Page 988 – New York Appellate Digest

/ Attorneys, Criminal Law, Trespass

FAILURE TO REQUEST THAT THE JURY BE CHARGED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE EVIDENCE OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE WAS WEAK, THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE WAS PLAUSIBLE, AND THE SENTENCING DISPARITY WAS ENORMOUS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defense counsel’s failure to ask that the jury be charged with the lesser included offense of trespass in this burglary prosecution constituted ineffective assistance. The court noted that, because defendant was a persistent violent felony offender he faced a minimum sentence of 16 to life on the burglary conviction, but a trespass conviction would entail only one year in jail. The evidence that defendant intended to steal something was weak, the mistaken-identification defense put forth by defense counsel was weak, so trespass would have been a viable alternative for the jury:

In deciding whether to ask for submission of the lesser included offense, defense counsel was obligated to consider the possible consequences of that decision for his client. The defendant was a persistent violent felony offender who, upon his conviction of burglary in the second degree (see Penal Law § 70.02[1][b]), faced a minimum sentence of 16 years to life imprisonment… . By contrast, upon conviction of criminal trespass in the second degree, which, like the remaining charge, criminal mischief in the fourth degree, was a class A misdemeanor, the defendant faced a maximum of one year in jail. That is not to say that counsel would have been required to argue the lesser included offense in summation, but it was not reasonable for counsel to deprive the jury of the opportunity to consider it … . Given the weakness of the mistaken-identification defense, the plausibility of the lesser included offense, and the enormous sentencing disparity between a burglary conviction and a criminal trespass conviction, counsel’s failure to request submission of the lesser included offense cannot be considered part of a legitimate all-or-nothing strategy. Under the circumstances, counsel’s failure to request submission of the lesser included offense deprived the defendant of his right to meaningful representation … . People v Orama, 2018 NY Slip Op 00571, Second Dept 1-31-18

CRIMINAL LAW (ATTORNEYS, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, FAILURE TO REQUEST THAT THE JURY BE CHARGED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE EVIDENCE OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE WAS WEAK, THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE WAS PLAUSIBLE, AND THE SENTENCING DISPARITY WAS ENORMOUS (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, FAILURE TO REQUEST THAT THE JURY BE CHARGED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE EVIDENCE OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE WAS WEAK, THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE WAS PLAUSIBLE, AND THE SENTENCING DISPARITY WAS ENORMOUS (SECOND DEPT))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO REQUEST THAT THE JURY BE CHARGED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE EVIDENCE OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE WAS WEAK, THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE WAS PLAUSIBLE, AND THE SENTENCING DISPARITY WAS ENORMOUS (SECOND DEPT))/LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES (INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, FAILURE TO REQUEST THAT THE JURY BE CHARGED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE EVIDENCE OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE WAS WEAK, THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE WAS PLAUSIBLE, AND THE SENTENCING DISPARITY WAS ENORMOUS (SECOND DEPT))

January 31, 2018

/ Criminal Law, Evidence

DEFENDANT’S ATTEMPTED ASSAULT CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the attempted assault conviction was against the weight of the evidence:

The only witness who identified the defendant prior to trial admitted to being intoxicated at the time of the stabbing incident. That witness failed to identify the defendant at trial. Although the People presented the testimony of three other witnesses who identified the defendant at the trial, those witnesses did not identify the defendant at any point prior to the trial, even though they were present at the scene of the crime when the defendant was apprehended and they appeared at a police precinct for questioning later that day. Two of the witnesses’ descriptions of the perpetrator’s clothing varied significantly from the clothing worn by the defendant upon his apprehension, which occurred within minutes of the incident. At the scene, those witnesses provided no further description of the defendant. Despite testimony that the victim began “gush[ing]” blood after he was stabbed during a physical struggle, the arresting officer did not remember having seen any blood on the defendant’s person or clothing when he was apprehended. That police officer testified that, after witnesses pointed to the perpetrator, he briefly “lost sight” of that person before apprehending the defendant. People v Serrano, 2018 NY Slip Op 00573, Second Dept 1-31-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, DEFENDANT’S ATTEMPTED ASSAULT CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT’S ATTEMPTED ASSAULT CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))/WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT’S ATTEMPTED ASSAULT CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT))

January 31, 2018

/ Criminal Law, Evidence, Landlord-Tenant, Trespass

ONCE THE LOCKS ON THE APARTMENT WERE CHANGED PURSUANT TO A LEGAL POSSESSION, DEFENDANT NO LONGER HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS BEDROOM, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGAL POSSESSION WAS ILLEGAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SEEK SUPPRESSION OF THE FIREARMS FOUND IN HIS BEDROOM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Cohen, in a matter of first impression, determined the defendant did not have standing to move to suppress firearms found in his bedroom in an apartment. Defendant had been living with the family who leased the apartment. Based on failure to pay rent, the marshal changed the locks, leaving the possessions inside, thereby tendering “legal possession” of the apartment to the landlord. Answering a complaint of trespass, police officers entered the apartment and found one of the family members who had been renting it inside. The police searched the apartment and seized several handguns in defendant’s room. The defendant argued that the People did not demonstrate the eviction (legal possession) had been done legally, and therefore he had standing to move to suppress. But the Second Department noted that defendant, who had relied on the evidence presented by the People, did not demonstrate the eviction (legal possession) was illegal and therefore did not meet his burden of proof on that issue. The defendant also argued that he had an expectation of privacy in the bedroom at the time it was searched. But the Second Department determined once the legal possession was accomplished, defendant had no right to enter the apartment, and therefore had no expectation of privacy in his former bedroom:

… [T]he defendant, to establish his standing, relied on the evidence presented by the People regarding the execution of the warrant of eviction…. [W]hile the defendant is correct that the “Marshal’s Legal Possession” letter did not establish that the legal possession had been obtained legally, it likewise did not establish that the legal possession had been obtained illegally.

… [T]he defendant failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that he had standing to challenge the search of his former bedroom and seizure of the guns and ammunition based upon the alleged illegality of the legal possession … . * * *

Here, the legal possession gave the landlord the right to possess the apartment and remove the tenants and occupants. Although their belongings remained in the apartment, thereby necessarily creating a bailment, the tenants and occupants no longer had a legal right to possess or control the subject apartment, nor to enter or remain therein. Given that the defendant had no legal right to possess or control the subject apartment after the landlord was given legal possession thereof, any subjective expectation of privacy he manifested in the bedroom which he had occupied in the apartment was not objectively reasonable … . People v McCullum, 2018 NY Slip Op 00570, Second Dept 1-31-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SUPPRESSION, ONCE THE LOCKS ON THE APARTMENT WERE CHANGED PURSUANT TO A LEGAL POSSESSION, DEFENDANT NO LONGER HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS BEDROOM, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGAL POSSESSION WAS ILLEGAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SEEK SUPPRESSION OF THE FIREARMS FOUND IN HIS BEDROOM (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, SUPPRESSION, ONCE THE LOCKS ON THE APARTMENT WERE CHANGED PURSUANT TO A LEGAL POSSESSION, DEFENDANT NO LONGER HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS BEDROOM, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGAL POSSESSION WAS ILLEGAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SEEK SUPPRESSION OF THE FIREARMS FOUND IN HIS BEDROOM (SECOND DEPT))/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (CRIMINAL LAW, SUPPRESSION, ONCE THE LOCKS ON THE APARTMENT WERE CHANGED PURSUANT TO A LEGAL POSSESSION, DEFENDANT NO LONGER HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS BEDROOM, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGAL POSSESSION WAS ILLEGAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SEEK SUPPRESSION OF THE FIREARMS FOUND IN HIS BEDROOM (SECOND DEPT))/STANDING (CRIMINAL LAW, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, SUPPRESSION, ONCE THE LOCKS ON THE APARTMENT WERE CHANGED PURSUANT TO A LEGAL POSSESSION, DEFENDANT NO LONGER HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS BEDROOM, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGAL POSSESSION WAS ILLEGAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SEEK SUPPRESSION OF THE FIREARMS FOUND IN HIS BEDROOM (SECOND DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (LEGAL POSSESSION, CRIMINAL LAW, ONCE THE LOCKS ON THE APARTMENT WERE CHANGED PURSUANT TO A LEGAL POSSESSION, DEFENDANT NO LONGER HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS BEDROOM, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGAL POSSESSION WAS ILLEGAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SEEK SUPPRESSION OF THE FIREARMS FOUND IN HIS BEDROOM (SECOND DEPT))/LEGAL POSSESSION (LANDLORD-TENANT, ONCE THE LOCKS ON THE APARTMENT WERE CHANGED PURSUANT TO A LEGAL POSSESSION, DEFENDANT NO LONGER HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS BEDROOM, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGAL POSSESSION WAS ILLEGAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SEEK SUPPRESSION OF THE FIREARMS FOUND IN HIS BEDROOM (SECOND DEPT))/EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY (CRIMINAL LAW, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ONCE THE LOCKS ON THE APARTMENT WERE CHANGED PURSUANT TO A LEGAL POSSESSION, DEFENDANT NO LONGER HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS BEDROOM, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGAL POSSESSION WAS ILLEGAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SEEK SUPPRESSION OF THE FIREARMS FOUND IN HIS BEDROOM (SECOND DEPT))/EVICTION (CRIMINAL LAW, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, LEGAL POSSESSION, ONCE THE LOCKS ON THE APARTMENT WERE CHANGED PURSUANT TO A LEGAL POSSESSION, DEFENDANT NO LONGER HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS BEDROOM, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGAL POSSESSION WAS ILLEGAL, DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SEEK SUPPRESSION OF THE FIREARMS FOUND IN HIS BEDROOM (SECOND DEPT))

January 31, 2018

/ Civil Procedure, Foreclosure

FILING A 90 DAY NOTICE AND THEN DISCONTINUING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION IN 2014 DID NOT REVOKE THE ELECTION TO ACCELERATE REPRESENTED BY THE FILING OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IN 2008, FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the foreclosure action was untimely. The summons and complaint operated to accelerate the debt, triggering the six-year statute of limitations. The fact that the plaintiff bank filed a 90-day notice within the six years and then subsequently discontinued the foreclosure action did not revoke the election to accelerate:

The filing of the summons and complaint seeking the entire unpaid balance of principal in the prior foreclosure action constituted a valid election by the plaintiff to accelerate the maturity of the debt… . This established that the mortgage debt was accelerated on April 11, 2008, and that the applicable six-year statute of limitations had expired by the time the plaintiff commenced the instant action on July 8, 2014 … .

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether it affirmatively revoked its election to accelerate the mortgage debt within the six-year limitations period … . The plaintiff voluntarily discontinued the prior foreclosure action on April 23, 2014, after the statute of limitations had expired, and it failed to demonstrate that its April 8, 2014, 90-day notice, as a matter of law, “destroy[ed] the effect of the sworn statement that the plaintiff had elected to accelerate the maturity of the debt” … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Adrian, 2018 NY Slip Op 00543, Second Dept 1-31-18

FORECLOSURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FILING A 90 DAY NOTICE AND THEN DISCONTINUING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION IN 2014 DID NOT REVOKE THE ELECTION TO ACCELERATE REPRESENTED BY THE FILING OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IN 2008, FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FILING A 90 DAY NOTICE AND THEN DISCONTINUING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION IN 2014 DID NOT REVOKE THE ELECTION TO ACCELERATE REPRESENTED BY THE FILING OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IN 2008, FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (FORECLOSURE, FILING A 90 DAY NOTICE AND THEN DISCONTINUING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION IN 2014 DID NOT REVOKE THE ELECTION TO ACCELERATE REPRESENTED BY THE FILING OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IN 2008, FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT))

January 31, 2018

/ Landlord-Tenant

TENANT’S MOTHER HAD SUCCESSION RIGHTS TO A RENT STABILIZED APARTMENT PURSUANT TO THE RENT STABILIZATION CODE AND PUBLIC HOUSING LAW, NYS DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL HAD MISINTERPRETED THE APPLICABLE CODE PROVISION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Hall, determined the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) misinterpreted the Rent Stabilization Code when it found that the tenant’s (Scherley’s) mother (Marie) did not have succession rights in a rent stabilized apartment. Mare had lived in the apartment with Scherley since 2003. Scherley was the named tenant on the lease and Marie was listed as an occupant. Scherley moved out in 2008 when she got married but she continued to pay the rent, executed a renewal lease, and Marie continued to live there:

We can discern no reason why the DHCR would intend to deny succession rights to a family member who had been residing in a unit for a long period of time merely because there was a period of time when the named tenant no longer resided there but still maintained some connection to the property. In this case, it is undisputed that Marie would have been entitled to succession if she had sought it immediately after her daughter moved out of the apartment in 2008. We see no rational reason to treat her differently solely because the named tenant later executed a renewal lease and continued to pay the rent while no longer residing there. We thus conclude that this was not the intent of the DHCR in promulgating the regulation. Matter of Jourdain v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 2018 NY Slip Op 00556, Second Dept 1-31-18

LANDLORD-TENANT (RENT STABILIZATION CODE, TENANT’S MOTHER HAD SUCCESSION RIGHTS TO A RENT STABILIZED APARTMENT PURSUANT TO THE RENT STABILIZATION CODE AND PUBLIC HOUSING LAW, NYS DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL HAD MISINTERPRETED THE APPLICABLE CODE PROVISION (SECOND DEPT))/RENT STABILIZATION CODE (TENANT’S MOTHER HAD SUCCESSION RIGHTS TO A RENT STABILIZED APARTMENT PURSUANT TO THE RENT STABILIZATION CODE AND PUBLIC HOUSING LAW, NYS DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL HAD MISINTERPRETED THE APPLICABLE CODE PROVISION (SECOND DEPT))/PUBLIC HOUSING LAW (RENT STABILIZATION CODE, TENANT’S MOTHER HAD SUCCESSION RIGHTS TO A RENT STABILIZED APARTMENT PURSUANT TO THE RENT STABILIZATION CODE AND PUBLIC HOUSING LAW, NYS DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL HAD MISINTERPRETED THE APPLICABLE CODE PROVISION (SECOND DEPT))/SUCCESSION RIGHTS (RENT STABILIZATION CODE, TENANT’S MOTHER HAD SUCCESSION RIGHTS TO A RENT STABILIZED APARTMENT PURSUANT TO THE RENT STABILIZATION CODE AND PUBLIC HOUSING LAW, NYS DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL HAD MISINTERPRETED THE APPLICABLE CODE PROVISION (SECOND DEPT))

January 31, 2018

/ Appeals, Contract Law, Landlord-Tenant

CLAUSE IN THE COMMERCIAL LEASES WHICH WAIVED THE AVAILABILITY OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AND EXTENDED TO PRECLUDE THE AVAILABILITY OF A YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION IN THIS LEASE TERMINATION PROCEEDING, WHETHER WAIVER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined the waiver-of-declaratory-relief clause in the commercial leases was enforceable and precluded both the plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action and the availability of a Yellowstone injunction (which would have stayed termination of the lease while the merits are considered). Although not raised below, the appellate court had the authority to consider whether the waiver violated public policy (no public policy violation found). The plaintiffs’ (tenants’) declaratory judgment and Yellowstone injunction actions were in response to the landlord’s notice to cure, which gave the tenants’ 15 days to cure certain alleged lease violations before termination of the leases. The waiver clause included a statement that the parties intended all disputes to be dealt with in summary proceedings:

Paragraph 67(H) in the rider of each lease provided that the tenant: “waives its right to bring a declaratory judgment action with respect to any provision of this Lease or with respect to any notice sent pursuant to the provisions of this Lease. Any breach of this paragraph shall constitute a breach of substantial obligations of the tenancy, and shall be grounds for the immediate termination of this Lease. It is further agreed that in the event injunctive relief is sought by Tenant and such relief shall be denied, the Owner shall be entitled to recover the costs of opposing such an application, or action, including its attorney’s fees actually incurred, it is the intention of the parties hereto that their disputes be adjudicated via summary proceedings.” * * *

… “[W]here a contract provision is arguably void as against public policy, that issue may be raised for the first time at the Appellate Division by a party, or by the court on its own motion” … . We therefore reach the merits of the public policy issue raised on appeal. * * *

Here, the parties were sophisticated entities that negotiated at arm’s length and entered into lengthy and detailed leases defining each party’s rights and obligations with great apparent care and specificity. 159 MP Corp. v Redbridge Bedford, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 00537, Second Dept 1-31-18

LANDLORD-TENANT (DECLARATORY RELIEF, YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION, CLAUSE IN THE COMMERCIAL LEASES WHICH WAIVED THE AVAILABILITY OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AND EXTENDED TO PRECLUDE THE AVAILABILITY OF A YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION IN THIS LEASE TERMINATION PROCEEDING, WHETHER WAIVER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (LANDLORD-TENANT, LEASES, DECLARATORY RELIEF, YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION, CLAUSE IN THE COMMERCIAL LEASES WHICH WAIVED THE AVAILABILITY OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AND EXTENDED TO PRECLUDE THE AVAILABILITY OF A YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION IN THIS LEASE TERMINATION PROCEEDING, WHETHER WAIVER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION (LANDLORD-TENANT, CLAUSE IN THE COMMERCIAL LEASES WHICH WAIVED THE AVAILABILITY OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AND EXTENDED TO PRECLUDE THE AVAILABILITY OF A YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION IN THIS LEASE TERMINATION PROCEEDING, WHETHER WAIVER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (WAIVER, LANDLORD-TENANT, CLAUSE IN THE COMMERCIAL LEASES WHICH WAIVED THE AVAILABILITY OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AND EXTENDED TO PRECLUDE THE AVAILABILITY OF A YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION IN THIS LEASE TERMINATION PROCEEDING, WHETHER WAIVER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/COMMERCIAL LEASES (WAIVER OF DECLARATORY RELIEF, YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION, CLAUSE IN THE COMMERCIAL LEASES WHICH WAIVED THE AVAILABILITY OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AND EXTENDED TO PRECLUDE THE AVAILABILITY OF A YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION IN THIS LEASE TERMINATION PROCEEDING, WHETHER WAIVER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/WAIVERS (LANDLORD-TENANT, COMMERCIAL LEASES, CLAUSE IN THE COMMERCIAL LEASES WHICH WAIVED THE AVAILABILITY OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AND EXTENDED TO PRECLUDE THE AVAILABILITY OF A YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION IN THIS LEASE TERMINATION PROCEEDING, WHETHER WAIVER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CONTRACT LAW, PUBLIC POLICY, CLAUSE IN THE COMMERCIAL LEASES WHICH WAIVED THE AVAILABILITY OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AND EXTENDED TO PRECLUDE THE AVAILABILITY OF A YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION IN THIS LEASE TERMINATION PROCEEDING, WHETHER WAIVER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/PUBLIC POLICY (APPEALS, CONTRACTS, CLAUSE IN THE COMMERCIAL LEASES WHICH WAIVED THE AVAILABILITY OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AND EXTENDED TO PRECLUDE THE AVAILABILITY OF A YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION IN THIS LEASE TERMINATION PROCEEDING, WHETHER WAIVER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))

January 31, 2018

/ Insurance Law, Municipal Law, Vehicle and Traffic Law

VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 370 DID NOT EXEMPT COUNTY FROM PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR PERSONS DRIVING COUNTY CARS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county was obligated to provide uninsured motorist coverage to respondent, who was injured by an uninsured driver while driving a county car. The county argued it was exempt from providing uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law 370:

“[T]he Legislature has specifically declared its grave concern that motorists who use the public highways be financially responsible to ensure that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents be recompensed for their injuries and losses'” … . Thus, although the Legislature authorized municipalities to be self-insured pursuant to the exception in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 370(1), it did not exculpate them from the responsibility of providing uninsured motorist protection … . Matter of County of Suffolk v Johnson, 2018 NY Slip Op 00552, Second Dept 1-31-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (INSURANCE LAW, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 370 DID NOT EXEMPT COUNTY FROM PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR PERSONS DRIVING COUNTY CARS (SECOND DEPT))/INSURANCE LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 370 DID NOT EXEMPT COUNTY FROM PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR PERSONS DRIVING COUNTY CARS (SECOND DEPT))/UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE (MUNICIPAL LAW, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 370 DID NOT EXEMPT COUNTY FROM PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR PERSONS DRIVING COUNTY CARS (SECOND DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, INSURANCE LAW, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 370 DID NOT EXEMPT COUNTY FROM PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR PERSONS DRIVING COUNTY CARS (SECOND DEPT))

January 31, 2018

/ Landlord-Tenant, Negligence

ALTHOUGH THE OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS WERE OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPAIRS, THEY DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT CREATE THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION AND DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF IT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant out-of-possession landlord’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted. Although the lease obligated defendants to make repairs, defendants established they did not create the alleged hazardous condition and did not have actual or constructive notice of it:

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when he tripped and fell off of the front stoop of a house that he was renting from the defendants, who owned the house. The plaintiff testified at a deposition that, as he exited the house, he stepped out onto the landing, and then down one stair. When he realized that he forgot to lock the interior door to the house, he stepped back onto the landing and attempted to open the outer door to the house. He alleged that the outer door extended beyond the edge of the landing, which made it difficult to stand on the landing and open the door at the same time. He further alleged that, as he tried to open the outer door, he lost his footing and began to fall. He grabbed the handrail to stop his fall, but the handrail broke.

“An out-of-possession landlord that has assumed the obligation to make repairs to its property cannot be held liable for injuries caused by a defective condition at the property unless it either created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it” … . Amster v Kromer, 2018 NY Slip Op 00538, Second Dept 1-31-18

NEGLIGENCE (ALTHOUGH THE OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS WERE OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPAIRS, THEY DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT CREATE THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION AND DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF IT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (LANDLORD-TENANT, ALTHOUGH THE OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS WERE OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPAIRS, THEY DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT CREATE THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION AND DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF IT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (SLIP AND FALL, ALTHOUGH THE OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS WERE OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPAIRS, THEY DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT CREATE THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION AND DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF IT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD (SLIP AND FALL, ALTHOUGH THE OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS WERE OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPAIRS, THEY DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT CREATE THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION AND DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF IT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

January 31, 2018

/ Criminal Law, Evidence

INTENT REQUIREMENT OF ATTEMPTED GRAND LARCENY DOES NOT ATTACH TO THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY, GRAND LARCENY COUNTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OR REDUCED BASED ON THE GRAND JURY EVIDENCE WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THE INTENT TO STEAL PROPERTY OF A CERTAIN VALUE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the attempted grand larceny counts should not have been dismissed or reduced based upon the grand jury evidence. The defendant was attempting to remove mail from a mailbox in which envelopes containing money orders had been planted by the police. There was no evidence any of the envelopes defendant had removed contained the planted money orders. The motion court reduced the grand larceny counts because it could not be proven defendant intended to steal property of a certain value. The First Department held that the intent requirement does not attach to the value element of the offense:

The court erred in dismissing one count of the indictment, and reducing another, on the ground that the People were required to present proof of intent with regard to the property value elements of attempted grand larceny in the third and fourth degrees. These elements are strict liability aggravating factors when the completed crimes are charged. While the Penal Law definitions of attempt (Penal Law § 110.00) and intentionally (Penal Law § 15.05[1]) may be susceptible to the interpretation accorded them by the motion court, any ambiguity has been resolved by the Court of Appeals’ holding in People v Miller (87 NY2d 211 [1995]), that a strict liability aggravating factor of a completed crime is not a “result” to which an intent requirement attaches when an attempt to commit the completed crime is charged. Accordingly, the mental culpability requirements for an attempt and a completed crime are identical… , and the court erred in finding that the attempted grand larceny charges required evidence of intent to steal property of a certain value. People v Deleon, 2018 NY Slip Op 00531, First Dept 1-30-18

CRIMINAL LAW (INTENT REQUIREMENT OF ATTEMPTED GRAND LARCENY DOES NOT ATTACH TO THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY, GRAND LARCENY COUNTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OR REDUCED BASED ON THE GRAND JURY EVIDENCE WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THE INTENT TO STEAL PROPERTY OF A CERTAIN VALUE (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (ATTEMPTED GRAND LARCENY, INTENT REQUIREMENT OF ATTEMPTED GRAND LARCENY DOES NOT ATTACH TO THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY, GRAND LARCENY COUNTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OR REDUCED BASED ON THE GRAND JURY EVIDENCE WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THE INTENT TO STEAL PROPERTY OF A CERTAIN VALUE (FIRST DEPT))/GRAND LARCENY (ATTEMPTED GRAND LARCENY, INTENT REQUIREMENT OF ATTEMPTED GRAND LARCENY DOES NOT ATTACH TO THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY, GRAND LARCENY COUNTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OR REDUCED BASED ON THE GRAND JURY EVIDENCE WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THE INTENT TO STEAL PROPERTY OF A CERTAIN VALUE (FIRST DEPT))/INTENT (CRIMINAL LAW, ATTEMPTED GRAND LARCENY, INTENT REQUIREMENT OF ATTEMPTED GRAND LARCENY DOES NOT ATTACH TO THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY, GRAND LARCENY COUNTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OR REDUCED BASED ON THE GRAND JURY EVIDENCE WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THE INTENT TO STEAL PROPERTY OF A CERTAIN VALUE (FIRST DEPT))

January 30, 2018

/ Negligence

DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA OF THE FALL WAS LAST CLEANED OR INSPECTED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, POINTING TO GAPS IN PLAINTIFFS’ CASE NOT ENOUGH (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment should not have been granted to defendant in this slip and fall case. The defendant did not demonstrate when the area of the fall was last cleaned or inspected. Therefore no prima facie case was made out. Reliance on gaps in plaintiffs’ case is not enough in the summary-judgment context.

In this slip and fall action, defendant sought to demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment by merely pointing to perceived gaps in plaintiffs’ case … . Defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating when the area in question was last cleaned or inspected relative to the time when plaintiff fell … . Vargas v Riverbay Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 00520, First Dept 1-30-18

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA OF THE FALL WAS LAST CLEANED OR INSPECTED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, POINTING TO GAPS IN PLAINTIFFS’ CASE NOT ENOUGH (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA OF THE FALL WAS LAST CLEANED OR INSPECTED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, POINTING TO GAPS IN PLAINTIFFS’ CASE NOT ENOUGH (FIRST DEPT))

January 30, 2018

Search Results

FAILURE TO REQUEST THAT THE JURY BE CHARGED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE EVIDENCE OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE WAS WEAK, THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE WAS PLAUSIBLE, AND THE SENTENCING DISPARITY WAS ENORMOUS (SECOND DEPT).

DEFENDANT’S ATTEMPTED ASSAULT CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).

FILING A 90 DAY NOTICE AND THEN DISCONTINUING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION IN 2014 DID NOT REVOKE THE ELECTION TO ACCELERATE REPRESENTED BY THE FILING OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IN 2008, FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

TENANT’S MOTHER HAD SUCCESSION RIGHTS TO A RENT STABILIZED APARTMENT PURSUANT TO THE RENT STABILIZATION CODE AND PUBLIC HOUSING LAW, NYS DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL HAD MISINTERPRETED THE APPLICABLE CODE PROVISION (SECOND DEPT).

VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 370 DID NOT EXEMPT COUNTY FROM PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR PERSONS DRIVING COUNTY CARS (SECOND DEPT).

ALTHOUGH THE OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORDS WERE OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPAIRS, THEY DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT CREATE THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION AND DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF IT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

INTENT REQUIREMENT OF ATTEMPTED GRAND LARCENY DOES NOT ATTACH TO THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY, GRAND LARCENY COUNTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OR REDUCED BASED ON THE GRAND JURY EVIDENCE WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THE INTENT TO STEAL PROPERTY OF A CERTAIN VALUE (FIRST DEPT).

DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA OF THE FALL WAS LAST CLEANED OR INSPECTED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, POINTING TO GAPS IN PLAINTIFFS’ CASE NOT ENOUGH (FIRST DEPT).

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