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VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER AND ASSAULT CONVICTIONS DISMISSED AS INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS OF AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOMICIDE AND AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR ASSAULT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined several counts should have been dismissed as inclusory concurrent counts in this vehicular homicide prosecution: … [D]efendant’s convictions for vehicular manslaughter in the first degree, reckless driving and driving while intoxicated under counts 7, 12, 13 and 14 of the indictment must be dismissed as inclusory concurrent counts of his convictions […]

THE PROCESS SERVER DID NOT TIMELY FILE PROOF OF SERVICE; THEREFORE SERVICE ON DEFENDANT WAS NEVER COMPLETE AND THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS A NULLITY; SUPREME COURT CAN CURE THE NONJURISDICTIONAL DEFECT BY ORDERING DEFENDANT TO BE SERVED AND THE DEFENDANT MAY THEN INTERPOSE AN ANSWER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the default judgment was a nullity because the process server did not timely file the affidavit of service. The defect is not jurisdictional and can be cured. But the default judgment cannot be reinstated retroactively. Once properly served the defendant may submit an answer: … [P]laintiff’s process server […]

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD A GOOD FAITH BELIEF THAT HE OWNED THE LAND WHERE TREES WERE HARVESTED; THEREFORE THE ISSUE WHETHER THE TREBLE DAMAGES ASPECT OF RPAPL 861 APPLIES MUST BE DETERMINED AT TRIAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined there was a question of fact whether defendant had a good faith belief that the land on which trees were harvested was his own property. Therefore whether plaintiff was entitled to treble damages pursuant to Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 861 must be determined at trial: “[T]he current version […]

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THE MILD PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE ARBITRATOR ON AN EMPLOYEE WHO SEXUALLY HARASSED A FELLOW EMPLOYEE VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY; MATTER REMITTED FOR IMPOSITION OF A PENALTY BY A NEW ARBITRATOR (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the mild penalty imposed by the arbitrator in this place-of-employment sexual harassment case violated public policy. The matter was remitted for imposition of a penalty by a different arbitrator. The employee, Dominie, committed several egregious acts of sexual harassment targeting another employee which led to his pleading guilty to harassment second […]

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THE ACTION CONTESTING THE AMENDMENT TO THE BY-LAWS OF A NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION WHICH OWNS RECREATIONAL LAND AND COLLECTS DUES FROM LOT OWNERS MUST BE BROUGHT AS AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING, NOT AN ACTION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT; THE ACTION IS THEREFORE TIME-BARRED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the amendment to the by-laws defendant not-for-profit corporation which owns land underneath a man-made lake must be contested in an Article 78 action, not a declaratory judgment action. Therefore the four-month Article 78 statute of limitations applied and the action was time-barred. The underlying dispute involved the assessment […]

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THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES’ AMENDMENT TO AN INSURANCE REGULATION DESIGNED TO PROTECT CONSUMERS OF LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITY PRODUCTS IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Egan, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Department of Financial Services’ (DFS’s) amendment to an Insurance Regulation was void for vagueness: The amendment was promulgated to address concerns with respect to the growing complexities involved with life insurance and annuity products, the corresponding need for consumers to […]

PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A PIECE OF SHEETROCK, THE LADDER HE WAS STANDING ON SHOOK, AND PLAINTIFF FELL TO THE GROUND; THERE WAS NO NEED TO PROVE THE LADDER WAS DEFECTIVE; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been granted, Plaintiff stood on an A-frame ladder while attempting to put up a piece of sheetrock on the ceiling. His arm which was holding up the sheetrock became tired, the sheetrock […]

PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR ACCESS TO RESPONDENT’S NEIGHBORING PROPERTY PURSUANT TO RPAPL 881 SHOIULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; MATTER REMITTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER LESS INTRUSIVE METHODS FOR ROOF PROTECTION OF RESPONDENT’S PROPERTY COULD BE USED TO FACILITATE FACADE WORK ON PETITIONER’S BUILDING (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined all the relevant factors had not been considered when granting petitioner’s application for access to respondent’s neighboring property to install roof and terrace protection related to work on the facade of petitioner’s building. The matter was remitted for a determination whether less intrusive methods of roof protection could […]

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THE PROCESS SERVER IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION MET THE DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS OF CPLR 308 (4); THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction should not have been granted. The process server for the bank in this foreclosure action satisfied the due diligence requirement for service pursuant to CPLR 308 (4): There were four attempts to serve the defendants at their residence at […]

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DETERMINED DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAIVED DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY MOVE FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS DISPOSITIVE AND NEVER LITIGATED; THE BANK’S FAILURE TO TIMELY MOVE FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3215 (C) REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE BANK’S ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff-bank’s failure to move for a default judgment within one year required dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c). The court noted that Supreme Court should not have, sua sponte, held defendant waived dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c) because the issue had never been litigated: […]

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