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PLAINTIFF IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) ACTION WAS STRUCK BY A PIPE WHICH FELL AS IT WAS BEING HOISTED FROM A TRUCK; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ADD THE VIOLATION OF ADDITIONAL INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISIONS TO THE BILL OF PARTICULARS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ summary judgment motion in this Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) action should not have been granted and plaintiff’s motion to amend the bill of particulars should have been granted. Plaintiff was unloading pipes from a flatbed truck when a pipe which was being lifted by an excavator […]

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE POLICE OFFICER ACTED IN RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO MAKE A U-TURN TO PURSUE A VEHICLE AND STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S CAR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants in this police-car traffic accident case did not demonstrate the defendant officer (Hughes) did not act with reckless disregard for the safety for the safety of others when he attempted a U-turn and struck plaintiff’s car: “Conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and […]

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AN AFFIDAVIT FROM A WITNESS TO THIS REAR-END TRAFFIC ACCIDENT STATING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS BACKING UP AT THE TIME DEFENDANT’S CAR STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S RAISED ONLY A QUESTION OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPARATIVE FAULT WHICH WILL NOT DEFEAT PLANTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this rear-end traffic accident case should have been granted. The affidavit of a witness stating that plaintiff was backing up when defendant’s car struck it raised an issue of comparative negligence, which is no longer a bar to summary judgment: “A driver […]

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A JUDGE HAS DISCRETION TO DENY A MOTION FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THE CAUSE OF ACTION HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO BE VIABLE; HERE THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT, WHICH ARE DEEMED ADMITTED, STATED A VIABLE CAUSE OF ACTION AND THE MOTION FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in a case related to Aleyne v Rutland Dev. Group, Inc.,2023 NY Slip Op 00975, Second Dept 2-22-23 (also summarized in the Digest), determined plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment in this action to set aside a deed as forged should have been granted: … [T]he plaintiff correctly contends that the […]

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AN “INTEREST OF JUSTICE” EXTENSION OF TIME TO SERVE A DEFENDANT HAS DIFFERENT CRITERIA THAN A “GOOD CAUSE” EXTENSION; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s request for more time to serve the defendant in this foreclosure action should have been granted. The different criteria for an “interest of justice” versus a “good cause” request for an extension is explained: Pursuant to CPLR 306-b, a court may, in the exercise of its discretion, […]

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IF PLAINTIFF MOVED FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ACTION TO SET ASIDE A DEED PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE HAD TO PROVE THE DEED WAS FORGED; TO WIN A MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THE DEFENDANT MUST UTTERLY REFUTE PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION THE DEED WAS FORGED WHICH DEFENDANT FAILED TO DO HERE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s (Golden Bridge’s) motion to dismiss this action to set aside a deed (allegedly forged) should not have been granted. The decision clearly lays out the subtle but crucial differences in proof requirements between a defendant’s motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence and a a plaintiff’s motion […]

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DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE ANSWER DESPITE THE FAILURE TO MAKE A PRE-ANSWER MOTION TO DISMISS; THE DEFENDANT GETS A SECOND CHANCE TO ADD AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IF THE COURT GRANT’S LEAVE TO AMEND (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant in this foreclosure action should have been allowed to amend the answer: … Supreme Court … should not have denied that branch of the defendant’s cross-motion which was for leave to amend his answer to assert an affirmative defense alleging lack of compliance with the condition precedent […]

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PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL EXPLAINED THAT THE RETURN DATE FOR DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS MISCALEDARED AS THE DATE FOR SUBMISSION OF OPPOSITION PAPERS; IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to vacate the order granting summary judgment to defendant in this slip and fall case. Plaintiff’s counsel explained that the return date had been mistakenly calendared as the date for the submission of opposition papers: In order to vacate […]

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IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT LAWSUIT ALLEGING PLAINTIFF WAS ABUSED BY A SCHOOL JANITOR, THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW 413 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE THE JANITOR WAS NOT “A PERSON LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE” FOR PLAINTIFF’S CARE; THEREFORE THE SCHOOL HAD NO DUTY TO REPORT THE ABUSE PURSUANT TO THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the Social Services Law cause of action in this Child Victims Act complaint should have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged she was abused by a school janitor and the defendant school violated Social Services Law 413 by not reporting the abuse. Social Services Law 413 applies only to […]

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THE TENANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE RELIEF WAS SOUGHT AFTER THE DEADLINE IN THE NOTICE TO CURE; THAT DEADLINE WAS CONTROLLED BY THE LEASE AND THEREFORE WAS NOT EXTENDED BY THE COVID-RELATED EXECUTIVE ORDERS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the tenant was not entitled to a Yellowstone injunction because the relief was not sought before the deadline in the notice to cure, which is controlled by the lease. The time-limit extensions in response to COVID do not apply to the notice-to-cure deadline which is contractual: … [T]he […]

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