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TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (TDR) COMPONENT OF TOWN’S COMPREHENSIVE PLAN WAS NOT PROPERLY ADOPTED UNDER THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the transfer of development rights (TDR) component of its comprehensive plan was not properly adopted under the General Municipal Law: The instant hybrid proceeding/action challenges the Town Board’s adoption of Local Law No. 12 (2005), which amended the Town’s zoning code to implement the transfer of development rights […]

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RURAL CORRIDOR (RLC) COMPONENT OF TOWN’S COMPREHENSIVE PLAN PROPERLY ADOPTED UNDER THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, TOWN LAW, AND STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA), QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PETITIONER’S DEVELOPMENT PROJECT APPLICATION WAS COMPLETE BEFORE THE NEW COMPREHENSIVE PLAN WAS ADOPTED, ENTITLING PETITIONER TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PRIOR LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the town properly implemented the Rural Corridor (RLC) component of its comprehensive plan under the General Municipal Law, Town Law, State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) and the implementation was a proper exercise of the town’s zoning and police powers. The court further determined there were questions of fact whether petitioner’s […]

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AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION ZONE (APZ) COMPONENT OF TOWN’S COMPREHENSIVE PLAN PROPERLY ADOPTED UNDER THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, TOWN LAW, AND STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA), QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PETITIONER’S DEVELOPMENT PROJECT APPLICATION WAS COMPLETE BEFORE THE NEW COMPREHENSIVE PLAN WAS ADOPTED, ENTITLING PETITIONER TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PRIOR LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the town properly implemented the Agricultural Protection Zone (APZ) component of its comprehensive plan under the General Municipal Law, Town Law, State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) and the implementation was a proper exercise of the town’s zoning and police powers. The court further determined there were questions of fact whether […]

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TOWN’S COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, WHICH WAS ADOPTED WHILE PETITIONER’S DEVELOPMENT PROJECT APPLICATION WAS PENDING AND NEGATIVELY AFFECTED IT, WAS PROPERLY ADOPTED UNDER THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, TOWN LAW AND STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA), AND WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE TOWN’S POLICE AND ZONING POWERS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that the town’s comprehensive plan, which was adopted while petitioner’s development project application was pending and negatively affected the project, was properly adopted under the General Municipal Law and Town Law, did not violate the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), and was a constitutional exercise of the police and zoning […]

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COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT A TOWN POLICE OFFICER WHO WAS INJURED UNDERGOING A PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST AS A CANDIDATE FOR A COUNTY SWAT TEAM WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF THE COUNTY SUCH THAT THE POLICE OFFICER’S ONLY REMEDY WAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted in this personal injury action. The plaintiff is a police officer employed by a town. He was a candidate for a position in a county counter-terrorism outfit (REACT). During a fitness test for the county plaintiff was […]

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MOTION TO VACATE DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION FOR A 1991 MURDER PROPERLY GRANTED BASED IN PART ON SUBSEQUENT SERIOUS MISCONDUCT BY ONE OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS, CRITERIA FOR NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IN THIS CONTEXT EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged, exhaustive opinion by Justice Miller (too detailed to be fairly summarized here), determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction for a 1991 murder was properly granted (requiring a new trial). The early 90’s trial lasted one day. One of the police investigators has since been implicated in facilitating false identification testimony. The […]

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BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS UNABLE TO SHOW THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT FROM THE DEFENDANTS EVER EXISTED HE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO STRIKE THE ANSWER FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE, HOWEVER PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER PRECLUDING THE DEFENDANTS FROM INTRODUCING ANY SUCH DOCUMENTS AT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that although plaintiff did not demonstrate spoliation of evidence warranting striking the answer, the plaintiff was entitled to an order of preclusion regarding any requested documents which defendants claimed did not exist. Plaintiff was shot by an intruder in his apartment building and had demanded any documents concerning the […]

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PURPORTED SUPPLEMENTAL BILLS OF PARTICULARS ALLEGING NEW INJURIES WERE ACTUALLY AMENDED BILLS OF PARTICULARS WHICH WERE PROPERLY STRUCK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendants’ motion to strike the purported supplemental bills of particulars was properly granted. The supplemental bills of particulars alleged new injuries in this rear-end collision case. The supplemental bills of particulars were actually amended bills of particulars. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate the defendants were not prejudiced by the new allegations […]

SENTENCING JUDGE’S MISINFORMATION ABOUT THE LENGTH OF THE PRISON SENTENCE THE JUVENILE OFFENDER COULD RECEIVE IF SHE FAILED TO MEET THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY A PLEA AGREEMENT RENDERED THE PLEA INVOLUNTARY, THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined juvenile defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea should have been granted. Defendant, who was 15, in connection with a robbery charge, was offered a youthful offender adjudication and a conditional discharge if she met certain conditions, including school attendance and curfews, for a year. The sentencing judge […]

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ABSENCE OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF CONSIDERATION RENDERED ANY WRITTEN OR ORAL GUARANTEE UNENFORCEABLE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a written guarantee to pay the debt of another was not enforceable because no consideration for the guarantee was included in the written guarantee. The 2nd Department further held that an oral guarantee would have been enforceable if it was induced by plaintiff’s promise to hold off on […]

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