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PLAINTIFF ALLEGED A DEFECTIVELY MAINTAINED AND/OR INSTALLED TRAFFIC SIGNAL ALLOWED A SIGNAL HEAD IN EACH DIRECTION TO SHOW A GREEN LIGHT, THEREBY CAUSING THE INTERSECTION COLLISION; ALTHOUGH THE TOWN DEMONSTRATED A LACK OF NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE TRAFFIC SIGNAL, THE PLAINTIFF RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ON THE “FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE INTERSECTION IN A SAFE CONDITION” AND “CREATION OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION” CAUSES OF ACTION, AND THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION WAS SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court and reinstating the complaint, determined the complaint and bill of particulars sufficiently alleged negligence and questions of fact were raised about whether the county failed to properly maintain a traffic signal and created a dangerous condition. The plaintiff alleged a pipe holding the traffic signal broke allowing it […]

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CONFLICTING EVIDENCE OF THE CAUSES OF CLAIMANT’S HEARING LOSS DID NOT SUPPORT THE MEDICAL EXPERTS’ CONCLUSIONS THAT THE LOSS WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE OPERATION OF HEAVY MACHINERY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the conflicting evidence of the causes of claimant’s hearing loss did not support the experts’ conclusions that the hearing loss was “likely” caused by exposure to noise from the operation of heavy equipment: … [T]he medical opinion evidence on the issue of causation need not be […]

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WITH RESPECT TO A RESIDENTIAL COOPERATIVE, INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS CAN BE SUED BY A SHAREHOLDER FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, BUT THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IS NOT AMENABLE TO SUIT APART FROM A SUIT AGAINST THE CORPORATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Scarpulla, determined the board of directors of a residential cooperative is not amenable to a lawsuit separate and apart from a suit against the cooperative. Here plaintiff shareholder sued the board of directors for breach of fiduciary duty after the dismissal of a […]

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IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT SUIT AGAINST THE COUNTY ALLEGING NEGLIGENT PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE, THE COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS ENTITLED TO GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IMMUNITY OR IMMUNITY PURSUANT TO THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county did not have immunity in this Child Victims Act lawsuit alleging negligent foster-care placement of plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged she was sexually abused by her foster father in the late 70’s: “The governmental function immunity defense provides immunity for the exercise of discretionary authority during the performance […]

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IN RESPONSE TO PETITIONER’S FOIL REQUESTS, THE TOWN DID NOT CITE ANY EXEMPTION FOR THE IDENTIFIED RECORDS WHICH WERE NOT PRODUCED AND DID NOT CERTIFY THOSE RECORDS DID NOT EXIST; IN ADDITION THE TOWN DID NOT EXPLAIN THE REASONS FOR THE REDACTIONS IN THE PRODUCED RECORDS; ALL IN VIOLATION OF THE PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW; MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court and remitting the matter, determined that the respondent town did not explain its failure to produce the determinations made in 51 of the 54 appeals identified in response to the petitioner’s FOIL request and did not explain the reasons for redactions made in the records which were provided: […]

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ENGAGING IN COUNSELING SHOULD NOT BE A CONDITION OF VISITATION; THE COURT SHOULD NOT DELEGATE ITS AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE IF AND WHEN VISITATION SHOULD OCCUR TO A COUNSELOR (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, modifying Family Court, determined father should not have been directed to engage in counseling as a condition of visitation Family Court shouild not have delegated its authority to the counselor to determine when visitation should resume: It is well settled that ” ‘[a]lthough a court may include a directive to obtain counseling […]

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WITH RESPECT TO THE MANNER IN WHICH WORK IS PERFORMED, A GENERAL CONTRACTOR’S LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE STEMS FROM THE EXERCISE OF SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY; INFORMING THE WORKER OF WHAT WORK SHOULD BE DONE, MONITORING THE TIME AND QUALITY OF THE WORK, ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH SAFETY REGULATIONS, AND HAVING THE AUTHORITY TO STOP WORK FOR SAFETY REASONS, DO NOT AMOUNT TO THE EXERCISE OF “SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY” (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendant general contractor’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence causes of action should have been granted because defendant did not exercise supervisory authority over plaintiff’s work. The Fourth Department took pains to describe what does not constitute the exercise of supervisory authority: … […]

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PETITIONER’S SISTER ACTED AS AGENT FOR THEIR DECEASED MOTHER; PETITIONER’S STANDING TO SEEK AN ACCOUNTING PURSUANT TO THE GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE PRINCIPAL’S DEATH (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined that petitioner had standing to seek an order pursuant to General Obligations Law 5-1510 directing the respondent, petitioner’s sister, to provide a copy of all bank statements, receipts, disbursements and transactions entered into by the respondent while acting as agent for the parties’ deceased mother. Contrary to the […]

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BASED UPON AN INTERPRETATION OF THE CLASS-ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THE ISSUE, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT UNCLAIMED SETTLEMENT FUNDS CAN BE REDISTRIBUTED TO THE OTHER CLASS MEMBERS, REJECTING DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENT THAT ANY UNCLAIMED FUNDS SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THEM (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Fisher, determined Supreme Court properly ruled that unclaimed checks payable to class members as part of a class action settlement can be redistributed to the other class members. The ruling was based upon an interpretation of the settlement agreement which did not specifically address the “unclaimed […]

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THE CONFLICTING EXPERT REPORTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CAUSED SERIOUS INJURY DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S PREEXISTING CONDITIONS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Michael, determined Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment on the question whether plaintiff’s decedent, Kenneth Moore, suffered “serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law 5102(d) in a traffic accident. The conflicting expert evidence raised questions of fact about whether the accident exacerbated preexisting conditions, including […]

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