You are here: / Bruce Freeman

Entries by Bruce Freeman

,

THE SUPPRESSION COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY REOPENING THE SUPPRESSION HEARING AFTER THE PEOPLE HAD RESTED TO ALLOW THE PEOPLE TO PRESENT AN ADDITIONAL WITNESS; THE “ONE FULL OPPORTUNITY” DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY IN THE “PRE-RULING” STAGE OF A SUPPRESSION HEARING (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over a two-judge dissenting opinion, held the suppression court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the People to reopen the suppression hearing to present another witness after the People had rested. The court subsequently denied the motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals […]

, ,

DEFENDANT, A NONCITIZEN, WAS TOLD DURING HIS PLEA COLLOQUY THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON THE DEPORTATION-ELIGIBLE B MISDEMEANOR; WHILE THE LEAVE APPLICATION WAS PENDING THE LAW WAS CHANGED TO AFFORD A PERSON IN DEFENDANT’S POSITION THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL; THE MAJORITY UPHELD THE GUILTY PLEA; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE PLEA SHOULD NOT STAND (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a brief memorandum, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined the accusatory instrument accusing defendant of criminal contempt was sufficient and defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary. During the plea colloquy defendant, an noncitizen, was told he did not have the right to a jury trial on the deportation-eligible B misdemeanor. While […]

,

AN APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT A VEHICLE FOR ISSUES WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN A DIRECT APPEAL OR A MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION PURSUANT TO CPL 44O (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus was properly denied because the issues could have been raised in a direct appeal or in a CPL 440 motion to vacate the conviction: With regard to petitioner’s claim that, pursuant to Penal Law § 70.35, his one-year jail sentences merged with and […]

INSPECTORS HIRED TO ASSESS DAMAGE TO PROPERTY CAUSED BY HURRICANE SANDY WERE EMPLOYEES ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined inspectors hired by Partnership for Response and Recovery (PaRR) to inspect damage to property caused by Hurricane Sandy were employees entitled to Unemployment Insurance benefits: Before the inspectors were deployed to a particular disaster area, PaRR set up a field operation near the site where it distributed FEMA-issued computers and cameras […]

, ,

MORTGAGE COMPANY’S PROOF OF STANDING AND MAILING OF RPAPL 1304 NOTICE INSUFFICIENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank did not provide sufficient evidence of standing and mailing of the RPAPL 1304 notice in this foreclosure proceeding: … [T]he plaintiff failed to meet its prima facie burden of establishing that it had standing to commence this action. In support of its motion, the plaintiff relied […]

,

EVIDENCE PETITIONER HAD MADE A THREAT TO A PRISON EMPLOYEE WAS INSUFFICIENT, DETERMINATION ANNULLED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, annulling the determination, held that the evidence petitioner had made a threat was insufficient: … [W]e agree with the petitioner that the determination that he was guilty of violating prison disciplinary rule 102.10 was not supported by substantial evidence. In reviewing a prison disciplinary determination, a court’s review of the factual findings is […]

, , ,

ALTHOUGH THE JUDGMENTS WERE DOCKETED, THE DEBTOR’S NAME WAS MISSPELLED RENDERING THE LIEN INVALID; ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BELOW, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN CONSIDER AN ISSUE OF LAW WHICH COULD NOT BE AVOIDED IF IT HAD BEEN RAISED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judgment creditor, Fischer, was not entitled to priority over the respondent wife, Mayrav, who had been awarded real property owned with her husband, Julius, in divorce proceedings. Although Fisher’s judgments were docketed, Julius’s surname was spelled incorrectly, rendering the lien invalid. Although this issue had not been […]

MOTHER ALLEGED SHE MADE PAYMENTS TO THIRD PARTIES IN THIS SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING; FATHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO REIMBURSE MOTHER WITHOUT PROOF THE PAYMENTS WERE IN FACT MADE BY MOTHER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined, in this support proceeding, father’s objections should have been granted. Although mother alleged she made payments to third parties, she presented no proof of the payments. Therefore mother did not prove father owed those amounts to her: At a support violation hearing, the petitioner has the initial burden […]

PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A SECOND EXTENSION OF TIME TO SERVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE; DEFENDANT WAS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING HE RESIDED AT AN ADDRESS DIFFERENT FROM THE ADDRESS ON FILE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff was properly granted a second extension of time, in the interest of justice, to serve the summons and complaint. The court noted that defendant Ewing was estopped from contending his address was different from the address indicated in the Department of Motor Vehicles; (DMV’s) records: Ewing maintains that he should […]

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy