You are here: / Bruce Freeman

Entries by Bruce Freeman

, ,

THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF COLLATERAL TO THE MAJORITY LENDERS WERE NOT DISTRIBUTED TO THE MINORITY LENDERS IN THE MANNER REQUIRED BY THE CREDIT AND SECURITY AGREEMENTS IN THIS PRIVATE FORECLOSURE; THE MINORITY LENDERS’ BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, determined the breach of contract claims by the minority lenders against the majority lenders and a collateral agent should not have been dismissed. Collateral was sold to the majority lenders but the proceeds were not distributed to the minority lenders in the […]

,

THE HANDWRITTEN ADDITION TO THE PRINTED CONTRACT IS PRESUMED TO EXPRESS THE LATEST INTENTION OF THE PARTIES; HERE THE ENTRY CREATED AMBIGUITY IN THE “NO DAMAGES FOR DELAY” CLAUSE REQUIRING DISCOVERY (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a handwritten entry in a printed contract is presumed to express the latest intention of the parties and created ambiguity requiring discovery: The subcontractor agreement between plaintiff and defendant JDS Construction Group LLC contains clauses precluding damages for delay. It also provides that if plaintiff’s work was “delayed […]

,

PERMIT/ORDER ALLOWING DEVELOPMENT OF MARINAS ON LOWER SARANAC LAKE IN THE ADIRONDACK PARK ANNULLED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Adirondack Park Agency (APA), in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Ceresia, determined that the APA misapplied its wetlands regulations in issuing a permit for the development of marinas on Lower Saranac Lake in the Adirondack Park. The permit/order was therefore annulled. The opinion is too detailed and comprehensive to fairly […]

, , ,

A JUDGE MAY NOT ORDER THAT ONLY THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD (AFC), AND NOT THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, IS ALLOWED TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF SURRENDER OR ADOPTION WITH THE CHILD; SUCH AN ORDER INTERFERES WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S STATUTORY DUTIES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court in a matter of first impression in this neglect proceeding, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, determined Family Court could not order the petitioner (Delaware County Department of Social Services) to refrain from discussing matters of surrender or adoption with the child. The attorney for the child (AFC) […]

,

PETITIONER OPERATED HIS BARBER SHOP OUT OF HIS HOME IN MARCH 2020 AFTER THE GOVERNOR ORDERED BARBER SHOPS CLOSED DUE TO COVID-19; REVOCATION OF PETITIONER’S BARBER LICENSES WAS DEEMED TOO SEVERE A PENALTY; THERE WAS A DISSENT (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined the revocation of petitioner’s barber operator license and barber shop license was too severe a penalty for violating the state’s COVID-19 policy in early 2020. After the governor ordered barber shops closed due to COVID, petitioner opened his barber shop in his home in March 2020. He closed his […]

,

EVIDENCE OF NEGLECT BASED UPON ALCOHOL USE WAS INSUFFICIENT; THE BASIS WAS OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS OF THE CHILD WHICH WERE NOT CORROBORATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined the evidence of father’s neglect based upon alcohol use was insufficient: … [A] preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding of neglect based on the father’s alcohol use or on any prior incidents of domestic abuse, as those findings were based on out-of-court statements of […]

, ,

THE INJURED PARTY WAS STRUCK WITH A BATON IN AN ALTERCATION OUTSIDE A BAR; IT WAS ALLEGED THE INJURY WAS ACCIDENTAL; THE INSURER SOUGHT A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT RE: THE OBLIGATION TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE INCIDENT FELL OUTSIDE THE COVERAGE OF THE POLICY (NO DISCLAIMER REQUIRED) OR WHETHER THE INCIDENT WAS SUBJECT TO A POLICY EXCLUSION (TIMELY DISCLAIMER REQUIRED) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether the disclaimer by the insurer, Mapfre, was required and/or timely in this personal injury case. In the midst of some sort of altercation outside a bar, Groskopf was struck with a baton by Edward Ferrall. Edward Ferrall claimed he did not intend […]

,

DEFENDANT’S CAR WAS STRUCK BY AN ONCOMING CAR WHICH CROSSED A DOUBLE YELLOW LINE; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this traffic accident case, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment, based on the emergency doctrine, should have have been granted. A car traveling in the opposite direction crossed a double yellow line into the path of defendant’s car: Pursuant to the emergency doctrine, “those faced with a sudden […]

,

THE ALLEGATION THE CAR IN FRONT MADE A SUDDEN STOP DOES NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT IN A REAR-END COLLISION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the allegation plaintiff made a sudden stop in this rear-end collision case did not raise a question of fact about whether there was a non-negligent cause for the traffic accident: … [T]he plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that her vehicle […]

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy