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A PLAINTIFF FACED WITH A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION NEED NOT SUBMIT ANY EVIDENCE OR AFFIDAVITS IN OPPOSITION BUT RATHER CAN STAND ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that a plaintiff, when faced with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, need not submit any evidence or affidavits in opposition, but may simply stand on the pleadings:

While a court is permitted to consider evidentiary material submitted by a defendant in support of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)… , “affidavits submitted by a defendant will almost never warrant dismissal under CPLR 3211 unless they establish conclusively that [the plaintiff] has no cause of action” … . The plaintiff “may not be penalized for failure to make an evidentiary showing in support of a complaint that states a claim on its face” … . Indeed, if a plaintiff chooses to stand on his or her pleading alone, “confident that its allegations are sufficient to state all the necessary elements of a cognizable cause of action, he [or she] is at liberty to do so and, unless the motion to dismiss is converted by the court to a motion for summary judgment, he [or she] will not be penalized because he [or she] has not made an evidentiary showing in support of his [or her] complaint” … .

Here, the Supreme Court did not convert motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. The amended complaint states a cause of action as against [defendant] and [defendant’s] submissions, including an affidavit of its president, did not conclusively establish that the plaintiff has no cause of action against it … . Yu Chen v Kupoint (USA) Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 02498, Second Dept 4-11-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO DISMISS, A PLAINTIFF FACED WITH A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION NEED NOT SUBMIT ANY EVIDENCE OR AFFIDAVITS IN OPPOSITION BUT RATHER CAN STAND ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3211 (MOTION TO DISMISS, A PLAINTIFF FACED WITH A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION NEED NOT SUBMIT ANY EVIDENCE OR AFFIDAVITS IN OPPOSITION BUT RATHER CAN STAND ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT))/DISMISS, MOTION TO (CIVIL PROCEDURE, A PLAINTIFF FACED WITH A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION NEED NOT SUBMIT ANY EVIDENCE OR AFFIDAVITS IN OPPOSITION BUT RATHER CAN STAND ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT))

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT DECIDED BY DEFAULT CANNOT SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, THE ISSUES HAVE NOT BEEN LITIGATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that a declaratory judgment decided on default does not support the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the issues were not litigated:

“The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel has the burden to show the identity of the issues, while the party trying to avoid application of the doctrine must establish the lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate” … . “If the issue has not been litigated, there is no identity of issues between the present action and the prior determination” … . In this case, since the determination in the declaratory judgment action regarding insurance coverage for the subject van was decided on default and, thus, was not actually litigated … , [the nominal defendants] failed to demonstrate that there was an identity of issues between the present proceeding and the determination in the declaratory judgment action. Matter of Hereford Ins. Co. v McKoy, 2018 NY Slip Op 02466, Second Dept 4-11-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT DECIDED BY DEFAULT CANNOT SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, THE ISSUES HAVE NOT BEEN LITIGATED (SECOND DEPT))/COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL (DECLARATORY JUDGMENT DECIDED BY DEFAULT CANNOT SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, THE ISSUES HAVE NOT BEEN LITIGATED (SECOND DEPT))/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT DECIDED BY DEFAULT CANNOT SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, THE ISSUES HAVE NOT BEEN LITIGATED (SECOND DEPT))/DEFAULT (COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT DECIDED BY DEFAULT CANNOT SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, THE ISSUES HAVE NOT BEEN LITIGATED (SECOND DEPT))

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FAILURE TO CITE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT IN NOTICE OF MOTION NOT FATAL, QUESTION WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS SERVED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION REQUIRED A TRAVERSE HEARING, BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT RESIDE AT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY CPLR 3215(g)(3) NOTICE NOT REQUIRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined (1) the failure to cite the CPLR provision upon which the cross motion to vacate the default was based was not fatal to the motion because the basis was clear from the motion papers, (2) there was a question of fact whether defendant was served with the foreclosure summons and complaint requiring a traverse hearing, and (3) because defendant did not live at the subject premises (he lived next door), the CPLR 3215(G)(3) notice requirement did not apply:

Plaintiff argues that the subject action is not a residential mortgage foreclosure action because such actions involve foreclosure of a “home loan,” which according to RPAPL (Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law) 1304(6)(iii) is any loan secured by property “which is or will be occupied by the borrower as the borrower’s principal dwelling.” It is undisputed that defendant does not reside at the mortgaged property. …  Therefore, plaintiff asserts the action is not subject to the additional mailing requirement of CPLR 3215.

CPLR 3215(g)(3) provides that when a default judgment “based upon nonappearance is sought against a natural person in an action based upon nonpayment of a contractual obligation,” that person is entitled to additional notice of the action, which is provided by mailing the summons to his or her place of residence. The provision was enacted out of concern for “unsophisticated homeowners” who “do not receive sufficient notice that they are about to lose their homes through foreclosure” … . As defendant does not reside at the mortgaged property, this foreclosure proceeding does not place his home at risk. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff was not required to serve a 3215(g)(3) notice on defendant. Bank of Am., N.A. v Diaz, 2018 NY Slip Op 02421, First Dept 4-10-18

​FORECLOSURE (FAILURE TO CITE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT IN NOTICE OF MOTION NOT FATAL, QUESTION WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS SERVED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION REQUIRED A TRAVERSE HEARING, BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT RESIDE AT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY CPLR 3215(g)(3) NOTICE NOT REQUIRED (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, FAILURE TO CITE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT IN NOTICE OF MOTION NOT FATAL, QUESTION WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS SERVED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION REQUIRED A TRAVERSE HEARING, BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT RESIDE AT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY CPLR 3215(g)(3) NOTICE NOT REQUIRED (FIRST DEPT))/CPLR 3215(g)(3) (FORECLOSURE, FAILURE TO CITE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT IN NOTICE OF MOTION NOT FATAL, QUESTION WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS SERVED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION REQUIRED A TRAVERSE HEARING, BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT RESIDE AT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY CPLR 3215(g)(3) NOTICE NOT REQUIRED (FIRST DEPT))/TRAVERSE HEARING (FORECLOSURE, FAILURE TO CITE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT IN NOTICE OF MOTION NOT FATAL, QUESTION WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS SERVED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION REQUIRED A TRAVERSE HEARING, BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT RESIDE AT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY CPLR 3215(g)(3) NOTICE NOT REQUIRED (FIRST DEPT))

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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT, AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW CAUSES OF ACTION INSUFFICIENTLY PLED, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the fraudulent conveyance allegations, which were made “upon information and belief,” were insufficient, and the tortious interference with contract allegations were insufficient because there was no allegation the contract would not have been breached but for the defendant’s conduct:

Plaintiff alleges that defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme to transfer and dispose of the assets of several related entities (the judgment debtors) in order to thwart plaintiff’s ability to collect debts owed by those entities, including judgments in two related actions.

The actual fraudulent conveyance claims, under the common law and Debtor and Creditor Law (DCL) § 276, should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to allege fraudulent intent with the particularity required by CPLR 3016(b) … . The key allegations were made “[u]pon information and belief,” without identifying the source of the information … . Moreover, the timing of the allegedly fraudulent transfers – beginning two years before the judgment debtors incurred the subject debts – undermines the claim of fraudulent intent… .

The constructive fraudulent conveyance claims pursuant to DCL 273, 274, and 275 should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that the transfers were made without fair consideration, as the relevant allegations were all made “[u]pon information and belief”…

Because the viability of the claims under DCL 276-a, 278, and 279 depends on the viability of the other fraudulent conveyance claims, these claims should likewise be dismissed.

The tortious interference claim should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that the contract “would not have been breached but for’ the defendant’s conduct” .. . The relevant allegations were vague and conclusory and supported by “mere speculation” … . Carlyle, LLC v Quik Park 1633 Garage LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02436, First Dept 4-10-18

​DEBTOR-CREDITOR (FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT, AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW CAUSES OF ACTION INSUFFICIENTLY PLED, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/FRAUD (DEBTOR-CREDITOR, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT, AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW CAUSES OF ACTION INSUFFICIENTLY PLED, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (DEBTOR-CREDITOR, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT, AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW CAUSES OF ACTION INSUFFICIENTLY PLED, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT, AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW CAUSES OF ACTION INSUFFICIENTLY PLED, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT (FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT, AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW CAUSES OF ACTION INSUFFICIENTLY PLED, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT, AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW CAUSES OF ACTION INSUFFICIENTLY PLED, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/CPLR 3016 (DEBTOR-CREDITOR, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT, AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW CAUSES OF ACTION INSUFFICIENTLY PLED, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/UPON INFORMATION AND BELIEF (COMPLAINT, (FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT, AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW CAUSES OF ACTION INSUFFICIENTLY PLED, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/COMPLAINT (UPON INFORMATION AND BELIEF, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT, AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW CAUSES OF ACTION INSUFFICIENTLY PLED, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))

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FACT THAT PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE PARTICULAR MACY’S STORE AT WHICH THE SKIRT WHICH CAUGHT FIRE WAS PURCHASED DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MACY’S, POINTING TO GAPS IN PLAINTIFF’S PROOF IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the Macy’s defendants did not eliminate all triable issues of fact concerning whether Macy’s sold the plaintiff’s skirt which caught fire from a heater. Although plaintiff could not identify the store where the skirt was purchased, Macy’s could not rely on the gaps in plaintiff’s proof as the basis for summary judgment. There was testimony from a buyer which indicated the skirt could have been purchased at a Macy’s store:

The Macy defendants failed to meet their initial burden of establishing that they did not sell the skirt at issue … . The Macy defendants correctly note that neither plaintiff nor her mother could identify the specific store from which the skirt was purchased. Merely pointing to gaps in plaintiff’s proof, however, does not suffice for the Macy defendants to meet their threshold burden … .

Furthermore, plaintiff testified that the skirt had an “Angie” label on it. Although a product director employed by the Macy defendants, who was previously a buyer, testified that she purchased Angie-labeled skirts from Star of India and that the Macy defendants sold skirts that were purchased from Star of India, her testimony was equivocal as to whether the type of skirt at issue was ever sold by the Macy defendants. In view of the foregoing evidence, the Macy defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether they sold the skirt and, therefore, their motion should have been denied regardless of the sufficiency of the [other] defendants’ opposition … . Palmatier v Mr. Heater Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 02382, Third Dept 4-5-18

​PRODUCTS LIABILITY (FACT THAT PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE PARTICULAR MACY’S STORE AT WHICH THE SKIRT WHICH CAUGHT FIRE WAS PURCHASED DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MACY’S, POINTING TO GAPS IN PLAINTIFF’S PROOF IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (THIRD DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FACT THAT PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE PARTICULAR MACY’S STORE AT WHICH THE SKIRT WHICH CAUGHT FIRE WAS PURCHASED DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MACY’S, POINTING TO GAPS IN PLAINTIFF’S PROOF IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (THIRD DEPT))/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FACT THAT PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE PARTICULAR MACY’S STORE AT WHICH THE SKIRT WHICH CAUGHT FIRE WAS PURCHASED DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MACY’S, POINTING TO GAPS IN PLAINTIFF’S PROOF IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FACT THAT PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE PARTICULAR MACY’S STORE AT WHICH THE SKIRT WHICH CAUGHT FIRE WAS PURCHASED DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MACY’S, POINTING TO GAPS IN PLAINTIFF’S PROOF IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (THIRD DEPT))

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ALTHOUGH THE BILL OF PARTICULARS MENTIONED NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION IN THIS BUS-PASSENGER-INJURY CASE, THE COMPLAINT DID NOT, THEREFORE THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR THE DEMAND TO DISCOVER REPORTS OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE BUS DRIVER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was not entitled to discover the reports of other accidents involving defendant bus driver. Plaintiff’s children were injured after getting off the bus. Both the driver (Morin) and his employer (CDTA) were sued. Although the bill of particulars mentioned negligent hiring and retention, the complaint did not. Therefore there were no grounds for the discovery of the reports of prior accidents:

The allegations of negligence set forth in the complaint, as they relate to Morin and CDTA, pertain solely to Morin’s operation of the bus on the day of the incident … . Specifically, the complaint alleges that, after discharging the infant passengers, Morin “negligently remained in that position for a considerable period of time, causing the bus to obstruct the path of travel for other vehicles in violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law[].” It further alleges that Morin was “negligent, careless and reckless” in failing to illuminate his hazard lights or any other signal to alert drivers of the presence of the bus during that time. Critically absent from the complaint is any allegation of direct negligence on the part of CDTA. Thus, the complaint “gives not the slightest indication of a theory of liability of negligent supervision[, hiring or retention]”… . Although plaintiff alleged a theory of negligent hiring and retention in his bill of particulars, “[i]t is well settled that a bill of particulars is intended to amplify the pleadings, limit the proof, and prevent surprise at trial . . . [, and it] may not be used to allege a new theory not originally asserted in the complaint” … . Schonbrun v DeLuke, 2018 NY Slip Op 02386, Third Dept 4-5-18

​NEGLIGENCE (ALTHOUGH THE BILL OF PARTICULARS MENTIONED NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION IN THIS BUS-PASSENGER-INJURY CASE, THE COMPLAINT DID NOT, THEREFORE THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR THE DEMAND TO DISCOVER REPORTS OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE BUS DRIVER (THIRD DEPT))/BUSES (ALTHOUGH THE BILL OF PARTICULARS MENTIONED NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION IN THIS BUS-PASSENGER-INJURY CASE, THE COMPLAINT DID NOT, THEREFORE THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR THE DEMAND TO DISCOVER REPORTS OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE BUS DRIVER (THIRD DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (BUSES, ALTHOUGH THE BILL OF PARTICULARS MENTIONED NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION IN THIS BUS-PASSENGER-INJURY CASE, THE COMPLAINT DID NOT, THEREFORE THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR THE DEMAND TO DISCOVER REPORTS OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE BUS DRIVER (THIRD DEPT)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (COMPLAINTS, ALTHOUGH THE BILL OF PARTICULARS MENTIONED NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION IN THIS BUS-PASSENGER-INJURY CASE, THE COMPLAINT DID NOT, THEREFORE THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR THE DEMAND TO DISCOVER REPORTS OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE BUS DRIVER (THIRD DEPT))/COMPLAINTS (ALTHOUGH THE BILL OF PARTICULARS MENTIONED NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION IN THIS BUS-PASSENGER-INJURY CASE, THE COMPLAINT DID NOT, THEREFORE THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR THE DEMAND TO DISCOVER REPORTS OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE BUS DRIVER (THIRD DEPT))/BILL OF PARTICULARS (ALTHOUGH THE BILL OF PARTICULARS MENTIONED NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION IN THIS BUS-PASSENGER-INJURY CASE, THE COMPLAINT DID NOT, THEREFORE THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR THE DEMAND TO DISCOVER REPORTS OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE BUS DRIVER (THIRD DEPT))/DISCOVERY (ACCIDENT REPORTS, ALTHOUGH THE BILL OF PARTICULARS MENTIONED NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION IN THIS BUS-PASSENGER-INJURY CASE, THE COMPLAINT DID NOT, THEREFORE THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR THE DEMAND TO DISCOVER REPORTS OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE BUS DRIVER (THIRD DEPT))/ACCIDENT REPORTS (NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION, ALTHOUGH THE BILL OF PARTICULARS MENTIONED NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION IN THIS BUS-PASSENGER-INJURY CASE, THE COMPLAINT DID NOT, THEREFORE THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR THE DEMAND TO DISCOVER REPORTS OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE BUS DRIVER (THIRD DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION, ALTHOUGH THE BILL OF PARTICULARS MENTIONED NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION IN THIS BUS-PASSENGER-INJURY CASE, THE COMPLAINT DID NOT, THEREFORE THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR THE DEMAND TO DISCOVER REPORTS OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE BUS DRIVER (THIRD DEPT))/NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION (ACCIDENT REPORTS, DISCOVERY , ALTHOUGH THE BILL OF PARTICULARS MENTIONED NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION IN THIS BUS-PASSENGER-INJURY CASE, THE COMPLAINT DID NOT, THEREFORE THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR THE DEMAND TO DISCOVER REPORTS OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE BUS DRIVER (THIRD DEPT))

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HEARSAY IN ACCIDENT REPORT NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ summary judgment motions should have been granted because the hearsay in an accident report was not admissible:

… [A]lthough the report’s author had a business duty to prepare the report, the statement in the report that the platform “must have been moved during demolition and trench work . . . [by defendant]” indicated that he did not have first hand knowledge of the occurrence and was relying on speculative statements made by others, who are not identified. Nor is there any indication that this inference was based on first hand knowledge of a third party who was under a business duty to inform the author (…CPLR 4518). The business records exception to the hearsay rule does not permit the receipt into evidence of entries based upon voluntary hearsay statements made by third parties not engaged in the business or under a duty in relation thereto … . 76th & Broadway Owner LLC v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 02409, First Dept 4-5-18

​EVIDENCE (HEARSAY IN ACCIDENT REPORT NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/HEARSAY (ACCIDENT REPORTS, HEARSAY IN ACCIDENT REPORT NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/ACCIDENT REPORTS (HEARSAY IN ACCIDENT REPORT NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/BUSINESS RECORDS  (HEARSAY IN ACCIDENT REPORT NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/CPLR 4518 (HEARSAY IN ACCIDENT REPORT NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD NAMES OF POLICE OFFICERS SUED AS JOHN DOES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE OFFICERS ARE NOT UNITED IN INTEREST WITH THE CITY DEFENDANT, FAILURE TO NAME THE OFFICERS WAS NOT A MISTAKE, AND PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MAKE A DILIGENT EFFORT TO LEARN THE OFFICERS’ NAMES BEFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint to add the names of police officers originally sued a John Does should not have been granted:

The motion court erred in granting plaintiff leave to amend her complaint and substitute the officers’ names under the relation back doctrine, because the officers are not “united in interest” with the City of New York, the original defendant … . Moreover, plaintiff failed to show that the failure to name defendants was a mistake… . Further, as for those claims where plaintiff was unaware of the officers’ identities prior to the statute of limitations running, she failed to show that she conducted a diligent inquiry into the actual identities of the intended defendants before the expiration of the statutory period … . Diaz v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 02419, First Dept 4-5-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (AMEND COMPLAINT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD NAMES OF POLICE OFFICERS SUED AS JOHN DOES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE OFFICERS ARE NOT UNITED IN INTEREST WITH THE CITY DEFENDANT, FAILURE TO NAME THE OFFICERS WAS NOT A MISTAKE, AND PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MAKE A DILIGENT EFFORT TO LEARN THE OFFICERS’ NAMES BEFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED (FIRST DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (POLICE OFFICERS SUED AS JOHN DOES, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD NAMES OF POLICE OFFICERS SUED AS JOHN DOES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE OFFICERS ARE NOT UNITED IN INTEREST WITH THE CITY DEFENDANT, FAILURE TO NAME THE OFFICERS WAS NOT A MISTAKE, AND PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MAKE A DILIGENT EFFORT TO LEARN THE OFFICERS’ NAMES BEFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED (FIRST DEPT))/POLICE OFFICERS (CIVIL PROCEDURE, JOHN DOES, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD NAMES OF POLICE OFFICERS SUED AS JOHN DOES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE OFFICERS ARE NOT UNITED IN INTEREST WITH THE CITY DEFENDANT, FAILURE TO NAME THE OFFICERS WAS NOT A MISTAKE, AND PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MAKE A DILIGENT EFFORT TO LEARN THE OFFICERS’ NAMES BEFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED (FIRST DEPT))/RELATION BACK (AMEND COMPLAINT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD NAMES OF POLICE OFFICERS SUED AS JOHN DOES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE OFFICERS ARE NOT UNITED IN INTEREST WITH THE CITY DEFENDANT, FAILURE TO NAME THE OFFICERS WAS NOT A MISTAKE, AND PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MAKE A DILIGENT EFFORT TO LEARN THE OFFICERS’ NAMES BEFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (AMEND COMPLAINT, POLICE OFFICERS SUED AS JOHN DOES, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD NAMES OF POLICE OFFICERS SUED AS JOHN DOES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE OFFICERS ARE NOT UNITED IN INTEREST WITH THE CITY DEFENDANT, FAILURE TO NAME THE OFFICERS WAS NOT A MISTAKE, AND PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MAKE A DILIGENT EFFORT TO LEARN THE OFFICERS’ NAMES BEFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED (FIRST DEPT))

PLAINTIFF CAN BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NONLEGAL REPRESENTATIVE TO A DEFENSE PHYSICAL EXAM (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff can be accompanied by a nonlegal representative at a defense physical examination:

Defendants concede that, under this Court’s recent decision in Santana v Johnson (154 AD3d 452 [1st Dept 2017]), they can no longer argue that plaintiff was required to show “special and unusual circumstances” to be permitted to have a nonlegal representative present at a physical examination conducted on their behalf pursuant to CPLR 3121. Martinez v Pinard, 2018 NY Slip Op 02402, First Dept 4-5-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (DISCOVERY, PHYSICAL EXAM, PLAINTIFF CAN BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NONLEGAL REPRESENTATIVE TO A DEFENSE PHYSICAL EXAM (FIRST DEPT))/DISCOVERY (PHYSICAL EXAM, PLAINTIFF CAN BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NONLEGAL REPRESENTATIVE TO A DEFENSE PHYSICAL EXAM (FIRST DEPT))/CPLR 3121 (DISCOVERY, PHYSICAL EXAM, PLAINTIFF CAN BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NONLEGAL REPRESENTATIVE TO A DEFENSE PHYSICAL EXAM (FIRST DEPT))/PHYSICAL EXAM (CIVIL PROCEDURE, DISCOVERY, PLAINTIFF CAN BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NONLEGAL REPRESENTATIVE TO A DEFENSE PHYSICAL EXAM (FIRST DEPT))

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USURY IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH IS WAIVED IF NOT RAISED, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEVERED USURIOUS PROVISIONS OF LOAN AGREEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANT DEFAULTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court did not have the power to find provisions of loan agreements usurious. Defendant defaulted in the action to enforce the loan agreements. Usury is an affirmative defense which is waived if not raised by a defendant:

Pursuant to CPLR 3215, a plaintiff may seek a default judgment against a defendant who fails to appear or answer … . A plaintiff moving for a default judgment against a defendant must submit proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting the cause of action, and proof of the defaulting defendant’s failure to answer or appear … .

Here, the plaintiff, by its submissions, met all of these requirements and, thus, demonstrated its entitlement to a default judgment against the defendants … . The Supreme Court erred when it severed those provisions of the agreements which it found to be illegal pursuant to the criminal usury statute. Usury is an affirmative defense which a defendant must either assert in an answer or as a ground to move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211. Otherwise, the defense is waived … . Power Up Lending Group, Ltd. v Cardinal Resources, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 02351, Second Dept 4-4-18

​DEBTOR-CREDITOR (USURY IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH IS WAIVED IF NOT RAISED, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEVERED USURIOUS PROVISIONS OF LOAN AGREEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANT DEFAULTED (SECOND DEPT))/USURY (DEBTOR-CREDITOR, USURY IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH IS WAIVED IF NOT RAISED, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEVERED USURIOUS PROVISIONS OF LOAN AGREEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANT DEFAULTED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, (USURY IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH IS WAIVED IF NOT RAISED, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEVERED USURIOUS PROVISIONS OF LOAN AGREEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANT DEFAULTED (SECOND DEPT))/AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (USURY IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH IS WAIVED IF NOT RAISED, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEVERED USURIOUS PROVISIONS OF LOAN AGREEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANT DEFAULTED (SECOND DEPT))/WAIVER (CIVIL PROCEDURE, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, USURY IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH IS WAIVED IF NOT RAISED, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEVERED USURIOUS PROVISIONS OF LOAN AGREEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANT DEFAULTED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3215  (USURY IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH IS WAIVED IF NOT RAISED, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEVERED USURIOUS PROVISIONS OF LOAN AGREEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANT DEFAULTED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3211 (USURY IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH IS WAIVED IF NOT RAISED, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEVERED USURIOUS PROVISIONS OF LOAN AGREEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANT DEFAULTED (SECOND DEPT))

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