dept 5-10-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE PROPERLY GRANTED, THE JURY FOUND DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT BUT WENT ON TO FIND THE NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY)/NEGLIGENCE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE PROPERLY GRANTED, THE JURY FOUND DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT BUT WENT ON TO FIND THE NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY)/VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE PROPERLY GRANTED, THE JURY FOUND DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT BUT WENT ON TO FIND THE NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY)

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LETTER TERMINATING ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS A LEGAL MALPRACTICE COMPLAINT AS BARRED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

The Second Department determined defendant-attorneys’ motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence was properly denied. Plaintiff alleged the attorneys missed a statute of limitations deadline. The attorneys submitted a letter purporting to terminate the attorney-client relationship with plaintiff prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The court found that the letter was not the type of document upon which a motion to dismiss the complaint can be based:

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“A motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action is barred by documentary evidence may be granted only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes the plaintiff’s factual allegations, thereby conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law”… . The evidence submitted in support of such motion must be ” documentary'” or the motion must be denied … . In order for evidence submitted in support of a CPLR 3211(a)(1) motion to qualify as documentary evidence, it must be “unambiguous, authentic, and undeniable” … . “[J]udicial records, as well as documents reflecting out-of-court transactions such as mortgages, deeds, contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable, would qualify as documentary evidence in the proper case” … . “Conversely, letters, emails, and affidavits fail to meet the requirements for documentary evidence” … . Prott v Lewin & Baglio, LLP, 2017 NY Slip Op 03786, 2nd Dept 5-10-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO DISMISS ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, LETTER TERMINATING ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS A LEGAL MALPRACTICE COMPLAINT AS BARRED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE)/ATTORNEYS (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, LETTER TERMINATING ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS A LEGAL MALPRACTICE COMPLAINT AS BARRED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE)/LEGAL MALPRACTICE (LETTER TERMINATING ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS A LEGAL MALPRACTICE COMPLAINT AS BARRED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE)

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PLAINTIFF STATE TROOPER ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AFTER HER SUCCESSFUL SEX DISCRIMINATION ACTION AGAINST THE STATE UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a concurrence and a two-judge dissent, determined plaintiff state trooper was entitled to attorney’s fees in connection with her successful employment discrimination action against the State under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA):

… [T] he plain language, legislative history and remedial nature of the EAJA together demonstrate that this civil action is eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees. We hold that for cases commenced before the effective date of the 2015 amendment to the Human Rights Law, the EAJA permits the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff in an action against the State under the Human Rights Law for sex discrimination in employment by a state agency. The plain language of the statute, which is supported by the legislative history, compels the conclusion that “any civil action” encompasses cases brought under the Human Rights Law. It is not for this Court to engraft limitations onto the plain language of the statute. Indeed, “[t]his Court should be very cautious in interpreting statutes based on what it views as a better choice of words when confronted with an explicit choice made by the Legislature” …. . Kimmel v State of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 03689, CtApp 5-9-17

EMPLOYMENT LAW (PLAINTIFF STATE TROOPER ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AFTER HER SUCCESSFUL SEX DISCRIMINATION ACTION AGAINST THE STATE UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT)/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (PLAINTIFF STATE TROOPER ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AFTER HER SUCCESSFUL SEX DISCRIMINATION ACTION AGAINST THE STATE UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT)/EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE(PLAINTIFF STATE TROOPER ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AFTER HER SUCCESSFUL SEX DISCRIMINATION ACTION AGAINST THE STATE UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT)/ATTORNEYS (EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PLAINTIFF STATE TROOPER ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AFTER HER SUCCESSFUL SEX DISCRIMINATION ACTION AGAINST THE STATE UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT)/SEX DISCRIMINATION (EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PLAINTIFF STATE TROOPER ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AFTER HER SUCCESSFUL SEX DISCRIMINATION ACTION AGAINST THE STATE UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT)/CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW (ATTORNEY’S FEES, PLAINTIFF STATE TROOPER ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AFTER HER SUCCESSFUL SEX DISCRIMINATION ACTION AGAINST THE STATE UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT)

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