You are here: / Administrative Law
, ,

THE DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF MINORITY AND WOMEN’S BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ERRONEOUSLY IGNORED THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING BEFORE AN ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WHICH DEMONSTRATED PETITIONER MET THE CRITERIA FOR A WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (WBE) (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, annulling the determination of the Division of Minority and Women’s Business Development of the Department of Economic Development (the Division), found the petitioner had demonstrated it met the criteria for certification as a woman-owned business enterprise (WBE). In its contrary ruling, the Division erroneously ignored the evidence presented at the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which had ruled in favor of the petitioner:

Petitioner contends that the determination should be annulled because the Director refused to consider the testimonial evidence introduced at the administrative hearing in assessing the regulatory factors, and we agree. … [F]ollowing a determination denying an application for certification as a WBE, the applicant is, upon written request, entitled to an administrative hearing before an independent hearing officer … . The hearing officer must thereafter conduct the hearing based upon the information included in the request for a hearing as it relates to the information that was provided by the applicant with its certification application, and each party must be accorded a full opportunity to present evidence, including calling witnesses and cross-examining other parties and their witnesses … . The hearing officer may also “request additional information and take other actions necessary to make an informed decision” … , which ultimately must be based upon his or her “consideration of the record as a whole or such portion thereof as may be cited by any party to the proceeding and as supported by and in accordance with substantial evidence” … .

The proof adduced at the administrative hearing was highly relevant to the issue of whether petitioner met the criteria for WBE certification. Matter of Scherzi Sys., LLC v White, 2021 NY Slip Op 05143, Third Dept 9-30-21

 

, ,

THE 3RD DEPARTMENT ANNULLED THE DETERMINATION OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD (PERB) WHICH FOUND THAT THE FIREFIGHTERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE CITY FAILED TO NEGOTIATE BEFORE UNILATERALLY IMPOSING A SALARY REDUCTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), determined the city did not fulfill its obligation to negotiate a change in salary for its firefighters:

PERB acknowledged petitioners’ claims that the City made a unilateral determination to end the past practice of paying night differential, check-in pay and holiday pay in calculating regular wages and benefits to current employees should they receive General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) benefits in the future, but rejected those contentions upon the ground that petitioners had only documented the City’s intent to discontinue those payments with regard to retirees to whom it owed no duty to bargain. … The parties … orally stipulated at the hearing … that “those affected [by the City’s unilateral change in benefits] are those in the unit as of the alleged unilateral change,” necessarily referring to current employees who are members of the bargaining units rather than the retirees who are not … . The parties later reinforced that point by stipulating that the unilateral change was made “in a uniform[] fashion to all members of both bargaining units,” again using language necessarily referring to current employees to whom the City owes a duty to bargain. In the absence of any indication that counsel lacked authority to enter into those unambiguous factual stipulations or that some cause sufficient to invalidate a contract existed for setting the stipulations aside, they are binding  … . Thus, as the parties stipulated that the City’s unilateral actions impacted current employees in the bargaining units, PERB’s finding that the record was barren of proof on that point is not supported by substantial evidence, and it follows that PERB’s determination must be annulled … . Matter of Uniformed Fire Officers Assn. of the City of Yonkers v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 2021 NY Slip Op 05144, Third Dept 9-30-21

 

, , , ,

THE FINDING BY THE BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS WAS NEVER FILED AS REQUIRED BY THE GENERAL CITY LAW; THEREFORE THE 60-DAY TIME LIMIT FOR CONTESTING THE RULING NEVER STARTED TO RUN (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the 60-day statute of limitation for contesting a ruling of the board of zoning appeals (BZA) never started to run because the ZBA’s finding was never filed:

General City Law § 81-a (5) (a) imposes an affirmative duty on administrative officials charged with the enforcement of a local zoning law or ordinance in mandating that “[e]ach order, requirement, decision, interpretation or determination . . . shall be filed. . . within five business days from the day it is rendered, and shall be a public record” … . General City Law § 81-a (5) (b) states that “[a]n appeal shall be taken within [60] days after the filingof any order, requirement, decision, interpretation or determination of the administrative official, by filing with such administrative official and with the board of appeals a notice of appeal, specifying the grounds thereof and the relief sought” (… see Code of the City of Ithaca § 325-40 [B] [1] [e]). Upon review of the record, it is impossible to ascertain exactly when the Planning Board determined that variances were not necessary. However, it is undisputed that no determination of such finding was ever filed. As General City Law § 81-a (5) (b) plainly provides that the time period for commencing a review proceeding is to be measured from the filing, and there was no filing, the time period for the administrative appeal never began to run … . Matter of Grout v Visum Dev. Group LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 04997, Third Dept 9-16-21

 

, , ,

SUPREME COURT PROPERLY ANNULLED THE ELECTION BOARD’S DESIGNATION OF AN EARLY VOTING POLLING PLACE BECAUSE THE BOARD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LOCATION MET THE ELECTION LAW REQUIREMENTS MANDATING A LOCATION ACCESSIBLE TO CITY RESIDENTS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined Supreme Court properly annulled the determination of the Rensselaer County Board of Elections designating an early voting polling pace pursuant to Election Law section 8-600. The 3rd Department also granted the motion to intervene in the Article 78 proceeding brought by the NAACP and three minority and/or disabled residents who argued for a polling place accessible to city residents dependent on public transportation:

… [I]n designating early voting polling places, the Board “shall have at least one polling place” in the City (as Rensselaer County’s most populous municipality) and, because the City has public transportation, “such polling place shall be situated along such transportation routes” (Election Law § 8-600 [2] [a]). Election Law § 8-600 (2) (e) further states that any early voting polling place “shall be located so that voters in the county have adequate and equitable access, taking into consideration population density, travel time to the polling place, proximity to other early voting poll sites, public transportation routes, commuter traffic patterns and such other factors the board of elections deems appropriate” (see 9 NYCRR 6211.1 [c]). * * *

… [W]e conclude that the Board did not adequately address “whether the early voting site[s are] on or near public transportation” (9 NYCRR 6211.1 [c] [2] [iv]). The failure to address that mandatory factor “precludes meaningful review of the rationality of” the Board’s siting determination, renders the decision arbitrary and capricious and, by itself, warrants annulment … . The Board failed to meaningfully address most of the other factors as well. Accordingly, Supreme Court properly granted the petition and annulled the Board’s determination designating early voting polling places for the 2021 election … . Matter of People of the State of New York v Schofield, 2021 NY Slip Op 04785, Third Dept 8-26-21

 

, , ,

THE NYC COMPTROLLER’S SUBPOENAS FOR COVID-19-PLANNING-RELATED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MAYOR DE BLASIO AND THE FIRST DEPUTY MAYOR WERE PROPERLY QUASHED BY SUPREME COURT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined Supreme Court properly quashed subpoenas issued by the NYC Comptroller seeking communications between Mayor de Blasio and First Deputy Mayor Fuleihan concerning the city’s COVID-19 pandemic planning. The First Department further held Supreme Court properly refused to quash other subpoenas issue by the Comptroller and properly ordered the depositions of two City witnesses without limitation of the scope of questioning:

In May 2020, in the midst of the ongoing COVID-19 public health emergency, Comptroller Scott Stringer commenced a [NYC Charter] Section 93(b) investigation of the City’s preparation for, planning for, and response to the pandemic to identify how those efforts impacted the City, its finances, residents and businesses. In connection with the investigation, the Comptroller issued a “request for information” to the City, which it sent to Dean Fuleihan, the City’s First Deputy Mayor, seeking information and communications related to COVID-19 … .

… [T]he court properly applied the public interest privilege to quash the document requests served on the Mayor and First Deputy Mayor. Generally, the public-interest privilege is a common-law rule that “attaches to confidential communications between public officers, and to public officers, in the performance of their duties, where the public interest requires that such confidential communications or the sources should not be divulged” because “the public interest would be harmed if the material were to lose its cloak of confidentiality” … . Matter of Comptroller of the City of N.Y. v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 04685, First Dept 8-12-21

 

PETITIONER WAITED EIGHT MONTHS WITHOUT RECEIVING A DECISION ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF HIS GRIEVANCE BEFORE FILING AN ARTICLE 78 CONTESTING THE DENIAL; PETITIONER WAS ENTITED TO THE “FUTILITY EXCEPTION” TO THE REQUIREMENT THAT HE EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE TURNING TO THE COURTS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined petitioner-inmate was entitled to the “futility exception” to the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted before bringing an Article 78 proceeding to contest the administrative ruling. Petitioner brought a grievance alleging the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) should not have reduced his pay for work in the mess hall because of his refusal to participate in certain prison programs. After the superintendent denied relief petitioner appealed to the Central Office Review Committee (CORC) but eight months passed without a decision. Then petitioner brought the Article 78:

… [P]etitioner filed his administrative appeal with CORC on December 12, 2018 and commenced this proceeding on August 19, 2019. He waited more than eight months without having received a decision — which is seven months after CORC’s 30-day limit had expired — before he commenced this proceeding. To the extent that the regulations are unclear regarding whether CORC’s failure to decide an appeal within 30 days constitutes a constructive denial, a grievant is placed in a catch-22 situation — if he or she files a CPLR article 78 proceeding before receiving a decision from CORC, DOCCS may seek dismissal based on the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but, if the grievant does not commence a court proceeding within four months after the 30-day decision period, he or she risks the possibility of DOCCS seeking dismissal based on a statute of limitations defense … . This untenable position, which arises from the confluence of CORC’s failure to comply with the regulation’s time frame for deciding administrative appeals and the lack of clarity in a different DOCCS regulation, creates substantial prejudice to a grievant such as petitioner … . Under the circumstances, we find that exhaustion should be excused based on the futility exception. Matter of McMillian v Krygier, 2021 NY Slip Op 04638, Third Dept 8-5-21

 

,

A TIMELY BUT DEFECTIVE ATTEMPT TO COMMENCE AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT WHICH CANNOT BE CURED BY A SECOND ATTEMPT AFTER THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petitioner’s Article 78 action should have been dismissed because it was not properly commenced within four months. An attempt to commence the action was timely made, but the petition was returned:

An article 78 proceeding must be commenced within four months of the final determination under review (see CPLR 217[1]). Such a proceeding is commenced when the clerk of the court receives the petition in valid form … . Although petitioners attempted to file the petition in Queens County within four months, they did not do so in a manner which was then authorized (see CPLR 304[b]; 22 NYCRR 202.5-b[a], 202.5-bb[a]). The petition was returned to petitioners, who filed it after the four-month period had passed. The petition was untimely, and the court had no discretion to extend the statute of limitations … . Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the deficiency in their initial filings is not subject to correction pursuant to CPLR 2001 so as to render the proceeding timely, as the failure to file the papers required to commence a proceeding constitutes a nonwaivable, jurisdictional defect … . Matter of Heffernan v New York City Mayor’s Off. of Hous. Recovery Operations, 2021 NY Slip Op 04276, First Dept 7-8-21

 

, , ,

THE PLANNING BOARD TOOK THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK REQUIRED BY THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) WHEN IT APPROVED THE DEVELOPMENT WHICH INCLUDED APARTMENTS AND A COSTCO RETAIL FACILITY; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ANNULLED THE APPROVAL AS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in an exhaustive analysis which cannot be fairly summarized here, determined the Planning Board took the required hard look, pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEGRA), at all the aspects of the proposed development project. Therefore the Planning Board’s approval of the project should not have been annulled as arbitrary and capricious. The development included apartments and a Costco Wholesale retail facility. With regard to the compatibility issues, the court wrote:

In essence, although the Costco store may, to some, not be the most compatible use, the Planning Board properly viewed it in the context of the entire project. As such, the Planning Board considered not only the fact that the Costco store is a permitted use that complied with all of the design standards contained in Local Law No. 4, but also the other tangible benefits of the project, which directly aligned with the purpose of the Local Law. These factors included pedestrian and bicycle accommodations and improvements. Also, the Planning Board considered access management and transit improvements in design and layout, including the reduction of lanes … , the construction of a new roundabout to process traffic more efficiently, the reconfiguration of a major intersection to reduce vehicular speed and a new CDTA bus stop, which CDTA confirmed would ease congestion, improve safety and result in a “marked improvement for customers” in the area. The Planning Board proposed the construction of a new connector road … , and numerous project design features to prevent noise and visual and other impacts. All told, the Planning Board discharged its duty and took the requisite hard look as to compatibility and satisfied its obligations under SEQRA … . Matter of Hart v Town of Guilderland, 2021 NY Slip Op 04273, Third Dept 7-8-21

 

, , ,

THERE WERE PARALLEL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS STEMMING FROM PETITIONER’S ALLEGED ABUSE OF A PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT; THE ARBITRATOR’S FINDING THAT PETITIONER DID NOT ABUSE THE PATIENT WAS ENTITLED TO PRECLUSIVE EFFECT IN THE PARALLEL PROCEEDING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the determination of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in this employment disciplinary matter, determined the prior finding by the arbitrator in a parallel proceeding that petitioner did not abuse the psychiatric patient was entitled to preclusive effect:

Petitioner’s sole contention on appeal is that the ALJ erred in not giving preclusive effect to the arbitrator’s determination that petitioner’s conduct did not constitute physical abuse. We agree. “The underlying purpose of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel is to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes which are essentially the same” … . … [R]espondent contends that the issue decided by the arbitrator was not the identical issue before the ALJ. …

Respondent’s “Report of Investigation Determination” and OMH’s [Office of Mental Health’s] notice of discipline were issued four days apart and both referenced the same case number and charged petitioner with physically abusing the service recipient. Although neither the notice of discipline nor the arbitrator’s decision specifically cite the relevant portion of the Social Services Law associated with physical abuse, the arbitrator specifically took notice of said provision at the disciplinary hearing … . … [T]he arbitrator and the ALJ both reviewed the same videos of the underlying incident and petitioner’s interview. Although the arbitrator and the ALJ both agreed that petitioner pushed the service recipient’s head down into the restraint bed, the arbitrator concluded that petitioner was “cradling the neck of [the service recipient] at that time” such that his conduct did not constitute physical abuse. … [T]his was the same factual issue the ALJ later confronted. Matter of Anonymous v New York State Justice Ctr. for the Protection of People with Special Needs, 2021 NY Slip Op 03510, Third Dept 6-2-21

 

, ,

THE TRAFFIC AND PARKING VIOLATIONS BUREAU (TPVA) IS A CRIMINAL COURT WHICH CANNOT ISSUE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHEN A DEFENDANT FAILS TO APPEAR FOR A TRAFFIC-INFRACTION TRIAL; IN CONTRAST, A TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS BUREAU (TVB) IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, NOT A CRIMINAL COURT, AND MAY ISSUE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined the Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Bureau (TPVA) is a criminal court which cannot issue a default judgment when a defendant who has pled not guilty does not show up for a traffic-infraction trial. On the other hand, a Traffic Violations Bureau (TVA) is not a criminal court and may issue a default judgment:

Defendants in these cases were prosecuted in district court … . Each defendant timely appeared before the TPVA, pleaded not guilty, and requested a trial. They were each given a document indicating the date and time of the trial with a warning of the repercussions for failure to appear: “THE COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST OR PROCEED IN YOUR ABSENCE AND YOU WILL BE LIABLE FOR ANY SENTENCE AND/OR FEES IMPOSED, INCLUDING INCARCERATION, AND other penalties permitted by law.” Despite the warning notice, defendants failed to timely appear on their respective trial dates. No attempt was made by the People to try defendants in absentia. Rather, a judicial hearing officer of the TPVA rendered default judgments against them and imposed fines. …

The issue before us is whether a TPVA judicial hearing officer is authorized under the Vehicle and Traffic Law to render a default judgment against a defendant charged with a traffic infraction who first enters a timely not guilty plea but then fails to appear for trial. We answer that question in the negative. …

Unlike TPVAs, … the TVB is not a criminal court … . It is … an administrative tribunal where, in cities having a population of one million or more, traffic infractions may be disposed of in an administrative hearing held before a hearing officer appointed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles … . In contrast to trials conducted before TPVAs, hearings before the TVB are not governed by the CPL … . People v Iverson, 2021 NY Slip Op 03347, CtApp 5-27-21

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy