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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED; HER TESTIMONY ABOUT HER ALLEGED CONDUCT AT THE INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION (IME) WOULD HAVE BEEN CUMULATIVE AND DEFENDANTS COULD NOT SHOW THE IME WAS COMPROMISED IN ANY WAY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s counsel should not have been disqualification based upon her alleged interference with the independent medical examination (IME). Defendants did not demonstrate counsel’s testimony concerning the IME was necessary, given the plaintiff’s and physician’s ability to testify: … [D]isqualification is required “only where the testimony by the attorney […]

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THE ASSAULT SECOND CONVICTION WAS REVERSED BECAUSE PROOF A BAMBOO STICK WAS A “DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT” WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT; ASSAULT THIRD CONVICTION VACATED AS AN INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNT OF ASSAULT SECOND (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the assault second conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence that a bamboo stick was a “dangerous instrument:” The defendant … contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support her convictions of assault in the second degree pursuant to Penal Law § 120.05(2) … and criminal possession of a […]

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THIS FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING WAS REMITTED TO FAMILY COURT; APPELLATE REVIEW WAS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF FINDINGS OF FACT ADDRESSING CONFLICTING EVIDENCE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, remitting the matter to Family Court in this family offense proceeding, noted that appellate review was impossible without findings of fact: The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the hearing court, and that court’s determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to […]

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MEDICAL RECORDS DEMONSTRATED THE NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE A SEVERED NERVE; THEREFORE THE MEDICAL FACILITY WAS DEEMED TO HAVE HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE MALPRACTICE CLAIM; THE PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND SERVE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition to file a late notice of claim in this medical malpractice action should have been granted. The medical facilities’ (NHCC’S) failure to diagnose a severed nerve was apparent from the medical records. Therefore NHCC had timely notice of the nature of the claim: Medical records can […]

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​THE ARBITRATOR’S AWARD OF EXCESSIVE ATTORNEY’S FEES WAS IRRATIONAL AND WARRANTED VACATION OF THE ENTIRE ARBITRATION AWARD (SECOND DEPT),

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the attorney’s fee awarded by the arbitrator was excessive and warranted vacation of the entire arbitration award: … [T]he arbitrator’s excessive award of attorneys’ fees in the sum of $11,307 was irrational because it was not supported by any proof. The arbitrator issued an award in the petitioner’s […]

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DID NOT SIGN THE NOTE, HE WAS A TITLE-HOLDER AND WAS LISTED AS A BORROWER ON THE MORTGAGE; THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE IN ACCORDANCE WITH RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant Kalenborn was entitled to the RPAL 1304 notice of foreclosure even though he did not sign the note. Kalenborn held title to the property and was listed as a “borrower” on the mortgage: … [D]efendants established that the plaintiff failed to serve Douglas Kalenborn with notice pursuant […]

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​ PLAINTIFF IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE WAS MAILED TO DEFENDANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate the notice of foreclosure was mailed to defendant in accordance with the requirements of RPAPL 1304: … [T]he plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it strictly complied with RPAPL 1304 … . The plaintiff did not submit proof of […]

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HERE THE LEASE MADE THE OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD RESPONSIBLE FOR STRUCTURAL REPAIRS AND MADE THE THE TENANT RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL NON-STRUCTURAL REPAIRS; THE CRACKED STEP WAS NOT A STRUCTURAL DEFECT; THE FACT THAT THE LANDLORD WAS AWARE OF THE DEFECT WAS IRRELEVANT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant out-of-possession landlord’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted. The court noted that if, due to the provisions of the lease, an out-of-possession landlord is not responsible for the repair of a defect, the fact that the landlord had notice […]

THE TRANSFER OF REAL PROPERTY TO DECEDENT’S CHILDREN WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF ATTORNEY; THE TRANSFER WAS COMPENSATION FOR CARE, NOT A GIFT; THE DISSENT ARGUED THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TRANSFER WAS A GIFT AND THE POWER OF ATTORNEY DID NOT AUTHORIZE GIFTS (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, over a dissent, determined that the transfer of real property to decedent’s children as compensation for the care given decedent was allowed under the operative power of attorney. The power of attorney did not include the power to make gifts. The dissent argued there was a question of fact whether the […]

THE PLAINTIFF, AFTER ASSIGNING HIS RIGHTS TO A STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT IN RETURN FOR LUMP SUM PAYMENTS, COULD NOT SUE THE INSURER PAYING THE SETTLEMENT ANNUITY FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE ASSIGNMENT, WHICH WAS PROHIBITED BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT; PLAINTIFF UNSUCCESSFULLY ARGUED THE INSURER’S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO HIS ASSIGNMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS CONSTITUTED A BREACH OF AN IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, over an extensive dissent, determined that the plaintiff, Cordera, who had received a settlement award for lead poisoning, could not sue the insurer for failing to stop him from “selling” the rights to his 30-years-of-monthly-settlement-payments worth about $950,000 for about $270,000. The transactions were […]

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