You are here: / Bruce Freeman

Entries by Bruce Freeman

THE COURT DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE SECOND SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT PROCURED BY THE PEOPLE AFTER A MISTRIAL, THE SECOND SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT WAS A NULLITY, CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the second superseding indictment, procured after a mistrial, was a nullity: Before trial commenced, the People obtained a superseding indictment … . A jury trial on the superseding indictment ensued; however, after the jury was impaneled and sworn, defendant’s motion for a mistrial was granted. The People subsequently […]

,

THE PURPORTED WAIVER OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE WAS NOT IN WRITING AS REQUIRED BY GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 17-103, PLAINTIFF’S BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION IS TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Friedman, determined that, because the defendant’s (CFA’s) purported waiver of the statute of limitations defense was not in writing as required by General Obligations Law 17-103, plaintiff’s breach of contract action was time-barred: To govern the … “subtle interplay . . . between the freedom to contract […]

FALL FROM A FOLDED, UNSECURED A-FRAME LADDER AFTER PLAINTIFF RECEIVED AN ELECTRIC SHOCK ENTITLED PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, SUPREME COURT REVERSED, TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff, who fell from a folded, unsecured A-frame ladder after receiving an electric shock, was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. The majority distinguished a Court of Appeals decision involving a properly opened and locked A-frame ladder which […]

,

THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A HOME TO RETRIEVE A HANDGUN DEFENDANT HAD THROWN UNDER A CHAIR IN THE PRESENCE OF THE POLICE WAS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER ANY EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT, THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE OFFICER DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE DEFENDANT HAD THROWN UNDER THE CHAIR, THE EMERGENCY EXCEPTION DID NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT WAS IN CUSTODY WHEN THE OFFICER REENTERED THE HOME TO LOOK UNDER THE CHAIR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the handgun seized in a warrantless search inside a home should have been suppressed, and subsequent statements made by the defendant should have been suppressed as the fruit of the illegal search. The defendant’s psychiatrist had called the police to tell them defendant had a gun and was paranoid. The defendant […]

,

STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT WHEN HE WAS HANDCUFFED IN THE BACK SEAT OF A POLICE CAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, TANGIBLE EVIDENCE RETRIEVED AS A RESULT OF THE STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED AS WELL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined defendant’s statements, made when he was handcuffed in the back seat of a police car, should have been suppressed. Defendant had possession of a wallet and had demanded money from the owner of the wallet in exchange for its return. The owner of the wallet went to the […]

, ,

FINDING OF CIVIL CONTEMPT AGAINST THE CHAIR OF THE NYS PAROLE BOARD WAS WARRANTED, ALTHOUGH ORDERED TO CONDUCT A DE NOVO HEARING ON PETITIONER-INMATE’S APPLICATION FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE, THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE CONCLUSION THAT THE BOARD DENIED PAROLE BASED ON THE SEVERITY OF THE OFFENSE ALONE, WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE STRONG FACTORS WHICH FAVORED RELEASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Leventhal, determined that the Chair of the NYS Parole Board was properly held in contempt for failing to comply with an order granting petitioner, in inmate who had served 40 years in prison for murdering a police office, a de novo hearing on his application for parole release. The […]

,

DESPITE MOTHER’S VIOLATION OF SIX CONDITIONS OF A SUSPENDED JUDGMENT, TERMINATING HER PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF HER SPECIAL NEEDS CHILD (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, noting that mother had violated six conditions of a suspended judgment, determined it was not in the best interests of the child to terminate mother’s parental rights. The special needs child had been severely neglected by mother (medical neglect). However, mother demonstrated she genuinely loved the child and had […]

,

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF-STUDENT’S INJURIES, ANOTHER STUDENT, WHO WAS BEING CHASED BY A DOG WHICH HAD BROKEN LOOSE, RAN INTO PLAINTIFF DURING LACROSSE PRACTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the plaintiff-student’s negligent supervision action against the board of education was properly dismissed. The plaintiff was injured during lacrosse practice when a dog brought into the field area by a nonstudent broke loose and chased a student who ran into plaintiff: … [T]he defendants established …that they had no specific knowledge of […]

,

ALTHOUGH THE TOWN DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, IT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ITS SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, THE TOWN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the town’s motion for summary judgment in this sidewalk slip and fall case should not have been granted. Although the town did not have written notice of the dangerous condition, the town did not demonstrate it did not create the dangerous condition by piling snow that melted and […]

, ,

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT VIOLATED VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1141 BY MAKING A LEFT TURN IN FRONT OF PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE, DEFENDANT AVERRED PLAINTIFF WAS DRIVING TOO FAST, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident case should not have been granted. Although plaintiff made out a prima facie case, alleging the defendant, without warning, made a left turn in front of him in violation of Vehicle and Traffic law 1141, defendant raised […]

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy