The Second Department noted that a motion to set aside a verdict (Criminal Procedure Law 330.30) is properly denied when it is based upon an error that was not preserved by objection. (The issue could be addressed by the appellate court in the interest of justice, but the exercise of interest of justice jurisdiction was declined here.) People v Clayborne, 2014 NY Slip OP 08659, 2nd Dept 12-10-14
The Second Department, over a dissent, determined that Family Court should not have denied the biological mother's petition to enforce the provision of a surrender agreement which allowed her to visit the child without a finding that the requested visitation is not in the best interests of the child. Finding the record inadequate for review, the Second Department sent the matter back for a hearing:
Social Services Law § 383-c(2)(b) permits the parties to a judicial surrender agreement to provide for a biological parent's continued communication or contact with the child. In determining whether to approve the agreement, the court must determine whether continued contact with the biological parent would be in the child's best interests (see Social Services Law § 383-c[2][b]). A provision providing for visitation with the biological parent is not legally enforceable unless the court that approved the surrender agreement states, in a written order, that the provision would be in the child's best interests (see Domestic Relations Law § 112-b[2]; cf. Social Services Law § 383-c[2][b]). Even then, in an enforcement proceeding pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 112-b, a court “shall not enforce an order under this section unless it finds that the enforcement is in the child's best interests” (Domestic Relations Law § 112-b[4]). In other words, there must be a best interests judicial determination both at the time the surrender agreement is accepted and at the time that enforcement of a visitation provision is sought … . * * *
Here, the Family Court dismissed the petition without affording the biological mother an opportunity to establish that enforcement of the visitation provision of the surrender agreement would be in the child's best interests. Thus, there is no hearing record for us to review. Further, while it may be true that the Family Court was aware of facts and circumstances that may have supported a determination that enforcement of the visitation provision would not have been in the child's best interests, the record before us does not contain those facts. Accordingly, we are unable to conduct effective appellate review of the court's determination or to make required findings on our own … . Matter of Jayden A, 2014 NY Slip Op 08637, 2nd Dept 12-10-14
In affirming the dismissal of an inmate's action seeking to challenge the computation of his sentence (dismissal was based upon the inmate's failure to comply with the service requirements in an order to show cause), the Third Department noted that no appeal lies from an ex parte order, including an order entered sua sponte. Apparently the remedy is a motion to vacate pursuant to CPLR 5015:
…[T]here is “no right of appeal from an ex parte [judgment/order], including [one] entered sua sponte,” such as Supreme Court's dismissal of the petition here … . Under the circumstances presented here, we decline to treat the notice of appeal from that judgment as an application for leave to appeal (see CPLR 5701 [c]…). Petitioner sought renewal pursuant to CPLR 2221 and, while perhaps more properly viewed as one to vacate pursuant to CPLR 5015, the judgment denying that motion presents the salient issues for review. Matter of Martin v Annucci, 2014 NY Slip Op 08539, 3rd Dept 12-4-14
The Third Department affirmed the arbitrator's decision that the school district employee, who had attempted to retire after allegations that she stole school district property surfaced, was entitled to health benefits. The court determined, given that the faithless servant doctrine was litigated fully during the arbitration and deemed inapplicable, and given the arbitrator's conclusion the employee was entitled to her contractual health benefits, the school district was collaterally estopped from amending its complaint in the related court proceedings to include the faithless servant doctrine:
…Vacatur of the arbitration award is not warranted. “It is well established that an arbitrator's award is largely unreviewable” … . Vacatur of an arbitration award is only appropriate where “it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power” … . “Outside of these narrowly circumscribed exceptions, courts lack authority to review arbitral decisions, even where 'an arbitrator has made an error of law or fact'” … . Union-Endicott Cent Sch Dist v Peters, 2014 NY Slip Op 08533, 3rd Dept 12-4-14
The First Department explained its review powers with respect to errors in a verdict sheet that were not preserved by objection:
The record reflects that the jury charge correctly advised that loss of enjoyment of life was a component of pain and suffering … . Defendant argues that the verdict sheet was inconsistent with this instruction. However, defendant concedes that it failed to object to the verdict sheet. Thus, defendant failed to preserve the issue of the error in the verdict sheet for review by this Court … .
Where a party fails to object to errors in a verdict sheet, the charge becomes the law applicable to the determination of the case, and on appeal, this Court will review only if the error was “fundamental” … . We find that the alleged conflict between the jury charge and the verdict sheet was not fundamental since it did not confuse or create doubt as to the principle of law to be applied, or improperly shift fault, such that the “jury was prevented from fairly considering the issues at trial” … . Grace v NYC Tr Auth, 2014 NY Slip Op 08362, 1st Dept 12-2-14
The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have set aside the verdict pursuant to a CPL 330.30 motion on a ground which was not preserved by an objection. Supreme Court set aside the assault second conviction on the ground that the indictment, which charged assault first, was improperly amended during trial to assault second. Because the defendant did not object to the amendment, the issue could not be the basis for setting aside the verdict pursuant to CPL 330.30:
In considering a motion to set aside or modify a verdict pursuant to CPL 330.30(1), a trial court may only consider questions of law, not fact … . Moreover, a trial court may only consider claims of legal error under CPL 330.30(1) where those claims are properly preserved for appellate review … .
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the alleged amendment of the indictment was not a nonwaivable defect, and the defendant was required to make a timely objection at trial to preserve, for the Supreme Court’s consideration, a claim pursuant to CPL 330.30(1) that the indictment was impermissibly amended … . As the defendant failed to object at trial, he “waived” any challenge to the reduction of the count alleging assault in the first degree …, and the Supreme Court was without authority to set aside the verdict on that ground … . People v Davidson, 2014 NY Slip Op 08346, 2nd Dept 11-26-14
Resolving a split among the appellate division departments, the Court of Appeals determined that an indictment rendered duplicitous by the trial evidence is not a “mode of proceedings” error and the error must therefore be preserved in order to raise it on appeal. The indictment charged one count of attempted murder. But the evidence presented two different occurrences to which the single count could apply:
The [1st] and [2nd] Departments have held that where it is claimed that the trial evidence has rendered a count duplicitous, the issue must be preserved for review … . The [4th] Department, however, has held that duplicity created by trial evidence violates a defendant’s right to be tried and convicted only of the crimes and theories charged in the indictment, which is a fundamental and non-waivable right, and that such error also violates a defendant’s right under CPL 310.80 to a unanimous verdict, and that preservation is unnecessary … .
As we held in People v Alvarez (20 NY3d 75, 81 [2012], cert denied US &mdash, 133 S Ct 1736 [2013]), in relation to the constitutional right to a public trial, “preservation of public trial claims is still required. Bringing a public trial violation to a judge’s attention in the first instance will ensure the timely opportunity to correct such errors” … . Therefore, defendant’s argument that he need not preserve an issue that has constitutional significance is unconvincing.
Any uncertainty could have easily been remedied with an objection during opening statements, the witness testimony, or to the jury charge. Requiring preservation will prevent unnecessary surprise after the conduct of a complete trial. Accordingly, we hold that issues of non-facial duplicity, like those of facial duplicity, must be preserved for appellate review. People v Allen, 2014 NY Slip Op 08222, CtApp 11-25-14
The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Graffeo, over a partial dissent, determined the failure of the record to indicate whether notes from the jury were properly addressed by the court (pursuant to People v O’Rama, 88 NY2d 270) constituted “mode of proceedings” errors requiring reversal in the absence of preservation:
Although not every violation of CPL 310.30 is immune from normal preservation principles …, a failure to apprise counsel about the specific contents of a substantive note from a deliberating jury violates the fundamental tenants of CPL 310.30 and qualifies as a mode of proceedings error … . The record therefore must indicate compliance with adequate procedures under O’Rama because reviewing courts “cannot assume” that the proper procedure was utilized when the record is devoid of information as to how jury notes were handled … . The “presumption of regularity” … cannot salvage an … error of this nature … . People v Silva, 2014 NY Slip Op 08215, CtApp 11-24-14
The Second Department determined defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal was not valid because the right was not adequately explained and because there was no indication that the written waiver signed by the defendant was translated for him:
…[T]he record does not reflect that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal … . The Supreme Court’s statements at the plea allocution improperly suggested that waiving the right to appeal was mandatory rather than a right which the defendant was being asked to voluntarily relinquish, and the court never elicited an acknowledgment that the defendant was voluntarily waiving his right to appeal … . Moreover, there is no indication in the record that the defendant understood the distinction between the right to appeal and other trial rights that are forfeited incident to a plea of guilty … . Although the defendant did sign a written waiver of his right to appeal, nothing in the record demonstrates that the document was translated for the defendant, who required the use of a Spanish language interpreter, before it was presented to him for signature … . In any event, the court’s terse colloquy at the plea allocution, which included the language suggesting that the waiver of the right to appeal was mandatory, failed to sufficiently advise the defendant of the nature of the right to appeal … . People v Guarchaj, 2014 NY Slip Op 08044, 2nd Dept 11-19-14
The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, determined the defendant should be allowed to raise the argument that he was deprived of his right to counsel in a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 440.10, even though the issue could have been raised on direct appeal. The defendant had appeared pro se, had pled guilty and did not appeal. The judge did not advise the defendant of his right to appeal:
It is correct as a general matter that, when the record is sufficient to permit review of an issue on direct appeal, a defendant who either has not appealed his conviction or, having appealed, has failed to raise that issue is barred from later asserting it as a basis for post-conviction relief … . * * *
But there is an obvious risk of unfairness in applying this procedural bar where the ground that the defendant seeks to raise is that he was deprived of his right to counsel. If he was indeed deprived of that right, that very deprivation may well have led him either not to appeal or not to have presented the issue to an appellate court. A defendant who has wrongly been deprived of a lawyer can hardly be blamed for failing to follow customary legal procedures. * * *
We conclude, in short, that defendant was not barred from raising his right to counsel claim in a CPL 440 motion. We express no opinion on the merits of the claim. People v Grubstein, 2014 NY Slip Op 07924, CtApp 11-18-14
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