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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE TOWN DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE DEFECT AND THE TOWN DEMONSTRATED THE “CREATION OF THE DEFECT” EXCEPTION TO THE WRITTEN-NOTICE REQUIREMENT DID NOT APPLY; THE DEFECT WAS THE RESULT OF DETERIORATION OF THE REPAIRED AREA OVER A 10-YEAR PERIOD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the town demonstrated it did not create the sidewalk condition which allegedly caused plaintiff’s slip and fall. Rather the sidewalk repair was done by the town 10 years ago and the current deteriorated condition had developed over time: The Court of Appeals “has recognized only two exceptions to […]

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THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE PRECLUDED MOTHER FROM BRINGING FURTHER PETITIONS WITHOUT COURT APPROVAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have precluded mother from filing petitions for custody of a family offense without the court’s permission: … [T]he provisions of the order … directing the mother to seek permission from the court before filing any additional petitions, whether for custody or alleging a […]

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PETITIONER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE COUNTY IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner in this slip and fall case should not have been allowed file a late notice of claim. The fact that county personnel responded to the scene of her injuries did not demonstrate the county had timely knowledge of the potential lawsuit. The late notice was served 50 […]

FAILURE TO INCLUDE ALL THE INFORMATION REQUIRED BY LIEN LAW 201 IN THE NOTICE OF SALE DID NOT WARRANT CANCELLATION OF THE LIENS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the deficiencies in the notice of sale did not warrant cancellation of the liens: Pursuant to Lien Law § 201-a, within 10 days after service of a notice of sale, the owner or any person entitled to notice may commence a special proceeding to determine the validity […]

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​ IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE BANK FAILED TO PROVE DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT (EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN REPLY NOT CONSIDERED) AND THE BANK FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE IT NOTIFIED A TENANT OF THE FORECLOSURE AS REQUIRED BY RPAPL 1303 (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank (Merrill Lynch) in this foreclosure action failed to prove defendant’s default and failed to notify a tenant on the property of the foreclosure. The bank’s attempt to prove the default in reply papers was rejected: Merrill Lynch failed to submit admissible evidence establishing the defendant’s default. […]

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REPEATED FAILURES TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS WITH NO EXCUSE WARRANTED STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants’ failure to comply with discovery orders justified striking the answer: Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the defendants’ answer. The defendants’ willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from their […]

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THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE ALLONGE, A SEPARATE PAPER, WAS FIRMLY ATTACHED TO THE NOTE, AS REQUIRED BY THE UCC; THEREFORE THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank did not demonstrate standing to bring the foreclosure action: … [T]he plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it had standing to commence the action based on its annexation of the note to the summons and complaint, since the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the purported […]

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THE BANK INCLUDED OTHER NOTICES WITH THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT, A VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATE ENVELOPE RULE (RPAPL 1304) (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank included other notice with the notice of default, a violation of RPAPL 1304 (the separate envelope rule): “[P]roper service of RPAPL 1304 notice on the borrower or borrowers is a condition precedent to the commencement of a residential foreclosure action” … . Here, the defendants established, […]

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ALTHOUGH THE FAILURE TO FILE PROOF OF SERVICE IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT AND CAN BE CURED SUA SPONTE, HERE THE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT PROPERLY SEEK LEAVE TO EXCUSE THE FAILURE AND THE JUDGE DID NOT GRANT PLAINTIFFS LEAVE TO FILE A LATE PROOF OF SERVICE; THE SERVICE WHICH WAS ALLOWED TO STAND BY THE JUDGE WAS THEREFORE A NULLITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not granted plaintiffs leave to file late proof of service on defendant Joffe. Plaintiffs offered no excuse for the failure: Supreme Court granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for a declaration that Joffe was properly served with process pursuant to CPLR 308(2) […]

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY (PANYNJ) WAS THE LESSOR OF THE PROPERTY WHERE PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED IN THIS LABOR LAW 241(6) ACTION, IT WAS AN “OWNER” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LABOR LAW AND, THEREFORE, WAS A PROPER DEFENDANT; ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS NOT AT THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, SHE WAS IN AN AREA USED TO CREATE MATERIALS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, WHICH IS COVERED BY THE LABOR LAW (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ), although the lessor of the property where plaintiff was injured in this Labor Law 241 (1) action, was an “owner” within the meaning of the Labor Law and therefore was a proper defendant. Although plaintiff was not injured at […]

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