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A LETTER FROM AN ATTORNEY THREATENING LITIGATION CAN CONSTITUTE “RETALIATION” AGAINST THOSE WHO MAKE HOUSING DICSRIMINATION COMPLAINTS PURSUANT TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, reversing the Appellate Division, determined a letter sent by an attorney for the landlord, Pine Ridge, to the respondent CityVision, a not-for-profit corporation which tests whether housing facilities engage in discrimination, constituted “retaliation” against those who make discrimination complaints. Here a CityVision employee, Renner, posed […]

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PARTIAL PAYMENT OF A DEBT WITHIN THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD MAY REVIVE OR TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ACTION BASED UPON THE DEBT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this suit against his employer seeking payment for work performed raised a question of fact whether the statute of limitations was revived by defendants’ partial payment: There is a “long-standing common law rule” that partial payment of a debt, if made under “circumstances from which a […]

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DEFENDANT LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY’S FAILURE TO UPDATE ITS ADDRESS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS ON FILE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TEN YEARS WAS NOT A REASONABLE EXCUSE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant limited liability company’s (FAC’s) failure to update its address for service of process on file with the Secretary of State was not a reasonable excuse sufficient to defeat a motion for leave to enter a default judgment: Generally, a corporation’s failure to receive copies of process served […]

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AS LONG AS PLAINTIFF TAKES SOME ACTION THAT WOULD LEAD TO ENTRY OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR AND NINETY DAYS OF THE DEFAULT, THE ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the sua sponte dismissal of the foreclosure complaint, noted that as long as a plaintiff initiates some action for the entry of judgment within one year and ninety days after a default, the action should not be dismissed as abandoned. Here the plaintiff made a request for judicial intervention within one […]

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THE SEARCH WARRANT SEEKING CELL SITE LOCATION INFORMATION (CSLI) FROM THE NEW JERSEY CELL PHONE COMPANY WAS FAXED TO NEW JERSEY FROM NEW YORK; THEREFORE THE WARRANT WAS “EXECUTED” IN NEW YORK AND DID NOT VIOLATE THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION OR CPL ARTICLE 690 (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice LaSalle, determined the search warrant for cell site location information (CSLI) was executed in New York, where the warrant was faxed from, not in New Jersey, where the T-Mobile records were located. Therefore there was no violation of the New York Constitution or Criminal Procedure Law […]

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THE STATEMENT GIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT WHEN HE WAS UNDER MEDICATION AT THE HOSPITAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; AT TRIAL THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REJECT THE STATEMENT IF THEY FOUND IT WAS INVOLUNTARILY MADE; AND THE DEFENSE BATSON CHALLENGE TO THE EXCLUSION OF FOUR AFRICAN-AMERICAN PROSPECTIVE JURORS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined: (1) the statement given by the defendant when he was under medication at the hospital should have been suppressed; (2) at trial the judge should have instructed the jury to reject the statement if they found the statement was not voluntarily made; and (3) the defense Batson challenge […]

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THE APPELLANT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER SHE WAS SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT ENTITLING HER TO A HEARING (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the appellant had raised a question of fact about whether she was served with the summons and complaint requiring a hearing: Here, the process server’s affidavit of service, in which he averred that he personally served the appellant, constituted prima facie evidence of valid service pursuant to CPLR […]

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RESPONDENT MATERNAL UNCLE IN THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING DID NOT EFFECTIVELY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL; ORDER REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court in this custody action, determined respondent uncle did not waive his right to counsel: Here, the maternal uncle had a statutory right to the assistance of counsel because he was a respondent in a child custody proceeding … . Although the record demonstrates that, at an appearance on the […]

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DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE WAS PREMATURE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case was premature and should have been denied: A motion for summary judgment may be denied as premature where it appears that the facts essential to oppose the motion exist but cannot then be stated (see CPLR 3212[f] […]

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THE REPEAL OF THE EMERGENCY OR DISASTER TREATMENT PROTECTION ACT (EDTPA) WAS NOT RETROACTIVE; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S NURSING HOME WAS IMMUNE FROM SUIT STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S DEATH FROM COVID-19 (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the repeal of the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act (EDTPA) in April 2021 was not retroactive. Therefore defendant’s nursing home was immune from suit stemming from plaintiff’s decedent’s death from COVID-19. Although the Act does not confer immunity from gross negligence, gross negligence was not demonstrated because the Department of […]

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