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DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE TEACHER’S PROPENSITY FOR SEXUAL ABUSE OR THE REPEATED, LONG-TERM ABUSE OF PLAINTIFF STUDENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this negligent hiring and negligent supervision case, over a two-justice dissent, determined the defendant school district did not demonstrate it did not have constructive notice of the sexual abuse of plaintiff by a teacher (Faralan) which occurred repeatedly over an extended period during school hours: … [T]he district […]

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HERE A SINGLE INCIDENT OF ALLEGED EXCESSIVE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT (GRABBING THE CHILD’S ARM AND SQUEEZING TIGHTLY) WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE NEGLECT FINDING; A NEGLECT FINDING CANNOT BE BASED UPON ALLEGATIONS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PETITION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court’s neglect finding and dismissing the petition, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Voutsinas, determined the evidence of a single incident of alleged excessive corporal punishment (grabbing the child’s arm and squeezing it tightly) was not enough. The Second Department further noted that a neglect finding cannot be based on […]

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WITNESS TESTIMONY DEMONSTRATED CLAIMANT LOST CONTROL OF HIS MOTORCYCLE AFTER GETTING CAUGHT IN A RUT IN THE ROAD; THE STATE HAD TAKEN PICTURES A FEW MONTHS BEFORE WHICH DEPICTED THE ROAD DEFECT; DEFENSE VERDICT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the state had actual or constructive notice of the road defect which caused claimant to lose control of his motorcycle. Photographs of the area, taken by the State a few months before claimant’s accident in connection with the clean-up of a fuel-truck-accident, depicted the road defect: […]

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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS ATTEMPTED MURDER CONVICTIONS ON INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-COUNSEL GROUNDS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Webber, reversing Supreme Court’s grant of defendant’s motion to vacate his attempted murder convictions, determined defendant’s counsel (Lee) was not ineffective for failure to raise a medical-condition defense. Defendant argued he was incapable of running because of a gunshot wound. Several witnesses to the shooting testified […]

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THE DEATH OF A PARTY DIVESTS THE COURT OF JURISDICTION, STAYS THE PROCEEDINGS AND TERMINATES THE REPRESENTATION OF THE DECEASED’S ATTORNEY; ANY ORDERS ISSUED OR APPEALS TAKEN ARE VACATED OR DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, noted that the death of a party divests the court of jurisdiction and terminates the representation of the attorney for the deceased person: “The death of a party divests the court of jurisdiction and stays the proceedings until a proper substitution has been made pursuant to CPLR 1015 […]

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DEFENDANT SNOW-REMOVAL CONTRACTOR WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; NO “ESPINAL” EXCEPTIONS WERE ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT OR DEMONSTRATED IN RESPONSE TO THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; THE CONTRACT WITH THE PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT MAKE THE SNOW-REMOVAL CONTRACTOR COMPLETELY RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE PARKING LOT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant snow-removal contractor was entitled to summary judgment in this parking-lot slip and fall case. The defendant demonstrated plaintiff was not a party to the snow-removal contract with the owner of the parking lot, a nursing home. The plaintiff had not alleged in the complaint that any “Espinal” […]

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THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION PURSUANT TO 18 USC 1983 AGAINST INDIVIDUAL POLICE OFFICERS FOR DEPRIVING PLAINTIFF OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND HIS RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM CONTINUED DETENTION (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined several 42 USC 1983 causes of action against individual police officers should not have been dismissed. The Second Department noted allegations that individual police officers violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights need not be based upon a municipal policy or custom. Plaintiff alleged the officers fabricated evidence and conspired with […]

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PLAINTIFF WAS REPAIRING THE FLASHING ON THE ROOF, NOT DOING ROUTINE MAINTENANCE, AT THE TIME HE WAS INJURED ENTITLING HIM TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was performing repairs, not routine maintenance, when he was injured, entitling him to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action: “Delineating between routine maintenance and repairs is frequently a close, fact-driven issue . . . , and that distinction depends upon whether the item […]

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THE COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTORNEYS STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR “DECEIT AND COLLUSION” PURSUANT TO JUDICIARY LAW 487 WHICH IS NOT THE SAME AS COMMON LAW FRAUD; THERE IS NO NEED TO SHOW A PARTY WAS MISLED BY THE ATTORNEY’S INTENTIONAL FALSE STATEMENTS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the complaint stated a cause of action against an attorney (Moore) for “deceit and collusion” within the meaning of Judiciary Law 487: Judiciary Law § 487 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n attorney or counselor who . . . [i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or […]

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PLAINTIFF SUED THE COUNTY SHERIFF SEEKING A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT A LOCAL COURT WHICH ISSUES A SECURING ORDER FOR A NONQUALIFYING OFFENSE VIOLATES THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT DETERMINED THERE WAS NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERY INVOLVING THE SHERIFF WHO IS BOUND TO OBEY A COURT’S SECURING ORDER; THE REAL DISPUTE IS WITH THE COURT WHICH ISSUES THE ORDER IN APPARENT VIOLATION OF A STATUTE (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court and dismissing the declaratory judgment action, determined there was no justiciable controversy. Plaintiff sued the County Sheriff seeking a declaration that “assigning a local court to arraign a criminal defendant with two previous felony convictions violates the constitutional rights of the accused because local courts lack the ability to […]

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