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PLAINTIFF HUSBAND IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION INSTALLED SPYWARE WHICH INTERCEPTED DEFENDANT WIFE’S PHONE CALLS AND THEN DESTROYED THE CONTENTS OF THE INTERCEPTION; THE INTERCEPTION VIOLATED DEFENDANT WIFE’S ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE; SANCTIONS FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE PROPERLY INCLUDED STRIKING THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AND ATTORNEY’S FEES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff husband in this divorce action was properly sanctioned for spoliation of evidence by striking from the complaint the causes of action seeking spousal support, equitable distribution and attorney’s fees. The husband had installed spyware which allowed interception of defendant wife’s phone calls. Evidence of what was intercepted was destroyed. It […]

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE DEFERRED TO THE NYC BOARD OF STANDARDS AND APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF AN AMBIGUOUS ZONING RESOLUTION WHICH ALLOWED THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 55 STORY CONDOMINIUM BUILDING; THE BUILDING IS COMPLETE AND THE DOCTRINE OF MOOTNESS APPLIES TO PRECLUDE THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should have deferred o the judgment of the NYC Board of Standards and Appeals (BSA) which allowed the construction of a 55 story condominium building. At issue was an ambiguous Zoning Resolution and the relationship between zoning lots and […]

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CARRIER PROPERLY ORDERED TO PAY FOR CLAIMAINT’S PAIN TREATMENT WITH MEDICAL MARIJUANA (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a comprehensive opinion by Justice Egan, determined the Workers’ Compensation Board properly issued a variance allowing coverage for medical marijuana for treatment of claimant’s pain. The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here. The carrier’s federal conflict preemption and statutory (Public Health Law) exemption arguments were rejected: “The federal preemption […]

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PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION STEMMING FROM PFOA CONTAMINATION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION DID NOT APPLY; QUESTIONS OF FACT RAISED ABOUT THE DUTY OF CARE, PROXIMATE CAUSE, PRIVATE NUISANCE, TRESPASS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiffs’ complaint in this PFOA contamination case properly survived defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not apply, defendant owed plaintiffs a duty of care, defendant did not demonstrate it did not proximately cause the alleged injuries, there was a question of fact […]

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ALTHOUGH THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW GAVE THE DECEDENT’S DAUGHTER THE AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE NURSING HOME’S ADMISSION AGREEMENT ON BEHALF OF HER FATHER, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DID NOT GIVE HER THE AUTHORITY TO SIGN A BINDING ARBITRATION AGREEMENT ON HER FATHER’S BEHALF; THEREFORE THE DECEDENT’S WIFE WAS NOT BOUND BY THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN HER SUIT AGAINST THE NURSING HOME (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff wife’s adult daughter had the authority, pursuant to the Public Health Law, to execute the nursing home’s admission agreement on behalf of plaintiff’s husband (her father), who was deemed incapable of making health-care related decisions. In addition to the admission agreement, plaintiff’s daughter signed a binding arbitration […]

PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; THE ROPE AND FRAME USED TO PREVENT A HEAVY OBJECT FROM FALLING WHEN PLAINTIFF DETACHED IT FROM THE WALL DID NOT WORK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff was struck by a 200 pound fire damper when it fell from the wall. A co-worker was holding a rope tied to the damper and looped over a temporary frame. When plaintiff […]

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION–A STEEP EMBANKMENT NEXT TO A GRASSY WALKWAY–SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE SAFE BY THE INSTALLATION OF A RAILING OR BARRIER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, over a dissent, determined the defendant property owner’s (COU’s) motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. COU owned a campground for developmentally disabled persons. Plaintiff, a developmentally disabled adult, slipped on a narrow grassy […]

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ALLEGED ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT DID NOT WARRANT SETTING ASIDE THE OVER $21 MILLION VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict based upon the conduct of plaintiff’s counsel should not have been granted in this medical malpractice action. Plaintiff suffered a brain injury rendering him unable to take care of himself and was awarded over $21 million: … [W]e conclude that the […]

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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA WAS MADE PURSUANT TO CPL 220.60, NOT CPL 330.30; THEREFORE THE “OUTSIDE THE RECORD” EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED; MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing County Court and remitting the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, determined defendant’s motion was made pursuant to CPL 220.60, not CPL 330.30. Therefore the evidence submitted by the defendant demonstrating his innocence of the charged crime could properly be considered. County Court had not considered the motion because the supporting […]

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THE ROBBERY COULD NOT BE COMMITTED WITHOUT COMMITTING THE ASSAULT; ASSAULT COUNT DISMISSED AS MULTIPLICITOUS; ISSUE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s assault first conviction, determined the robbery first and assault first counts were multiplicitous. The redundant count was dismissed in the interest of justice (error was not preserved): “An indictment is multiplicitous when two separate counts charge the same crime” … . “Multiplicity does not exist where each count requires proof […]

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