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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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THE WRONGFUL DEATH COMPLAINT ALLEGED PORT AUTHORITY WAS NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO INSTALL SUICIDE-PREVENTION BARRIERS ON THE GEORGE WASHINGTON BRIDGE; THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the complaint alleging the Port Authority was negligent for failure to install suicide-prevention barriers on the George Washington Bridge should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff’s decedent had jumped off the bridge. Supreme Court held the maintenance of the bridge was a governmental function and there […]

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THE POLICE WITNESSES AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING WERE NOT CREDIBLE; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND THE INDICTMENT DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Miller, determined defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted because the People’s witnesses at the suppression hearing were not credible. Therefore the People did not meet their burden to show the legality of the police conduct. The indictment was dismissed. The police witnesses […]

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A GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 349 DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICE ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SOUNDS IN TORT TRIGGERING THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that a deceptive business practice cause of action pursuant to General Business Law 349 sounds in tort. The GBL 349 cause of action against the city did not state a cause of action because no notice of claim was filed: Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201 and […]

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DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE THE PEOPLE WERE GOING TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SHE TYPED IN THE COMBINATION TO A SAFE IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM A DETECTIVE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers, determined defendant was entitled to notice that the People were going to introduce evidence that she typed in the combination of a safe in response to a request from a detective: Here, the Supreme Court erred in determining that the defendant’s act of […]

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ALTHOUGH IT APPEARS THE POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST THE DEFENDANT BEFORE THEY ENTERED THE HOME AND THEREFORE COULD HAVE GOTTEN AN ARREST WARRANT, THERE WAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION BECAUSE THE POLICE ENTERED THE HOME WITH CONSENT; DEFENSE COUNSEL ARGUED THE POLICE DID NOT GET A WARRANT TO DELAY THE ATTACHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND PROCURE STATEMENTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers raising a question of first impression, determined the police did not violate the New York Constitution when they entered the home looking for defendant and made a warrantless arrest. The police had probable cause when they went to the home and defense counsel argued they […]

DEFENDANT, AT THE PLEA PROCEEDINGS, WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION TO BE IMPOSED OR THE MAXIMUM WHICH COULD BE IMPOSED; GUILTY PLEA VACATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, noted County Court did not specify the period of postrelease supervision which would be imposed, or the maximum which could be imposed at the plea proceedings: “‘[A] trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the […]

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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RESTORE THE FORECLOSURE ACTION TO THE CALENDAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; ABSENT SPECIFIC AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES PLAINTIFF BANK NEED NOT PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY AND CONTRACTUAL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, determined plaintiff’s motion to restore the matter to the calendar should have been granted and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. The court noted that defendant had not waived the defense of standing but plaintiff submitted sufficient proof of standing and held […]

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SURROGATE’S COURT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO APPROVE, NUNC PRO TUNC, A METHOD OF SERVICE ON AN OUT-OF-STATE PARTY ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT PRIOR COURT APPROVAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Duffy, in a matter of first impression, determined Surrogate’s Court had the authority to approve, nunc pro tunc, service upon an out-of-state party by a method which was not in compliance with the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (SCPA). Here the attempts at service which complied with […]

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THE PETITIONER, A PROBATIONARY POLICE OFFICER CHALLENGING HIS TERMINATION, RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT IN THIS ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING; THEREFORE THE SUMMARY DETERMINATION PURSUANT TO CPLR 409 WAS NOT AVAILABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined this Article 78 proceeding reviewing the termination of a probationary police officer (Lake) involved questions of fact rendering a summary determination pursuant to CPLR 409(b) improper: Since Lake submitted sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the reasons put forth by the Town were […]

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