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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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A GRADUATE OF AN ANTIGUA MEDICAL SCHOOL WHO HAD PASSED THE US MEDICAL LICENSING EXAMINATION WAS NOT ENTITLED TO LICENSURE AS A PHYSICIAN’S ASSISTANT IN NEW YORK (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the appellant, who graduated from a medical school in Antigua (AUA) but was not licensed in New York, was not entitled to a license to practice in New York as a Physician’s Assistant (PA): In processing his application, SED [NYS Department of Education] requested documentation from petitioner that he had graduated […]

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IN ORDER TO DIRECT A DEFENDANT TO INSTALL AN IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE, THE DEFENDANT MUST BE SENTENCED TO A PERIOD OF PROBATION OR A CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant could not be directed to install an ignition interlock device in the absence of a sentence to probation or a conditional discharge. Matter remitted for resentencing: Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193(1)(b)(ii) provides that the court shall “sentence such person convicted of . . . a violation […]

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MOTHER FAILED TO APPEAR IN THE PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE FATHER’S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY; THE PETITION WAS GRANTED; BUT NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED ON WHETHER MODIFICATION WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN; MOTHER’S MOTION TO VACATE THE ORDER GRANTING FATHER’S PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the judge should not have granted father’s petition for a modification of custody upon mother’s failure to appear. No evidence was taken on whether modification was in the best interests of the children. Mother’s motion to vacate the order should have been granted: “A custody determination, whether made […]

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PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THEY WERE OVERWHELMED BY THE DOCUMENTS THEY SIGNED AND DID NOT REALIZE THE DOCUMENTS TRANSFERRED THEIR PROPERTY TO DEFENDANT; THOSE ALLEGATIONS DID NOT SUPPORT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFFS’ FAVOR ON THEIR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND QUIET TITLE CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on their actions for fraudulent inducement, unjust enrichment and to quiet title should not have been granted. Plaintiffs alleged the were overwhelmed by the number of documents to sign and did not realize they documents transferred the property to the defendant: … [T]he […]

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PLAINTIFF OFFERED NO EXPLANATION FOR THE SEVEN-YEAR DELAY BETWEEN THE ORDER OF REFERENCE AND THE MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND SALE; THE ACCRUAL OF INTEREST DURING THE DELAY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLLED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the defendant was prejudiced by the unexplained seven-year delay between the order of reference in 2009 and the motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale in 2016, Therefore the accrual of interest during the delay should have been tolled: … [A]pproximately seven years elapsed between the […]

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THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE DESTROYED THE UNDERGROUND OIL TANKS WHICH WERE ALLEGED TO HAVE LEAKED, CONTAMINATING PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY; HOWEVER THE DEFENDANT OIL COMPANIES DID NOT DEMONSRTATE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TANKS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE A DEFENSE; THEREFORE AN ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION, NOT THE STRIKING OF THE COMPLAINT, WAS THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the plaintiff should have preserved the underground oil tanks which allegedly leaked and contaminated plaintiff’s property, but that striking the complaint was not warranted under the doctrine of spoliation. Because the defendants did not demonstrate the destruction of the tanks made it impossible to mount a […]

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BECAUSE THE PRIOR FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF STANDING, THE PRIOR ACTION DID NOT ACCELERATE THE DEBT; THEREFORE DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE INSTANT ACTION WAS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that the defendant in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate the foreclosure action was time barred. The initial foreclosure action was dismissed for lack of standing. Therefore the debt was not accelerated by the prior action: Since the prior action was dismissed for lack of standing, [defendant] failed to establish that […]

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ALTHOUGH THE LOAN SERVICER’S AFFIDAVIT MAY HAVE LAID A PROPER FOUNDATION FOR THE DOCUMENTS DEMONSTRATING DEFENDANTS’ DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE DOCUMENTS THEMSELVES WERE NOT PRODUCED, RENDERING THE AFFIDAVIT INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank in this foreclosure action did not prove defendants’ default. The affidavit from the loan servicer may have laid a proper foundation for the relevant documents, but the business records themselves were not attached: Even assuming that the subject affidavit established a sufficient foundation for the records […]

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THE STIPULATION ACKNOWLEDGING THE PRIOR DEBT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE DEED TRANSFERRING THE PROPERTY CREATED ONLY A SECURITY INTEREST AND DID NOT TRANSFER LEGAL TITLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the transfer of property by deed did not transfer title, but rather was a security interest for a loan (a mortgage): … [T]he … deed never conveyed legal title to the plaintiff, but merely created a security interest in the subject property. “A deed conveying real property, […]

QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS INSTRUCTED TO WORK ONLY ON GROUND LEVEL AND NOT TO USE STILTS, AND WHETHER THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS PLAINTIFF’S CONTINUED USE OF THE STILTS AFTER HE FELT THEM BECOME UNSTABLE, PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact which precluded summary judgment on plaintiff’s Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Apparently, plaintiff fell while using stilts. There was a question of fact whether plaintiff’s boss told him to work only on ground level without stilts. And there was a […]

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