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THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78 PETITION CHALLENGING TERMINATION OF SECTION 8 RENT-SUBSIDY BENEFITS STARTS WHEN THE TENANT BECOMES AWARE OF THE TERMINATION; THE PETITION WAS TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner became aware that the Section 8 rent subsidy benefits were terminated in December 2019 triggering the four-month statute of limitations for challenging the termination. Therefore petitioner’s 2024 article 78 petition was time-barred: The four-month statute of limitations applies to proceedings terminating Section 8 benefits, and it begins […]

PLAINTIFF TRIPPED AND FELL OUTSIDE, NOT IN A “PASSAGEWAY” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE; THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action should have been dismissed because plaintiff tripped and fell outside and not in a “passageway” within the meaning of Industrial Code 23-1.7(e)(1): … [T]he Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as it was predicated on Industrial Code § 23-1.7(e)(1), as […]

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ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES PROPERLY HELD IN CIVIL CONTEMPT FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER TO PLACE THE CHILD IN TRADITIONAL FOSTER CARE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Family Court, determined the petitioner (Administration for Children’s Services) was properly held in civil contempt upon the motion of the attorney for the child for failure to comply with the court order to place the child in a traditional foster home. However, the Second Department deemed the imposition of a fine […]

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HERE THE PURPORTED TRANSFER BY DEED OF AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY TO A LIMITED LIABILTY COMPANY WAS NULL AND VOID FROM THE OUTSET BECAUSE THE LLC DID NOT EXIST WHEN THE DEED WAS EXECUTED; THEREFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR REFORMATION OF THE DEED NEVER STARTED RUNNING; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT THE TRANSFER TO THE LLC WAS NULL AND VOID (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the action seeking a declaratory judgment that a deed is null and void should not have been dismissed as time-barred. The deed was void from the outset because the limited liability company listed as a property owner did not not exist at the time the deed was […]

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MEASUREMENT OF THE SIX-MONTH GRACE PERIOD FOR THE FILING OF A NEW ACTION AFTER DISMISSAL (WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE TIME-BARRED) PURSUANT TO CPLR 205(A) AND CPLR 205-A CLARIFIED IN AN OPINION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, clarified how the six-month grace period for filing a new action after dismissal (CPLR 205(a) and 205-a) is measured: This appeal provides our Court with an occasion to resolve some inconsistencies in decisional authority regarding the timing of the termination event from which the six-month […]

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IN THIS HOTEL-ROOM SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD WAS NOT OBLIGATED BY CONTRACT OR COURSE OF CONDUCT TO REPAIR DANGEROUS CONDITIONS AND THE LESSEE OF THE HOTEL DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE OR ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE WATER ON THE BATHROOM FLOOR IN PLAINTIFF’S ROOM; DEFENDANTS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the out-of-possession landlord and the lessee of the hotel where plaintiff slipped and fell on water on the bathroom floor were entitled to summary judgment. The out-of-possession landlord was not bound by contract or course of conduct to repair a dangerous condition. The lessee demonstrated it had no […]

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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF IN THIS INTERSECTION ACCIDENT CASE DID NOT HAVE A STOP SIGN AND HAD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE COLLISION WITH DEFENDANT WHO HAD ENTERED THE INTERSECTION AFTER STOPPING AT A STOP SIGN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiffs in this intersection traffic accident case did not not demonstrate plaintiff driver, who had the right-of-way (no stop sigh), was not at fault. Defendant testified he stopped at a stop sign, looked both ways, proceeded slowly into the intersection and was half-way through when the rear […]

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AT THE FORECLOSURE TRIAL, THE BANK DEMONSTRATED THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE WAS SENT TO DEFENDANT BY CERTIFIED MAIL BUT FAILED TO PROVE THE NOTICE WAS ALSO SENT BY REGULAR MAIL; COMPLAINT DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the proof of mailing of the RPAPL 1304 notice in this foreclosure action was insufficient: “A plaintiff can establish strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 by submitting domestic return receipts, proof of a standard office procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed, or an affidavit […]

PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHILE STANDING ON INSTALLED REBAR WHICH WOBBLED AS A CO-WORKER HANDED HIM A PIECE OF REBAR; HE DROPPED THE REBAR BUT GRABBED IT BEFORE IT FELL ANY FURTHER, INJURING HIS SHOULDER; INJURY WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT AN OBJECT FROM FALLING IS COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff dropped a piece of rebar while standing on installed rebar which wobbled. The rebar fell about one foot before he grabbed it to keep it from falling further, injuring his shoulder. Injury from […]

PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN A DRILL FELL FROM A CO-WORKER WHO WAS STANDING ON AN A-FRAME LADDER; THE DRILL SHOULD HAVE BEEN TETHERED TO THE CO-WORKER’S PERSON; PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this Labor Law 240(1) action was entitled to summary judgment in this falling object case. Plaintiff was struck by a drill which fell from a co-worker standing on an A-frame ladder. The drill should have been tethered to the co-worker’s person: … [T[he coworker’s elevated work […]

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