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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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THE INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE IN THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT DID NOT INCLUDE “UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR” LANGUAGE INDICATING THE WAIVER OF THE “AMERICAN RULE” REQUIRING EACH PARTY TO PAY THAT PARTY’S OWN ATTORNEY’S FEES; PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES ASSOCIATED WITH DEFENDANT’S UNSUCCESSFUL DISSOLUTION ACTION (CT APP).

​The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, reversing the appellate division, determined the indemnification clause in the partnership agreement did not serve to waive the “American Rule” that each party is responsible for that party’s own attorney’s fees. The indemnification clause states: “The Partnership and the other Partners shall be indemnified […]

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​ AN AMENDED REGULATION DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF LIFE-INSURANCE AND ANNUITY CONSUMERS IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS AND WAS PROPERLY CRAFTED AND ISSUED BY THE NYS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, reversing the appellate division, determined an amended regulation designed to protect the interests of life-insurance and annuity consumers was not void for vagueness and was properly crafted and issued by the NYS Department of Financial Services (DFS): The amendment addressed concerns that the purchase […]

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THE ALTERNATE JURORS WERE DISCHARGED JUST PRIOR TO THE LUNCH BREAK; A PROBLEM WITH A SITTING JUROR AROSE DURING THE BREAK AND THE JUROR WAS REMOVED; DELIBERATIONS HAD NOT YET BEGUN BUT THE ALTERNATE JURORS WERE NO LONGER AVAILABLE FOR SERVICE; THE JUDGE THEREFORE SHOULD NOT HAVE RECALLED ONE OF THE ALTERNATE JURORS; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, reversing the appellate division and ordering a new trial, determined that once the alternate jurors were discharged they were not longer “available for service.” Therefore, the judge should not have seated one of the discharged alternate jurors after a trial juror was removed for […]

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DISNEY WAS DEDUCTING ROYALTY PAYMENTS MADE BY AFFILIATES WHICH DID NOT PAY NEW YORK TAXES; THE TAX LAW WAS DESIGNED TO PLUG THAT “LOOPHOLE” AND THE DEDUCTIONS WERE PROPERLY DISALLOWED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Fisher, determined the Tax Law did not permit petitioner to deduct royalty payments made by affiliates organized under the law of foreign countries pursuant to intellectual-property licensing agreements. The opinion is too detailed and comprehensive to be fairly summarized here: Essentially, the petitioner was deemed to […]

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DESPITE THE DRIVER’S FAILURE TO USE A TURN SIGNAL AS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE TRAFFIC STOP, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION ON THE GROUND THE STOP WAS ACTUALLY BASED UPON RACIAL PROFILING; IN THE FIRST DEPARTMENT THE “TURN SIGNAL” GROUND FOR THE STOP WOULD BE ENOUGH, EVEN IF THE STOP WAS ACTUALLY MOTIVATED BY DISCRIMINATION; NOT SO IN THE THIRD DEPARTMENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lynch, disagreeing with the First Department, determined defendant was entitled to a hearing on his motion to vacate his conviction on the ground the traffic stop was motivated by racial profiling. The traffic stop was justified by the driver’s failure to use a […]

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NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S (DOE’S) DENIALS OF PETITIONERS’ APPLICATIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE CITY’S SPECIALIZED HIGH SCHOOLS (SHS’S) WERE NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, determined the NYC Department of Education’s (DOE’s) denials of petitioners’ applications for admission to NYC’s Specialized High Schools (SHS’s) were not arbitrary and capricious. The opinion includes a detailed history of the SHS’s and detailed explanations of the criteria for admission of students deemed to […]

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THE EVIDENCE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING A MODIFICATION OF THE CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT, FAMILY COURT REVERSED (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, revering Family Court, determined the evidence did not demonstrate a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of the custody arrangement: The father’s primary contention was that the change in his work schedule constituted a sufficient change in circumstances. In that regard, at the time that the 2016 order was entered, […]

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THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT FAMILY COURT’S SUA SPONTE FINDING THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES, I.E., A BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MOTHER AND FATHER, WARRANTING A MODIFICATION OF THE CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT AND AWARDING SOLE CUSTODY TO MOTHER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, found there had been a change in circumstances, i.e., a breakdown in communication between mother and father,  justifying awarding sole custody to mother. The evidence did not support the finding that communication had broken down: … Family Court erred in determining […]

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THE PLEADINGS ALLEGED THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE HOSPITAL’S “AGENTS AND EMPLOYEES” AND PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT POINTED TO THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF THE EMERGENCY ROOM PHYSICIAN WHO TREATED PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT; THEREFORE THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE HOSPITAL WOULD BE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE EMERGENCY ROOM PHYSICIAN’S ACTS OR OMISSIONS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether the defendant hospital was vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of the emergency room doctor, Vaugeois, who treated plaintiff’s decedent. Although the complaint did not name Vaugeois as a defendant, the pleadings alleged the negligence of defendant’s agents and employees: […]

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THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO CURE THE OMISSION OF THE “PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE” REQUIREMENT IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE; THE AMENDMENT WAS NOT PALPABLY DEVOID OF MERIT AND WOULD NOT PREJUDICE THE CITY DEFENDANT; PLAINTIFF DID NOT NEED TO PRESENT ANY PROOF ON THE ISSUE; THEREFORE THE AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED ON THE GROUND THE PROOF SUBMITTED WAS INSUFFICIENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff should have been allowed to amend the complaint to cure a pleading omission in this slip and fall case. The complaint did not allege the defendant city had written notice of the sidewalk condition which allegedly caused plaintiff’s fall. The amendment sought to cure the omission. The […]

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