You are here: / Bruce Freeman

Entries by Bruce Freeman

INJURY FROM A CHAIN-LINK FENCE AT A CONSTRUCTION SITE WHICH BLEW OVER ONTO PLAINTIFFS NOT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1) OR 241 (6); QUESTIONS OF FACT RE: LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action. Plaintiffs were injured when a chain link fence blew over on them, an incident not covered by Labor Law 240 (1) or 241 (6). However, there were questions of fact […]

,

TWO YOUNG MEN DID NOT REALIZE THE CONCRETE THEY WERE MOVING WAS A CESSPOOL COVER; ONE FELL IN AND THE OTHER JUMPED IN TO RESCUE HIM; BOTH DIED FROM CHEMICAL ASPHYXIATION; QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE COVER WAS A DANGEROUS CONDITION, WHETHER THE CESSPOOL CONTRACTOR LAUNCHED AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM AND WHETHER THE RESCUE ATTEMPT WAS FORESEEABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether the property owner (Cruzate) was negligent and whether the cesspool contractor (Port Jefferson) launched an instrument of harm. Two young men were planning to build a campfire in the backyard of a rental property owned by Cruzate. The men did not realize […]

, ,

A JUDGE HAS THE DISCRETION TO EXPUNGE A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER’S DNA RECORDS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, reversing Supreme Court determined: (1) the Executive Law pertains to the local DNA databank maintained by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME); (2) an Article 78 mandamus action seeking the expungement of the petitioner-youthful-offender’s (YO’s) DNA records from the databank was properly brought; and […]

, ,

LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WERE ISSUED ON THE LAST DAY OF THE SIX MONTHS ALLOWED BY CPLR 205 (a) TO REFILE A DISMISSED ACTION, THE MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; ARGUMENT THAT SUPREME COURT USED THE WRONG DATE TO CALCULATE THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD PROPERLY RAISED AND CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the medical malpractice/wrongful death action should not have been dismissed because the letters of administration were issued within six months of the prior dismissal. The argument that Supreme Court used the wrong date to calculate the six-month period for re-filing a lawsuit pursuant to CPLR 205 (a) could […]

DEFENDANTS BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY TERMINATING IT WITHOUT GIVING PLAINTIFF THE TIME TO CURE DEFICIENCIES CALLED FOR IN THE CONTRACT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined defendants should not have terminated plaintiff’s contract to install a heating system without giving plaintiff the time to cure deficiencies called for by the contract: … [W]e conclude that plaintiff met its initial burden of establishing that defendants failed to follow the termination for cause procedures in the contract when they, […]

PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY WITH RESPECT TO DEFENDANT HOSPITAL IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION; HOSPITAL DID NOT CONSENT TO JURISDICTION BY REGISTERING AS A FOREIGN CORPORATION; DOCTORS DID NOT CONSENT TO JURISDICTION BY BECOMING LICENSED IN NEW YORK (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the plaintiff was entitled to jurisdictional discovery with regard to a hospital defendant in this medical malpractice action. The court noted that the hospital did not consent to the general jurisdiction of New York courts by registering as a foreign corporation with the Department of State and the defendant doctors did […]

CELLINO’S PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF CELLINO & BARNES PC PROPERLY SURVIVED A MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined petitioner’s (Cellino’s) petition for dissolution of the professional corporation (Cellino & Barnes, PC) properly survived a motion for summary dismissal: … [W]e reject respondents’ [Barnes’] contention that the court erred in denying their motion insofar as it sought summary dismissal of the amended petition on the ground that dissolution would not […]

,

IN DENYING A SUPPRESSION MOTION THE JUDGE CAN CONSIDER EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PEOPLE, EVEN IF THAT EVIDENCE WAS NOT EXPRESSLY RELIED UPON BY THE PEOPLE; OBSERVATION OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A DRUG TRANSACTION PROVIDED PROBABLE CAUSE; THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT APPLIED; THE INVENTORY SEARCH WAS VALID (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s motion to suppress tangible evidence was properly denied, finding (1) the suppression court could properly consider all the evidence presented by the People, even if the evidence was not expressly relied upon by the People; (2) although the vehicle occupants were seized at the time the police approached, the officers’ prior […]

DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE FROM SIDEBAR CONFERENCES DURING JURY SELECTION DID NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined defendant’s absence from sidebar conferences did not require reversal: Defendant contends that the court violated the rule in People v Antommarchi (80 NY2d 247, 250 [1992] …) when it conducted several sidebar conferences in his absence and that reversal is required with respect to two of those conferences. We disagree with […]

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy